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FOREWORD
For more than a decade, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of
Excellence (CCDCOE) has been analyzing cyberwar while wishing for
cyber peace. That wish has been granted: what we have may be tumultuous, tense, and fragile, but it is peaceful. At least peaceful in the sense
of existing below the threshold of conflict and violence. Consequently,
non-war realities form the context for a vast share of our legal research.
While, for instance, the first Tallinn Manual was a book about war, Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace and Tallinn Manual 2.0, two
later publications, sought to explore the uneasy kind of peace we are
currently experiencing. This edited volume examines the rights to digital privacy and data protection in times of armed conflict while also
offering a broader perspective on the fundamental differences between
war- and peacetime thinking about cyber security and privacy. In doing
so, it critically dissects how the rules of war and peace shape the ways
our digital data is collected and utilized.
Legal writing on the relationship between international human rights
law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL) has focused mainly
on the rights that are closer to the kinetic theatre of war and thus also
to the core of IHL. Even though the majority of States and experts take
the view that both IHRL and IHL apply to cyber activities in relation to
an armed conflict, the unsettled interplay between the two has rarely
been elucidated further. Despite the militaries’ increasing dependency
on data, digital human rights are still, often reflexively, considered a
peacetime legal concern. It is tacitly assumed that, should war break out,
there would be more specific norms to rely on. Yet in fact, when it comes
to the right to privacy, IHL is surprisingly silent. This silence cannot be
deliberate, unless, of course, the laws of war were drafted by technological visionaries who foresaw the risks and opportunities that personal
data could one day entail in terms of intelligence, weaponry, or human
dignity. Therefore, building on the assumption that IHRL plays a key
role in protecting our informational privacy before, during, and after an
armed conflict, the essays in this anthology delve a great deal deeper into
the realistic remits of privacy and data protection in a military context.
The editors and authors have elegantly united two clashing discourses—that of the critical necessities of conflict and that of the peace
and freedom people seek in their daily lives. Naturally, implementing the
ideas expressed here might create short-term practical and procedural
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obstacles in planning or executing military (cyber) operations. That would
call for a sobering reassessment of how much personal data is actually
needed for any given military activity, be it the biometric identification of
prisoners of war or protected persons, the development of AI-based cyber
weapons, the preservation of evidence for postwar investigations, or the
storage of records held by international criminal tribunals. Furthermore,
hard questions must be asked, such as where the data comes from and
whether it actually provides any national security or military advantages.
But these contemplations are essential for a just and efficient military
decision-making that can keep pace with its technological environment.
The discussions in the book are as relevant to the complex balancing act between civilian normality and military necessity as they are to
data-processing practices within the military community. At their heart
is a concern that people should be able to lead dignified lives that are not
reducible to mere behavioral statistics and involve a few secrets. A study
into the means to protect such lives from arbitrary violations can only
advance our ability to understand both conflict and peace against their
current technological backdrop and therefore makes for a truly valuable
addition to CCDCOE’s work.

Ann Väljataga
International law researcher
Lead of the Privacy in Conflict research project
CCDCOE
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Introduction
Russell Buchan and Asaf Lubin

As we are writing this introduction war is raging in Europe. Russian
aggression1 against Ukraine has already led to the death or injury of thousands of soldiers and civilians. Whole Ukrainian cities are under siege and
subject to heavy shelling as corridors of humanitarian relief are formed
to support millions of Ukrainians as they flee west in search of refuge.
The images of devastation and destruction coming out of Ukraine are a
chilling reminder of some of humanity’s most savage tendencies. These
images trigger historical trauma from wars in the European continent’s
past. But at least in some respects, the 2022 Russian invasion into Ukraine
represents the future of warfare.
The formation of a global cyber militia to support the war efforts
of Ukraine by conducting cyber attacks against Russian targets offers
one example of that future.2 Another one is represented by the role that
citizens are playing in the real-time documentation of war crimes using

1
2

U.N. General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/ES-11/L.1 (Mar. 1, 2022), https://www.documentcloud.org/
documents/21314169-unga-resolution.
See e.g. Matt Burgess, Ukraine’s Volunteer ‘IT Army’ Is Hacking in Uncharted Territory, Wired (Feb. 27,
2022), https://www.wired.com/story/ukraine-it-army-russia-war-cyberattacks-ddos/. Russell
Buchan and Nicholas Tsagourias, Ukranian ‘IT Army’: A Cyber Levée en Masse or Civilians Directly
Participating in Hostilities?, EJIL: Talk! (Mar. 9, 2022), https://www.ejiltalk.org/ukranian-it-
army-a-cyber-levee-en-masse-or-civilians-directly-participating-in-hostilities/.
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their smartphones. This type of “user-generated evidence” is dramatically changing the face of international criminal investigations and
prosecutions.3
The conflict is also a propaganda war with both States trying to
develop and disseminate a narrative by controlling the flow of information in and out of the region. As more and more social media giants
pull out of Russia and as Russian authorities continue to censor speech,
a new “digital barricade between the country and the West” is forming,
“erasing the last remnants of independent information online.”4 Meanwhile, in Ukraine news conferences where captured Russian POWs are
paraded “to counter the Kremlin’s propaganda” have become a routine.5
These conferences join other “gory videos” shared by Ukraine’s Ministry
of Internal Affairs on TikTok, Twitter, and YouTube “purporting to show
dead bodies of Russian soldiers.”6
So while we have not yet seen a full-fledged cyber war break out in
Ukraine, as some had initially anticipated,7 these anecdotal examples do
tell an evolving story about the informationalization, digitization, and
datafication of warfare. In fact, Ukraine only serves as the dress rehearsal
for what is to come in this regard. Already now the U.S. Department of
Defence (DoD) has a “formal objective to treat data as a strategic asset,”
and to consider its collection and deployment for warfighting efforts as
“the currency of future warfare.”8 The DoD thus recognizes that “it is in
a high stakes race to harness the power of data and is actively working on
creating a culture of data-centric decision-making.”9 These tendencies
are only likely to increase with the incorporation of machine learning
and artificial intelligence applications into greater parts of the military
apparatus.10
3

4

5

6
7

8

9
10

See e.g. Rebecca Hamilton and Lindsay Freeman, The Int’l Criminal Court’s Ukraine Investigation:
A Test Case for User-Generated Evidence, Just Security (Mar. 2, 2022), https://www.justsecurity.
org/80404/the-intl-criminal-courts-ukraine-investigation-a-test-case-for-user-generated-
evidence/.
Adam Satariano and Valerie Hopkins, Russia, Blocked From the Global Internet, Plunges Into Digital
Isolation, N.Y. T imes (Mar. 7, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/07/technology/
russia-ukraine-internet-isolation.html.
Isabelle Khurshudyan and Sammy Westfall, Ukraine puts captured Russians on stage. It’s a powerful
propaganda tool, but is it a violation of POW rights?, Washington Post (Mar. 9, 2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/09/ukraine-russia-prisoners-pows/.
Id.
Kari Paul, ‘Catastrophic’ cyberwar between Ukraine and Russia hasn’t happened (yet), experts say,
T he Guardian (Mar. 9, 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/mar/09/
catastrophic-cyber-war-ukraine-russia-hasnt-happened-yet-experts-say.
Robert Work and Tara Murphy Dougherty, It’s Time for the Pentagon to Take Data Principles More
Seriously, War on the Rocks (Oct. 6, 2020), https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/its-time-forthe-pentagon-to-take-data-principles-more-seriously/.
Id.
See e.g. David Vergun, Delivering AI to Warfighters Is Strategic Imperative, US Dep’t Def.
(Sept. 10, 2020), https://dodcio.defense.gov/In-the-News/News-Display/Article/2347200/
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But as Omri Ben-Shahar once said, “[t]he digital economy creates
digital smog,”11 in the sense that “[e]missions of data are like emissions
of other pollutants; the costs are often external, degrading social interests.”12 In the context of military operations in war, that social interest
being degraded might very well be our collective strive to protect the lives,
the physical and mental health, and the human dignity of individuals.
Consider again the digital iron curtain being erected in Russia or the
collection of user-generated evidence across cities and towns in Ukraine.
What is at stake in both instances are a set of digital rights — informational privacy and data protection, anonymity, encryption, internet
access, freedom of online expression, freedom from online censorship,
access to information, internet security, and cyber security. If we do not
act soon, we might grow to regret our failure to appreciate the magnitude
of the potential externalities that certain data-driven wartime practices
have on this list of digital rights. Put differently, the trend towards treating data as a strategic asset in war might stand in direct opposition to a
decades-long humanitarian campaign to minimize human suffering and
protect persons affected by armed conflict.
Troublingly, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Additional Protocols, the bedrock of contemporary treatises of international humanitarian law (IHL), offer very little guidance as to the protection of digital
rights during war. We certainly have the Martens Clause, which the
International Court of Justice once described as “an effective means of
addressing the rapid evolution of military technology.”13 But the general
commitment to “the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public
conscience” is a poor substitute for tailored rules, standards, and analytical frameworks that could be responsive to the tectonic technological
shifts generated by a growing military datasphere.
Looking beyond treaty law, “there is practically no international
legal jurisprudence, commentaries, or academic literature” that applies
digital rights like the rights to privacy and data protection in times of
armed conflict.14 Indeed, it would seem that the “pace of technological

11
12
13
14

delivering-ai-to-warfighters-is-strategic-imperative/; Kelley M. Sayler, Artificial Intelligence and
National Security, Cong. R esearch Serv. (Nov. 10, 2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/
pdf/R/R45178/10.
Omri Ben-Shahar, Data Pollution, 11 J. Legal A nalysis 104, 118 (2019).
Id., at 112.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para. 78
(Jul. 8).
Asaf Lubin, The Rights to Privacy and Data Protection Under International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights Law, in R esearch H andbook on Human R ights and Humanitarian L aw:
F urther R eflections and Perspectives 463, 466 (Robert Kolb, Gloria Gaggioli and Pavle
Kilibarda eds., 2022).
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innovation is outmatching the intellectual stamina and regulatory capacities of IHL rule-prescribers and rule-appliers.”15 When Asaf Lubin first
wrote these words in a book chapter in 2019 he didn’t imagine that they
will turn into a full research agenda. But shortly after a draft of that
chapter was released to the world, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) approached Asaf and asked him to lead
this book project. He immediately suggested the involvement of Russell
Buchan and together they spent the next two years as co-editors bringing
this project to life.
In light of the technological advances in the fields of electronic
surveillance, social engineering, predictive algorithms, big data analytics,
artificial intelligence, automated processing, biometric analysis, and
targeted hacking, we presented our contributing authors with a herculean
task. We asked each author to doctrinally and theoretically explore the
ways that these technologies, and others, are already interacting or could
possibly inter- act in the future with wartime digital rights. In so doing,
we invited the authors to grapple with the concurrent and extraterritorial
application of these rights, with the limitations and possible derogations
from these rights during war, and with their scope of application to actual
case studies and scenarios taken from the field.
Our contributing authors rose to this challenge in two ways. First,
their chapters provide a unique canvassing of the various actors that
play a role in the multistakeholder and polycentric tapestry of governance that controls emerging military technologies. Particular focus is
given to non-State actors and their obligations to protect digital rights
in the context of wartime data generation, collection, and dissemination activities. The chapters thus provide a true tour de force of the
ecosystem, examining such actors as military contractors, tech giants,
internet service providers, cloud providers, third-party vendors and
suppliers of software and hardware, armed groups, international organizations and fact-finding missions, courts and tribunals, journalists,
and humanitarian actors.
Second, the chapters also offer a wide ranging account of specific IHL
regimes, including the law of targeting, the law of occupation, the law of
neutrality, weapon acquisition, coalition operations, the law of detainees and POWs, the protections of property in war, the law on weapons
review, and the law governing jus post bellum investigations. Each chapter
provides a deep dive into a different classic field of study in IHL and in
15

Id. at 491.
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each chapter the authors chart riveting pathways for reconceptualizing
traditional rules to futureproof them against this technological revolution.
This collection is split into four parts. Part I explores the extent to
which various regimes of IHL protect the rights to digital privacy and
data protection. Part I begins with a chapter by Mary Ellen O’Connell
and its core claim is that the protection afforded by international law to
personal data is the same during times of armed conflict as it is during
times of peace. This chapter advances this claim by relying on four interrelated arguments: first, personal data plays no role in the kinetic action
of armed conflict; second, and due to the non-kinetic nature of personal
data, peacetime legal protections continue to apply during times of armed
conflict; third, the protection of personal medical data under IHL extends
by analogy to other personal data; and fourth, targeting personal data
cannot be justified on the basis of military necessity and cannot be carried
out in compliance with the duty to take precautions, thus rendering such
operations unlawful under IHL.
In Chapter 2, Tal Mimran and Yuval Shany document the privacy-
related risks associated with the development of new military technologies such as autonomous weapons, cyber operations, and the enhancement of human soldiers. This chapter argues that the weapons review
obligation contained in Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions requires State parties to integrate privacy concerns into
their evaluation of new military technologies and assesses whether these
technologies can be used compliantly with the right to privacy as it is
protected under international human rights law. This chapter maintains
that the weapons review obligation requires States to develop a unique
privacy impact assessment methodology, which demands consideration of
a host of difficult issues such as the likely long-term harms and indirect
harms caused by autonomous and cyber weapons and when soldiers can
be said to have consented to human enhancement.
In Chapter 3, Laurie Blank and Eric Talbot Jensen examine the extent
to which IHL governs the seizure, destruction, and requisition of data
during times of armed conflict. Critical to this assessment is whether
data can be regarded as ‘property’ because, as they reveal, the relevant
rules of IHL only apply to ‘property’. Assuming that data can be regarded
as property, this chapter explores when the appropriation of data can be
regarded as an act of ‘pillage’, which is prohibited by IHL. This chapter
also assesses which types of data fall within the meaning of ‘war booty’,
which is important because IHL permits parties to armed conflicts to seize
such property where it is necessary to assist the war effort.
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In Chapter 4, Jacqueline Van De Velde focuses on the situation in
which private companies located in neutral States transfer data to parties
to armed conflicts. This chapter examines the extent to which the law
of neutrality requires neutral States to monitor and prevent companies
located within their jurisdictions from transferring data to parties to
armed conflicts in breach of the data subject’s rights to privacy and
data protection. This chapter also assesses whether the law of neutrality
imposes direct obligations on corporate entities, given that, in the digital
age, they have come to possess quasi-sovereign status.
In Chapter 5, Omar Yousef Shehabi explains that contemporary occupying powers use a range of technologies to collect intelligence on the
residents of occupied territories, including biometric IDs, facial recognition checkpoints, ‘smart’ video surveillance, spyware, and offensive
cyber tools. Using the occupied Palestinian territory as a case study, this
chapter considers how the conventional law of occupation may be progressively reinterpreted to protect digital privacy and queries whether
the procedural approach to data protection duties and data subject rights
emerging in human rights law interfaces with the nature of occupation
regimes. It questions whether the source and scope of data rights and
obligations can be defined as a matter of the general law of occupation,
without resolving epistemological questions regarding particular occupation regimes.
In Chapter 6, Emily Crawford explores the privacy-related rights
of prisoners of war (POWs) in the digital age. In particular, this chapter
identifies the types of data that detaining powers can collect from POWs
and examines how this data must be managed. It finds that there is a
lack of IHL protecting the data of POWs and encourages stakeholders
to develop more effective rules in this area, averring that international
human rights law has much to offer in this regard and that its rules on
the right to privacy can provide a model or blueprint to help guide the
practice of detaining powers in the future.
Part II of this collection considers the impact of surveillance technologies on the protection of digital rights. In Chapter 7, Leah West
highlights the tension between the obligation imposed on commanders
by IHL to gather and use intelligence to inform their targeting decisions
and the obligation imposed on parties to armed conflicts under international human rights law to respect the privacy rights of civilians who
are affected by those intelligence operations. By using facial recognition
technology as a case study, this chapter reveals the legal obligations that
arise during an armed conflict that both necessitate and limit the use
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of modern surveillance technology. It also identifies the core policy and
procedural questions that commanders must consider before deploying
facial recognition technology to meet those legal obligations.
In Chapter 8, Eliza Watt examines the impact of sustained drone
surveillance on non-combatants in war zones and argues that legal
constraints should be placed on this practice. This chapter identifies a
lacuna in the IHL framework with respect to privacy and data protection
rights. It demonstrates that IHL and international human rights law apply
concurrently in armed conflict and contends that the international human
rights law rules on mass surveillance of communications apply to this
method of intelligence collection. This chapter argues that the rationale
for their application is the constant care principle set out in Article 57(1)
of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which places State
parties under a continuous duty of care over civilian populations.
In Chapter 9, Tara Davenport demonstrates that attempts to intercept
and collect data resident on or transiting through cable infrastructure are
an increasingly common practice in armed conflict. This chapter identifies
and explores the international law that applies where parties to armed
conflicts seek to intercept and collect data located on cable infrastructure. Its analysis spans a range of international legal rules and regimes
including the law of the sea, international human rights law, and IHL.
Part III of this collection examines the obligations of militaries and
humanitarian organizations when it comes to the protection of digital
rights. In Chapter 10, Tim Cochrane explores the potential for subject
access rights — core data protection rights enabling a person to obtain
their own personal data from others — to be used to obtain personal data
from military agencies during armed conflicts, and labels these ‘military
subject access rights’ (MSARs). This chapter explains the extent to which
MSARs are available in four common law jurisdictions: Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. It then applies these MSARs to
three hypothetical extraterritorial armed conflict case studies, taking into
account overarching international human rights law and IHL. Overall,
this chapter provides a practical roadmap for the exercise of MSARs by
individuals and makes recommendations for comparator States and others
to better provide and protect MSARs.
In Chapter 11, Deborah Housen-Couriel focuses on data sharing within
multilateral military operations and especially the sharing of data relating
to the members of their armed forces. While this chapter argues that IHL
provides members of the armed forces with little data privacy protection,
it maintains that coalition partners remain bound by their domestic law
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regimes, which often include considerable data privacy protections. Using
the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation as a sample
regulatory regime for the protection of data privacy, this chapter explores
the extent to which partners must respect the data privacy of members
of their armed forces when sharing information. This chapter considers
how personal data privacy might be supported as part of overall legal
interoperability and argues that the requirement of legal interoperability
exemplifies the need to coordinate civilian data protection regimes at the
global level.
In Chapter 12, Asaf Lubin examines the International Committee
of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) obligations to protect data in the context of
their humanitarian action. This chapter turns to the recent revelations
of a sophisticated cyber attack that targeted ICRC servers storing the
personal data of over 500,000 people worldwide. Building on that experience, this chapter explores the extent to which data custodians like
the ICRC are legally bound, as a matter of international or transnational
law, to protect the data of their constituencies, and the scope of such
an obligation. While recognizing some of the ICRC’s pioneering work
in developing data protection norms and best practices for the humanitarian sector, this chapter also identifies challenges imposed by new
and evolving technological, political, and market-based realities. These
developments generate complex ethical and legal challenges on the ability
of an organization like the ICRC to uniformly and consistently apply its
data protection rules.
Part IV of this collection analyses the protection of digital rights in
the jus post bellum. In Chapter 13, Kristina Hellwig examines the role of
the right to privacy in the investigation and prosecution of international
crimes. Focusing on the rules and procedures of the International Criminal
Court (ICC), this chapter explores possible interferences with the right to
privacy during criminal proceedings. In particular, it assesses whether the
ICC’s rules and procedures relating to the collection, handling, and use of
digital evidence are compatible with the right to privacy as guaranteed by
international human rights law. Looking forward, this chapter concludes
by making some broader suggestions as to how the right to privacy should
inform the work of international criminal tribunals in the future.
In Chapter 14, Yaël Ronen focuses on the ‘right to be forgotten’, that
is, the right of individuals to remove personal information from the public
sphere and especially when that personal information is linked to criminal activities. This chapter examines the human rights rationales for the
removal of information relating to criminal activity from online resources,
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platforms, and repositories. Moreover, it considers the factors that emerge
when the criminal activity constitutes an international crime, such as
the right to truth, the peremptory character of international crimes, the
gravity of the international crimes in question, and public safety.
In Chapter 15, Amir Cahane proposes a ‘right not to be forgotten’
and does so in order to protect the identities of individuals caught up in
humanitarian disasters. At the heart of this chapter is the concern that,
particularly during humanitarian crises, private tech companies may deny
individuals access to their online accounts. After explaining the adverse
impact this can have on individual identities, this chapter explores the
legal protections available to individuals affected by humanitarian disasters to maintain access to their online accounts. Finding that international
law fails to adequately protect the ‘right not to be forgotten’, this chapter
suggests that private tech companies should be subject to a moratorium
that prevents them from blocking access to online accounts belonging
to individuals caught up in humanitarian disasters.
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Chapter 1

Data Privacy Rights:
The Same in
War and Peace
Mary Ellen O’Connell1

INTRODUCTION
This chapter responds to the thesis that parties to an armed conflict may
violate an individual’s peacetime right to the privacy of their personal digitized data. Substantial evidence exists supporting the opposite position:
people do not lose data privacy rights in armed conflict. Four supporting
rationales are provided for this conclusion under the following headings:
(1) the nature of personal digitized data; (2) the continuation of peacetime
legal protections in armed conflict; (3) the protection of medical data in
armed conflict; and (4) the restrictions imposed by military necessity.
Analysis of these four rationales proceeds in two parts. Part I briefly
reviews international legal protections for personal digitized data. In the
1

Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law and Research Professor of International Dispute
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editing assistance to Kristen Burns, J.D. expected 2022.
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course of that review, the nature of personal data is assessed—both its
normative aspects and the fact it has no role in the kinetic exchange of
fighting that constitutes armed conflict. The law tolerates the alteration
of some rights owing to the realities of armed conflict. People may be
killed, for example, and physical property may be destroyed. Personal
data is not part of the kinetic exchange, meaning there is no need to
alter personal data protections to gain an advantage in fighting. Part II
then considers the alternative case: if personal digitized data did have
some connection to armed conflict, it would nevertheless be exempt from
interference under human rights protections that apply concurrently with
international humanitarian law (IHL). It is well established that certain
human rights protections apply at all times, even during armed conflict.
While no tribunal has yet ruled on personal data protection rights in
armed conflict, the same reasoning used by courts in deciding on the
application of human rights during armed conflict applies to personal
data. This choice of law supports the protection of personal data. Moreover, under the IHL principle of military necessity that guides the lawful
targeting of persons and property in hostilities, killing and destruction
are permitted only to obtain a definite military advantage. No definite
military advantage accrues in a kinetic fight from malicious cyber conduct
that interferes with personal data.

I

THE NATURE AND PROTECTION OF
PERSONAL DIGITIZED DATA
The topic of this chapter is narrow. It is concerned not with all data that
might be affected in armed conflict but with an individual’s personal data
in digitized form. This section describes personal data, emphasizing that it
has no connection with the kinetic fighting of armed conflict. The international law relevant to personal data is international human rights law
(IHRL), as well as regional and national data privacy protection laws and
national criminal law.2 The law on resort to force (jus ad bellum) and the
law regulating the conduct of conflict (jus in bello) are not directly relevant.

2

See, e.g., Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. No. 185, https://rm.coe.int/
CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680081561.
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While this chapter views the law from an international perspective,
certain national and regional developments are influencing universal law.
The definition of “personal data” in the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) provides a solid starting place. Personal data is:
any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person… one who can be identified, directly or indirectly,
in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an
identification number, location data, an online identifier or
to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological,
genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that
natural person.3
Common examples of personal data include medical, legal, and financial records. Individuals and their communities have a clear interest in
keeping personal data confidential except as they might authorize. With
the advent of digitization for computer access and storage, protecting the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of personal data has become
the goal of considerable lawmaking as well as technical efforts.4
International law on data privacy protection is developing through
various national, regional, and international initiatives. The European
Union’s GDPR and the Council of Europe’s Convention 108+ for the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data5
both draw on human rights treaty provisions protecting privacy that
predate digitization. The 1950 European Convention on Human Rights,
for example, provides for protection of private life in Article 8. Two
United Nations working groups have devoted considerable attention to
the international legal protection of digitized data privacy: the UN Group
of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behavior in
Cyberspace (GGE) and the Open-Ended Working Group on Developments

3

4

5

Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),
art. 4, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 33 [hereinafter GDPR].
Robin Geiss and Henning Lahmann, Protection of Data in Armed Conflict, 97 Int’l L. Stud. 556,
561–62 (2021). This paper is focused primarily on digitized content data, as opposed to the
computer code upon which it depends. For an explanation of the distinction, see id. at 562.
Peter Hustinx, Data Protection and International Organizations: A Dialogue Between EU Law and
International Law, 11 J. Int’l Data Priv. L. 77, 79 (2021). “There is no doubt that the EU—with
the 1995 Directive and now the GDPR—has been very influential globally, but the substance and
still growing scope of Convention 108+ has made it an obvious candidate for a global standard
that is both interesting and attractive, also given the fact it is mentioned in the GDPR as [a]
building block for an adequate—or essentially equivalent—level of protection for the purpose of
its provisions on transborder data flows.”
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in the Field of Information Telecommunications in the Context of
International Security (OEWG). In March 2021, the OEWG’s final report
became the first UN report on cybersecurity to be “adopted with direct
governmental participation.”6 The report concludes that States “should
respect human rights and fundamental freedoms… [and that] confidentiality of sensitive information should be ensured.”7
The Secretariat of Legal Affairs for the Organization of American
States’ (OAS) Inter-American Juridical Committee confirms the existence
of an international human right to personal data privacy today that flows
from earlier human rights norms.8 The OAS Secretariat cites the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), both of which include a right to privacy. The
ICCPR provides in Article 17:
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.9
The OAS Secretariat concludes that the scope of Article 17 and other
forms of the right to privacy mean that “the right to privacy covers all
aspects of life of the individual and also the processing of personal data by
government and private organizations….”10 The rationale for the right is
closely tied to both human dignity and “respect for family life, religious,
political, and sexual preferences,” as well as the importance of being free
from “the interception of communications, the use of hidden cameras,
genetic testing, etc. The protection of privacy is necessary for the legal
order to guarantee respect for personal dignity.”11
The scope of the human right to privacy is limited by legitimate needs
of law enforcement and other public purposes. In many States, a warrant
6

7

8

9
10
11

Adina Ponta, Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace: Two New Reports from Parallel UN Processes, 25
ASIL Insights at 2, July 30, 2021, https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/ASIL_Insights_2021_
V25_I14_0.pdf.
Open-ended Working Grp. on Dev. in the Field of Info. and Telecomm. in the Context of Int’l
Sec., Final Substantive Rep., at 8, U.N. Doc. A/AC.290/2021/CRP.2 (Mar. 10, 2021). See also Ponta,
supra note 6, at 5.
Org. of Am. States Inter-Am. Jurid. Comm., Secretariat for Legal Aff., Relation between Privacy
Protection, Data Protection and Habeas Data, http://www.oas.org/dil/data_protection_privacy_
habeas_data.htm [hereinafter OAS Inter-Am. Jurid. Comm.].
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966).
OAS Inter-Am. Jurid. Comm., supra note 8.
Id.
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or other form of legal process is required to access personal data.12 The
central question of this chapter is whether these protections end during
armed conflict. The UN GGE was unable to resolve certain issues related
to armed conflict. The GGE should have produced a report in 201713 but
failed to do so because experts disagreed on “the concrete application of
international law, particularly IHL, countermeasures, and the right to
self-defense in cyberspace.”14 The GDPR has multiple scope provisions
and exceptions that limit the law’s application during national emergencies, including, apparently, armed conflict. GDPR Article 2 limits its
application to the processing of personal data that form (or are intended
to form) part of a filing system.15 Thus it does not apply to “issues of
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms or the free flow of personal
data related to activities which fall outside the scope of Union law, such as
activities concerning national security” nor to “the processing of personal
data by the Member States when carrying out activities in relation to the
common foreign and security policy of the Union.”16
Other exceptions involve “important reasons of public interest”;
the establishment, exercise, or defense of legal claims; and protection
of the “vital interests of the data subject” or other people in instances
where the data subject lacks the capacity to give consent.17 Additionally,
exceptions may be made where information is being provided to the
public on the basis of demonstratable “legitimate interest.”18 Recital 112
explains “public interest,” which figures into several of the exceptions
explained above. Public interest justifications include situations where it
is necessary to protect a data subject’s or another person’s vital interests
(physical integrity or life), or data transfers to international humanitarian organizations for data subjects who are legally incapable of giving
consent (“with a view to accomplishing a task incumbent under the
Geneva Conventions or to complying with international humanitarian
law applicable in armed conflicts”).19
Geiss and Lahmann conclude that the GDPR seems to be precluded
from applying to “any State activities in relation to conduct during situations of armed conflict.”20 In support, they cite the express limits in
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-505, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986) (US).
Ponta, supra note 6, at 1.
Id.
GDPR, supra note 3, art. 2(1).
Id.
GDPR, supra note 3, art. 49(1).
Id.
GDPR Recital 112, https://gdpr-info.eu/recitals/no-112/.
Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 4, at 568.
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the GDPR for “activities concerning national security” or “activities in
relation to the common foreign and security policy of the Union” from
its scope provisions.21 Presumably, they take the view that data privacy
rights do not apply in armed conflict even without express exceptions in
national, regional, or international law. As discussed above, however,
international law now includes human rights protections for personal
data, so individuals are not dependent upon national or regional law for
protection. Whether data privacy protections apply in armed conflict
depends on international choice of law principles, not national or regional
law scope provisions.
Even with respect to national or regional laws like the GDPR, however, national security exceptions cannot permit as much as Geiss and
Lahmann seem to assume. First, States may only invoke national security
exceptions in genuine national security situations. In Russia — Measures
Concerning Traffic in Transit, the World Trade Organization (WTO) explained
that an objective national security test requires the State to invoke the
national security exception in good faith and meet a “minimum requirement of plausibility in relation to the proffered essential security interests.”22 Second, national and regional legislation that sets standards for
the protection of human rights applies to States for the benefit of people under the State’s jurisdiction. The GDPR, for example, is aimed at
restricting EU States from infringing on the data privacy rights of EU
nationals and others under EU prescriptive jurisdiction.23 The GDPR and
its exceptions do not apply beyond the limits of EU jurisdiction. There is
no national security exception for the international human rights principles of data privacy. In an armed conflict, therefore, even if an EU member
State invokes the national security exception, it would apply only to those
under its prescriptive jurisdiction. The nationals of an adversary State are
not under the invoking State’s jurisdiction. They do not lose protections
because of a national security exception. This critical point appears to
be mostly overlooked in discussions of national security exceptions to
the GDPR. Third, national security exceptions are usually subject to a
21
22
23

Id. at 566.
See Report of the Panel, Russia — Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ¶ 7.138, WTO Doc.
WT/DS512/R (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/512r_e.pdf.
GDPR, supra note 3, art. 3. Article 3 states that the GDPR applies to controllers or processors in the
EU, regardless of whether the processing of data actually occurs within the EU, and controllers or
processors outside of the EU that process information on data subjects in the EU. Id. “Customary
international law permits exercises of prescriptive jurisdiction if there is a genuine connection
between the subject of the regulation and the state seeking to regulate.” Restatement (Fourth)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 407 (Am. Law Inst. 2018). See id. §§ 408–13
(explaining the most common bases for establishing a genuine connection as territory, effects,
active personality, passive personality, protection, and universal jurisdiction).
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restrictive derogation process. A decision by the Court of Justice of the
European Union explained that “derogations and limitations in relation
to the protection of personal data… must apply only insofar as is strictly
necessary.”24 As a matter of general human rights law, a “right to derogate
is subjected to strict formal and substantive requirements.”25
Geiss and Lahmann also suggest that when the GDPR does not apply,
due to a national security exception or some other reason, IHL is the
proper law to govern privacy rights in situations linked to armed conflict.
This position appears to overlook more appropriate alternatives to IHL.
In the now-considerable jurisprudence on the dual application of human
rights and humanitarian law in armed conflict, the disconnect between
kinetic impact and personal data requires the application of privacy rights
in armed conflict.
Geiss and Lahmann provide several scenarios in which digitized data
is controlled or destroyed in situations that are linked to armed conflict.
The scenario bearing most closely on the physical force that constitutes
hostilities while also involving personal digitized data is the following:
During an armed conflict between State A and State B, the
military of State A carries out a ransomware operation against
the servers of a hospital in State B that store patients’ case
files, encrypting them until State B is willing to withdraw
its troops from a contested island located on the continental
shelf of State A.26
The core conduct is the same as the ransomware attack aimed at the
Republic of Ireland’s health care sector in mid-May 2021. After an
international cybercrime gang known as Conti encrypted medical files,27
the Irish health service shut down IT systems, Reuters reported, “to
protect them from a ‘significant’ ransomware attack, crippling diagnostic services, disrupting COVID-19 testing and forcing hospitals to
cancel many appointments.”28 The difference between the real case from
24
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European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 10/2020 on Restrictions under Article 23 GDPR, at 10
(Dec. 15, 2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/consultation/edpb_guidelines_202010_
article23_en.pdf (quoting Case C-73/07, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy
and Satamedia Oy, ECLI:EU:C:2008:727, ¶ 56 (Dec. 16, 2008) (emphasis added)).
International Human Rights Law and the Role of the Legal Professions: A General Introduction, in
U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human R ights, Human R ights in the A dministration of Justice: A M anual on Human R ights for Judges, P rosecutors and L awyers 16
(2003).
Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 4, at 557.
Irish Cyber-Attack: Hackers Bail out Irish Health Service for Free, BBC, May 21, 2021,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-57197688.
Padraic Halpin & Connor Humphries, Irish Health Service Hit by “Very Sophisticated” Ransomware

19

Data Privacy Rights: The Same in War and Peace

Ireland and the hypothetical one is the form of the ransom. The demand
in the hypothetical is related to the armed conflict, as it is for a troop
withdrawal; by contrast, the demand in the Irish case was for money. For
purposes of applying the proper law, it is the conduct that matters most,
not the form of the ransom. In May 2021, for example, computer hackers
based in Eastern Europe carried out a ransomware operation against a U.S.
company operating the largest petroleum pipeline in the United States.
For several days, until a U.S. $5 million payment was made, petroleum
stopped flowing.29 The hackers could just as easily have been working for
the Taliban, seeking funds to purchase weapons for their armed conflict
against Afghanistan’s government and its ally, the United States.
In all of these cases, the law governing the ransomware operation
is the national criminal law of the place of the injury or the place of the
criminal conduct. The cases did not involve any direct connection to the
kinetic action of an armed conflict, so IHL does not apply. State A could,
for example, hack the computers of the weapons systems used by State
B’s troops on the contested island so that State A would have a military
advantage in battling State B’s troops for control of the island. State A
might also hack the controls of a dam and release water to drown State B’s
troops. This second hypothetical use of computers in armed conflict might
violate the IHL principle respecting critical civilian infrastructure.30 It
would, nevertheless, constitute a computer-enabled kinetic attack. These
two hypotheticals pair computer operations with the kinetic action of
weapons and a weaponized dam.
This analysis relies on two threshold definitions involving kinetic
impact for the right to resort to force in self-defense and for the existence
of armed conflict during which IHL applies. First, the right to resort to
force under United Nations Charter Article 51 is triggered by a significant
armed attack.31 An attack of little gravity, such as a mere frontier incident, does not trigger the right of self-defense. Likewise, an attack of
no kinetic impact, such as a ransomware incident, does not fit Article 51
any more than the imposition of heavy economic sanctions that might
indirectly result in the deaths of people. Economic impacts have not been
judged to be “armed attacks.”
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Attack, R euters, May 14, 2021, 3:39 AM, https://www.reuters.com/technology/irish-health-
service-hit-by-ransomware-attack-vaccine-rollout-unaffected-2021-05-14/.
How a Major Oil Pipeline Got Held for Ransom, Vox, June 8, 2021, 12:50 PM, https://www.vox.com/
recode/22428774/ransomeware-pipeline-colonial-darkside-gas-prices.
Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 4, at 564.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. 14, 103 ¶ 195 (June 27).
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Second, IHL applies only in armed conflict and occupation. Armed
conflict, like armed attack, depends on the existence of certain factual
prerequisites. It depends on kinetic impact—the actual exchange of armed
fighting. In 2010, the International Law Association’s Committee on the
Use of Force reported on the definition of armed conflict in international
law in light of the United States declaring a “global war on terror” in
which it claimed the right to apply the combatant’s privilege to kill and
the right of indefinite detention worldwide regardless of the existence of
hostilities within any reasonable territorial distance. Following five years
of research into the practice and opinio juris of States from the adoption
of the UN Charter in 1945 to 2010, the report said:
The Committee confirmed that at least two characteristics are
found with respect to all armed conflict:
1) The existence of organized armed groups
2) Engaged in fighting of some intensity
In addition to these minimum criteria respecting all
armed conflict, IHL includes additional criteria so as to
classify conflicts as either international or non-international
in nature.32
The international legal definition of armed conflict requires the exchange
of armed fighting with the potential to inflict death or destruction. Some
scholars take the alternative view that war or armed conflict are possible
as a legal matter without kinetic impact. They argue that the use of
malware against an opponent that creates injurious cyber effects alone
is “cyberwar,” “hybrid warfare,” or just plain war. The argument fails to
meet the definition of armed conflict under international law. Even those
who argue for the recognition of “cyberwar” acknowledge that conflicts
with minimal or no kinetic component do not easily fit the jus ad bellum
or jus in bello regimes.33 The attempt to expand what qualifies as armed
conflict seems motivated by an interest in deploying new technologies

32
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Int’l L. A ss’n, Committee on the Use of Force: Final R eport on the M eaning of A rmed
Conflict in International L aw 2 (2010), https://www.ila-hq.org/index.php/committees.
Harriet Moynihan, The Vital Role of International Law in the Framework for Responsible State Behavior
in Cyberspace, J. C yber Pol’y (2020), tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23738871.2020.18325
50?needAccess=true. See also Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 Colum. J. T ransnat’l L. 885 (1999);
Yoram Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense, 76 Int’l L. Stud. 99 (2002).
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in ways that are unlawful under existing law.34 The discussion above
on self-defense under Article 51 demonstrates that cyber attacks fail to
meet the “armed attack” requirement. Malicious cyber conduct, including
unauthorized use of personal data, cannot meet the requirements of IHL,
in part because such conduct does not constitute armed conflict. IHL
applies only in armed conflict or occupation.

II

PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA IN
ARMED CONFLICT HOSTILITIES
In addition to the disconnect between armed conflict and personal data,
further grounds exist for treating data privacy rights uniformly in peace
and armed conflict. Courts have held that to the extent that normal
peacetime human rights are capable of application in armed conflict, they
must be honored. Given that personal data plays no role in kinetic conflict,
compliance with peacetime protections is fully possible. Even if personal
data played a role in conflict, two rules of IHL prohibit unauthorized
use and thus preserve peacetime protection of personal data. IHL prohibits
interference with medical data, which can be extended to other sensitive
personal data.35 In addition, the IHL targeting principle of military
necessity leaves personal data immune from attack. Armed conflict is
an abnormal occurrence that alters application and operation of rules
and procedures but only to the extent necessary. Unauthorized use of
personal data has little connection to overcoming the military power of
an adversary.36 Without this connection, no alteration of peacetime rights
is warranted under the principle of military necessity.
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Waxman echoes some scholars’ advocacy during the Cold War for expanded rights to use military
force by resorting to novel interpretations of the plain terms of the UN Charter and rules of
customary international law in Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the
Future of Article 2(4), 36 Yale J. Int’l L. 421, 425–26 (2011).
See Rules 25, 26, 28, and 29, Customary IHL Database, ICRC, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/
customary-ihl/eng/docs/; Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 4, at 564 (citing Tallinn M anual 2.0
on the International L aw A pplicable to C yber Operations 515 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d
ed. 2017)). See, e.g., Helen McDermott, Application of the International Human Rights Law Framework
in Cyber Space, in Human R ights and 21st Century Challenges: Poverty, Conflict, and the
Environment 190 (Dapo Akande, Jaakko Kuosmanen, Helen McDermott & Dominic Roser eds., 2020).
See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protections of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 52, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 (1979).
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A THE CONCURRENT REGIMES OF IHRL AND IHL
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) held in its Advisory Opinion on
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that certain human rights must be
respected during armed conflict.37 The ICJ cited non-derogable rights such
as the right to life. Later decisions of international tribunals indicate that
where conditions permit respect for normal peacetime human rights,
including derogable rights, they must be respected even during armed
conflict. Derogation is premised on need. Suspending the international
human right to the privacy of one’s personal digitized data, as discussed
in Part I, is simply not critical to winning a war.
The locus classicus of the concurrent application of human rights
and humanitarian law in armed conflict is the ICJ advisory opinion on
Nuclear Weapons. The court famously explained “that the protection of the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times
of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain
provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency.”38
Article 4 of the ICCPR does not expressly cite the right to privacy provided
for in Article 17 as a non-derogable right, but it does provide strict procedural restrictions on derogation from any article, including Article 17.
In particular, “States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures
derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.” As discussed
above, derogation from the personal data privacy rights of non-nationals
has little or no connection with the conduct permitted to defeat an adversary in an armed conflict.39
Moreover, meeting the further procedural requirements for derogation set out in Article 4(3) would eliminate any possible use of malware
against personal data:
Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of
the right of derogation shall immediately inform the other
States Parties to the present Covenant… of the provisions
from which it has derogated and of the reasons by which
it was actuated. A further communication shall be made,
through the same intermediary, on the date on which it
terminates such derogation.
37
38
39

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 240, ¶ 25 (July 8).
Id.
See supra notes 30 and 33 and accompanying text.
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Informing other parties of derogation of digitized privacy protections should put the target of the derogation on notice to harden cyber
protections.
In the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, the court clarified additional
aspects of the convergent regimes of IHRL and IHL. Human rights obligations under the ICCPR extend to a State exercising “jurisdiction” over
individuals.40 The best conception of cyberspace is as international space
in which all customary international human rights apply, including the
right to privacy, to be respected by States and non-State actors.41 This
view is consistent with the ICJ’s decision in the Wall advisory opinion
that while jurisdiction in the ICCPR is understood to be largely territorial,
where a State lawfully exercises jurisdiction extraterritorially, the State
must respect the ICCPR.42
The Wall advisory opinion concerned occupation, where, because of
the occupier’s effective control of territory, most, if not all, peacetime
human rights can be applied and, therefore, must be applied. The European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) reached a similar decision respecting the
British occupation zone in Iraq in Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom.43 Application
of human rights to situations of active armed conflict hostilities is more
complex, but for rights such as the right to privacy, the outcome is the
same as in occupation. In Russia v. Georgia (II), the ECHR extended the
extraterritorial application of human rights obligations to “acts of its
authorities which produce effects outside its own territory.”44 The one
exception the court made to its own exercise of jurisdiction was to decline
to adjudicate the kinetic uses of force in the active phase of hostilities.45
Other, non-kinetic conduct, such as the detention and abuse of persons
during active hostilities, does fall under the court’s jurisdiction. The court
found that Russia had violated human rights in its detention practices.46
Interference with digitized, personal data is non-kinetic, as has been
emphasized throughout this chapter, and thus, normal human rights
continue to apply.
40
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Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 178–79 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall Advisory Opinion].
Mary Ellen O’Connell, Cyber Security without Cyber War, 17 J. Conflict & Security L. 187, 189 (2012).
Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 40, at 179, ¶ 109.
Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589 (2011).
Georgia v. Russia (II), App. No. 38263/08, ¶ 133 (Jan. 21, 2021), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
fre?i=001-207757. See also Marko Milanovic, Georgia v. Russia No. 2: The European Court’s
Resurrection of Bankovic in the Contexts of Chaos, EJIL: Talk! (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.ejiltalk.
org/georgia-v-russia-no-2-the-european-courts-resurrection-of-bankovic-in-the-contextsof-chaos/.
Id.
Id.
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The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) helpfully summarizes the dual application of IHRL and IHL in a report on detention:
[T]he interplay between IHL and human rights law is the
subject of on-going debate. The issue is particularly relevant
in situations of NIAC [non-international armed conflict] where
the relative absence of treaty-based IHL repeatedly raises the
question of whether human rights law should step in as the
default regime. It is generally agreed that IHL and human
rights law are complementary legal frameworks, albeit with
different scopes of application. While most rules of IHL apply
only during armed conflicts, human rights law applies at all
times. Therefore, in times of armed conflict, certain norms
of the two regimes overlap, sometimes leading to identical
outcomes, sometimes revealing a gap in humanitarian law,
and sometimes resulting in conflicting standards.47

B IHL ALONE
As already mentioned, even without the dual application of human rights
law, IHL protects personal digitized data. IHL protections for data privacy
may be found in at least two principles: the protection of medical data
and similar personal data, and the restrictions on targeting derived from
military necessity.
IHL expressly protects various aspects of medical services. The weight
of international legal scholarly opinion holds that this protection extends
to personal medical data.48 Two approaches to other personal data follow from this position. If interpretation can lead to extending protections to aspects of medical care that are not expressly mentioned in IHL
treaties, it is equally possible to use the same interpretative methods to
extend protections from medical records to other personal records. Such
an extension is an example of the legal canon of construction nocitur a
sociis, “it is known by its associates.”49 The extension is also supported by
the rationale for privacy protection. The same need for privacy respecting
47

48
49

ICRC, Strengthening Legal Protection for Persons Deprived of their Liberty in Relation to Non-Inter
national Armed Conflict: Regional Consultations 2012–13, Background Paper, at 5 (2013),
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/2013/strengthening-legal-protection-detention-
consultations-2012-2013-icrc.pdf.
Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 4, at 565.
See generally Canon, Black’s L aw Dictionary (Brian A. Garner ed., 11th ed. 2019); Noscitur a sociis,
Black’s L aw Dictionary (Brian A. Garner ed., 11th ed. 2019).
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medical records to protect human dignity exists to protect personal legal
and financial records.50
On the other hand, some will point to the specific mention of
“medical” in treaties and argue that non-medical data is excluded from
protection. This might be an example of another canon of construction
ejusdem generis, “of the same kind or class,” whereby the mention of a
specific thing or attribute excludes examples lacking that specific thing
or attribute.51 In this case, it would be the descriptor “medical.” With
respect to human rights, when two interpretations are possible, there
is support for giving the presumption to the more generous interpretation — the interpretation supporting more extensive rights protection.52 The presumption for personal digitized data is that all such data
is protected in the same way that medical records are.
With respect to targeting, scholars are again divided into two groups,
and again, the view that supports the wider protection of privacy must
receive the presumption. There is, however, some uncertainty as to what
interpretation of military necessity would achieve greater protection.
The uncertainty flows from a debate over the nature of digital data for
purposes of applying IHL. In the long tradition of IHL, objects must
have a physical dimension, so that a kinetic impact will have physical
consequences.53 Most IHL scholars take the position that data is not an
object.54 A few scholars conclude that if data is not an object, it is subject
to unregulated targeting. Kubo Mačák takes this position and argues on
instrumental grounds that the world should view data as an object to
prevent leaving it “fair game” for attack during armed conflict.55
50
51
52

53
54
55

See supra notes 10 and 11 accompanying text.
Ejusdem generis, Black’s L aw Dictionary (Brian A. Garner ed., 11th ed. 2019).
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights provides direct support for the presumption in favor
of the more generous rights standard. It frequently applies the pro persone or pro homine principle
of interpretation, which holds that the court should give a human rights standard at issue in a
case its “widest expression.” Alejandro Rodiles, The Law and Politics of the Pro Persona Principle
in Latin America, in T he Interpretation of International L aw by D omestic Courts (Helmut
Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte eds 2016) 153–74, 162–63. Other support is found in the UN Charter
references to member States having a duty to “promote” human rights and the growing influence
of human rights law on IHL that results in interpretations of IHL that are increasingly protective.
On the UN Charter, see Hersch L auterpacht, International L aw and Human R ights (1950,
reprinted 1968), 147–54. On IHL, see Theodor Meron, Humanizing Humanitarian Law, 94
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more protective civilian and prisoner-of-war statuses, as well as the presumption of innocence in
criminal trials. See “Presumptions” in M arco Sassòli et al., How D oes L aw Protect in War?
https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/presumptions.
Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 4, at 565.
Tallinn M anual 2.0 on the International L aw A pplicable to C yber Operations 437
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017).
Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 4, at 565 (citing Kubo Mačák, Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for
Interpreting Computer Data as Objects under International Humanitarian Law, 48 Isr. L. R ev. 55, 73
(2015)). Dinniss considers content-level data generally outside the scope of the law of armed
conflict. Heather A. Harrison Dinniss, The Nature of Objects: Targeting Networks and the Challenge of
Defining Cyber Military Objectives, 48 Isr. L. R ev. 39, 41 (2015).
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Mačák’s position is unpersuasive. As a legal matter, classification
is based on a thing or concept’s physical, social, or legal characteristics,
not external issues such as the better legal regime to regulate or protect
it. In addition, data does not lose protection because it is not an object.
All of the human rights protections discussed above apply. Indeed, it is
argued here that they apply regardless of whether some provisions of the
lex specialis of armed conflict are applicable to some aspects of a situation.56 Even then, some rules of IHL protect personal data from targeting
irrespective of whether it is an object, such as the medical records rule.
Nevertheless, even taking Mačák’s position, the outcome regarding
targeting personal data is the same as that presented in peacetime and
under the IHL analogy to medical records. Article 52 of the 1977 Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions restates the legal test for lawful
attacks on objects during armed conflict hostilities:

Article 52 — General protection of civilian objects
1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals.
Civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives
as defined in paragraph
2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so
far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use
make an effective contribution to military action and whose
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage.57
Civilian objects are “all objects which are not military objectives,” as
defined in paragraph 2 of Article 52.58 Any object which falls outside the
definition in Article 52(2) is a civilian object. There are no lists or categories of legitimate military targets. The legality of attacking an object
on the basis that it is a military objective depends on the specific facts.
A weapons depot, for example, will likely satisfy the definition, but a
56
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Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 37.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protections of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 52, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3 (1979). Dinniss refers to Article 52 as “customary international law”; it may more properly
belong to the category of general principles of law. Regardless of the source of the principle and
regardless of the treaty, it will be binding on States. Dinniss, supra note 55, at 40.
Dinniss, supra note 55, at 50.
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bridge will require more careful assessment. The determination depends
on the use being made of the bridge at the time it is targeted and the
definite military advantage to be anticipated from its destruction. Even
if some bridges are legitimate targets, others will not be.
In the Banković case, the petitioners argued that a building housing a
television station in Belgrade was unlawfully destroyed by NATO bombing
during the 1999 Kosovo crisis. The petitioners claimed the station was
not being used for a military purpose, per Article 51:
Most civilian objects can become useful objects to the armed
forces. Thus, for example, a school or a hotel is a civilian
object, but if they are used to accommodate troops or headquarters staff, they become military objectives…. In other
words, the status of the object depends on the use being made
of it at the time. The use to which the object is being put must
make an “effective contribution to military action.” That does
not require a direct connection with combat operations but
does require that the object: “provides an effective contribution
to the military phase of a Party’s overall war effort.”
The promotion of general political support for the war effort
by means of propaganda does not represent an effective
contribution to military action.… The second reason why the
RTS [Radio Television of Serbia] building did not come within
the definition of a military objective is that its destruction or
neutralization did not offer a “definite military advantage.”…
The only potential military advantage in attacking the
television station was to put an end to the broadcasts.
An attack on the RTS building… could only interrupt
transmission for a very brief period of time. Furthermore,
putting an end to the broadcasts would not offer a military
advantage, far less a “definite military advantage.”59
Similarly, personal medical, financial, and legal data do not contribute
in any way to the conduct of armed fighting, let alone contributing a
definite military advantage. Even if they did, the targeting of civilian
59

Application, Banković v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99 (Dec. 12, 2001) (citing Commentary of the
A dditional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, at 1448
(Yves Sandoz et al. eds. 1987); Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Partsch & Waldemar A. Solf, New Rules
for Victims of A rmed C onflicts (2d ed. 2013)).
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objects requires taking precautions to protect the civilian population.60
When civilians face a possible missile attack, for example, leaflets and
other means of communication in advance provide warnings. Warning of
a planned attack on digitized personal data will lead to defensive measures
that would likely render the attempt to interfere unsuccessful. Cyber
attacks tend only to inflict damage when carried out without warning.
IHL, however, requires that precautions be taken. Complying with this
IHL principle will prevent interference with personal data.61

CONCLUSION
This chapter has considered two competing theses with respect to an
individual’s privacy rights regarding personal digitized data. One thesis
holds that the peacetime protection of personal privacy rights changes
or disappears during armed conflict. The other thesis holds that they
do not change. The same protections apply in peace and armed conflict.
No interference is justified for the purpose of winning an armed conflict.
The evidence and analysis presented in this chapter appear far stronger
for uniform protection, judging by the four points reviewed in the chapter.
First, the nature of digitized personal data is such that it plays no role in
the kinetic action of armed conflict. This data does not operate weapons,
weaponize objects, or communicate with troops. Second, as a result of the
non-kinetic nature of personal data, the jurisprudence on the application
of human rights protections during armed conflict applies to privacy
rights. A State may derogate from privacy rights owed to its own nationals
during times of emergency by following the proper derogation procedures
of IHRL. Derogation does not apply to the rights owed during armed
conflict to foreign nationals. Third, the protection of personal medical
data under IHL extends by analogy to other personal data. Finally, interference with personal data is unlawful under the IHL targeting regime.
Targeting personal data cannot meet the standard of military necessity
or be carried out in compliance with the duty to take precautions. The
protection of personal data is the same in war and peace.

60
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Protocol I, supra note 57, art. 57.
Mary Ellen O’Connell, Attribution and Other Conditions of Lawful Countermeasures to Cyber Misconduct,
10 Notre Dame J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1, 10 (2020).
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Integrating Privacy
Concerns in the
Development and
Introduction of New
Military or Dual-Use
Technologies
Tal Mimran and Yuval Shany 1

INTRODUCTION
The rapidly evolving technologies of the digital age have dramatically
changed the everyday life of billions of human beings and, consequently,
the “human condition.”2 New and emerging technologies also impact
significantly the ways in which military operations are conducted.3 While
1

2

3
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digital technology has permeated many parts of the militaries of information societies,4 notable quantum leaps have been, or are being, achieved in
three particular fields: the development of autonomous weapon systems,5
the military use of cyberspace,6 and the human enhancement of soldiers.7
All three fields involve a significant change in military capabilities and in the potential to harm civilians and civilian objects. Furthermore, they all engage dual-use digital technologies that have important
civilian uses, but can also be adapted to serve military needs:8 Artificial
intelligence (AI)-based autonomous systems are already employed in a
wide range of civilian settings, including medicine and transportation;9
cyber operations affect conditions in cyberspace, a domain extensively
utilized by civilian users for communication and access to information,
comprising a linchpin of the contemporary global economic system;10
and human enhancement technologies have an important role to play
in treating, aiding, and rehabilitating injured persons and persons with
disabilities in non-military contexts.11 Still, their application in military
contexts raises difficult legal issues relating to human control over military operations and accountability for violations of the laws of war and, as
discussed below, serious privacy concerns. Granted, while various other
human rights, including digital human rights,12 might be implicated by
new technologies, we chose to focus on the right of privacy, since privacy
interests are especially affected by new military capabilities and because,
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unlike other rights, the interests underlying the right to privacy are not
adequately protected by international humanitarian law (IHL).
According to IHL—the international law branch regulating the
conduct of hostilities—the legal implications of introducing new technologies into the military should be assessed in accordance to Article 36
of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (API), which
obligates States parties to determine “in the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon or new means or methods of warfare,”
whether their employment would be prohibited under international law.13
Not only the importance, but also the challenges, of conducting proper
legality reviews under Article 36 increase in cases involving new technologies with unclear impact on civilians and civilian objects.14 The picture is
even more complicated when considering long-term impacts, including
those on soldiers,15 such as privacy violations that could continue to affect
them long after they finish their military service.
In this chapter, we will examine one aspect of the reliance on
Article 36 in legality reviews of military development and the use of
new digital technology—whether it can serve as a vehicle for integrating
privacy concerns in the evaluation of new military technologies, including
dual-use technologies. After this introduction, we will present Article 36
and consider how international human rights law (IHRL) forms part of
the review process (Part I). Then we will present in brief the privacy
risks associated with new military technologies, in particular in the three
aforementioned developments — the use of autonomous weapon systems,
military operations in cyberspace, and enhancing human soldiers (Part II).
Subsequently, we will discuss the role of privacy concerns in the review
process prescribed by Article 36 in relation to new digital technologies
(Part III). The final part of this chapter provides conclusions. We believe
that privacy concerns can and should constitute an important part of
the process of legality assessment for new technologies, particularly in
relation to human enhancement technology, which threatens personal
autonomy, physical and mental integrity, and the ability to pursue private
life outside of military settings.
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Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, Article 36
(hereinafter API).
Boulanin & Verbruggen, supra note 8.
Thibault Moulin, No More Humans? Enhanced Soldiers as a Weapon, Means or Method of Warfare,
Federmann C yber Security R esearch Center (2021), https://csrcl.huji.ac.il/book/no-morehumans-enhanced-soldiers-weapon-means-or-method-warfare
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I

THE ARTICLE 36 REVIEW MECHANISM
A basic tenet in IHL is that States are limited in their choice of weapons,
and means or methods of warfare, by norms of international law.16 Such
norms sometimes ban specific weapons, such as explosive projectiles
weighing less than 400 grams17 or chemical weapons,18 or means and
methods of warfare, such as perfidy19 or the starvation of a besieged
population.20 Such bans sometimes reflect broad acceptance among States
that the humanitarian harm that the weapons, means, or methods cause
likely exceeds any military advantage they afford.21 At other times, the
relevant norms of IHL identify a general principle, such as the prohibition
on weapons that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering22 or
the principle of distinction,23 and expect States to implement it on a caseby-case basis. In all cases, however, some ex ante cost-benefit assessment
is undertaken by States in order to determine whether to support the
regulation outlawing specific weapons, means, or methods or embrace a
general principle limiting their tactical choices. Once the regulation has
been adopted, those bound by it must assess its compatibility with any
new weapon and means or method of warfare they contemplate developing or using.24

16

17

18

19
20
21
22
23
24

Broadly speaking, bringing about suffering without a military purpose infringes IHL. See 1
Jean-M arie Henckaerts & L ouise D oswald-Beck, C ustomary International Humanitarian L aw, rule 70 (2006). Interestingly, API refers alternately to “methods or means of
warfare” (e.g., Articles 35(1) and 55(1)), “methods and means of warfare” (e.g., in Section I of
Part III), “means and methods of attack” (in Article 57(2)(a)(ii)), and “weapon, means or method
of warfare” (in Article 36). For an earlier version of the rule, see Article 22 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. For discussion, see International C ommittee of the R ed Cross, A Guide to the Legal R eview of New Weapons,
M eans and M ethods of Warfare M easures to I mplement A rticle 36 of A dditional
Protocol I of 1977, 3 (2006), https://shop.icrc.org/a-guide-to-the-legal-review-of-newweapons-means-and-methods-of-warfare-pdf-en.
Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes
Weight, St. Petersburg, 1868; International Committee of the R ed Cross, A Guide to the
Legal R eview of New Weapons, M eans and M ethods of Warfare: M easures to I mplement
A rticle 36 of A dditional Protocol I of 1977, 4 (2006), https://shop.icrc.org/a-guide-to-the-
legal-review-of-new-weapons-means-and-methods-of-warfare-pdf-en.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45. 115 Protocol on Blinding Laser
Weapons, Geneva, Oct. 13, 1995, 1380 U.N.T.S. 370.
API, art. 37.
API, art. 54(1).
For discussion, see Helen Durham & T imothy LH McCormack (eds), T he Changing Face of
Conflict and the Efficacy of International Humanitarian L aw 66–73 (1999).
API, art. 35(2).
Id., art. 48 and 54; Jean-M arie Henckaerts & L ouise D oswald-Beck, C ustomary International Humanitarian L aw, rules 7 and 54 (2006).
Cf. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 55.
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Article 36 of API gives effect to IHL limits on weapons, means, or
methods of warfare by introducing a procedural obligation requiring
States parties to the Protocol to conduct legality reviews:
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new
weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party
is under an obligation to determine whether its employment
would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this
Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to
the High Contracting Party.25
The obligation under Article 36 applies regardless of whether the State
develops and manufactures weapons itself or purchases them from
another State or from a private company.26 Furthermore, although many
provisions of IHL apply only during times of armed conflict, legality
reviews pursuant to Article 36 can, and often do, take place in peacetime,
without connection to any specific armed conflict or military operation.27
Legality reviews are particularly important and challenging when
dealing with weapons or means or methods of warfare based on new
technologies (such as computing, nanotechnology, and synthetic biotechnology),28 given the lack of scientific certainty as to their long-term
impact on humanitarian interests.29 In such cases, questions relating to
the application of the precautionary principle, or some version thereof,
might present themselves.30 Confronting questions as to the precise point
in time in which a legality review for new technology should be carried
out, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has persuasively
maintained that the term “study” found in Article 36 alongside “development, acquisition or adoption” indicates a broad temporal scope.31
The technologies discussed in this article are all at either the development or implementation stage.32 As a result, Article 36 appears to be

25
26

27

28
29
30
31
32

API, art. 36.
Isabelle Daoust, Robin Coupland & Rikke Ishoey, New Wars, New Weapons? The Obligation of States to
Assess the Legality of Means and Methods of Warfare, 84 International R eview of the R ed Cross
345, 348 (2002).
Cf. Anne Dienelt, “After the War is Before the War”: The Environment, Preventive Measures under
International Humanitarian Law, and their Post-Conflict Impact, Environmental Protection and
T ransitions from Conflict to Peace: Clarifying Norms, Principles, and Practices 420,
421 (Carsten Stahn, Jens Iverson & Jennifer S. Easterday eds., 2017).
ICRC, LEGAL REVIEW OF METHODS OF WARFARE, supra note 17, 5.
B oulanin & Verbruggen, supra note 8, at 6.
See, e.g., Brian Rappert and Richard Moyes, Enhancing the Protection of Civilians from Armed Conflict:
Precautionary Lessons, 26 M edicine, Conflict and Survival 24 (2010).
ICRC, Legal R eview of M ethods of Warfare, supra note 17, at 23.
See, e.g., Moulin, supra note 15.
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sufficiently broad to require review of all of them. It should also be noted
that if new evidence or knowledge comes to light after the review was
held, providing new information about the operational performance or
effects of the weapon, means, or method of warfare, a new evaluation
under Article 36 would be required.33
There are three categories that fall within the ambit of Article 36:
weapons, means of warfare, and methods of warfare. The term “weapons” has been understood to include a range of offensive capabilities
used in combat that are capable of causing damage to objects or injury
or death to persons.34 In the view of the ICRC, the term should be
read broadly so as to encompass weapons and weapon systems of all
kinds, including defensive weapons.35 “Means of warfare” is an even
broader term, extending to military equipment, systems, platforms,
and other associated appliances used to facilitate military operations.36
For example, a surveillance system would fall under this category, if it
can collect information about potential military targets.37 “Methods of
warfare,” by comparison, extends to a variety of military strategies and
practices, as well as specific tactics used in military operations.38 The
ICRC explains that a method of warfare includes the manner in which
weapons and means of warfare are expected to be used in warfare.39
When dual-use equipment is introduced in connection with the conduct
of hostilities, it should be subject to review, either as a weapon or as a
means of warfare.40
Article 36 creates a binding procedural obligation for State parties to
API. However, it may be claimed that other States who have not joined
API but are nonetheless bound by substantive limits on weapons, means,
or methods of warfare should resort to a comparable ex ante review of
weapons and means, so as to avoid taking measures that would lead to
33
34
35

36

37
38

39
40

ICRC, Legal R eview of M ethods of Warfare, supra note 17, at 24.
Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict R esearch, Commentary on the M anual
on International L aw A pplicable to A ir and M issile Warfare 55 (2010).
ICRC, LEGAL REVIEW OF METHODS OF WARFARE, supra note 17, 9. For discussion of the
Iron Dome system used in Israel, which raises interesting questions in this regard, see Daphné
Richemond-Barak & Ayal Feinberg, The Irony of the Iron Dome: Intelligent Defense Systems, Law, and
Security, 7 H arvard National Security Journal 469 (2016).
Heather A. Harrison Dinniss & Jann K. Kleffner, Soldier 2.0: Military Human Enhancement and
International Law, 92 Int’l L. Stud. 432, 437 (2016). See also William H. B oothby, Weapons
and the L aw of A rmed C onflict 4 (2009).
B oulanin &Verbruggen, supra note 8, at 3.
Commentary on the A dditional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, ¶ 1402 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987);
Daoust et al., supra note 26, at 352.
ICRC, Legal R eview of M ethods of Warfare, supra note 17, at 10.
B oulanin & Verbruggen, supra note 8, at 3. For a discussion of the challenges of dealing with
dual-use objects and infrastructure in the cyber context, see Gisel, Rodenhäuser & Dörmann,
supra note 3, at 320.
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a violation of their substantive obligations.41 This is especially so, since
Article 36 does not dictate any particular manner in which the review
should be conducted, and its actual mechanisms of application differ
from one State to the other in review aspects such as format, methodology, and mandate of the reviewing body.42 Indeed, General Comment
36 of the Human Rights Committee (HRC) takes the approach that
ensuring the protection of the right to life under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) invites prophylactic impact
assessment measures, including a legality review for new weapons,43
and in practice, some States have resorted to review procedures without
being members of API.44 In any event, it is important to note that determinations of legality or illegality by one State do not create obligations
for other States, nor do they affect their obligation to conduct their own
legality review.45
According to the ICRC, the review should follow, whenever possible,
a multidisciplinary approach, with particular scrutiny given to weapons,
means, or methods of warfare that generate novel health effects.46 States
should consider during the review all the IHL rules that prohibit or limit
the use of specific weapons and means or methods of warfare, regardless
of whether they derive from a treaty, a custom, or a general principle of
law.47 In addition, States should consider whether the weapon infringes
on the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience (based
41
42

43
44
45
46
47

ICRC, Legal R eview of M ethods of Warfare, supra note 17, at 4.
Several States implement weapons review mechanisms, including Australia, Belgium, and the
United States. See Australia: Legal review of new weapons, Australian Department of Defence
Instruction (General) OPS 44-1, June 2, 2005; Belgium: Défense, Etat-Major de la Défense,
Ordre Général - J/836 (July 18, 2002), establishing La Commission d’Evaluation Juridique des
nouvelles armes, des nouveaux moyens et des nouvelles méthodes de guerre; the Netherlands:
Beschikking van de Minister van Defensie nr. 458.614/A, May 5, 1978, establishing the Adviescommissie Internationaal Recht en Conventioneel Wapengebruik; Norway: Direktiv om folkerettslig vurdering av vapen, krigforingsmetoder og krigforingsvirkemidler, Ministry of Defence,
June 18, 2003; the United States: Review of Legality of Weapons under International Law, US
Department of Defense Instruction 5500.15, Oct. 16, 1974; Weapons Review, US Department
of Air Force Instruction 51-402, May 13, 1994. In Sweden the committee is composed of legal,
military, medical, and arms technology experts, and in Norway it includes representatives
from the Defence Research Establishment, the Army Material Command, the Logistic Resources
Management Division, and the Defence Staff College. See Daoust et al., supra note 26, at 355–58.
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, para. 65, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018).
Daoust et al., supra note 26, at 348. The US is an example of a State not party to API that adopted
weapons review procedures.
Howard S. Levie, Protection of War Victims: Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
287 (1980).
ICRC, Legal R eview of M ethods of Warfare, supra note 17, at 6.
Daoust et al., supra note 26, at 350. Examples of customary prohibitions include poison or
poisoned weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons, and herbicides. See Jean-M arie
Henckaerts & L ouise D oswald-Beck, C ustomary International Humanitarian L aw
(2006); Patrick Lin, Could Human Enhancement Turn Soldiers into Weapons That Violate International
Law? Yes, Atlantic (Jan. 4, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/01/
could-human-enhancement-turn-soldiers-into-weapons-that-violate-international-
law-yes/266732/.
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on the well-known Martens clause).48 Given its broad nature, the Martens
clause is in itself a source for addressing unforeseen impacts of new
military technology,49 including new health factors.50 This is of particular
relevance to the violations of the right to privacy discussed below, which
may entail physical and mental health repercussions.51
Furthermore, Article 36 invites States to consider new weapons,
means, or methods of warfare in light of IHL, IHRL, and any other rule
of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party. 52 Given the
increased acceptance of the co-application of IHL and IHRL in armed
conflict situations,53 legality reviews should, in principle, include assessment of compatibility with both bodies of law. As we explain below, this
is especially the case with regard to human rights that protect aspects of
personal well-being that have no close parallel in IHL, such as the right
to privacy, and which are nonetheless threatened by new technology.54
The next section discusses such new technological developments that are
incorporated in new weapons and means of warfare and considers their
potential impact on the enjoyment of the right to privacy. Part III then
considers the role of Article 36 reviews in that regard.

II

NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
ASSOCIATED LEGALITY CHALLENGES
Recent decades saw a significant technological leap in a number of fields
amenable to military application either as new weapons or means of warfare, deployed through new methods of warfare. We will focus below on
three fields where particularly dramatic developments have taken place,
48

49
50
51
52
53

54

ICRC, Legal R eview of M ethods of Warfare, supra note 17, at 17. As stated in Article 1(2) of
API: “In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and
combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law
derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public
conscience.”
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 24, at ¶ 87; Daoust et al., supra note
26, at 351.
ICRC, Legal R eview of M ethods of Warfare, supra note 17, at 19.
Bensaid v. United Kingdom, 44599/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 47 (2001).
Daoust et al., supra note 26, at 349.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 24, at ¶ 25; Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J Rep. 168, ¶ 168 (Dec. 19). See, in
the context of the Islamic State, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts, Concluding Observations on
the Fourth Periodic Report of Iraq, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/IRQ/CO/4, ¶ 5 (Oct. 27, 2015).
Harrison Dinniss & Kleffner, supra note 36, at 433.
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entailing significant implications for the ability to enjoy the right to
privacy — autonomous weapons, cyberspace, and human enhancement.
These developments invite the question of how to integrate their privacy
implications in relevant Article 36 review processes.

A AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS
At first glance, it may seem that autonomous weapons systems raise fewer
privacy concerns than the other technologies discussed in this chapter,
since they “merely” involve the substitution of human decision-makers
with machines without necessarily changing the modus operandi of the
controlled weapon systems.55 Yet, a closer look at the new technology
employed is likely to raise significant privacy concerns.
The development of military technology in the field of autonomous
weapon systems has progressed remarkably in recent decades. True, only
a few autonomous weapon systems — that is, systems that can take and
execute decisions without human beings in the decision-making loop or
exercising meaningful control over such decisions56— have actually been
put into operation.57 Still, advanced militaries have already acquired the
capacity to deploy such weapon systems. The autonomous features of
these new weapon systems obviously warrant a weapon review under
Article 36 assessing, for example, the actual capacity of the autonomous
weapon to distinguish between military and civilian targets, the manner
in which they are programmed to apply the principle of proportionality
and their propensity to generate “false positives”, especially in light of
interaction with unforeseen or unforeseeable circumstances.58 In addition,
the review must examine the meaningful controls and safeguards that
are put in place to intervene in the event of system failure.59
Although the link between autonomous weapons systems and the
right to privacy is indirect, it is nonetheless a meaningful connection.
Like other AI weapon systems, the operation of autonomous weapon
55
56

57
58
59

For discussion, see Micah Clark, Claire Finkelstein & Oren Gross, Autonomous Systems and the
Ethics of Conflict, 7 Penn. St. J.L. & Int’l A ff. 74 (2020).
See, e.g., id.; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary
or Arbitrary Executions, Christof Heyns, Lethal Autonomous Robotics, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (Apr.
9, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/
A-HRC-23-47_en.pdf; Report of the 2018 Session of the Group of Governmental Experts on
Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/
GGE.1/2018/3 (Oct. 23, 2018), https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/CCW/GGE.1/2018/3.
B oulanin & Verbruggen, supra note 8, at 17.
BOOTHBY, supra note 36, 341.
Michael W. Meier, Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (Laws): Conducting a Comprehensive Weapons
Review, 30 T emp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 119 (2016).
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systems presumes a constant flow of data and metadata about the conduct
of adversary forces that underlies AI threat predictions, target identification, and machine learning.60 This, in turn, requires a constant supply
of intelligence by means of biometric surveillance, including facial and
gait recognition, digital surveillance of cellular and online activity, and
big data analysis.61 The controversial United States drone program in
Pakistan, which involved inter alia constant monitoring from the sky
of large swaths of territory with a view to identifying “patterns of life”
compatible with membership in terror organizations, feeding into specific targeting decisions, is illustrative of the means or methods of warfare that could support the operation of the aforementioned autonomous
weapon systems.62 Such means or methods do, however, have serious
privacy implications, as they place broad populations under constant or
almost constant surveillance.63 In particular, human rights groups have
chronicled the mental harm caused to civilians living under constant
drone surveillance.64
An Article 36 legality review of autonomous weapon systems would
arguably have to consider their dependency on constant surveillance,
and the right to privacy and other implications of such practices. Such a
review may result, among other things, in privacy protocols for data and
metadata collection, retention and use.

B CYBERSPACE
In recent years, cyberspace has become an important domain for military operations, with cyber attacks becoming part of the reality of armed
conflicts.65 New cyber weapons and cyber capacities that constitute new
60

61

62
63

64
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Alan Backstrom & Ian Henderson, New Capabilities in Warfare: An Overview of Contemporary Technological Developments and the Associated Legal and Engineering Issues in Article 36 Weapons Reviews, 94
International R eview of the R ed Cross 483, 492 (2012).
Maziar Homayounnejad, The Lawful Use of Autonomous Weapon Systems for Targeted Strikes
(Part 2): Targeting Law & Practice, TLI T hink! Paper 13/2018 (2018), at 54, https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3200416.
Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Out of the Loop: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law
of Armed Conflict, 4(2) H arv. Nat’l Sec. J. 231, 268 (2013).
For a discussion, see, e.g., Katharine H. Kindervater, The Emergence of Lethal Surveillance: Watching
and Killing in the History of Drone Technology, 47(3) Security Dialogue 223, 224 (2016); Tyler Wall
& Torin Monahan, Surveillance and Violence from Afar: The Politics of Drones and Liminal Security-Scapes, 15(3) T heoretical Criminology 239 (2011).
International Human R ights and Conflict R esolution Clinic at Stanford L aw S chool
and Global Justice Clinic at NYU S chool of L aw, Living Under Drones: Death, Injury,
and T rauma to Civilians F rom US Drone P ractices in Pakistan 80 (2012). See also Ranjana
Ferrao, Drones and the Future of Armed Conflict, 16 ISIL Y.B. Int’l Human. & R efugee L. 270,
273 (2016–2017); T he Humanitarian I mpact of Drones 37 (Ray Acheson, Matthew Bolton,
Elizabeth Minor & Allison Pytlak eds., 2017).
Gisel, Rodenhäuser & Dörmann, supra note 3, at 288–89.
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means of warfare or invite the application of new methods of warfare
unquestionably warrant a legality review under Article 36. Such a review
should explore, for example, whether cyber tools aimed at disruption,
degradation, or the destruction of information in military systems and
networks,66 or rendering those systems inaccessible,67 are indiscriminate in
nature or cause disproportionate harm to civilians and civilian objects. The
case that there is a duty to conduct a legality review for cyber weapons and
tools is particularly strong after it has been amply demonstrated that cyber
attacks can cause significant and widespread damage to real-life objects
and infrastructure68 and that cyber attacks can also precede the deployment
of conventional military force, or comprise part of a broader attack.69
Where cyber attacks facilitate conventional attacks—for example,
when a cyber attack neutralizes air-defense systems70—there is little
question that the use of cyber attack constitutes a means of warfare
supporting the use of kinetic weapons, which would merit an Article
36 legality review. It is more difficult to categorize cyber capabilities
intended to produce stand-alone attacks that do not cause physical
harm as requiring an Article 36 review, since they may not qualify as
a weapon or means of warfare under narrow understandings of these
terms.71 Still, according to broader interpretations, cyber tools applied
by the military that can infiltrate without authorization into computer
systems, manipulate, erase, or disrupt data, and result in impairment of
the functionality of the targeted systems and the infrastructure dependent thereon, should be considered weapons or means of warfare for the
purposes of Article 36.72 Note that even cyber tools that do not fall under
66
67
68
69

70

71

72

Nicholas Tsagourias, Cyber Attacks, Self-Defence and the Problem of Attribution, 17(2) Journal of
Conflict & Security L aw 229, 229 (2012).
Herbert S. Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force, 4 J Nat. Sec. L aw and Policy 63, 64
(2010); Oona Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 C al. L. R ev. 817, 821 (2012).
Delbert Tran, The Law of Attribution: Rules for Attributing the Source of a Cyber-Attack,
20 Yale J.L. & T ech. 376, 380 (2018).
Oona Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 C al. L. R ev. 817, 830 (2012). See generally
R ichard A. Clarke & Robert K. K nake, C yber War: T he Next T hreat to National Security
and What to D o A bout It (2010).
For example, some claim that in September 2007, Israel infiltrated and disabled the radar systems
of Syria in order to enable Israeli air force planes to enter Syria undetected and conduct an air
strike against a nuclear facility. See Kenneth Geers, The Cyber Threat to National Critical Infrastructures: Beyond Theory, 18 Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective 1, 4 (2009).
Additional examples are the cyber attacks in Georgia before Russia’s 2008 military invasion, and
the cyber attacks in Ukraine in 2015–2017, during that country’s military conflict with Russia. See
Michael Preciado, If You Wish Cyber Peace, Prepare for Cyber War: The Need for the Federal Government
to Protect Critical Infrastructure From Cyber Warfare, 1(1) Journal of L aw & C yber Warfare 99,
114 (2012); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Cyber Security without Cyber War, 17(2) Journal of Conflict &
Security L aw 187, 188 (2012).
See, e.g., William H. Boothby, Methods and Means of Cyber Warfare, 89 Int’l L. Stud. 389 (2013);
Tallinn M anual 2.0 on the International L aw A pplicable to C yber Operations (Michael
N. Schmitt ed., 2017), rule 30.
B oulanin & Verbruggen, supra note 8, at 10; Cordula Droege, Get off My Cloud: Cyber Warfare,
International Humanitarian Law, and the Protection of Civilians, 94 International R eview of the
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the scope of Article 36 might still need to be subject to ex ante review
under IHRL, if they are likely to pose a real risk to basic human rights
of affected individuals.
There are three principal ways in which cyber tools or weapons can
infringe on the right to privacy—mass surveillance, data theft, and the
engendering of cyber security vulnerabilities.73 The first two types of activities may occur outside an armed conflict, but they may also be undertaken
as a means of warfare intended to facilitate targeting decisions or generate
actionable military intelligence.74 Where mass surveillance or data theft
is undertaken by military personnel or by other security agencies whose
activities are embedded in military operations, there is little question
that Article 36 should be resorted to and the associated privacy concerns
considered in the review process. Still, the covert and dual-use nature
of espionage activity by security agencies outside the military, which is
capable of producing military actionable intelligence, could raise difficult
practical problems in determining the timing and scope of the review,
its legal basis (e.g., whether its mandated by Article 36 or international
human rights law) and how to enforce the obligation to conduct it.
The third type of cyber operation is more characteristic of armed conflict situations or preparations for them. Degrading cyber defenses, identifying existing vulnerabilities, or installing malware that could disrupt computer functionality or facilitate cyber attacks might have collateral spillover
effects in the sense that they would make it easier to conduct cyber attacks
against affected civilian computers and to access personal civilian data

73

74

R ed Cross 533, 559 (June 2012). For an opposing view, see Roy Schondorf, Israel’s Perspective on
Key Legal and Practical Issues Concerning the Application of International Law to Cyber Operations, EJIL
Talk!, Dec. 9, 2020, https://www.ejiltalk.org/israels-perspective-on-key-legal-and-practical-issues-concerning-the-application-of-international-law-to-cyber-operations/.
The issue of data collection and its impact on privacy have been widely discussed. See, e.g.,
Federico Fabbrini, Human Rights in the Digital Age: The European Court of Justice Ruling in the Data
Retention Case and Its Lessons for Privacy and Surveillance in the US, 28 H arv. Hum. Rts. J. 65 (2015);
Francesca Bignami, Towards a Right to Privacy in Transnational Intelligence Networks, 28 M ich. J.
Int’l L. 663 (2006). In the Liberty case, surveillance by the United Kingdom was deemed to be
in breach of the right to privacy, as it did not set out an accessible procedure to be followed for
selecting for examination, sharing, storing, and destroying intercepted material. See Liberty and
Others v. United Kingdom, E.C.H.R., 58243/00 (2008), ¶ 59. See also Stefan Kirchner, Beyond
Privacy Rights: Crossborder Cyber-Espionage and International Law, 31 J. M arshall J. Info. T ech.
& Privacy L. 369 (2014); Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Ben Emmerson,
¶ 30 U.N. Doc. A/69/397 (2014) [43]; Report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, ¶ 22 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014).
Another concern for privacy in the context of cyber operations can arise when they form part
of espionage activities. While espionage has a long history, the technological tools used for it
today raise renewed questions about its legality. Concerns arise relating to illegal intervention,
infringement of diplomatic inviolability, and privacy. Espionage also occurs in peacetime, and as
such, it is also questionable whether such actions fall under one of the three categories of Article
36 (weapon, means, or method of warfare). For discussion, see Ashley Deeks, An International
Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 Virg. J. Int’l L. 291, 302 (2015); Stefan Kirchner, Beyond
Privacy Rights: Crossborder Cyber-Espionage and International Law, 31 J. M arshall J. Info.
T ech. & Privacy L. 369 (2014).
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and metadata stored in them.75 The cyber attack against the US Office of
Personal Management (OPM) database, which compromised security data
and personal data of a sensitive nature, exemplifies the potential linkage
between cyber attacks in a military context (in the case of the OPM, most
probably for military intelligence purposes) and right-to-privacy concerns
of large numbers of affected individuals.76 It would therefore seem that
an Article 36 legality review is required to evaluate the long-term privacy
implications of cyber operations that weaken cyber defenses.

C ENHANCEMENT OF HUMANS
The third field of new and emerging military technologies, which is
perhaps most relevant to a discussion of the right to privacy, is the
human enhancement of soldiers. The idea of human enhancement has
long been a source of inspiration for popular-culture depictions, but it
is also the subject of contemporary scientific research aimed at restoring
full functionalities to ill or disabled persons or at conferring super-human
capabilities on “enhanced humans.”77 In the military context, enhanced
combatants might obtain heightened capabilities by wearing, and in some
cases embedding in their bodies, integrated technology that improves
their organic and natural functions (e.g., additional strength, reduced
need for sleep, improved vision and better decision-taking capacity,
etc.).78 Arguably, human enhancement programs do not necessarily run
contrary to IHL, as they can reduce operational mistakes during hostilities
and thus reduce harm to civilians and civilian objects.79
The US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is a
principal engine for the development of human enhancement projects
directed at improving the capabilities of soldiers80 and has invested signif75

76

77

78
79
80

Examples of spillover effects include the CrashOverride, WannaCry, and NotPetya incidents. For
discussion, see Laurent Gisel and Lukasz Olejnik, The Potential Human Cost of Cyber Operations:
Starting the Conversation, Humanitarian L aw and Policy Blog, Nov. 14, 2018, https://blogs.icrc.
org/law-and-policy/2018/11/14/potential-human-cost-cyber-operations/.
For discussion of the attack, see Stephanie Gootman, OPM Hack: The Most Dangerous Threat to the
Federal Government Today, 11(4) Journal of A pplied Security R esearch 517 (2016); Alan Wehbe,
OPM Data Breach Case Study: Mitigating Personnel Cybersecurity Risk, 26(1) B oston University
P ublic Interest L aw Journal 75 (2017).
Harrison Dinniss & Kleffner, supra note 36, at 433; Patrick Lin et al., Super Soldiers (Part 2):
The Ethical, Legal and Operational Implications, Human Performance T echnology: Concepts,
M ethodologies, T ools and A pplications 82 (2019).
Harrison Dinniss & Kleffner, supra note 36, at 434. For more discussion, see Patrick Lin, Ethical
Blowback from Emerging Technologies, 9 Journal of M ilitary Ethics 313 (2010).
Oren Gross, The New Way of War: Is There a Duty to Use Drones? 67 Fla . L. R ev. 1 (2016); Harrison
Dinniss & Kleffner, supra note 36, at 444.
Yahli Shereshevsky, Are All Soldiers Created Equal? On the Equal Application of the Law to Enhanced
Soldiers, 61 Va . J. Int’l L. 271, 274 (2021). See also Michael Joseph Gross, The Pentagon’s Push

42

Tal Mimran and Yuval Shany

icant resources into promoting relevant research projects.81 Such research
often involves dual-use technology, since enhancement measures, like
pain blocking or machine-brain interfaces, can also be used in civilian
therapeutic contexts82 and often rely on dual-use infrastructures like the
internet83 or global navigation satellite systems.84
Human enhancement is commonly divided into three main categories: biochemical, cybernetic, and prosthetic.85 Biochemical enhancement entails the use of pharmaceutical agents to enhance physical and
mental functions.86 Cybernetic enhancement, or brain-machine interface,
involves technologies that aim to connect electric signals produced by the
human brain directly to a machine without the need for manual input.87
Examples include the Avatar project in the United States, which develops
interfaces and algorithms that will allow a soldier to partner up with a
semi-autonomous bipedal machine, and the N3 program, aimed at broadening the applicability of neural interfaces to warfighters.88 Prosthetic
enhancement involves physical improvements for humans,89 including
prosthetics capable of providing sensory feedback and thought-controlled
movement, visual prosthetics that allow for augmented or restored vision,
and auditory enhancement.90
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to Program Soldiers’ Brains, Atlantic, Nov. 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2018/11/the-pentagonwants-to-weaponize-the-brain-what-could-go-wrong/570841/.
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Unconventional Threats and Capabilities of the H. Comm. on House Armed Services, 108th Cong.
(2003) (statement of Tony Tether, Director, Defense Advances Research Projects Agency), at 12,
https://www.darpa.mil/attachments/TestimonyArchived(March%2027%202003).pdf.
Harrison Dinniss & Kleffner, supra note 36, at 449. See also Joel G arreau, R adical E volution:
T he Promise and Peril of Enhancing Our M inds, Our B odies—and What it M eans to be
Human 27–29 (2005).
Michael Schmitt, The Sixth United Nations GGE and International Law in Cyberspace, Just Security,
June 10, 2021, https://www.justsecurity.org/76864/the-sixth-united-nations-gge-and-international-law-in-cyberspace/.
Gisel, Rodenhäuser & Dörmann, supra note 3, at 320.
Shereshevsky, supra note 80, 278.. See also Heather A. Harrison Dinniss, Legal Aspects of Human
Enhancement Technologies, in New T echnologies and the L aw in War and Peace 230, 240
(William H. Boothby ed., 2018).
For discussion, see Lukasz K amienski, Shooting Up: A Short History of Drugs of War
(2016). See also Helen Thomson, Narcolepsy Medication Modafinil is World’s First Safe “Smart Drug,”
Guardian, Aug. 20, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/aug/20/narcolepsy-
medication-modafinil-worlds-first-safe-smart-drug.
Harrison Dinniss & Kleffner, supra note 36, at 435. See, e.g., Pierre Bienaimé, Mind-Controlled
Drones Are Already a Reality, Business Insider, Oct. 24, 2014, https://www.businessinsider.com.
au/drones-you-can-control-with-your-mind-2014-10; Emanuel et. al., supra note 11, 7.
This includes projects intended to use neural implants to control three aircrafts at once (including
an F-35 fighter). See Zayan Guedim, DARPA’s BCI Chip Allows Pilots to Control Drones Telepathically,
EDGI, Sept. 11, 2018, 05:30 AM, https://edgy.app/is-this-real-darpas-hivemind-is-operational;
Moulin, supra note 15, at 11.
Emanuel et al, supra note 11, 4.
Harrison Dinniss & Kleffner, supra note 36, at 436. See also David Talbot, An Artificial Hand
with Real Feelings, MIT T echnology R eview, Dec. 5, 2013, https://www.technologyreview.
com/2013/12/05/14493/an-artificial-hand-with-real-feelings/; Yahli Shereshevsky, Are All Soldiers
Created Equal? On the Equal Application of the Law to Enhanced Soldiers, 61 Va . J. Int’l L. 271, 274
(2021); E manuel et al., supra note 11.
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It is debatable which human enhancement technologies fall within
the ambit of Article 36 of API. The enhanced human combatant is generally not considered a weapon (or a military object).91 However, when
brain-computer interface facilitates remote control of weapons like
drones, it arguably constitutes means of warfare.92 It has even been
argued by Boulanin and Verbruggen that the deployment of enhanced
soldiers can constitute a method of warfare, when the use of the
enhanced capabilities is an integral part of the deploying military’s
offensive activities.93
The more the human enhancement technology is computerized and
embedded in the human body and mind, the greater is the associated privacy risk.94 Other than the direct risks emanating from the physical bodily
intrusion which most enhancements entail, other indirect risks can also
arise. For example, offensive tools might be developed in order to hack
brain-computer interfaces95 with a view to manipulating brain-connected
weapon systems or assisted decision-making facilities, or to access the
personal data generated by prosthetic digital devices.

III

PRIVACY CONCERNS AND LEGALITY
REVIEWS
A THE CO-APPLICATION OF IHL AND IHRL
As noted before, we are of the view that legality reviews under Article 36
should consider both IHL and IHRL standards. This conclusion is inescapable from the language of Article 36, which alludes to any other rule of
international law applicable and the broad consensus among international
law experts surrounding the co-application of IHL and IHRL.96 Hence, to
91
92
93
94
95
96

Harrison Dinniss & Kleffner, supra note 36, at 438. But see B oulanin &Verbruggen, supra note 8,
at 28–29.
Moulin, supra note 15, at 4.
B oulanin & Verbruggen, supra note 8, at 28–29.
Harrison Dinniss & Kleffner, supra note 36, at 441.
Moulin, supra note 15, at 21.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 24, ¶ 226 (“…In principle, the right
not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities”). See also Armed Activities on
the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J Rep. 168, ¶ 168 (Dec. 19). See,
in the context of the Islamic State, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts, Concluding Observations
on the Fourth Periodic Report of Iraq, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/IRQ/CO/4, ¶ 5 (Oct. 27, 2015).
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the extent that new military technologies such as autonomous weapons
systems, cyber capabilities, and human enhancement can potentially
harm the human rights of civilians or soldiers that are protected under
international law, their compatibility with these international law norms
should be part of an Article 36 legality review.
While the International Court of Justice (ICJ) considered IHL to be the
lex specialis which enjoys interpretive precedence over IHRL,97 this is not
necessarily the case with respect to legal areas where IHRL contains more
detailed norms or where IHL contains lacunae.98 For example, the prohibition against torture, which constitutes a grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions,99 should be interpreted during an armed conflict in light
of the Convention against Torture,100 and the right to privacy, which
is missing from IHL treaties,101 can be applied as part of IHRL, as long
as it does not contradict applicable IHL norms. In the latter context, it
has also been claimed in the literature, although State practice does not
appear to support this, that international law should adopt a pro humanitate presumption, favoring the international standard most protective
of human well-being.102 Accepting such a presumption might have led
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 24, ¶ 226 (“In principle, the right
not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities”). Other international
institutions have supported the view that both regimes apply simultaneously and have enriched
the discussion on this issue. The Human Rights Committee grants priority to the norm which
benefits the individual most in the relevant context, unlike the lex specialis suggested by the ICJ.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights (IACHR) also take a similar view to that prescribed by the Human Rights Committee.
See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of
Emergency, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001); Human Rights Committee, General
Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right
to Life, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018), ¶ 64 (“both spheres of law are complementary,
not mutually exclusive… practices inconsistent with international humanitarian law, entailing
a risk to the lives of civilians and other persons protected by international humanitarian law…
would also violate article 6 of the Covenant.”); Hassan v. United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09
(Sept. 16, 2014); Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00 (Feb. 24, 2005), ¶ 176; IACmHR, Juan
Carlos Abella (Tablada case), Case No. 11.137, Nov. 18, 1997, Annual Report of the IACmHR 1997
(OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev) 271. For a discussion by the African Commission of Human Rights,
see Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v. Sudan, May
27, 2009 (45th Ordinary Session).
98 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 106 (July 9); Martti Koskenniemi (Chairman of Int’l L. Comm.),
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of
International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006).
99 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 UNTS
135, art. 130; Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, art. 147 [hereinafter GC IV].
100 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
1984, UN Doc. A/39/51; Nigel S. Rodley, The Prohibition of Torture: Absolute Means Absolute, 34
Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 145 (2006).
101 For a discussion, see Asaf Lubin, The Rights to Privacy and Data Protection Under International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, R esearch H andbook on Human R ights and
Humanitarian L aw: F urther R eflections and Perspectives (Robert Kolb, Gloria Gaggioli &
Pavle Kilibarda eds., 2022).
102 William Schabas, Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law and the
Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus ad Bellum, 40 Israel L aw R eview 592, 593 (2007).
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to the application of the right to privacy even with respect to matters
directly regulated by IHL.

B CONSIDERATIONS OF PRIVACY IN
THE EVALUATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES
Article 17 of the ICCPR, which lays out the global IHRL right to privacy
norm, provides for the right of every person to be protected against arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, as well as against
unlawful attacks on his or her honor and reputation, whether emanating
from State authorities or from other legal persons.103 This right has been
understood as protective of core aspects of human dignity104 and autonomy105 and as an important condition for physical and mental well-being
and the enjoyment of other human rights.106 Unlike many other human
rights which are mirrored to a considerable extent by provisions of IHL,
the right to privacy and associated international law norms (such as
data protection obligations) enjoy only a very limited level of protection
under IHL.107
Article 17 deals with protection against interference which is unlawful,
namely not authorized in law, and with interference that is arbitrary,
a notion that the HRC, which is the expert body responsible for monitoring
the implementation of the ICCPR, has construed as including elements
of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability, reasonableness,
necessity, proportionality, and due process of law.108 From the States’
103 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966); UN Human Rights
Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), The Right to Respect of
Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation, Apr. 8, 1988,
¶ 1, https://www.refworld.org/docid/453883f922.html. See also European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, 5 E.T.S. (1950).
104 Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, App. No. 41288/15 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 117 (2020).
105 Reklos and Davourlis v. Greece, App. No. 1234/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 38 (2009).
106 For a discussion, see UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17
(Right to Privacy), The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of
Honour and Reputation, Apr. 8, 1988, ¶ 11, https://www.refworld.org/docid/453883f922.html.
107 See e.g., GC IV, art. 27 (“Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for
their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and
their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected
especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity”)
(emphasis added).
108 UN Human Rights Committee, Views adopted by the Committee under Article 5(4) of the
Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 2081/2011, CCPR/C/117/D/2081/2011, Sept. 29,
2016, ¶ 7.6, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G16/217/46/PDF/G1621746.
pdf?OpenElement. The ECHR also seeks to examine compatibility with the rule of law. See
European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights—Right to Respect for Private and Family Life, Aug. 31, 2020, ¶ 14, https://www.refworld.
org/docid/5a016ebe4.html. In addition, part of the evaluation of a possible infringement of the
right to privacy entails looking into the decision-making process leading to it (particularly if it
was fair, and if due respect was afforded to the rights of the individual). See Buckley v. United
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perspective, legitimate grounds for interference with the right to privacy
may include national security, public safety, public health, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.109
As indicated above, all three military technologies discussed in the
chapter have direct or indirect privacy implications, which may be relevant for Article 36 legality reviews: autonomous weapons depend on
extensive data collection, military use of cyberspace is likely to result in
a less secure online environment for personal data and metadata, and
human enhancement might imply a direct intervention in the human
body or mind or create conditions for digital surveillance and “brain
hacking.” Note that privacy harms potentially caused by the first two
technologies implicate methods of warfare employed to use such weapons
or means of warfare, whereas for the third technology, it is the weapon
or means themselves that might violate the right to privacy. Indeed,
human enhancement is the most challenging of the three new military
technologies, not only because of its more direct privacy implications
but also because of the magnitude of the challenge: the embedding of
digital technology in human bodies may entail a dramatic invasion of the
private sphere (even if consented to by the soldier in question), a change
in personal identity, and a dire threat to personal autonomy,110 given the
possibility for manipulating bodily functions, including brain activities.111
An Article 36 legality review process, which evaluates the legal implications of possible harm to privacy caused by new military technology,
should comprise a mapping of possible interferences with privacy, assessment of operational safeguards that can prevent or minimize any harm
caused, and analysis of possible circumstances that might nonetheless
justify the deployment of the reviewed technology. As indicated above,
significant changes in the technology—for example, following a technical version update—would arguably require a new review either at the
development stage or—especially when relying on private technology,
at the introduction to use stage.
With regard to autonomous weapons and cyber operations, the conceptual issues (heightened surveillance, lower cyber security) are rather

Kingdom, App. No. 20348/92 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996).
109 European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights—Right to Respect for Private and Family Life, Aug. 31, 2020, ¶ 1, https://www.refworld.org/
docid/5a016ebe4.html.
110 For a discussion, see Harrison Dinniss & Kleffner, supra note 36, at 453. There, Dinniss and
Kleffner discuss somewhat analogous cases of genetic and chromosomal abnormalities: X v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 8416/79, 19 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 244 (1980); H.L. v. United Kingdom,
2004-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 197; Zarzycki v. Poland, App. No. 15351/03 (2013) (ECtHR).
111 B oulanin & Verbruggen, supra note 8, at 30.
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straightforward, and the review should focus on issues such as harm
probabilities, safeguard or mitigation measures, and national security
thresholds for the application of such technology. With regard to human
enhancement, a more complex analysis will be required, bearing in mind
also the diverse scope of enhancement techniques. For example, one
aspect that might need consideration is the long-term personality modification and mental-well-being consequences for soldiers who have
undergone human enhancement112 and the possible harm to “personal
honour and reputation” that might accrue from social stigma or negative
public opinion against enhanced humans.113
In addition, as far as safeguards are concerned, it would be important to examine in the legality review process whether the enhancement
system is embedded in the body or removable, what maintenance and
version update operations are required, and whether it is possible to stop
recording data generated by the system when the soldier is off-duty114
or in private or intimate settings.115 Another set of safeguards—also relevant to extensive data collection operations intended to facilitate the
use of autonomous weapon systems—is the taking of effective measures
to ensure that data collected from human enhancement devices will not
reach the hands of persons who are not authorized by law to receive,
process, or use it.116 Finally, the legality review would have to consider
the question of consent to human enhancement—the manner in which
it is given; whether free, prior, and informed consent can be given in
military settings; and whether all foreseeable and unforeseeable harms
caused to the enhanced person can be cured or mitigated by any level of
consent.117 Cases where there is no free, prior, and informed consent by
the enhanced human will most probably lead to a violation of the right
to privacy, regardless of the actual impact of the technology at hand.
112
113

114
115

116

117

Moulin, supra note 15, at 25.
UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy),
The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and
Reputation, ¶ 11, Apr. 8, 1988, https://www.refworld.org/docid/453883f922.html.
Harrison Dinniss & Kleffner, supra note 36, at 464; Moulin, supra note 15, at 30.
Moulin, supra note 15, at 31. By a way of an analogy, the ECHR recognized in the past that
the lack of a divide between the sanitary facilities and the rest of the cell, in the context of
detention, constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment (a prohibition sharing several values
with right to privacy—physical and mental well-being, dignity, and the protection of autonomy).
See Szafrański v. Poland, App. No. 17249/12, Eur, Ct. H.R. ¶ 24, and ¶ 38 (2015).
UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy),
The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and
Reputation, Apr. 8, 1988, ¶ 10, https://www.refworld.org/docid/453883f922.html.
Efthimios Parasidis, Human Enhancement and Experimental Research in the Military, in Beyond
Bioethics: T oward a New Biopolitics 301 (Osagie K. Obasogie & Marcy Darnovsky eds., 2018).
See also Thibault Moulin, Doctors Playing Gods? The Legal Challenges in Regulating the Experimental
Stage of Cybernetic Human Enhancement, 54 Isr. L. R ev. 236–62 (2021); Sahar Latheef & Adam
Henschke, Can a Soldier Say No to an Enhancing Intervention? 5(3) Philosophies 13 (2020).
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As a result, the legality review may rule out any possible justification for
application in a military context of certain military enhancement technologies and provide contexts and conditions under which some other
enhancement technologies might be resorted to.
One consequence of accepting a duty to conduct a legality review
for monitoring privacy harm is the need to develop a suitable impact
assessment methodology. This is not a new insight: the ICRC’s SIrUS
Project, which brought together experts in the fields of weapons, medicine, law, and communications,118 demonstrated the challenge of developing measurable indicators for the health effects of different weapon
systems.119 The concluding report of that project asserted that the effects
of weapons on health should be the leading consideration when making
legal, ethical, technical, and political decisions with respect to them.120
Arguably, a similar need to develop indicators exists with regard to effects
on different dimensions of privacy needs and interests, especially given
the proven links between enjoyment of the right to privacy and physical
and mental health.121

CONCLUSION
Developments in the fields of autonomous weapons, cyber operations,
and human enhancement present new challenges for upholding IHRL in
general, and the right to privacy in particular, in military contexts. An
important mechanism for integrating privacy concerns in the development and introduction of new technologies into military use is the legality
review afforded Article 36 of API.
Given the privacy implications of all three technologies discussed in
the chapter—the reliance of autonomous weapons on extensive surveillance and data collection, the corrosive effects of cyber operations on cyber
security and data protection, and the potentially dramatic intervention
For an overview, see Douglas Holdstock, Jack Piachaud & Robin M. Coupland, The SIrUS Project
towards a Determination of Which Weapons Cause “Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering,” 14
M edicine, Conflict & Survival 243 (1998). For a critical view on this project, see Donna Marie
Verchio, Just Say No—The SIrUS Project: Well-Intentioned, but Unnecessary and Superfluous, 51 A.F. L.
R ev. 183 (2001).
119 Daoust et al., supra note 26, at 353; Holdstock et al., supra note 118.
120 Robin Coupland (ed.), T he SIrUS Project: T owards a Determination of Which Weapons
C ause “Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering” 13 (1997).
121 See Bensaid v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44599/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 47 (2001); Vasileva v.
Bulgaria, App No. 23796/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 63–69 (2016).
118
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in the bodies and minds of enhanced persons—Article 36 reviews are
arguably warranted for all three types of technologies, albeit under different Article 36 categories (weapons, means, methods). Such reviews
would need to delineate possible harms and consider safeguard measures
and the circumstances that would justify use. Ultimately, a new privacy
impact assessment methodology would need to be developed, covering
difficult issues such as consent, long-term harm, and indirect harms so
as to usefully utilize Article 36 legality reviews to effectively protect the
right to privacy.
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Chapter 3

LOAC and the
Protection and Use
of Digital Property
in Armed Conflict
Laurie R. Blank 1 and Eric Talbot Jensen2

INTRODUCTION
Data protection is one of the catchphrases of contemporary society and
an essential component of individual privacy and the smooth and secure
functioning of societies and economies. Digital property refers to any
information in digital form, whether online or housed in an electronic
storage device, and can include images, text, sounds, and video. As commonly understood, data protection refers to the process of and efforts
to secure and safeguard such digital property from loss, corruption, or
compromise, whether inadvertent or due to the nefarious actions of other
actors. The need to preserve and protect such digital property does not
disappear during armed conflict; in fact, it may well be stronger in the face
1
2
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International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory University School of Law.
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of efforts by the adversary, criminals, or other opportunistic actors to take
advantage of the chaos of conflict and gain access to such information.
Data is also critical to strategic, operational, and tactical decision-
making and action during armed conflict. Militaries rely on data for
targeting analysis and decisions; for assessing proportionality and other
precautionary obligations; for evaluating the strength, weaknesses, and
capabilities of the adversary; for humanitarian purposes; and for many
other considerations. Any cyber operations inherently use, manipulate, or,
at a minimum, encounter digital property or the storage or transit mechanisms for such property. The increasing reliance on new and emerging
technologies, including machine learning, during military operations and
conflict only reinforces the importance of analyzing and understanding
the appropriate parameters for the protection and use or exploitation of
data during armed conflict.
Although the Tallinn Manual and other recent literature have briefly
examined the treatment of data and digital property in the context of
cyber operations and issues during armed conflict, a more focused analysis of how the law of armed conflict’s (LOAC) rules on the protection
of property—including seizure and destruction, requisition and other
uses of property—apply to data and digital property can provide needed
clarity. Treaty law setting forth the protections for property and the
limits on seizure or destruction of property during military operations
first appeared in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which sought
to prevent total war and minimize war’s destructive impact on civilian
property and infrastructure. Applying the law in the context of digital
property may not, however, be as simple as translating the rules from
buildings to bytes. It introduces questions about the meaning of terms
such as property, seizure, destruction, war booty, and others in the digital
context. In addition, as with physical property, effective implementation
of the law requires analysis not only from the perspective of the needs and
rights of individuals to protect and continue to have use of and access to
their data but also in light of the military and operational needs of warring
parties to use, seize, and restrict access to data for military purposes.
Part I of this chapter identifies and frames the key issues, including the type of operations in question and the relevant actors and users
of digital property in such situations. In addition, this part briefly provides background on the relevant law of armed conflict rules governing
the seizure, destruction, and requisition of property during conflict and
the core preliminary question of whether data constitutes property for
purposes of the legal rules. Part II of this chapter then examines how
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each of the main legal rules applies in the digital space. A first question,
for example, concerns the types of actions with respect to data that constitute pillage and the types of data or digital property that fall within
the meaning of war booty as understood in customary international law.
Second, Part II analyzes the meaning and application to digital property of
Article 23(g) of the 1907 Hague Convention on the seizure and destruction
of property, including, for example, whether copying or a loss of functionality or access constitutes seizure and whether manipulation of data
could constitute destruction as traditionally understood. Finally, given the
extensive and increasing demand for data for many core functionalities
in military operations, the parameters for requisition of and access to
data are equally critical.

I

FRAMING THE ISSUE
A WHO AND WHAT
With the onset of the digital age, the transition of information to digital
sources has become an ever-increasing fact of modern life. One recent
study found that at the beginning of 2020, there were 44 zettabytes—that
is, 44,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 bytes—of data in the world. This
means that the number of bytes in the world is “40 times bigger than
the number of stars in the observable universe.”3 This number is estimated to more than triple by 2025. This vast transition of information
to electronic data significantly impacts society in general, dramatically
increasing the ease of access to virtually all sources of information. In
addition, data is not only the substantive content that can be transformed into information readily accessible to humans but also includes
the “‘raw material’ needed by computer systems to function.”4 Heather
Harrison Dinniss has helpfully described these two categories of data as
content-level data—the type of data that transforms into readily useable information—and operational-level data—the data that provides
3

4

Jeff Desjardins, How Much Data Is Generated Each Day? World Economic Forum, Apr. 17,
2019, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/04/how-much-data-is-generated-each-daycf4bddf29f/.
Robin Geiss & Henning Lahmann, Protection of Data in Armed Conflict, 97 Int’l. L. Stud. 556, 560
(2021).
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functionality and the ability to perform specific tasks.5 The internet, the
primary tool to access this information, was built on the foundational
premise of access superseding security.
Against this backdrop, the potential use of data in armed conflict
has also taken on increased significance, and the value of data to warring
parties is unquestioned. Examining the legal protections for such data and
the parameters for any action to use, destroy, or capture such information is therefore essential. The enormous growth of and interest in cyber
capabilities over the past two decades has led to a robust academic and
practitioner literature analyzing the application of international law to
attacks and other uses of force in the cyber arena.6 Such analysis includes
examination of what constitutes a lawful target of attack in cyberspace
or by cyber means and how to assess and minimize incidental harm to
civilians and civilian property in the course of such attacks (otherwise
commonly known as collateral damage). However, the literature has paid
little, if any, attention to protections for and use or exploitation of digital
property beyond the conduct of hostilities and attacks, the subject of this
chapter. Analyzing how the law of armed conflict applies to the seizure
and destruction of digital property does not address attacks, the deliberate
and incidental consequences of such actions, or the precautions required
to mitigate the risk to civilians. Rather—and importantly for the proper
application of the law—the rules on seizure and destruction of property
discussed below apply outside the context of attacks, such as the clearing
of property to enable passage of military vehicles or other actions to provide support for military operations. Countless actions taken with respect
to data and other digital information fall within this broader category of
actions outside of attacks, such as the seizure or erasure of military or
government data, the manipulation of images for propaganda purposes,
or the exploitation or destruction of civilian medical records, tax records,
or other information integral to everyday life.7
In addition to the type of data and how it might be used or destroyed,
another important question in exploring the legal framework is who
5
6

7

Heather Harrison Dinniss, The Nature of Objects: Targeting Networks and the Challenge of Defining
Cyber Military Objectives, 48 Isr. L. R ev. 39, 41 (2015).
See generally Tallinn M anual 2.0 on the International L aw A pplicable to C yber Operations (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017); Ashley Deeks, Noam Lubell & Daragh Murray, Machine
Learning, Artificial Intelligence, and the Use of Force by States, 10 J. Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y 1, 5 (2019);
Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 4, at 560.
See, e.g., Roy Schöndorf, Israel’s Perspective on Key Legal and Practical Issues Concerning the Application of International Law to Cyber Operations, 97 Int’l L. Stud. 395, 400 (2021) (“For this reason,
practices such as certain types of electronic warfare, psychological warfare, economic sanctions,
seizure of property, and detention have never been considered to be attacks as such, and, accordingly, were not considered as subject to LOAC targeting rules.”).
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might interact with such data during armed conflict. A range of actors
is likely to have an interest in various types of data in times of armed
conflict. For example, consider the data containing details on the sewer
and other underground utilities. An attacker, whether state or non-state,
would be interested in securing this data for many reasons, including
identifying the location of specific utility lines for both targeting and
non-targeting, as well as sewer lines and other transit-capable lines to
be able to interdict potential underground warfare.8 In addition to the
attacker, others would also be interested in access to and the protection of that data, including: (1) defending forces for similar reasons as
the attacker; and (2) the creators of the data, such as: (a) the administrator of the system upon which the data exists; and (b) the individuals
or entity responsible for securing that data, in order to preserve this
data from destruction or exploitation by one or both sides of the conflict.
Many other individuals, groups, or entities would be anxious to either
have access to or prevent access to various forms of data. In terms of
pertinent legal categories, interested parties involve a broad spectrum
that includes combatants or fighters, civilians who are directly participating in hostilities on either a one-time or recurring basis, members
of organized armed groups, criminal enterprises, civilians assisting one
side of a conflict, and non-participating civilians whose data may be at
risk. In addition, humanitarian relief organizations and other external
actors will have relevant goals and interests with respect to their own
data and that of others.

B THE LAW
The law of armed conflict regulates the treatment and disposal of property
during armed conflict. In particular, both treaty and customary international law prohibit the destruction or seizure of enemy property unless
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war, prohibit pillage, set
rules for the requisition of property by military forces, and provide for
the capture of war booty.9 Part II of this chapter below examines each of
these rules regarding the use or abuse of property in the specific context of
digital property, highlighting key issues and challenges in how these longstanding rules apply in this contemporary and quickly evolving domain.
8
9

See generally Daphné R ichemond-Barak, Underground Warfare (2019).
See generally William Gerald Downey, Jr., Captured Enemy Property: Booty of War and Seized Enemy
Property, 44 AM. J. Int’l L. 488 (1950).
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First, the law forbids pillage in all types of conflict, whether international or non-international. Pillage is the act of taking, for private
or personal use, any public or private property belonging to the enemy
State; to wounded, sick, or shipwrecked persons; or to prisoners of war
by a party to an armed conflict.10 Pillage is generally synonymous with
looting and plunder, and most military manuals treat all three acts in an
identical manner.11 In addition, international courts adjudicating charges
of pillage post-World War II have not limited the crime to members of
armed forces but have included non-state actors and entities.12
A soldier who takes a camera from a civilian or prisoner of war and
keeps it for her own use therefore commits the war crime of pillage. In
contrast, seizure of enemy property for use by the armed forces is permissible when that property falls within the meaning of war booty. Customary international law has long permitted a party to an international armed
conflict to seize as war booty all enemy public movable property and any
enemy private movable property that is “susceptible to direct military
use.”13 Public property is property that belongs to the State or an agency of
the State, such as any military or government property. Although private
property is protected from seizure as a general rule, any such property
that is susceptible to direct military use, such as “arms, ammunition,
military papers or property that can be used as military equipment (e.g.,
as a means of transportation or communication),”14 can be captured as
war booty. During non-international armed conflict, however, the law
includes no provision for the capture of property as war booty.
With regard to the seizure and destruction of property, the primary
rule appears in Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations of 1907, which
states that it is forbidden to “destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless
10

11
12
13

14

See Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land arts. 28, 47, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277,
T.S. 539 [hereinafter Hague IV]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 33(2), 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 4(2)(g), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(b)(xvi), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90; Australian Defence Force, Law of Armed Conflicts—Commander’s Guide ¶¶ 743, 1224;
Office of the Judge Advocate, Canadian Armed Forces, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational
and Tactical Level, at 12–18; Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, L aw
of War M anual § 5.17.4.1 (2015, rev’d Dec. 2016) [hereinafter D oD L aw of War M anual].
Christopher D. Greulich & Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Pillage, 26 S outhwestern J. Int’l L. 264,
267 (2020).
Id. at 278.
D oD L aw of War M anual, supra note 10, § 5.17.3. See also L auterpacht, II Oppenheim’s
International L aw 406 (§144) (“Private enemy property on the battlefield is no longer in every
case an object of booty. Arms, horses, and military papers may indeed be appropriated, even if
they are private property, as may also private means of transport, such as cars and other vehicles
which an enemy may make use of.”).
D oD L aw of War M anual, supra note 10, § 5.17.3.
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such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities
of war.”15 Commonly accepted justifications for seizure or destruction of
property imperatively demanded by the necessities of war include actions
that provide support for military operations or diminish the enemy’s
ability to conduct or sustain military operations. In contrast, wanton or
extensive destruction of property not justified by military necessity is a
grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and a war crime.16 Any destruction of property thus must have a reasonable connection to the effort to
overcome the adversary—“[d]evastation as an end in itself or as a separate measure of war is not sanctioned by the law of war.”17 Destruction
or seizure of property will be accepted as “imperatively demanded by the
necessities of war” when it contributes to military operations or hampers
or neutralizes the adversary’s ability to pursue its own military objectives or campaign. Consider, for example, the seizure of trucks, railroad
cars, or other means of transportation to transport supplies or troops, or
destroying buildings or cutting down trees to deny the enemy cover or
to clear a field of fire.18 In essence, the rules on seizure and destruction
of property balance the goal of having war “affect private citizens and
their property as little as possible”19 with the recognition that, in armed
conflict, “military necessity justifies behaviour (seizure and destruction
of property) which otherwise would be unlawful.”20
Finally, during occupation, although the occupying party may not
seize private enemy property, it may requisition such property to fulfill
the needs of the occupying forces. Any property deemed necessary for
the maintenance of the army may be requisitioned, such as “fuel, food,
clothing, building materials, machinery, tools, vehicles, or furnishings for
quarters.”21 The occupying power must either pay for the requisitioned
property in cash at the time of the requisition or provide a receipt and
subsequent payment as soon as possible.
15

16

17
18
19
20

21

Hague IV, supra note 10, art. 23(g). The First, Second, and Fourth Geneva Conventions also include
rules to this effect. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 33, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, arts. 22–25, 27–28, 38–39, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention IV, arts. 18, 19, 53.
Geneva Convention 1, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, art. 51; Geneva Convention IV, art. 147;
Statute of the ICTY, art. 2(d); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 8(2)(b)(xiii),
8(2)(e)(xii), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
Department of the A rmy, FM 27–10, T he L aw of L and Warfare ¶ 56 (1956) (Change 1976).
D oD L aw of War M anual, supra note 10, § 5.17.2.2.
Partial Award—Civilians Claims, Eritrea’s Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27–32 ¶ 125, Eri-Eth. Cl. Comm. (2005).
M ichael N. S chmitt, Charles H.B. G arraway & Yoram Dinstein, T he M anual on the L aw
of Non-International A rmed C onflict with C ommentary 55 (2006), http://www.dur.ac.uk/
resources/law/NIACManualIYBHR15th.pdf.
FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C, T he Commander’s H andbook on the L aw of L and Warfare, ¶ 6–103
(2019).
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II

USE AND PROTECTION OF DIGITAL
PROPERTY
As the brief background on the law above highlights, these rules regarding
the protection, destruction, and seizure of property center on the concept
of property and, more specifically, “enemy property.” Enemy property
includes both public and private property, whether movable or immovable. International law does not include a specific definition of enemy
property,22 but the term is generally understood to mean the property
of the adversary in the armed conflict. Such property is generally on the
territory of the adversary State or “belong[s] to individuals or entities
aligned with or with allegiance to a party to the conflict adverse or hostile
to the perpetrator.”23
To apply this existing treaty law to cyber data effectively, determining whether cyber data equates to “property” as contemplated in these
legal documents is an essential predicate.24 However, neither treaty commentaries nor international or domestic jurisprudence offer any guidance
on this question. The Tallinn Manual does consider the nature of digital
data, predominantly with respect to whether it constitutes an “object”
with respect to the law of armed conflict and targeting, a critical issue
for the application of the core principles of distinction, proportionality,
and precautions. The majority of participating experts determined that
data is not an object,25 sparking extensive debate among scholars and
practitioners supporting26 and arguing against27 the manual’s conclusions. Unfortunately, few States have commented directly on this issue,
providing little help in advancing the debate.28 Although the question of
22

23
24

25
26

27
28

Note that the First, Second, and Fourth Geneva Conventions refer not to “property of the
adversary” but to “property protected by the Convention.” Geneva Convention I, art. 50; Geneva
Convention II, art. 51; Geneva Convention IV, art. 147.
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on
Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 310 (Int’l Crim. Court, Sept. 30, 2008).
See Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 4, where they argue that only “content level data” presents
difficult issues and that operational-level data should be understood as an operation not against
data but rather against the system itself.
Tallinn M anual, supra note 6, cmt. to r. 100, ¶ 6, at 437.
Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 4, at 566–67; Ori Pomson, ‘Objects’? The Legal Status of Computer Data
under International Humanitarian Law, Mar. 1, 2021, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3795479 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3795479.
Dinniss, supra note 5; Kubo Mačák, Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for Interpreting Computer Data as
Objects under International Humanitarian Law, 48 Isr. L. R ev. 55 (2015).
See Schöndorf, supra note 7, at 401; Norway, Chief of Defence, M anual of the L aw of A rmed
Conflict 210 (2013) 210; Danish M inistry of Defence, M ilitary M anual on International
L aw R elevant to Danish A rmed Forces in International Operations 292 (Jes Rynkeby
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property for the instant discussion of the law of armed conflict’s rules
on seizure and destruction is broader, with “object” a subset of property,
the Tallinn Manual’s analysis regarding the status of data as an object is
instructive, as are subsequent developments in the intervening decade.
The Tallinn Manual experts focused on the “intangible” nature of
data and argued that, as a result, data “[n]either falls within the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the term object, nor comports with the explanation
of it offered in the ICRC Additional Protocols 1987 Commentary.”29 In
contrast, the minority of the experts argued that, “at a minimum, civilian data that is ‘essential’ to the well-being of the civilian population is
encompassed in the notion of civilian objects and protected as such.”30
This decision carries significant import. “If data is an object, the rule
on distinction applies and international humanitarian law prohibits the
targeting of civilian data in the context of an armed conflict. If data does
not constitute an object, the targeting of data per se is not unlawful and
the rule on distinction does not apply.”31 Critically, for those identifying
data as an object, “the limitation with the majority position is not that
military code cannot be targeted. Rather, it is that civilian code can also
be targeted. Because the majority does not consider code an object, the
law of targeting does not apply to operations directed against it.”32
The Tallinn Manual experts took a similar approach—and were also
split in a debate—with respect to data as property. For similar reasons as
those noted above with respect to data as object, a majority determined
that “sensu stricto, data does not qualify as property.”33 This, of course,
does not mean that data has no protections. Some indirect protection
accrues to data at rest, because cyber infrastructure such as computers and servers receives protection as property. As with the question of
whether data is an object, a minority of the experts argued that “data
can qualify as property.”34
Ten years after those initial discussions, it is unclear whether the
Tallinn Manual experts would reach the same conclusion on either data
as object or data as property. The International Committee of the Red

29
30
31
32
33
34

Knudsen ed., 2016); Ministère des Armées de France, Droit international appliqué aux opérations
dans le cyberespace 16 (2019); Ori Pomson, ‘Objects’? The Legal Status of Computer Data under
International Humanitarian Law, Mar. 1, 2021, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3795479 or http://dx.doi.
org/10.2139/ssrn.3795479.
Tallinn M anual, supra note 6, cmt. to r. 100, ¶ 6, at 437.
Id. cmt. to r. 100, ¶ 7, at 437.
Tim McCormack, International Humanitarian Law and the Targeting of Data, 94 Int’l L. Stud. 222,
227 (2018).
Id. 232.
Tallinn M anual, supra note 6, cmt. to r. 149, ¶ 3, at 550.
Id.
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Cross takes a more inclusive approach, arguing that “data belonging to
certain categories of objects... enjoy specific protection under IHL,” with
specific mention of data belonging to medical facilities.35 Some of the
Tallinn Manual experts have expressly changed their views with regard
to the nature of data as an object since the first Manual was published.36
In addition, although the general consensus appears to be that digital
information is not property as so understood for domestic law purposes,37
courts in several countries have begun to affirm that digital information
is property within the context of criminal law and other relevant legal
regimes. These developments may demonstrate a shift in the understanding of how to conceptualize data and digital information in the context of
longstanding legal frameworks, definitions, and categories. For example,
the Supreme Court of New Zealand held in 2017 that digital information
is property because “digital files can be identified, have a value and are
capable of being transferred to others. They also have a physical presence,
albeit one that cannot be detected by means of the unaided senses.”38
States have not expressed any consensus on the nature of digital
information as property in the context of international law generally or
the law of armed conflict specifically. Given the strong minority view
favoring the treatment of data and digital information as property and
the apparent trend in this direction and towards greater recognition of
protections for data, this chapter examines the application of the relevant law of armed conflict rules as if data is, or will soon be, considered
property during times of armed conflict.

A PILLAGE AND WAR BOOTY
As stated above, pillage is “the non-consensual taking of public or private property... during armed conflict for private or personal use.”39
Members of a State’s armed forces, of non-state organized armed groups,
35
36
37

38

39

Int’l Comm. Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed
Conflicts, 97 Int’l R ev. R ed Cross 1427, 1478 (2016).
McCormack, supra note 31, at 240.
See, e.g., Oxford v. Moss, (1979) 68 Cr App R 183 (QB); R v. Stewart, [1988] 1 SCR 963; TS & B
Retail Systems Pty Ltd v. 3Fold Resources Pty Ltd (No 3) [2007] FCA 151. For a detailed discussion,
see João Marinotti, Tangibility as Technology, 37 G a . S. Univ. L. R ev. 671, 723 n. 238 (2021).
Dixon v. R [2015] NZSC 147, [2016] 1 NZLR 678, at 25. Several efforts at proposed legislation in the
United States have sought to establish property rights in data, such as the “Own Your Own Data
Act of 2019” introduced by Senator John Kennedy or California governor Gavin Newsom’s proposed
“data dividend.” Cameron F. Kerry & John B. Morris, Jr., Why Data Ownership Is the Wrong Approach
to Protecting Privacy, Brookings Institution, June 26, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
techtank/2019/06/26/why-data-ownership-is-the-wrong-approach-to-protecting-privacy/.
Greulich & Jensen, supra note 11, at 267.
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of transnational terrorist and criminal groups, and even individuals and
corporations can be guilty of pillage. Thus, not only would a uniformed
member of United States Cyber Command (CyberCom) who steals private
digital data for personal use during an armed conflict be prosecutable for
pillage, but a civilian employee of the National Security Agency (NSA)
would also be guilty of such an offense. Indeed, a government contractor
working for a private cyber company that is contracted to the US government would also be potentially guilty of pillage if he or she committed
the same type of act with a nexus to the armed conflict.
For example, consider that during an armed conflict between State A
and State B, a defense contractor in State B is shipping defense goods and
articles to its military to assist with operations, and State A’s cyber team
hacks into the contractor’s computer systems to disrupt the shipping of
goods by deleting or corrupting the tracking data for military shipments.
While in the defense contractor’s systems, a member of the cyber team
uncovers computer data containing trade secrets for certain items that
the contractor produces.
If the member of the cyber team took those trade secrets and then
sold them for private gain, he or she would be guilty of pillage: the trade
secrets are the private property of the defense contractor, and the cyber
operator takes that property for personal gain. Questions that could arise
here include the meaning of “taking” digital property: does “taking”
include only the removal of such digital property such that it no longer
exists in the original server, file, or other storage capacity, or does it also
include copying the digital information in order to use it for personal
gain while still leaving its original content in its original location? The
purpose of the prohibition of pillage strongly suggests that both scenarios fall within the meaning of taking property, because both involve the
undesirable and prohibited act of private gain.
In contrast, if the cyber operator instead removes or copies trade
secrets or other digital information for the development of weapons or
for supply chain logistics on behalf of State A (i.e., does not keep or sell
such data for private gain), such digital property would constitute war
booty and would—at least in this international armed conflict between
State A and State B—be lawful. Any such data that belongs to State B is
automatically war booty as enemy public property, and if the data belongs
to the defense contractor, both weapons data and supply chain logistics
are “susceptible to direct military use”40 and become war booty. If, for
40

D oD L aw of War M anual, supra note 10, § 5.17.3 (2015, rev’d 2016).
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example, the Taliban’s reported seizure of biometric data during and after
the United States withdrawal had occurred during an international armed
conflict, it would constitute war booty—public enemy property seized on
the battlefield. Property lawfully taken as war booty becomes the property
of the capturing state; it does not need to be returned and may even be
destroyed.41 As another example, if State A’s operators hack into State
B’s government cryptocurrency wallet and transfer the cryptocurrency
into State A’s government account, such data-taking would be considered war booty, not theft, and would not be a violation of international
law. In the context of digital information, the notion of war booty thus
becomes enormously consequential—a state that acquires data belonging to its adversary state may keep it, a significant boost to its own
capabilities, or may destroy it altogether, at equally significant cost to
the adversary. Measures to protect such data, and to encourage or even
require equivalent protection of private data that is “susceptible to direct
military use,” are therefore essential, indeed existential, in contemporary
and future conflicts.

B SEIZURE AND DESTRUCTION
The question of whether data and other digital information constitutes
property within the meaning of the law of armed conflict is of particular consequence for the law’s broader proscriptions on the seizure
and destruction of property. The basic rule, as stated above, is that the
seizure or destruction of property outside the context of attacks is prohibited unless imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. If data
is not property, the Hague and Geneva proscriptions42 will not apply
to the seizure or destruction of any data, regardless of whether it is
public or private, or military or non-military in use, leaving States and
other parties to armed conflict free to do so pending some other explicit
prohibition. In effect, if data is not property, the law does not appear
to prohibit a State or other conflict actor from taking any data from the
enemy State or private persons or entities during armed conflict and using
it for its own purposes. Similarly, the restraints of Hague and Geneva
would not preclude the destruction of any data—the LOAC obligations
mandating protection for civilian property during targeting or during

41
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Int’l Comm. R ed Cross, C ustomary International Humanitarian L aw, Rule 49.
See supra note 10.
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military operations more generally would not protect data from damage
or destruction, since data is not property and thus does not fall within
the ambit of the rules. Article 57 of Additional Protocol I’s constant care
obligation would offer some protection where restraint with respect to
data is relevant to “spar[ing] the civilian population, civilians and civilian
objects,”43 for all Additional Protocol I treaty parties and all States to the
extent that the provision reflects customary international law. However,
the general restraints on the conduct of attacks found in the remainder
of Article 57, as well as the obligation to take feasible precautions against
the effects of attacks found in Article 58, would not strictly apply, leaving
data in a precarious position, as noted above.
Assuming, however, that States may come to consider data to be
property, the LOAC prohibits the seizure and destruction of data unless
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Notably, as explained
above, the rules for seizure and destruction do not apply to objects that
qualify as military objectives or to incidental harm caused in the context
of an attack on a lawful military objective. Thus, for example, if data is
indeed an object, then data meeting the definition of a military objective, such as military troop movements or weapons development plans
or schedules, falls outside the scope of this rule and can be attacked in
accordance with the core principles of targeting. Similarly, incidental
erasure or damage to civilian data in the course of such attack is not
unlawful as long as such damage is not excessive in relation to the military advantage gained from the attack.
Many other types of digital information might be susceptible to
destruction or seizure in the course of conflict but do not qualify as military objectives. For example, one party to a conflict might seek to seize
data on local utilities and location of utility infrastructure for use as it
advances into enemy territory, or might destroy meteorological data to
hamper the adversary’s planning. Applying the LOAC’s rules—primarily
set forth in Article 23(g) of the 1907 Hague Regulations—to the protection of such digital property thus requires an analysis of the meaning of
three terms with respect to data: destruction, seizure, and “imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war.”
Destruction includes acts such as demolishing, destroying, or otherwise damaging property. An action that wipes away certain data should
43

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 57(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. See also Asaf
Lubin, The Duty of Constant Care and Data Protection in War, in Big Data and A rmed Conflict:
Legal Issues A bove and Below the A rmed Conflict T hreshold (Berg & Dickinson, eds.,
forthcoming, 2022).
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qualify as demolishing or destroying in the context of digital information:
the information existed, and then it did not. Damaging may be a more
elusive concept and could include corrupting or manipulating the data
but leaves open questions of temporality and repairability, issues with
which the Tallinn Manual experts wrestled in considering the level of
cyber action constituting an attack.44 For example, a state planning to
attack and take control of the adversary’s main airfield might seek to
disable the traffic lights on the surrounding streets in order to clog the
roads and slow down the adversary’s ability to muster forces in response.
Deleting the data altogether would fall within the meaning of destruction,
but other avenues for altering data, such as adjusting the timing indicators, corrupting the sensors, or other actions, require further inquiry
in considering whether they would constitute damage or destruction.
More challenging, perhaps, is how to apply the notion of “seizure” to
digital information. Although no formal definition of “seizure” appears
in treaty or case law, the term is generally accepted to refer to the custody or use of property, such as by appropriation or control, a relatively
straightforward concept for physical items. One might gain control of data
in a variety of ways beyond or in a different manner than this physical
concept of taking custody, however, such as using, copying, corrupting,
or preventing access to it. An action that prevents the original owner from
using or accessing the data, such as encryption or changing passwords,
should fall squarely within the notion of seizure, including when such
actions are temporary or episodic. The use, copying, manipulation, or
corruption of data is a harder question, because the original owner seems
to still have access to the data in some fashion. By a strict and technical
interpretation of seizure, such actions might be excluded, but a more
purpose-driven interpretation based on the LOAC’s goal of minimizing
the effect and dangers of war for the civilian population could properly
encompass such acts.
The generally accepted understanding of “imperatively demanded by
the necessities of war”—supporting military operations or diminishing
the enemy’s ability to conduct such operations—is likely to encompass large categories, types, and quantities of data, including any digital
information regarding infrastructure, population movements, or personal
identifying information. Consider the example above with the traffic lights
en route to the airfield. The traffic-light data is not a military objective
44

Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 6, cmt. to r. 92, ¶ 10, at 417 (after “extensive discussion,”
a majority was of the view that “interference with functionality qualifies as damage if restoration
of functionality requires replacement of physical components”).
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and cannot be attacked, but its destruction or damage surely contributes
to diminishing the adversary’s ability to conduct operations. Similarly,
if State A is occupying State B, the seizure of digital maintenance records
of key infrastructure, or the local criminal and prison records, would be
necessary for State A to fulfill its role as occupying power. Similarly, when
taking the obligatory feasible precautions in launching an attack that
might affect a water treatment plant, the attacker would want information regarding that infrastructure, or information regarding sewers and
subway tunnels for any subterranean maneuvers or to protect individuals in underground shelters. Actions going far beyond this criterion of
“imperatively demanded by the necessities of war,” such as deleting or
destroying all banking data throughout the country, for example, would
violate the prohibition on wanton or extensive destruction of data not
justified by military necessity, thus constituting a war crime and a grave
breach of the Geneva Conventions.

C REQUISITION
The rules on requisition mirror those of seizure, with the exception
that they apply to private property in occupation and require immediate payment or a voucher. As with seizure, the Tallinn Manual experts
concluded that data was not property with respect to requisition,45
meaning that an occupying force that took data from private entities
would ordinarily not have to comply with the rules on compensation
for requisition of private property.46 However, if data is considered to be
property, or becomes considered as property, the rules on compensation
would apply. For example, when State A is occupying a portion of State
B, if State A wanted to gather historical commercial consumption data
from a retail store in order to continue to provide a steady stream of goods
for the civilians in occupied territory, then State A would be required to
purchase that data at market price.
Once data has been requisitioned (or seized as discussed above) lawfully under the applicable law, that data can be put to use as described previously. However, it is important to note that at some point after requisition
(or seizure), obligations may arise with respect to the disposition of that
data by way of human rights law, as discussed elsewhere in this volume.
45
46

Id. cmt. to r. 149, ¶ 3, at 550.
Id. (“[T]his fact [that data is not property] does not preclude the Occupying Power from making
use of State data for its military operations.”).
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LOOKING FORWARD
The growing use of new and emerging technologies and the essential role
of data in both everyday life and armed conflict only serve to emphasize
the need for further research and discourse regarding the protection and
use of digital information during armed conflict. As a starting point, the
protections for certain categories of data—based on its use or nature,
regardless of whether it falls within the definition of property—may
offer lessons for the development of further granularity across all types
of digital information. These existing protections for medical data, the
data of POWs and civilian internees, digital cultural property, and the data
of neutrals are integral to the fulfillment of the LOAC’s core purposes of
protecting those not involved with the conflict and those who are hors
de combat, as well as ensuring the preservation of functions and services
essential to the civilian population. Several of the other chapters in this
volume highlight specific issues in this regard, laying the foundation for
further research and analysis in the future.
First, medical data and “data that form an integral part of the operations or administration of medical units and transports” is protected
at all times.47 For example, if a State involved in an international armed
conflict aims to undermine the confidence of the adversary State in its
medical records, including its blood typing, gaining access to the medical
records of individuals in that State and changing the blood type would
be a violation of the LOAC. Indeed, accessing the data and not changing
it but leaving the impression that the information was corrupted would
also be unlawful.
Second, data collected as part of the internment of civilian internees
or detention of prisoners of war must be protected from disclosure and
maintained separately from other data that may be targetable as a military objective.48 Such protections include the data containing information
at initial in-processing and throughout the internment, as well as data
concerning the location of the remains of deceased persons.
A third area of current protection for data in the LOAC is cultural
property. Notwithstanding the continued uncertainty regarding the status
of data as property for the purposes of the LOAC, a majority of the Tallinn

47
48

Id. cmt. to r. 132, ¶ 3, at 515.
Id. cmt. to r. 135, ¶ 4, at 521. See also Emily Crawford’s chapter in this volume.
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Manual experts argued that “digital manifestations of cultural property
are entitled to … protection... when the original is either inaccessible
or has been destroyed.”49 In this case, the data comprising the digital
manifestation would be protected, not necessarily because it is data, but
because it comprises cultural property.
Finally, any use or destruction of, or damage to, a neutral country’s data, regardless of whether it is characterized as property, would
likely amount to a violation of neutrality in accordance with the rules
on neutrality during international armed conflict. As the Tallinn Manual
explains, the violation of a neutral country’s cyber infrastructure or a
neutral country allowing use of its cyber infrastructure by a belligerent
would violate the doctrine of neutrality.50 Presumably, neutral data would
also fall within this rule. Consider, for example, an armed conflict between
State A and State B, during which a computer engineering company in
neutral State C sells computer software to State B. If State A hacks into
the computer engineering company in State C and inserts malware into
the software that will be sold to State B in order to infect State B’s government computer systems, State A would be violating international law.
Looking forward, further exploration and analysis of the LOAC’s rules
on the use, seizure, and destruction of digital property during armed
conflict will be important for protecting the rights and needs of individuals with respect to their own digital information and for determining the
appropriate parameters governing the rights and obligations of parties
to armed conflict in terms of using, destroying, seizing, or restricting
access to digital information.

49
50

Id. cmt. to r. 142, ¶ 6, at 535.
Id. cmt. to r. 150–53, at 553–61.
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From Telegraphs
to Terabytes:
The Implications of
the Law of Neutrality
for Data Protection
by “Third” States and
the Corporations
Within Them
Jacqueline Van De Velde 1

INTRODUCTION
Parties to a conflict2 are increasingly recipients of data or internet-
related services from technology companies situated in States otherwise unconnected to the conflict. Social networks must consider whether
to moderate content in situations where the laws of war (international
1
2

Jacqueline Van De Velde is an associate at King & Spalding, LLP. The author’s views are her own.
For the purposes of this chapter, a “conflict situation” is a situation where international humanitarian law applies and could therefore include instances of occupation. Although neutrality law
is formally only triggered by international armed conflicts, recent scholarship has suggested its
application to non-international armed conflicts, which we also consider.
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humanitarian law) may be applicable; technology companies selling data
storage/processing tools must assess the implications of their use by belligerents; and technology companies must evaluate State-issued customer
data requests, ranging from subpoenas to national security requests.3 In
such scenarios, the State receiving the data or service is typically other
than the one where the technology company is headquartered, data is
stored, or from whence a response travels. In international legal parlance,
the company is situated in a “third” State.
Because data transfer impacts the digital rights—including privacy
and data protection — of those whose data is requested or used, it is critical to determine the international legal obligations owed by States where
a corporation is headquartered or stores data. Beyond the perennial issue
that some States disclaim extraterritorial human rights obligations, corporate involvement complicates or limits the application of human rights
law, given attribution issues and less-defined corporate responsibility.
Uncertainties are especially pronounced for positive human rights and
due diligence obligations.
A longstanding, albeit “slightly musty,”4 area of international
humanitarian law — the law of neutrality — is well-configured to address
such limitations, but its application remains unexplored.5 As a doctrine,
neutrality law originated to define the legal relationship between belligerents and third parties. Because it is triggered by the existence of armed
conflict,6 it provides a provenance of obligation that must be turned to. But
in addition, neutrality law should be turned to, given its historic concern
with private actors (including those involved with the high tech of the
time, e.g., telegraph towers and submarine cables). Never mind that,
3

4
5

6

See, e.g., Kim Lyons, Myanmar Orders Internet Providers to Block Twitter and Instagram in the
Country, The Verge, Feb. 6, 2021, 10:10AM EST, https://www.theverge.com/2021/2/6/22269831/
myanmar-orders-block-twitter-facebook-instagram-military-coup#:~:text=%E2%80%9CAll%20mobile%20operators%2C%20international%20gateways,company%20Telenor%20
said%20in%20a; Ellen Nakashima, Report: Web Monitoring Devices Made by U.S. Firm Blue Coat
Detected in Iran, Sudan, Washington Post, July 8, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/report-web-monitoring-devices-made-by-us-firm-blue-coat-detected-iniran-sudan/2013/07/08/09877ad6-e7cf-11e2-a301-ea5a8116d211_story.html. Compare Facebook,
Government Requests for User Data, https://transparency.facebook.com/government-data-requests
(noting that between January and June 2020, Facebook received 173,592 total requests for data,
including requests from India (33,374), Pakistan (1,358), Ukraine (9), and Iraq (9)), with Rule of
Law in Armed Conflicts, Conflicts, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian L aw and
Human R ights, https://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts (recording international armed conflicts
between India and China, between India and Pakistan, and in Ukraine, Iraq, and Syria).
See Committee for the Red Cross, Neutrality in Cyber War, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/
Neutrality_in_Cyber_War_for_web.pdf.
Notably, neutrality law has been discussed in great detail in the context of cyber operations,
and in particular the extent to which IHL applies to them. However, cyber attacks are only one
example of the type of conflict issues that implicate digital rights. A broader examination of the
role of neutrality and digital rights in respect to armed conflict situations is thus warranted.
See Rebecca Ingber, Untangling Belligerency from Neutrality in the Conflict with Al-Qaeda, 47 T ex.
Int’l L. J. 75, 79 (2011).
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at the time of the doctrine’s conception, belligerents and neutrals were
telegraph operators and kings: when technology companies transfer data
or provide services from a neutral State to an entity in a belligerent State,
the same legal relationship is in play. Just as importantly, neutrality law
clarifies the scope and content of States’ obligations and rights towards
private actors. This chapter is the first to address the operation of neutrality principles in relation to data transfer affecting digital rights in
conflict situations, as well as to import the doctrine concerning private
actors into this context.
This chapter examines four aspects of neutrality law applied to data
transfer. First, it analyzes two threshold issues: the extent to which:
(a) digital goods can be analogized to instruments of warfare, as recognized under neutrality law (e.g., data transfer to telecommunications, data
processing tools to munitions,7 and social networking to something in
between); and (b) neutrality law’s utility in digital spaces, versus traditional territorial divisions.8
Second, this chapter identifies conditions under which neutral States
are obligated to monitor or prevent data distribution/tools for use in
conflict — e.g., limit data tool provision to conflicts where the capability
is likely to be asymmetrically accessed and used by one side.9
Third, it presents scenarios where impartiality and prevention of
neutrality violations, among more specific neutrality duties, are capable of regulating corporate conduct where human rights may not. For
instance, recent examples suggest that technology companies sometimes comply with neutrality principles, including by modifying corporate
behavior based on normative assessments of belligerents, with potentially rights-advancing outcomes.10 It also considers whether and how
7

8

9

10

See, e.g., Nakashima, supra note 3 (reporting the detection of technological devices produced by
U.S.-based technology companies for internet monitoring, on government networks in Iran and
Sudan during periods of armed conflict and noting uncertainty about whether their sale and
delivery violated U.S. sanctions laws).
See Noam Neuman, Neutrality and Cyberspace: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Reality, 97 Int’l
L. Stud. 765, 766–71 (2021) (noting that neutrality law was developed with attention to the
concrete attributes of the physical domains of land, sea, and air).
See, e.g., Ryan Gallagher, Belarusian Officials Shut Down Internet with Technology Made by U.S. Firm,
Bloomberg, Aug. 28, 2020, 7:22 AM EDT, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/202008-28/belarusian-officials-shut-down-internet-with-technology-made-by-u-s-firm
(describing alleged deployment of deep packet inspection (DPI) equipment by the Belarusian
government to interrupt internet access before a contested election—equipment that had been
manufactured by a U.S. corporation—and discussing the use of similar equipment in Iran, Egypt,
and Turkey). Although State sanctions regimes were designed to, and generally do, capture
physical goods transported for use in armed conflict, it is less clear to what extent services transferred entirely over the internet are captured by those systems.
See, e.g., Eric Auchard, Yahoo Settles Case over Chinese Dissident E-Mails, Reuters, Nov. 13, 2007, 2:13
PM, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yahoo-china/yahoo-settles-case-over-chinese-dissident-e-mails-idUSN1360603420071113. It is not difficult to imagine similar conduct occurring
in the context of armed conflict, although most such examples are likely classified. Moreover,
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neutrality law is capable of governing corporations’ now quasi-sovereign
status: while distinctions between the actors and the centrality of territory in the lex lata present challenges, State neutrality rules may imply
a heightened duty to ensure neutrality compliance for quasi-sovereigns.
Fourth, this chapter considers how neutrality law can complicate
digital rights protection, through contradictions among rules applicable
to different territories or certain rules’ direct operation.
While acknowledging the limitations to neutrality law’s application
in the data transfer context, this chapter demonstrates that neutrality
law can serve a clarifying — even gap-filling — role with respect to digital
rights protection in conflict.

I

THE ORIGINS OF NEUTRALITY LAW
AND ITS MODERN LEGAL STATUS
Shaped over the 18th and 19th centuries and codified in the 20th century,
neutrality law developed alongside—and in response to—tremendous
technological advances in warfare and business. Telephone and telegraph wires made communications more efficient,11 while the internal
combustion engine accelerated transport and manufacturing alike.12 But
these inventions had military impacts, too. Now military communications could race across neutral States in telegraph cables, and steamships could quickly supply an enemy with weapons or munitions,
undetected.
Thus neutrality law arose, defining the relationship between parties
engaged in armed conflict (belligerents) and those not engaged in armed
conflict (neutrals).13 Neutrality limits the scope of warfare in two ways: it
protects the territorial sovereignty of neutral States from warfare’s spillover effects while shielding belligerents from potential State or corporate

11
12
13

we will point out how even narrower duties derived from the corpus of neutrality law—e.g.,
the duty to determine whether the particular recipient is under belligerent control—should be
recognized and can contribute to this framework.
See John Bourne, Total War I: The Great War, in T he Oxford History of Modern War 132–35
(Charles Townshend ed. 2005).
See David French, The Nation in Arms II: The Nineteenth Century, in T he Oxford History of Modern
War 87-88 (Charles Townshend ed. 2005).
The Law of Neutrality, in A nnotated Supplement to the Commander’s H andbook on the L aw
of Naval Operations (A.R. Thomas and James C. Duncan eds.), https://digital-commons.usnwc.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1558&context=ils/.
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interference in a conflict.14 The doctrine thus provides a mechanism by
which belligerents and neutral States can continue to interact without
interrupting international commerce.
Neutrality was codified in Hague Conventions V and XIII of 1907,
which mapped the rules applicable to land and sea, respectively.15 The
conventions set forth the rights and duties owed by and to neutral States
and belligerents, which were automatically triggered by the existence of
an armed conflict.16 Chief among those rights and duties was the concept of the inviolability of territorial sovereignty. As an extension of that
right, belligerents were prohibited from entering, passing through (at
least on land), recruiting from, or installing or using telecommunications
equipment in neutral space.17 For their part, neutral States are obligated
to act impartially; to abstain from hostilities and refrain from providing
belligerents “war material of any kind”; to ensure belligerent respect
for neutrality, including by using force to repel violation of territorial
sovereignty; and to intern belligerent forces, vehicles, vessels, aircraft,
and equipment located in neutral territory.18
Interestingly, Hague Conventions V and XIII concerned themselves
not only with the obligations of States, but also with the role of corporations. Common across both conventions was a theme that the obligations
to respect neutrality were owed by the State, who in turn was obligated
to enforce it upon private actors within its territorial sovereignty. The
obligations within Hague V and XIII that relate either to technological
developments, corporate conduct, or private actors are outlined below:

14

15

16
17

18

See generally Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Neutrality in Cyberspace, NATO Cooperate C yber
Defence Centre of E xcellence 37 (2012), https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2012/01/1_3_von_
Heinegg_NeutralityInCyberspace.pdf/.
See Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in
Case of War on Land art. 10, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 1 Bevans 654 [hereinafter Hague V];
Hague Convention (XIII) Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, 1 Bevans 723 [hereinafter Hague XIII]. Similar rules applicable to airspace
were drafted in the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare; however, these rules were never incorporated into a binding international treaty. Commission of Jurists to Consider and Report Upon
the Revision of the Rules of Warfare, Rules of Air Warfare art. 12, Feb. 19, 1923, reprinted in 32
A merican Journal of International L aw Supplement 12 (1938).
See Rebecca Ingber, Untangling Belligerency from Neutrality in the Conflict with Al-Qaeda, 47 T ex.
Int’l L. J. 75, 79 (2011).
Hague V, art. 1. See also Hitoshi Nasu, The Laws of Neutrality in the Interconnected World: Mapping
the Future Scenarios, E xeter Centre for Int’l L. Working Paper Series (2020), https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/345978014_The_Laws_of_Neutrality_in_the_Interconnected_
World_Mapping_the_Future_Scenarios.
These rights and duties were articulated by Jeremy K. Davis in his article Bilateral Defense-Related
Treaties and the Dilemma Posed by the Law of Neutrality, 11 H arv. Nat’l Sec. J. 455, 464 (2020)
(outlining this framework for obligations of neutrals under the law of neutrality).
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HAGUE V
Art. 2;
Art. 5

Moving war supplies • Belligerents may not move munitions or war supplies
across neutral territory.
• A neutral power must not allow this act to occur on
its territory and has an obligation to punish such
a violation of neutrality if committed on its territory.

Art. 3(a); Communications
Art. 5
apparatus
construction

• Belligerents may not erect a wireless telegraphy station
or other apparatus on neutral territory for the purpose
of communicating with belligerent forces on land or sea.
• A neutral power must not allow this act to occur on
its territory and has an obligation to punish such
a violation of neutrality if committed on its territory.

Art. 3(b); Communications
Art. 5
apparatus use

• Belligerents may not use any apparatus established
before war on neutral territory for purely military
purposes where that apparatus has not been opened for
service of public messages.
• A neutral power must not allow this act to occur on
its territory and has an obligation to punish such
a violation of neutrality if committed on its territory.

Art. 7

Preventing supply
transit

• Neutrals are not obligated to prevent export or transport
on behalf of a belligerent of anything that could be of
use to an army or fleet.

Art. 8

Restricting
apparatus use

• Neutrals are not obligated to forbid/restrict belligerents’
use of telegraph or telephone cables or wireless
telegraphy apparatus belonging to it or to private
companies or individuals.

Art. 9

Ensuring
corporations and
private actors
treat belligerents
impartially

• Neutrals must ensure that companies or private
individuals owning telegraph or telephone cables
or wireless telegraphy apparatus treat belligerents
impartially.

Art. 19

Requisition or
railway material

• Railway material should only be requisitioned by
neutrals or belligerents when absolutely necessary.
• Compensation shall be paid in proportion to material
used and period of usage.

HAGUE XIII
Art. 5

Communications
apparatus
construction

• In neutral ports and waters, belligerents may not
erect wireless telegraphy stations or apparatus for the
purpose of communicating with belligerent forces on
land or sea.

Art. 6;
Art 7

War supplies;
Preventing supply
transit

• Neutrals may not supply warships, ammunitions, or war
material to belligerents.
• However, neutrals need not prevent the export or transit
of anything that could be of use to an army or fleet.
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In the decades after neutrality law was codified, the rules of warfare
were transformed by the advent of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the establishment of the United Nations, and the dawn of the modern collective
security regime.19
The centralized security structures constructed within Article 16 of
the Covenant of the League of Nations,20 followed by Articles 2(4), 25,
and 40 of the UN Charter,21 called into question member States’ abilities
to behave impartially towards States that violated either the Covenant or
the Charter. Practically, too, neutrality law—which applies only in international armed conflicts—proved unhelpful with respect to increasingly
common conflicts involving non-State actors. Thus, for the past century,
neutrality law has been given cursory treatment.
Whether the law of neutrality, derived from the laws of war, is
“extinct” or retains independent normative and legal force in contemporary international politics has since been subject to debate.22 While some
scholars assert that neutrality law conflicts with the post-UN collective
security structure,23 others assert that the collective security regime and
neutrality can coexist.24 Specifically, those scholars note that member
19

20

21

22

23

24

See Detlev F. Vagts, The Traditional Legal Concept of Neutrality in a Changing Environment, 14 A m.
U. Int’l L. R ev. 83, 84 (1998). Article 2, para. 5 of the UN Charter obligates members to assist
the United Nations in actions taken in accordance with the UN Charter and refrain from assisting
States against which the United Nations is taking preventative or enforcement action. In this
way, the UN Charter contemplates that no member State will be neutral to a conflict.
Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations obligated member States to immediately cease
economic relations with any State that waged an aggressive war contrary to Covenant principles,
permit transit of foreign troops carrying out military sanctions recommended by the League’s
Council, and blockade the aggressor.
Article 2(5) of the UN Charter obligates member States to assist the United Nations at all
times and to refrain from assisting any State against which the UN is taking preventative or
enforcement action. Article 25 obligates all member States to be bound by all Security Council
decisions. Article 40 of the Charter obligates States to join in affording mutual assistance in
carrying out any measures decided upon by the Security Council.
See, e.g., Michael Bothe, The Law of Neutrality, in T he H andbook of Humanitarian L aw in
A rmed Conflicts 571, 573-75 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008) (“These [Hague] rules of 1907 have
in part been rendered obsolete by later practice. The Charter of the United Nations completed
the development of the international legal prohibition of the use of force and established a
system of collective security, by the reaction of the international community against breaches
of peace. The traditional law of neutrality with its duty of impartiality, i.e. the prohibition of
discrimination between the parties to the conflict, seems to be incompatible with this development which outlaws the aggressor. However, this is not generally the case. Also under the
UN Charter, neutrality during international armed conflicts is permissible and possible. States
expressly rely on the law of neutrality. The International Court of Justice as well as national
courts have recently upheld the continued validity of the law of neutrality. The impartiality of the
neutral state retains its important functions at least as long as there is no possibility of a binding
decision concerning the question of who in a given conflict is the aggressor and who is the
victim.... [but] the duty of non-participation as well as that of impartiality may be restricted by
decisions of the Security Council. But it must be ascertained in each particular case how far this
has been the case.”).
See generally Maria Gavouneli, Neutrality: A Survivor? 23 Eur. J. Int’l L. 267, 267 (2012) (describing
Nicholas Politis’s argument that neutrality law was obsolete following the establishment of the
collective security system).
For an argument for the continued utility of neutrality law after the UN Charter’s comprehensive
regulation of the use of force, see James Upcher, Neutrality in Contemporary International
L aw 1–5, 217–62 (2020).
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States are bound by the general obligation within Article 2(5) to refrain
from giving assistance to an aggressor State and are bound to conduct
certain enforcement actions only when called upon by the Security Council
per Articles 24 and 25.25 However, nothing in neutrality law prevents
States from creating treaty-based and commitment-based bilateral and
multilateral collective security frameworks that run against the duty of
non-participation, providing support for the enduring power of neutrality law.
State practice is perhaps telling with respect to neutrality law’s modern legal status. My research has been unable to identify any statement,
by any State, disavowing neutrality law’s continued force. Rather, as
others have pointed out, many States continue to interpret their obligations vis-à-vis neutrality law within international armed conflicts.26 This
chapter thus assumes that neutrality law remains operational — though
the boundaries of when and how remain unsettled.

II

NEUTRALITY LAW’S MODERN
APPLICATION
Modern military operations almost necessarily rely on infrastructure
passing through a neutral State via infrastructure or multinational corporations. It is not difficult to imagine examples in which data transfer,
storage, or moderation requests, implicating a third State, could arise in
an armed conflict situation and thus implicate neutrality law.27

25

26

27

See, e.g., Heribert Franz Koeck, A Permanently Neutral State in the Security Council, 6 Cornell Int’l
L. J. 137, 147 (1973) (discussing the status of neutral States, such as Switzerland, within the
collective security system and their obligations vis-à-vis the UN Charter).
See generally Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Neutrality in Cyberspace, NATO Cooperative
C yber Defence Centre of E xcellence 36 and fns. 4–10 (2012), https://ccdcoe.org/
uploads/2012/01/1_3_von_Heinegg_NeutralityInCyberspace.pdf/ (collecting provisions relating
to neutrality in the military manuals of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany,
the San Remo Manual, the ILA Helsinki Principles, and the HPCR Manual).
For example, consider these scenarios: (1) U.S.-created web-monitoring devices found in Iran;
(2) a request for data from a server in Ireland by a government committing human rights/LOAC
violations, where the server company is headquartered in the U.S.; and (3) a request from a
belligerent (e.g., Syria or the government of Myanmar) to a company in Turkey or Bangladesh
(respectively), or another country with a large refugee population, for data stored/processed
about the refugees in connection with military efforts against the victim/refugee group remaining
in the country.
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A EXAMPLES OF DATA TRANSFER, STORAGE,
OR MODERATION FROM THIRD STATES
Take three recent examples of scenarios that arose outside an international armed conflict. First, in August 2020, Bloomberg reported that the
government of Belarus had shut down citizens’ internet access amidst
a contested election.28 To interrupt the internet, the government had
allegedly deployed deep packet inspection (DPI) equipment manufactured
by an American company. According to news reports, this was not the
first time that American-made content interruption software had been
identified on other States’ computer networks. According to the Bloomberg
news agency, that software had also been identified in Turkey, Syria, and
Egypt. Previous news reports alleged that other, similar American-made
software had been deployed in Iran, Sudan, Egypt, and China.29
Second: in November 2007, Yahoo allegedly provided information
to the Chinese government, pursuant to a data request, about a Chinese
dissident involved in advocating for democratic reform. Accorded to a
lawsuit filed in the United States, the Chinese government allegedly used
that Yahoo-provided information to prosecute the Chinese dissident.30
Data requests issued directly from States to multinational companies
have since exploded in scale and scope. To respond to these requests,
technology companies have built robust regulatory and compliance
architectures to address and organize their cross-border data transfer
process.31
Third: in February 2021, Myanmar ordered its local mobile network
and internet service providers to block Twitter and Instagram in the
country.32 Facebook responded with a formal statement that the company
28

29

30

31

32

See, e.g., Ryan Gallagher, Belarusian Officials Shut Down Internet with Technology Made by U.S. Firm,
Bloomberg, Aug. 28, 2020, 7:22 AM EDT, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/202008-28/belarusian-officials-shut-down-internet-with-technology-made-by-u-s-firm.
See Ellen Nakashima, Report: Web Monitoring Devices Made by U.S. Firm Blue Coat Detected in Iran,
Sudan, Washington Post, July 8, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/report-web-monitoring-devices-made-by-us-firm-blue-coat-detected-in-iran-
sudan/2013/07/08/09877ad6-e7cf-11e2-a301-ea5a8116d211_story.html.
See Eric Auchard, Yahoo Settles Case over Chinese Dissident E-Mails, Reuters, Nov. 13, 2007,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yahoo-china/yahoo-settles-case-over-chinese-dissident-
e-mails-idUSN1360603420071113.
Compare Microsoft Releases Report on Law Enforcement Requests, Access Now, Mar. 25, 2013, 3:31
PM, https://www.accessnow.org/microsoft-releases-report-on-law-enforcement-requests/,
with Information Request Report, Amazon (Dec. 2020), https://d1.awsstatic.com/certifications/
Information_Request_Report_December_2020.pdf, and Transparency Report, Google, https://
transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/overview?user_requests_report_period=authority:US,
(exemplifying emergent State practice of corporate due diligence programs, with characteristics
akin to sanctions regimes traditionally undertaken by States).
See, e.g., Kim Lyons, Myanmar Orders Internet Providers to Block Twitter and Instagram in the
Country, T he Verge, Feb. 6, 2021, 10:10 AM EST, https://www.theverge.com/2021/2/6/22269831/
myanmar-orders-block-twitter-facebook-instagram-military-coup (noting Facebook’s response
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was “extremely concerned” by the shutdown orders; urged authorities to
unblock access; and noted that during the ongoing military coup, it was
particularly important for citizens to be able to access information and
communicate with their loved ones. Twitter promised to “continue to
advocate to end destructive government-led shutdowns.”33 Those statements reflect a broader trend in which corporations are called to set policy
in response to a repressive State’s violation of digital rights.
If any of these examples took place in the context of an international
armed conflict, the data transfer, storage, and moderation would implicate neutrality law, with the neutral State in which the corporation was
headquartered at risk of having violated its impartiality obligations.

B NEUTRALITY LAW AND MODERN DIGITAL
GOODS AND SPACES
The characteristics and purposes of modern goods are similar to the
weapons, information, and instruments that neutrality law was created
to govern. In this way, neutrality law has potential application to digital
goods and spaces in modern armed conflict, including social media content moderation, data storage or processing tool provisions, or evaluation
of State-issued consumer data requests.
A caveat: the domain-specific nature of neutrality law is an obvious
limitation on its extension to the digital context. Although neutrality law
explicitly governs physical domains—namely land and sea34—data and
infrastructure provisions operate both within and beyond physical space.35
Digital space lacks territorial boundaries and optical visibility (and thus
easy attribution) of the physical domain. But because data transfer can
also have kinetic effects, cross territorial borders, and pass through sea
and air, it could involve the rules of land, air, and sea. Some scholars have

33
34
35

to Myanmar’s orders that ISPs block Twitter and Facebook-owned Instagram: “At this critical
time, the people of Myanmar need access to important information and to be able to communicate with their loved ones”).
See id.
For an analysis of State practice and opinio juris relating to the applicability of the law of
neutrality to digital space, see Neuman, supra note 8, at 779–86.
See generally Eric Talbot Jensen, Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyber Conflict, 35 Fordham Int’l L.
J. 815, 824–30 (2012) (applying laws of neutrality to cyber incidents on sea and land to reach
coherent results). See also Tallinn M anual 2.0 rules 150 through 154 (noting that the law of
neutrality developed in situations in which entry or exit from a neutral State’s territory constituted a physical act, but digital space’s realities involve transit irrespective of geopolitical borders.
Although the International Group of Experts advised caution and careful consideration in assessing
a neutral State’s violations under the law of neutrality or drawing conclusions about violations of a
State’s neutrality, they concluded that neutrality law had application to the cyber domain.)
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noted that the application of neutrality laws to cyber actions may lead to
inconsistent results, depending on which domain’s rules are applied.36

1

Corporate Acts Subject to Regulation
Assuming the domain-specific limitations of neutrality law do not
prevent its application to digital space, how (if at all) might neutrality law’s obligations and prohibitions map onto modern corporate acts
occurring within international armed conflicts? What obligations might
neutrality impose on States, and what obligation might States be expected
to, in turn, enforce upon corporations?
Data requests and compelled assistance: Neutrality law could govern data
requests made by belligerent States. Modern data transfers have several
potential analogues under the Hague Conventions:

• To the use of telecommunications and related equipment for the
intangible transfer of information,37 where that apparatus is also
open for service of public messages, per Hague V, arts. 3(a) and 5;
and

• To the movement of things of use to an army or fleet, per Hague
V, art. 7 and Hague XIII, arts. 6–7.
36

37

See generally Neuman, supra note 8, at 787–98 (outlining conflicting outcomes from applying
rules applicable to different domains to a cyber context). Neuman ultimately concludes that the
various domains share overarching principles applicable to all, such as inviolability and impartiality, that can govern actions in cyberspace even in the face of a domain-specific conflict. Where
the various conventions would lead to inconsistency, this chapter offers no solution to which
doctrine to apply, other than to suggest that digital actions may be best gauged individually, with
the lex specialis that most accurately describes the content, nature, and venue of the cyber act as
the one that governs.
In “The Law of Maritime Neutrality and Submarine Cables,” James Kraska disagrees with this
assessment. In his view, information packets are more like “radio or sound waves” that “merely
propagate energy and cannot be analogised to physically violating neutral territory.” See James
Kraska, The Law of Maritime Neutrality and Submarine Cables, EJIL: Talk! July 29, 2020, https://
www.ejiltalk.org/the-law-of-maritime-neutrality-and-submarine-cables/. Kraska relies
primarily on a 1923 arbitration, in which the tribunal determined that a belligerent was permitted
to cut an underseas cable outside neutral territory. See Eastern Extension, Autralasia and China
Telegraph Company, Ltd. (Great Britain) v. United States, Arbitral Award of Nov. 9, 1923, 6 Rep. J.
Int’l. Arb. Awards (11) Arb. 1923. Kraska’s argument can be distinguished from the majority of the
data transfers we discuss in this chapter. First, Kraska lists reasons to distinguish data storage
from classic “cyber” information flows that center on whether they create a physical violation.
But many of the examples considered in this chapter—particularly those relating to the provision
of data from a storage facility in a third State, e.g., a data request emanating from a Microsoft
Ireland server—have a physical aspect to them. An information request directed to a physical
facility used to store and process data is different than merely having unmonitorable information
flows going through a cable that happens to pass through the building. Moreover, the transfer
of software from a third State that can be offensively used by a belligerent calls up the seminal
debate about whether a cyber attack must result in physical effects. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh,
International Law in Cyberspace, 54 H arv. Int’l. L.J. Online 1, 2–7 (2012); Oona A. Hathaway et
al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 C alif. L. R ev. 817, 841–48 (2012). In addition, most of the law
on which Kraska relies is lex specialis to the maritime context. However, the law of neutrality has
some role to play on governing data transfer in armed conflict, and lex specialis should not apply.
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The Hague Conventions do not forbid information transfer, facilitated
by corporations or private actors, to a belligerent. However, such a data
transfer from a corporation to a belligerent is subject to the obligation for
neutrals to ensure that companies or private individuals owning telegraph
or telephone cables or wireless telegraphy apparatus treat belligerents
impartially, per Hague V, art. 8.
The implicit obligation behind this provision is for States to monitor
corporate compliance in data transfer to belligerents—whether compelled
or voluntary—to ensure that any assistance is rendered impartially.
Trade: Neutrality also might impose obligations vis-à-vis the trade of
data processing tools.38 Applicable Hague provisions include:

• The obligation of belligerents not to move munitions of war or
supplies across neutral territory, and the related obligation on
neutrals to prevent this act from occurring on its territory and
punishing any such violation that occurs, per Hague V, arts. 2
and 5; and

• The obligation of neutrals to not supply warships, ammunitions,
or war material to belligerents, per Hague XIII, art. 6.
Though belligerents are prohibited from moving supplies across neutral
territory, private corporations are free to export them. Hague V, art. 7 and
Hague XIII, art. 7 clarify that neutrals need not prevent the export or transit, on land or sea, of anything that could be of use to an army or a fleet.
Inherent in these articles is a responsibility of the neutral State to
assess what is being provided by corporations to belligerents. The neutral
State has an obligation to ensure that any data or equipment traveling
across its territory is not munitions or supply for warfare; it has the obligation to prevent and to punish such transfers. To the extent that data
could be used as a weapon—such as via denial of service—neutral States
would also be responsible for assessing and interfacing with its transfer.
That being said, as with information transfer, neutrals are obligated
to ensure that companies or private individuals owning telegraph or
38

This view is consistent with Rule 150 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0. Tallinn M anual 2.0 on the
International L aw A pplicable to C yber Warfare 48–52 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017)
[hereinafter Tallinn M anual 2.0]. That rule states that the “exercise of belligerent rights by
cyber means directed against neutral cyber infrastructure is prohibited.” Implicit within this rule
is the concept that cyber operations can be analogized to the physical transportation or munitions
or supplies of war through a neutral power, as Kraska points out. See Kraska, supra at 37.
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telephone cables and wireless telegraphy apparatus treat belligerents
impartially, per Hague V, art. 9. In the context of the export or provision of data-processing tools, that could look like monitoring corporate
exports and ensuring that they are not unfairly assisting one party to
the conflict.
Platform provision: This subset of data transfers encompasses uses of platforms, as well as conducting content restrictions or moderations on those
platforms. This seems most akin to Hague V, art. 3(b)’s requirement that
belligerents not use any apparatus established before war on neutral
territory for purely military purposes where that apparatus has not been
opened to convey public messages. But that scenario seems unlikely to
occur on social media platforms or messaging services, which generally
hold themselves out for public use. Platform usage likely implicates Hague
V, art. 7 and Hague XIII, art. 7; again, these clarify that neutrals need
not prevent the export or transit, on land or sea, of anything that could
be of use to an army or a fleet.
Akin to platform provision is a belligerent’s request to conduct
content restriction or moderation. To the extent that content restriction or moderation goes a step beyond denying access to manipulating
access—for example, through redirection to another website—content
restriction becomes like a munition. To the extent that a moderation or
content restriction operates like an instrument of warfare, a belligerent
would not be permitted to move content restrictions across neutral territory, and neutral powers would have an obligation to prevent this from
occurring on their territory and punish any violations committed on their
territory, per Hague V, arts. 2 and 5.
Infrastructure provision: Finally, the Hague provisions most easily map
onto the provision of physical infrastructure that makes data services
possible, like underseas cables or telecommunications equipment and
structures. For these, the Hague analogues are relatively clear:

• Belligerents may not erect equipment, for the purposes of
communicating with belligerent forces, on neutral territory,
per Hague V, art. 3(a) and Hague XIII, art. 5;

• Neutrals need not forbid or restrict belligerent use of such
equipment belonging to it or to private companies or individuals,
per Hague V, art. 8; and
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• Neutrals and belligerents may requisition such equipment only
when absolutely necessary, and even then must pay proportionate
compensation, per Hague V, art. 19.
The construction and use of infrastructure or equipment requires less
State monitoring of corporate conduct. Since infrastructure has closer ties
to physical space (generally, cell towers or data storage and processing
centers built on land or underseas cable laid at sea), the Hague provisions
map neatly onto these potential issues.

2

State Obligations and Consequences of Non-Compliance
The above analysis suggests that neutral States are bound to ensure
that their corporations treat belligerents impartially in their exports of
data and digital tools and thus violate neutrality by failing to ensure that
their corporations treat belligerents neutrally.
A neutral State that has failed to fulfill the duty of impartiality may
be subject to countermeasures, including forceful countermeasures, from
belligerents.39 The text of Hague V and Hague XIII make clear that the
obligation to ensure impartiality is absolute.40 However, scholars have
drawn a distinction between “slight” and “substantial” violations of
neutrality, arguing that belligerents can institute measures other than the
use of force that deny neutrals some or all of the benefits of neutrality.41
However, it is unclear whether a neutral State is rendered a belligerent or a co-belligerent by failing to impose the duty of impartiality on
private actors within its territory. Most scholars believe that breaching
neutrality does not per se render an actor a co-belligerent;42 rather, only
39

40
41

42

See The Law of Neutrality, in U.S. Dep’t of Defense L aw of War M anual 957 (June 2015) (citing
Robert W. T ucker, T he L aw of War and Neutrality at Sea 203, fn. 14 (1955) (“The duties of
a neutral state may also be classified—and frequently are so classified—as duties of abstention,
prevention and acquiescence (or toleration). … [D]uties of acquiescence have reference to neutral
obligations to permit belligerent measures of repression against neutral subjects found rendering
certain acts of assistance to an enemy”)).
See, e.g., Hague V, art. 9.
See L. Oppenheim, International L aw § 359 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1952) (“If the violation
is only slight and unimportant, the offended State will often merely complain. If, on the other
hand, the violation is very substantial and grave, the offended State will perhaps at once declare
that it considers itself at war with the offender”); see also Rebecca Ingber, Untangling Belligerency
from Neutrality in the Conflict with Al-Qaeda, 47 T ex. Int’l L. J. 75, 87–88 (2011) (noting that violations of neutrality “often do not permit the use of force in return, particularly in the post-U.N.
Charter world” and that “states negotiating details of neutrality law in its heyday constructed
elaborate regimes for redressing violations that fell far short of declaring war at any particular
instance and included remedies such as financial compensation”).
See Clyde Eagleton, The Duty of Impartiality on the Part of a Neutral, 34 A m. J. Int’l L. 99, 101 (“The
failure to perform a specific duty… would permit a legal claim and perhaps the collection of
damages; the failure to be impartial, on the other hand, would not arouse or justify a legal claim
for damages, but might modify or end neutral status”). See also United Nations General Assembly,
Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, ¶ 60, U.N. Doc. A/68/382 (“Co-belligerency is
a concept that applies to international armed conflicts and entails a sovereign State becoming
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systematic, serious violations of the law of neutrality do so.43 But what
constitutes “systematic” violations of the law of neutrality has yet to
be explored in the data transfer context. In particular, whether a State
commits systematic violations of the laws of neutrality through failure to
monitor and ensure the impartiality of corporations within its territory
with respect to data transfer is undetermined.

3

What Actions Might a State Stop?
Taking a step back, neutrality might be operationalized in a corporate
context to obligate a degree of State oversight over data, data services,
and data infrastructure requests made by belligerent States involved in
international armed conflicts.44
States might assess the nature of the requests for data transfers or
services made by belligerent States and serve as the umpire for whether
the provision of the requested material would favor one belligerent over
the other. If so, States might stop its export entirely, or else delay it until
after the international armed conflict has concluded.
Relatedly, States might be called upon to assess whether data or
services requested could function as munitions—something that could
be used by one State against the other in a conflict. Things like denials of
service, data collection tools, or other digital systems could arguably fall
within that category. For those, States would be obligated not only to prevent their export but also to punish their movement across its territory.
These questions are particularly relevant in the context of State practice. The United States has created an infrastructure for extraterritorial
data sharing and facilitation of government data requests via the CLOUD
Act, which provides transnational access to personal data in criminal law
enforcement investigations. One of the effects of the CLOUD Act is that
qualifying foreign governments have now been permitted to send data

43

44

a party to a conflict, either through formal or informal processes.… [A]n informal process
could involve providing assistance to or establishing a common cause with belligerent forces”)
(not opining on the degree of assistance required to establish co-belligerency).
See Ingber, supra note 41, at 87–88 (2011) (“The law of neutrality itself did not traditionally articulate when a state or individual gave up its neutral state and became a belligerent…; it simply
acknowledged that, once a state or individual became a belligerent, it could no longer avail itself
of its prior neutrality”); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and
the War on Terrorism, 118 H arv. L. R ev. 2047, 2112–13 (2005) (“One way that a state can become
a co-belligerent is through systematic or significant violations of its duties under the law of
neutrality…. [A] state is deemed to be in an armed conflict with a ‘neutral’ state that systematically violates its neutral duties”); Nathalie Weizmann, Associated Forces and Co-Belligerency, Just
Security, Feb. 24, 2015, https://www.justsecurity.org/20344/isil-aumf-forces-co-belligerency/
(last accessed Nov. 12, 2021).
This proposal may be hampered by feasibility, consider the amount of data and the number of
companies making frequent, and sometimes automated, decisions regarding data processing and
transfer. The amount of data and number of requests that would need to be umpired, though,
may be limited by the relatively small number of international armed conflicts.
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requests directly to U.S. companies for data, rather than contacting the
U.S. Department of Justice to obtain warrants for that data from U.S.
judges. So the CLOUD Act has functionally decreased a neutral State’s
review of data provision.

III

SCENARIOS THAT NEUTRALITY
DUTIES MIGHT REGULATE BUT
HUMAN RIGHTS MIGHT NOT
At a high level, international human rights law provides protections for
digital rights that include the right to privacy and the right to data protection.45 States are obligated to respect and ensure those rights to all individuals within their territory and potentially to individuals within their
effective control.46 So too must States refrain from violating or restricting
those rights.47 Soft law likewise suggests corporate obligations: to respect
international human rights, avoid causing adverse impacts, and seek to
prevent and mitigate human rights impacts through their businesses.48
Concerning digital rights, the law of neutrality varies from human
rights law in the following manners. First, the law of neutrality and
human rights law vary as to their scope of application. One way of thinking
about the two doctrines is their relative applications in times of peace
and in times of war. International human rights apply to States during
both war and peace;49 however, States can derogate from human rights
45

46

47
48

49

See Asaf Lubin, The Rights to Privacy and Data Protection Under International Humanitarian Law
and Human Rights Law, in R esearch H andbook on Human R ights and Humanitarian L aw:
F urther R eflections and Perspectives 468–76 (Robert Kolb, Gloria Gaggioli and Pavle
Kilibarda eds., Edward Elgar, 2022).
For an overview of the debate concerning extraterritorial human rights obligations, see
generally Marko Milanovic, E xtraterritorial A pplication of Human R ights T reaties: L aw,
Principles, and Policy (2011); and Oona Hathaway et al., Human Rights Abroad: When Do Human
Rights Treaty Obligations Apply Extraterritorially? 43 A rizona State L. J. 389 (2011).
See, e.g., The Right to Privacy in the Digital Act (Aug. 3, 2018), A/HRC/39/29.
See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression (May 11, 2016), A/HRC/32/38 (“The private sector, however,
also plays independent roles that may either advance or restrict rights, a point the Human Rights
Council well understood by adopting the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in
2011 as general guidance in that field”); Guiding Principles on Business and Human R ights:
I mplementing the United Nations “Protect, R espect and R emedy” Framework (Guiding
Principles), UN Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011), www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.
See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 55
(July 8) (“The Court observes that the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and
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obligations under emergency situations, including in wartime.50 The law
of neutrality operates only when States are at war; however, the laws
apply automatically and without derogation to all States, even those at
peace.51 Moreover, as the lex specialis, the law of neutrality will apply when
human rights law and the law of neutrality conflict.52 Thus the laws of
neutrality could theoretically provide a backstop for human rights-like
obligations during emergency periods in which States are permitted to
derogate from international human rights law.
Second, the law of neutrality and human rights law differ in terms of
their triggering test. The indicator for whether neutrality is violated (i.e.,
whether one side is being assisted more than the other) is fundamentally
different than the human-rights-derived triggering tests (e.g., effective
control). Comparing the two, it is simpler to gauge whether the laws of
neutrality have been violated than to determine whether effective control is at play. Effective control has uncertain application with respect to
digital rights abroad in some circumstances,53 whereas the laws of war
feature no such constraint.54 Neutrality law can thus embolden the application of positive human rights due diligence obligations and offer value
by filling a gap left by uncertain extraterritorial human rights obligations.
Third, the law of neutrality and human rights law vary with respect
to the obligations imposed upon States. International human rights due
diligence obligations are less clear-cut than the question of impartiality
obligation under neutrality law.55 But neutrality imposes three clear

50
51
52

53

54

55

Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant
whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect
for the right to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be
deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life,
however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in
armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities”).
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 UNTS
171, 174.
See supra sources cited at fn. 39. States that are at peace have obligations under neutrality law in
relation to States that are at war.
See C. Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 British Yearbook of International
L aw 401, 446 (1953) (“A clear illustration of [lex specialis’s] applicability is afforded by instruments relating to the laws of war which, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intention or
other special circumstances, must clearly be regarded as a leges speciales in relation to instruments laying down peace-time norms concerning the same subjects”).
See, e.g., 10 Human Rights Organizations v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24960/15 (May 2015) (holding
that “a contracting state owes no obligation under Article 8 [the right to respect for privacy] to
persons both of whom are situated outside its territory in respect of electronic communications
between them which pass through the state”). The case—and thus the question of the extraterritorial application of human rights under the European Convention on Human Rights—is awaiting
judgment from the European Court of Human Rights.
See, e.g., Montgomery Sapone, Have Rifle With Scope, Will Travel: The Global Economy of Mercenary
Violence, 30 C al. W. Int’l L.J. 1, 32 (1999) (“The United States need not recognize the belligerent
status of the political entity in order for the Act to apply; actual conflict triggers application of the
Act”).
See, e.g., Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Addendum,
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human
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obligations onto States: to refrain from acting (much like negative human
rights obligations), to prevent the commission of certain acts (much like
positive human rights obligations), and to acquiesce (to permit belligerents to repress neutral subjects to render assistance to an enemy).56 Those
“positive neutrality law obligations” are more clear-cut than those that
international human rights law can offer. For example, neutral States
have an obligation to prevent specific acts by anyone within their jurisdiction, including belligerent acts of hostility in neutral waters and the
use of neutral ports as operational bases.
Fourth, the law of neutrality and human rights law vary with respect
to the obligations imposed upon private actors within a State. For its part,
human rights law generally imposes obligations on State governments
with respect to citizens; corporations, being neither, are governed by
human rights law only by analogy and soft law.57 But neutrality law
imposes obligations on corporations directly, while permitting States to
enforce compliance.58
The fourth point is of particular interest. Recent examples suggest
that technology companies sometimes comply with neutrality principles,
including by assessing whether a State is engaging in armed conflict

56

57

58

Rights in Colombia, UN Doc A/HRC/22/17/Add.3 (Jan. 7, 2013) (“Everyone has rights and
obligations under human rights law. The State holds primary responsibility, as not only must
it respect human rights and respond when it violates them, but it also has the duty to protect
against violations by third parties and to create an environment where all rights are respected.
While, for example, armed actors, landlords and businesses must all respect human rights and
be accountable for violations they commit, the State, through its policies, programmes and laws,
must act to stop these violations and prevent their repetition”). Negative obligations on States
(prohibition from action in a manner that violates or unlawfully restricts rights and freedoms
guaranteed by human rights treaty) are more clear-cut than their positive law obligations
(adoption of measures to protect individuals over whom the State exercises effective control from
violations of rights by State organs, State agents, or private actors).
See The Law of Neutrality, in U.S. Dep’t of Defense L aw of War M anual 957 (June 2015) (citing
Robert W. T ucker, T he L aw of War and Neutrality at Sea 203, fn. 14 (1955) (“The duties of
a neutral state may also be classified—and frequently are so classified—as duties of abstention,
prevention and acquiescence (or toleration). Duties of abstention refer to acts the neutral state
itself must refrain from performing; duties of prevention refer to acts the commission of which
within its jurisdiction the neutral is obligated to prevent; and, finally, duties of acquiescence
have reference to neutral obligations to permit belligerent measures of repression against neutral
subjects found rendering certain acts of assistance to an enemy”)).
See, e.g., United Nations Remarks on Signing International Covenants on Human Rights, 1 Pub.
Papers 1734 (Oct. 5, 1977) (“The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights concerns what governments must not do to their people, and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
concerns what governments must do for their people. By ratifying the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, a government pledges, as a matter of law, to refrain from subjecting its own
people to arbitrary imprisonment or execution or to cruel or degrading treatment. It recognizes
the right of every person to freedom of thought, freedom of conscience, freedom of religion,
freedom of opinion, freedom of expression”).
See, e.g., Hague V, art. 9 (“Every measure of restriction or prohibition taken by a neutral Power
in regard to the matters referred to in Articles 7 and 8 must be impartially applied by it to both
belligerents. A neutral Power must see to the same obligation being observed by companies or
private individuals owning telegraph or telephone cables or wireless telegraphy apparatus”).
The text’s suggestion is that the obligations regarding impartial transport of goods and information applies to corporations and that States have an enforcement obligation.
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and determining whether their interactions with one party to a conflict would serve as asymmetric assistance. Based on those normative
assessments, corporations have modified their behavior with potentially
rights-advancing outcomes.59
This observation is particularly important given that modern technology companies—although they are not sovereigns themselves and are
not subject to neutrality law directly—exercise features of sovereignty as
recognized in international law within contemporary international relations. Take, for example, Microsoft’s handling of a data request. For data
requests to U.S.-based technology corporations, the CLOUD Act permits
foreign governments, under certain circumstances, to coordinate directly
with foreign governments about data requests.60 Technology companies
are asked to make normative assessments of conflict and in fact do so.
Although technology companies do not exercise power over territory, their
rising degree of power over both internal and external affairs reflects at
least one conception of sovereignty discussed in international law.61
Impartiality, abstention, and the prevention of neutrality violations
offer opportunities to regulate corporate conduct where human rights may
not.62 Distinctions between the actors and the centrality of territory in
the lex lata present challenges, but neutrality already purports to impose
conduct upon corporations and empower States to enforce compliance.

59

60
61

62

For example, Facebook released a report noting that it removed accounts and pages linked
to Sluha Narodu, a Ukrainian political party that supports Ukraine’s current government.
See April 2021 Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Report, Facebook, May 6, 2021, https://about.
fb.com/news/2021/05/april-2021-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-report/; “Facebook
removes Ukrainian Pages Promoting Zelensky’s Political Party,” Medium, May 6, 2021, https://
medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-removes-ukrainian-pages-promoting-zelenskys-political-party-d5600998cb06. Facebook has cited international organizations’ assessments related to international human rights violations for making similar de-platforming determinations. See Jenny
Domino, Gambia v. Facebook: What the Discovery Request Reveals about Facebook’s Content Moderation,
Just Security, July 6, 2020 (“International experts, most recently in a report by the UN Human
Rights Council-authorized Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, have found evidence that many
of these individuals and organizations committed or enabled serious human rights abuses in the
country”), https://www.justsecurity.org/71157/gambia-v-facebook-what-the-discovery-request-reveals-about-facebooks-content-moderation/.
See Stephen P. Mulligan, Cross-Border Data Sharing under the CLOUD Act, Congressional Research
Service, Apr. 23, 2018.
See generally Samantha Besson, Sovereignty, M ax Planck Encyclopedias of International
L aw ¶¶ 69–73 (Apr. 2011), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/
law-9780199231690-e1472?prd=MPIL.
This chapter does not offer a systematic articulation of the circumstances in which international
human rights law applies and neutrality does not, or vice versa. Rather, this chapter focuses on
the human rights that fall under the new umbrella of “digital rights,” chief among them the
right to privacy, and discusses how human rights principles of necessity and due process operate
within and alongside the context of neutrals.
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CONCLUSION
The law of neutrality has historically been excluded from international
humanitarian law. Christopher Greenwood wrote:
The term “international humanitarian law” is of relatively
recent origin and does not appear in the Geneva Conventions
of 1949.… International humanitarian law thus includes most
of what used to be known as the laws of war, although strictly
speaking some parts of those laws, such as the law of neutrality, are not included since their primary purpose is not
humanitarian.63
This chapter posits that although the law of neutrality’s primary purpose is not humanitarian, its application—particularly in the contested
and evolving field of digital rights—may well be. Neutrality law offers a
potential backstop to gaps in international human rights law, with particular regard to questions about the extraterritorial application of human
rights and situations in which human rights obligations have been derogated. At bottom, this chapter outlines certain circumstances where neutrality works to govern conflict in situations where international human
rights obligations are sufficiently uncertain. Thus neutrality is capable
of doing work that international human rights law, as of yet, cannot.
Likewise, neutrality, on its face and as reflected in practice, extends
its authority to govern not only States but also corporations. And State
practice suggests that data companies are complying with principles of
neutrality by making normative assessments of conflicts and seeking to
render impartial assistance.

63

Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in Dieter Fleck, T he H andbook
Of Humanitarian L aw In A rmed Conflicts 9 (¶102) (1999).
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Chapter 5 Digital Privacy and Data Protection in Military Occupation

Emerging
Technologies, Digital
Privacy, and Data
Protection in Military
Occupation
Omar Yousef Shehabi1

INTRODUCTION
In the occupied Palestinian territory, al-munasiq, Arabic for “the coordinator”, is understood to refer to the Israeli Coordinator of Government
Activities in the Territories (COGAT). COGAT is the branch of the Israeli
military government in the occupied territory responsible for civilian
affairs, including permits to work in Israel.2 Palestinian labour in Israel
has been an abiding feature of the occupation, peaking in 1988, at the
end of the open borders era, when roughly one-third of the occupied

1

2

JSD candidate, Yale Law School, omar.shehabi@yale.edu. I thank Carmel Alshaibi for her research
assistance, Omar Dajani, Ardi Imseis, Polina Levina Mahnad and Michael Schoiswohl for their
comments, and the editors and contributors to this book project for their insights. The views
expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the view of the United Nations. All internet
sources herein were last accessed on 20 January 2022.
COGAT is the parent entity of the Civil Administration, the occupation bureaucracy established by
Military Order No. 947 of 1981.
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territory’s workforce worked in “Israel proper”.3 In 2019, some 133,000
Palestinians — roughly 11 per cent of the West Bank’s working-age population4 — worked in Israel or Israeli settlements in the occupied territory.
That year, COGAT launched the al-Munasiq smartphone app, which
allows Palestinians to check the status of their permits. Previously, this
required a visit to Israeli-Palestinian district coordination and liaison
offices (DCOs) in the West Bank. To register in the app, the user was
required to accept terms of service which authorised COGAT and third
parties to use the information collected “for any purpose, including for
security purposes” and to store user information in COGAT’s databases.5
The app gave COGAT access to users’ contacts, photos, files, chats, emails,
camera and location data.
When the coronavirus pandemic forced the DCOs to close in March
2020, al-Munasiq became the only way for Palestinians to check the
status of their permits. An Israeli NGO petitioned the Israeli High Court
of Justice for a ruling that in the context of a health emergency which
effectively rendered use of the app mandatory, its terms of service violated the right to privacy under Israeli and international law. While the
petition was pending, COGAT announced amendments to the app’s terms
of service and that data collection would be limited to the forms specified therein, including location services and camera and file access for
scanning and uploading documents.6 In May 2020, the Israeli high court
dismissed the petition, which did not name individual petitioners or
plead actual harm, as premature and theoretical.7 By then, over 50,000
Palestinians had downloaded the app. What became of the data extracted
from users under the earlier terms of use is unclear,8 and the app does
not allow users to request deletion of their data.
Al-Munasiq is but a small part of an ecosystem of surveillance in
the occupied territory that includes biometric checkpoints, social media
data-mining, and CCTV camera networks enhanced with facial recognition technology and machine learning. Israel, of course, is not unique
3
4

5

6
7
8

Andrew Ross, Who Built Zion? Palestinian Labor and the Case for Political Rights, 27(3) New
L abor F. 44, 47 (2018).
The West Bank’s working-age population stood at 1,173,530 at the 2017 census. Labour Force
Participation and Employment in the State of Palestine 30, Palestinian Central Bureau of
Statistics (2020), https://pcbs.gov.ps/Downloads/book2507.pdf
Hagar Shezaf, Israel Tells Court Would Stop Forcing Palestinian Laborers to Give Access to Phone Data,
H aaretz (May 15, 2020), https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premiumover-50-000-palestinians-forced-to-give-phone-data-to-israel-1.8844580.
Id.
HCJ 20/2992 HaMoked v. Ministry of Defence, https://hamoked.org.il/files/2020/1664225.pdf.
Following HaMoked’s demand: the military amended the invasive terms of use of the mobile app
enabling Palestinians to check the status of permit requests, H a Moked (June 2, 2020),
http://www.hamoked.org/Document.aspx?dID=Updates2175.
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among occupying powers in deploying mass surveillance technologies.
The United States established a data mining programme in occupied Iraq
and a biometric database of roughly two million Iraqis.9 There is every
reason to believe that other contemporary occupying powers deploy many
of the same technologies.10
As these technologies grow in ubiquity, democratic societies are
grappling with standards governing the collection, storage, and processing of personal data (data protection standards) and the right of data
subjects to have some control over these processes (data subject rights).
In the inherently coercive context of military occupation, the desire to
regulate surveillance technologies, limit the use of the data they yield,
and endow data subjects (i.e., protected persons in the occupied territory)
with some degree of agency over their personal data is compelling. However, the pursuit of a doctrinally sound way to regulate the use of these
technologies raises thorny epistemological questions regarding the law
of occupation and its place within international law. This short contribution merely endeavours to highlight the challenges in establishing a data
privacy and protection regime for occupied territory, using the occupied
Palestinian territory as a most imperfect case study.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Part I samples Israel’s use of mass
and targeted surveillance technologies in the occupied Palestinian territory. Part II examines the few provisions of the conventional law of occupation which relate to privacy and how these provisions might be progressively reinterpreted to reach digital privacy. Part III assesses whether and
to what extent the digital privacy and data subject rights emerging in
human rights law are interoperable with international humanitarian law
(IHL) in the context of military occupation. Part IV considers, however
inadequately, the inescapable epistemological questions conjured up by
the question of digital privacy and data protection in settler-occupations and transformative occupations. The final part concludes with a
sober assessment of the prospects for regulating digital privacy and data
protection in the general law of occupation.

9

10

Henrik Moltke, Mission Creep: How the NSA’s Game-Changing Targeting System Built for Iraq and
Afghanistan Ended Up on the Mexico Border, T he Intercept (May 29, 2019), https://theintercept.
com/2019/05/29/nsa-data-afghanistan-iraq-mexico-border/; Farah Stockman, Worries About
US Data on Iraqis, B oston Globe (Aug. 31, 2010), http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/
washington/articles/2010/08/31/questions_arise_about_use_of_data_gathered_in_iraq_war/.
Laurens Cerulus, How Ukraine became a testbed for cyberweaponry, Politico (Feb. 14, 2019), https://
www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-cyber-war-frontline-russia-malware-attacks (describing
Russian surveillance and cyber activities in Donbas region of eastern Ukraine); K hayrallah
al-Hilu, A frin Under T urkish C ontrol: P olitical, E conomic and S ocial T ransformations, 3–5 (2019) (describing Turkish intelligence network in occupied parts of northern Syria).
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I

SURVEILLANCE, DATA COLLECTION
AND DATA MINING IN OCCUPIED
TERRITORY
A BIOMETRIC DATABASES
It’s no secret that the occupied Palestinian territory is Israel’s proving
grounds for emerging technologies and the capabilities of its military
intelligence units, most prominently its signals intelligence corps, Unit
8200.11 With biometrics — the “automated recognition of individuals based
on their biological and behavioural characteristics” such as fingerprints,
facial structure, irises, palm veins, or DNA12 — the process began with the
Basel system of biometric work permits for Palestinian workers in Israel
and biometric verification at checkpoints, first implemented in 1999 for
Gaza Strip residents13 and extended to the West Bank around 2005.14 The
biometric ID supplemented the non-biometric magnetic cards which
entered into circulation in 1998 and would become a prerequisite for a
permit to work in Israel.15 Until 2007, Israeli policy was only to issue
magnetic cards to Palestinians vetted and approved by Israel’s internal
security service, the Shabak.16 Since 2007, COGAT has issued magnetic
cards to Palestinians not approved by the Shabak to work in Israel, transforming the card from a confirmation of security-vetting to a form of
identification only.17
The Basel system served as the technological basis for the Moaz
biometric system for non-Palestinian foreign workers in Israel, which
11

12

13

14
15
16
17

See Amos Barshad, Inside Israel’s lucrative—and secretive—cybersurveillance industry, R est of World
(Mar. 9, 2021), https://restofworld.org/2021/inside-israels-lucrative-and-secretive-cybersurveillance-talent-pipeline/; Hagar Shezaf & Jonathan Jacobson, Revealed: Israel’s Cyber-spy Industry
Helps World Dictators Hunt Dissidents and Gays, H aaretz (Oct. 20, 2018), https://www.haaretz.com/
israel-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-israel-s-cyber-spy-industry-aids-dictators-hunt-dissidents-and-gays-1.6573027; Jeff H alper, War Against the People: Israel, the Palestinians
and Global Pacification (2015).
Martin Zwanenburg, Know Thy Enemy: The Use of Biometrics in Military Operations and International
Humanitarian Law, 97 Int’l L. Stud. 1404, 1406 (2021), citing the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) definition of biometrics.
Privacy International, Biometrics and Counter-Terrorism: Case Study of Israel/Palestine, 9 (2021),
https://privacyinternational.org/report/4527/biometrics-and-counter-terrorism-case-study-israelpalestine.
Amira Hass, The Yearnings for a Magnetic Card, H aaretz (May 9, 2007), https://www.haaretz.
com/1.4819750.
Privacy International, supra note 13, at 9.
Formally known as the General Security Service and also known by its Hebrew initials, Shin Bet.
Hass, supra note 14.

91

Digital Privacy and Data Protection in Military Occupation

launched in 2004.18 Subsequently, Israel’s interior ministry pushed to
create a national biometric identification system. That effort, which
included a voluntary pilot programme launched in 2013, culminated in
a 2017 law that made biometric IDs mandatory for Israeli citizens and
residents.19 As a product of the democratic process, the final law made
certain compromises in favour of privacy, such as revocable consent to
fingerprint storage.20

B FACIAL RECOGNITION CHECKPOINTS
In late 2018, Israel began to add facial recognition technology to its checkpoints.21 To use the facial recognition scanners, which expedites the
crossing process, Palestinians must be fingerprinted and photographed
at a DCO. The facial recognition software was developed by Israeli firm
AnyVision, which was recently rebranded Oosto.22 By August 2019, the
Israeli military said that 450,000 West Bank Palestinians were registered
in the biometric database.23

C REAL-TIME IDENTIFICATION BY FACIAL
RECOGNITION
Blue Wolf is a project of the information technologies command implementation unit of the Israeli military’s central command.24 It consists of
18
19
20
21

22

23

24

Privacy International, supra note 13, at 9.
Inclusion of Biometric Means of Identification and Biometric Identification Data in Identity
Documents and in an Information Database Law (Amendment and Temporary Order), 5777-2017.
See generally Michelle Spektor, Imagining the Biometric Future: Debates Over National Biometric
Identification in Israel, 29 S cience as C ulture 100 (2020).
Amitai Ziv, This Israeli Face-recognition Startup Is Secretly Tracking Palestinians, H aaretz (July 15,
2019), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/.premium-this-israeli-face-recognition-startup-is-secretly-tracking-palestinians-1.7500359. The literature often differentiates
“internal checkpoints” from “border crossings”, irrespective of whether the “border” being
crossed is the 1949 armistice line, the Israeli separation barrier, or checkpoints separating East
Jerusalem from other West Bank territory.
The company is called AnyVision herein because it is identified as such in all relevant materials.
See Visual AI Company AnyVision Changes its Name to Oosto, BusinessWire (Oct. 27, 2021), https://
www.businesswire.com/news/home/20211027005340/en/Visual-AI-Company-AnyVision-Changes-its-Name-to-Oosto. AnyVision sells a facial recognition access-control product, Abraxas
(now called OnAccess), based on the same technology. See https://oosto.com/wp-content/
uploads/2021/10/oosto-touchless-access-control-brochure.pdf.
Daniel Estrin, Face Recognition Lets Palestinians Cross Israeli Checkposts Fast, But Raises Concerns, NPR
(Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/22/752765606/face-recognition-lets-palestinians-cross-israeli-checkposts-fast-but-raises-conc.
[ "לוחכ באז"ל םג ךתוא ךופהת השדח הקלחמ ?ש"ויאב וק ספותStationed at a post in the West Bank? A new
platoon will turn you into a ‘blue wolf’], Israel Defence Forces (June 15, 2021), https://www.
idf.il/םירתא/ףגא-בושקתה-הנגההו-רבסב/2021/תקלחמ-העמטה-דוקיפ-זכרמ-בושקת-תוכרדה-היגולונכט-םימחול-באז-לוחכ/.
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a smartphone app linked to a database of images of Palestinian residents
of the occupied territory. A soldier scans either the subject’s face or the
magnetic strip on their identity card and the app alerts the soldier using
a colour-coded system whether the subject should be allowed to pass, be
detained for questioning, or be arrested. If the subject does not appear in
the database, the solider may add them by photographing him or her and
inputting personal details taken from the ID card.25 The military reportedly developed the database through CCTV surveillance, social media
data-mining, and assigning soldiers on patrol to photograph as many
Palestinians as possible.26
White Wolf is a smartphone app employing the same technology and
possibly linked to the same database as Blue Wolf, which allows volunteer security personnel in West Bank settlements to scan the ID cards of
Palestinians before they enter the settlement.27

D VIDEO SURVEILLANCE WITH BEHAVIOURPREDICTIVE MACHINE LEARNING
The Israeli and international media have widely reported that Israel has
deployed AnyVision’s facial recognition technology throughout the West
Bank to “spot and monitor potential Palestinian assailants”, for which
AnyVision won the Israel Defence Prize.28 This program, although officially denied by AnyVision,29 reportedly employs the same technologies as an AnyVision commercial product, Better Tomorrow (now called
OnWatch), which combines facial and body recognition with machine
learning to identify suspicious behaviour.30 AnyVision claims that Better
Tomorrow “can trace a person-of-interest across multiple cameras; find
repeated appearances of an individual; detect suspects and suspicious
objects caught on camera; rapidly perform historic video analysis for
25

26
27
28

29
30

Elizabeth Dwoskin, Israel Escalates Surveillance of Palestinians with Facial Recognition Program in West
Bank, Washington Post (Nov. 8, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/
israel-palestinians-surveillance-facial-recognition/2021/11/05/3787bf42-26b2-11ec-8739-5cb6a
ba30a30_story.html.
Id.
Id.
Ziv, supra note 21. The programme is reportedly nicknamed Google Ayosh despite no connection
to Google, Ayosh being a Hebrew acronym for the West Bank. Olivia Solon, Why did Microsoft
fund an Israeli firm that surveils West Bank Palestinians?, NBC News (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.
nbcnews.com/news/all/why-did-microsoft-fund-israeli-firm-surveils-west-bank-palestinians-n1072116; AnyVision Interactive Technologies, Who Profits (July 17, 2019), https://www.
whoprofits.org/company/anyvision-interactive-technologies/.
Joint statement by Microsoft & AnyVision, M12 (Mar. 27, 2020), https://m12.vc/news/joint-statement-by-microsoft-anyvision.
https://oosto.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/oosto-onwatch-overview.pdf.
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forensic purposes; and extract, analyze and store face images of all individuals who pass within a camera’s view”.31 The platform also supports
heat mapping which can detect crowd formations and traffic patterns.
Better Tomorrow reportedly can be used with most types of CCTV cameras
without elaborate retrofitting.32
Video surveillance in Jerusalem’s Old City is long-standing, comprehensive, open and notorious. Roughly 40,000 residents, the vast majority
of them Palestinian, live within the 0.9-square kilometre walled enclosure. The video surveillance system therein is known as Mabat 2000,
reflecting the year of its introduction. Its 400 CCTV cameras monitor
roughly 90 per cent of the Old City’s public areas. As of 2011, the Israeli
police operated the system without a code of practice restricting its permissible uses (e.g. forbidding inspection of private residential or commercial properties) or governing data retention;33 whether that remains
the case is unclear. In 2017, the Israeli government upgraded Mabat 2000
with facial recognition capabilities.34 A 2014 Israeli government resolution
expanded the Mabat surveillance model into the Kedem sub-district of
the Jerusalem District Police, covering Palestinian neighbourhoods north
of the Old City.35 Mabat Kedem is known to include CCTV cameras with
licence-plate capture capabilities.36 The Israeli military has established
a real-time video surveillance system in and around Hebron’s Old City,
where roughly 700 settlers live interspersed amongst 34,000 Palestinians,
which reportedly operates similarly to Mabat 2000.37
Video surveillance extends to the West Bank road network. TSG
IT Advanced Systems, a parastatal Israeli firm specialising in command-and-control systems, video analysis and behaviour-predictive
artificial intelligence (AI), has developed and deployed an analytic CCTV
system with facial recognition capabilities for the West Bank road network
that can reportedly locate a car according to its licence plate, model and
colour, identify irregular behaviour, and send automatic alerts.38
31
32
33

34
35
36
37

38

Privacy International, supra note 13, at 15–16.
8 AI-based video analytics platforms advance security implementation, ASM ag.com (July 29, 2019),
https://www.asmag.com/showpost/28633.aspx.
Usama Halabi, Legal Analysis and Critique of Some Surveillance Methods Used by Israel, in Surveillance and C ontrol in Israel/Palestine: P opulation, T erritory and P ower, 210–11 (Elia
Zureik, David Lyon, and Yasmeen Abu-Laban eds., 2010).
Who Profits, “Big Brother” in Jerusalem’s Old City: Israel’s Militarized Visual Surveillance System
in Occupied East Jerusalem, 11–12 (2018).
Government of Israel resolution 1775 (June 29, 2014).
Who Profits, supra note 34, at 11–12.
The surveillance network is called “Hebron Smart City” in media reports. Dwoskin, supra note
25. For a map of CCTV installations in Hebron, see Map, M apping the A partheid, https://www.
hebronapartheid.org/mapPDF/CAMERAS.pdf.
Ami Rojkes Dombe, Our Vision Is to Become a World Leader in the Field of C2 and Intelligence, Israel
Defense (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/32613.

94

Omar Yousef Shehabi

E SPYWARE AND OTHER CYBER TOOLS
NSO Group, maker of the now-infamous Pegasus spyware,39 is an Israeli
firm founded by former Unit 8200 members. The Israeli defence ministry’s export control agency licenses NSO to sell Pegasus abroad.40 NSO’s
export licence stipulates that only the Israeli security services are authorised to monitor Israeli (+972) and Palestinian (+970) phone numbers,
and NSO has stated that Pegasus is not authorised for use against Israeli
(or US) phone numbers.41
On 16 October 2021, the Palestinian NGO Al-Haq contacted forensic
investigators with suspicions that an employee’s smartphone had been
targeted with spyware. Investigators checked the devices of 75 employees
of West Bank-based civil society organisations and determined that six
had been hacked using Pegasus at various times between July 2020 and
April 2021.42 On 19 October 2021, the Israeli defence ministry declared six
Palestinian civil society organisations to be terrorist organisations for their
alleged affiliation with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,
a Palestinian political faction with a paramilitary wing which is banned
by Israel.43 Three of the six individuals whose devices were hacked agreed
to be named; all three worked at one of these proscribed organisations.
In November 2021, Palestinian government officials made an uncorroborated allegation that Israel had used Pegasus to spy on three senior
diplomats working on Palestine’s referral to the International Criminal
Court.44
Beyond NSO, the Israeli cyber tools industry is vast and reliable
details regarding the deployment of these tools in the occupied territory
39

40

41

42

43

44

Dana Priest, Craig Timberg & Souad Mekhennet, Private Israeli spyware used to hack cellphones of
journalists, activists worldwide, Washington Post (July 18, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/investigations/interactive/2021/nso-spyware-pegasus-cellphones/.
In response to the Pegasus scandal, Israel updated its export control policy governing cyber
systems and updated its end-user declaration. See Israel MoD tightens control of cyber exports,
Israel M inistry of Foreign A ffairs (Dec. 7, 2021), https://www.gov.il/en/departments/news/
mod-tightens-control-of-cyber-exports-6-december-2021.
Patrick O’Neill, Inside NSO, Israel’s billion-dollar spyware giant, MIT T echnology R eview (Aug. 19,
2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/08/19/1006458/nso-spyware-controversy-pegasus-human-rights/; Amitai Ziv & Amira Hass, NSO Spyware Used Against Palestinian Activists
From NGOs Israel Outlawed, Report Says, H aaretz (Nov. 8, 2021), https://www.haaretz.com/
israel-news/.premium.HIGHLIGHT-nso-spyware-used-against-palestinian-activists-in-blacklisted-ngos-report-says-1.10363231.
Devices of Palestinian Human Rights Defenders Hacked with NSO Group’s Pegasus Spyware, A mnesty
International (Nov. 8, 2021), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/11/devices-ofpalestinian-human-rights-defenders-hacked-with-nso-groups-pegasus-spyware-2/.
The Minister of Defense designated six organizations of the “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine”
as terror organizations, National Bureau for Counter T error Financing in Israel (Oct. 19,
2021), https://nbctf.mod.gov.il/en/Pages/211021EN.aspx.
Patrick Kingsley & Rawan Sheikh Ahmad, Palestinian Diplomats Targeted by Israeli Spyware,
Official Says, N.Y. T imes (Nov. 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/11/world/middleeast/
israel-palestinian-nso-hacking.html.
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are thin. It bears noting, however, that Israel’s military may procure
versions of these tools unencumbered by export control restrictions.

F IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
These surveillance technologies enhance Israel’s formidable human and
signals intelligence apparatus in the occupied territory, including its
network of informants.45 They consolidate Israeli spatial control of the
occupied territory by creating a data trail of movement across a dynamic
constellation of “land cells” created by the checkpoints and permit
regime,46 with a view towards discouraging movement altogether —
what Ariel Handel calls “exclusionary surveillance”.47 These surveillance
technologies are now an integral part of the Israeli separation wall’s
“associated régime” of administrative measures, including permits and
ID cards, which the International Court of Justice considered to “gravely
infringe a number of rights of Palestinians”.48 Whether the isolating and
self-disciplining effect of video surveillance in Jerusalem and Hebron,49
the use of digital surveillance to augment the recruitment of collaborators,
or the use of spyware in efforts to discredit civil society organisations,
the surveillance technologies deployed in the occupied territory render
Palestinian society more atomised, more riven with suspicion, and less
capable of mobilising against Israeli rule.
Any remedial effort grounded in the law of occupation must confront
“the inherent limitations of existing IHL, which at its core is concerned
with the physical effects of armed conflict.”50 These limitations are highlighted by the debate over whether data has an object-quality, and thus
whether cyber attacks must comply with the principles of distinction,
proportionality and precautions in attack.51 Additionally, the emerging
technologies surveyed above, with the possible exception of offensive
cybertools, would not seem to constitute means or methods of warfare
45
46

47
48
49
50
51

See generally Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine, supra note 33; I an Black &
Benny Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars: A History of Israel’s Intelligence Services (1992).
See generally Ariel Handel, Where, Where to, and When in the Occupied Territories: An Introduction to
Geography of Disaster, in T he Power of E xclusive Inclusion: A natomy of Israeli Rule in the
O ccupied Palestinian T erritories 179-226 (Michal Givoni, Sari Hanafi & Adi Ophir eds., 2009).
Ariel Handel, Exclusionary Surveillance and Spatial Uncertainty in the Occupied Palestinian Territories,
in Zureik, Lyon and Abu-Laban, supra note 33, 259, 270.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 193 (July 9).
Dwoskin, supra note 25.
Robin Geiß & Henning Lahmann, Data Protection in Armed Conflict, Verfassungsblog (Feb. 15,
2021), https://verfassungsblog.de/data-protection-in-armed-conflict/.
Id.
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subject to legal review before deployment.52 Given these limitations, if
the law of occupation is to offer protection from the coercive effect of
emerging surveillance technologies, that defence will be located in the
rights of the civilian population rather than restraints on the technologies directly.

II

PRIVACY AND THE LAW OF
OCCUPATION
As the last major codifications of jus in bello occurred in the late 1940s and
mid-1970s, the black-letter law of occupation says little about privacy.53
It obviously says nothing about data collection practices by an occupying
power and the data privacy rights of the occupied territory’s protected
persons. The travaux préparatoires of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, as the human
rights contemporaries to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, show that the
right to privacy was incorporated “as an afterthought”.54 The same is
true of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
a generation later.55 Privacy was scarcely mentioned in the Diplomatic
Conference which studied and endorsed Additional Protocols I and II to
the Geneva Conventions and in the myriad General Assembly resolutions
on respect for human rights and armed conflict adopted before and during
the Diplomatic Conference.56
To the extent that one can derive a right to digital privacy from conventional IHL, the starting point is Article 27 of Convention (IV), which
establishes the general standard of treatment of protected persons. The
provisions of Article 27 potentially relevant to privacy are the duty to
show protected persons “respect for their persons, their honour, [and]
52

53

54
55
56

Zwanenburg, supra note 12, at 1413-1415; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
I), art. 36, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (June 8, 1977).
Asaf Lubin, The Rights to Privacy and Data Protection Under International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights Law, in R esearch H andbook on Human R ights and Humanitarian L aw
F urther R eflections and Perspectives 463, 464 (Robert Kolb, Gloria Gaggioli and Pavle
Kilibarda eds., 2022).
Vivek Krishnamurthy, A Tale of Two Privacy Laws: The GDPR and the International Right to Privacy, 114
A m. J. Int’l L. Unbound 26, 27 (2020).
Id.
Starting with G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII) (Dec. 19, 1968), based on the eponymous resolution adopted
at the Tehran Conference on Human Rights earlier that year.
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their family rights”; the duty to afford them humane treatment; and
the article’s reservation clause, which recognizes the occupying power’s
authority to institute control and security measures.
Article 27’s guarantee of respect for persons, honour and family
rights has the same connotations and coverage as “family honour and
rights” in Article 46 of the 1907 Hague Regulations: protection against
“arbitrary interference” with the home, “marriage ties”, and the “community of parents and children which constitute a family”.57 This drafting
history would not seem to invite an expansive interpretation of family
rights such as that which the Human Rights Committee has given to Article 17 ICCPR.58 Nevertheless, one path towards a right to digital privacy,
consistent with the principle of IHL-human rights law complementarity, would be to interpret “family rights” synonymously with the dyad
“privacy [and] family” or “private and family life” as used in Article 17
ICCPR and Article 8 ECHR, respectively. The Pictet commentary to Convention (IV) hints at this normative convergence with human rights
law.59 Recalling that the high contracting parties narrowly voted down a
more robust preamble with “respect [for] the principles of human rights
which constitute the safeguard of civilization” as part of the Convention’s object and purpose,60 the commentary asserts that Article 27 fills
that interpretative void and “reflect[s] the spirit which imbues the whole
Convention in regard to the rights of the individual.”61
Beyond the concept of family honour, “respect for honour” as used
in Article 27 of Convention (IV) also means what it does in Article 14
of Convention (III): protection against libel, slander, insult, and “any
violation of secrets of a personal nature.”62 The updated commentary to
Convention (III) observes that new surveillance technologies implicate
“the right of prisoners to respect for their persons and honour.”63 The new
commentary submits that “limited, well-regulated and well-managed
video surveillance” in prisoner-of-war camps “should not in principle
be considered as prohibited” by Article 14 insofar as it may prevent or
57
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International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Commentary to Geneva Convention (IV) Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 202 (Oscar Uhler and Henri Coursier, eds.,
1958) (‘Convention (IV) Commentary’); Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
art. 46 (Oct. 18, 1907) (‘Hague Regulations’).
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16, ¶ 5 (Apr. 8, 1988).
Convention (IV) Commentary, supra note 57, at 207.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 200.
ICRC, Commentary to Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 145
(Jean de Preux et al eds., 1960); compare Convention (IV) Commentary, supra note 57, at 202.
ICRC, Updated Commentary on Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War ¶ 1674 (2021) (‘Updated Convention (III) Commentary’).
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deter escape or suicide attempts, abuse by guards, and intra-prisoner
violence.64 In contrast, constant video surveillance of all prisoners would
seem disproportionate and would thus be prohibited, as would filming
family visits and bathroom use “if other ways to prevent security breaches
… would be equally effective.”65 The updated commentary, which confines
its analysis of new surveillance technologies to video monitoring and
electronic tracking bracelets, cites no authorities for these principles and
standards.66 The forthcoming updated commentary to Convention (IV)
faces the far greater task of addressing the various technologies used by
occupying powers to surveil an entire civilian population.
Article 27 also requires that protected persons in occupied territory be
“humanely treated” and protected from “tout acte de violence ou d’intimidation, contre les insultes et la curiosité publique”, an identical formulation
to Article 13 of Convention (III) on the humane treatment of prisoners of
war.67 While the Pictet commentaries to Conventions (III) and (IV) define
humane treatment in general and largely tautological terms, the ICRC’s
updated commentary to Convention (III) interprets this duty of protection
to prohibit all forms of physical or psychological abuse and humiliation.68
The updated commentary also observes that “protection from public curiosity has gained particular relevance… owing to the rapid developments
in communication technology”, “mass media in the coverage of armed
conflicts”, and “the ubiquity of social media as a means of distributing
both images and comment”.69 But while taking and disseminating Abu
Ghraib-type images of detainee abuse to humiliate an enemy clearly
violate this prohibition,70 its application in the Convention (IV) context
poses tougher, highly contextual questions — for example, whether and in
64
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Id. ¶¶ 1675-1676. The updated commentary also states that measures of “special surveillance”
imposed on a prisoner-of-war following an escape attempt pursuant to article 92 must be
“necessary, proportionate to their intended aim and serve a legal purpose”. Id. ¶ 3840.
Id. ¶ 1677.
The Updated Convention (III) Commentary has been criticised for underweighting State operational practice relative to military manuals and other secondary sources. In this vein, see Michael
Meier, The Updated GC III Commentary: A Flawed Methodology?, A rticles of War (Feb. 3, 2021),
https://lieber.westpoint.edu/updated-gciii-commentary-flawed-methodology/.
This phrase originates in Article 2 of the 1929 Geneva POW Convention, the predecessor to
Convention (III). The English version of Article 27 of Convention (IV) prohibits “all acts of
violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity”, without using the term
intimidation, which appears in the French text. The French and English versions of the Conventions are equally authentic.
Updated Convention (III) Commentary, supra note 63, ¶ 1563.
Id.
See American Civil Liberties Union v. Department of Defense, 543 F.3d 59, 90 (2nd Cir. 2008), vacated
on other grounds, 558 U.S. 1042 (2009) (in case concerning public disclosure of photographs
depicting abusive treatment by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, holding that “Article 13 of
the Third Geneva Convention and Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention do not prohibit
dissemination of images of detainees being abused when the images are redacted so as to protect
the identities of the detainees, at least in situations where… the purpose of the dissemination is
not itself to humiliate the detainees”.)
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what circumstances non-consensual photographing of protected persons
for facial recognition purposes (such as Blue Wolf) goes beyond a legitimate security measure and constitutes instead a form of intimidation
or humiliation.
Article 27’s reservation clause recognizes the occupying power’s right
to take “such measures of control and security in regard to protected
persons as may be necessary as a result of the war.” The Convention (IV)
commentary suggests that “necessary” as used in this reservation is more
permissive than the concept of military necessity.71 This interpretation
is bolstered by Article 78, which in contrast with Article 27’s general
standard for security measures requires “imperative reasons of security” for two exceptional control and security measures: internment and
assigned residence. The Pictet commentary to Convention (IV) provides a
non-exhaustive list of examples of permissible measures, including less
intrusive restrictions such as requiring the carrying of identity cards—
which can by analogised to include the use of technologies that identify
those permitted access and restrict those considered a security risk.
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I expands the protections of Article
27 of Convention (IV) by prohibiting discrimination in the enjoyment
of Convention rights based inter alia on “political or other opinion” and
enshrining respect for non-religious “convictions” on top of existing
protections for religious beliefs and observance. Respect for convictions
“implies that a person professing any particular convictions cannot be
arrested or imprisoned for this reason alone” and stands as the nonderogable counterpart to the derogable right to free expression under
Article 19 ICCPR.72
Upon this sparse framework of conventional IHL, those who would
advocate for a more robust concept of privacy in the law of occupation
urge an evolved understanding of humane treatment. Eyal Benvenisti,
for one, does so by appealing to the common origins of IHL and human
rights law in human dignity. He suggests “the principle of human dignity arguably obliges the occupying army to treat enemy nationals under
its control as ends and not merely as means” — that a warring army’s
71

72

Convention (IV) Commentary, supra note 57, at 207 (stating of security measures anticipated
by Article 27’s reservation clause: “[a] great deal is thus left to the discretion of [the occupying
power] as regards the choice of means”). Military necessity permits measures necessary to
accomplish a legitimate military objective that are not otherwise prohibited. Military necessity,
ICRC Online Casebook, https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/military-necessity. Legitimate military
objectives in occupation are to restore and ensure public order in the occupied territory (with law
enforcement and judicial measures favoured over the use of force) and to provide for military
security. See M arco L ongobardo, T he Use of Force in O ccupied T erritory, 238–40 (2008).
ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, 871 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987).
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“attenuated duties” to respect certain rights of the enemy’s civilian population are transformed by exclusive control of the territory into a duty
to ensure a wider array of rights.73
A variant of this move is to extrapolate an evolving right to privacy
from the local law predating the occupation, rather than human rights
law or notions of human dignity. In this vein is a recent article which
considered the data gathering and storage practices alleged by Unit 8200
“refuseniks” and concluded that these practices ran afoul of Article 43
of the Hague Regulations because they violated the right to privacy
enshrined in the Jordanian and Egyptian constitutions applicable in the
West Bank and Gaza, respectively, when the occupation commenced,
and were not justified by military necessity.74 But adequately regulated
uses of surveillance technologies might equally be viewed as legitimate
measures to restore public order and civil life in a manner consistent
with this evolving right to privacy, with its focus on data subject rights
rather than the outright prohibition of mass surveillance.
The absence of express rights to privacy and data protection in conventional IHL is unlikely to change anytime soon. As Amanda Alexander has
illustrated, however, the ascendancy of the humanitarian dimension of
ius in bello is recent, historically contingent, fitful in its development, and
less attributable to States and the ICRC than the conventional narrative
of continuity suggests.75 Alexander has documented how human rights
organisations played an outsized role in building consensus regarding
the customary status of large swathes of Additional Protocol I, persistent
objectors notwithstanding.76 So, too, might non-State actors take the lead
on digital privacy and data protection in times of occupation, whether
through interpretations of IHL of the types just described or by appeal
to human rights law, to which we now turn.
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Eyal Benvenisti, T he International L aw of O ccupation, 90 (1st ed. 2006).
Benjamin Waters, An International Right to Privacy: Israeli Intelligence Collection in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories, 50 Geo. J. Int’l L. 573, 590–94 (2019). Peter Beaumont, Israeli intelligence veterans refuse to serve in Palestinian territories, Guardian (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/12/israeli-intelligence-reservists-refuse-serve-palestinian-territories.
Amanda Alexander, A Short History of International Humanitarian Law, 26 Eur. J. Int’l L. 109
(2015).
Id. at 126–35.
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III

DOES THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
FOR DIGITAL PRIVACY AND DATA
PROTECTION RIGHTS TRANSLATE TO
THE OCCUPATION CONTEXT?
As Asaf Lubin notes, while “IHL will more often than not be silent”
as to emerging surveillance technologies, human rights law “has been
developing at a far faster rate” to address the challenges such technologies pose.77 This raises the question of the interoperability of IHL and
human rights law, the subject of a vast literature which has yielded two
prevailing views.78 The first, complementarity, posits their concurrent
application and mutually informed interpretation. The second, conflict
resolution, posits that true conflicts between the regimes, while perhaps
rare, do exist and cannot be resolved by appeal to a normative hierarchy
but only by policy choices.79 The questions are thus to what extent digital
privacy and data protection as they are developing in human rights law
can apply concurrently and without conflict to the law of occupation; and
where there are conflicts, which policy interests should be prioritised in
mediating their resolution. This section focuses on the former question
and leaves the latter for another day.
Other contributions in this volume closely examine these developments in human rights law, which we need only summarise here. Lubin,
while acknowledging that “at the international level, data protection
remains fragmented and weak”,80 identifies six “emerging norms” of
a right to digital privacy and data protection: data collection and processing that is (1) “lawful, fair and transparent”, i.e. legally-grounded
and restricted, and (2) accurate, complete, and up-to-date; (3) “purpose
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Lubin, supra note 53, at 482.
For an account of interoperability specific to occupation rather than active hostilities,
see L ongobardo, supra note 71, at 81–82.
Leah West’s contribution in this volume surveys the interoperability literature and the conflict
resolution model specifically; see Leah West (Chapter 7 of this collection). See also Lubin, supra
note 53, at 481 and notes 112–13, discussing proposed conflict resolution heuristics. This view
presupposes that the lex specialis principle, appropriately understood, does not dictate such a
hierarchy and generally obscures the policy preferences at work. See Marko Milanovic, The Lost
Origins of Lex Specialis, in T heoretical B oundaries of A rmed Conflict and Human R ights, 78
(Jens David Ohlin ed., 2016).
Lubin, supra note 53, at 473 (citing to Kriangsak Kittichaisaree and Christopher Kuner, The
Growing Importance of Data Protection in Public International Law, EJIL: Talk! (Oct. 14, 2015),
available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-growing -importance-of-data-protection-in-public-
international-law/); compare G.A. Res. 69/166, ¶ 4 (Dec. 18, 2014).
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and storage specification and limitation” such that data should be kept
in personally-identifiable form no longer than required for the express
purpose it was collected; (4) individual participation, encompassing the
right to know of and object to processing of personal data, and to rectify, block access to, and erase that data; (5) integrity and confidentiality, including reasonable protection from security breaches and other
unauthorised disclosures; and (6) “due process, supervision and legal
sanction” to ensure compliance with these principles, e.g. by establishing
a data protection authority.81
I leave aside my doubts as to whether these norms are emerging
beyond European frontiers82 and assume their eventual place in the corpus
of international human rights law.83 I have more acute doubts whether
these norms can be made interoperable with the law of occupation without exacerbating the tensions plaguing the latter regime.
The Strasbourg Court in Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom defined
the procedural safeguards required of bulk interception regimes in eight
principles broadly similar to Lubin’s six.84 The court conceptualised mass
surveillance’s infringement upon privacy rights as a sliding scale: least
upon the initial interception of data, increasing with its storage and
automatic processing, and peaking upon review by an intelligence analyst.85 In the court’s analysis, however, the increasing infringement on
privacy only warrants more exacting scrutiny of the State’s procedural
safeguards; it does not require proportionality by the substantive metric
of greater functionality and effectiveness.86 The court reserved judgments
regarding the need for particular mass surveillance programmes to the
State’s margin of appreciation.87 Big Brother Watch can thus be viewed as a
further stage in the Strasbourg Court’s so-called procedural turn towards
inferring substantive compliance from procedural due diligence.88
The problem for interoperability purposes is that this procedural
approach to digital privacy and data protection — examining the internal
81
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Lubin, supra note 53, at 475–76.
See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/60, ¶ 15 (Sept. 6,
2017) (observing regression at national level in legislative regulation of surveillance).
Or perhaps even beyond the EU’s frontiers – Norway argued in Big Brother Watch that the Strasbourg Court should not import “concepts and criteria” from the data protection jurisprudence of
the Court of Justice of the European Union applying the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. See Big
Brother Watch v. United Kingdom [GC], Nos. 58170/13, 62322/14 & 24969/15, ¶ 310 (May 25, 2021).
Id. ¶ 361; see also id. ¶¶ 348–59.
Id. ¶ 330–31.
Monika Zalnieriute, Procedural Fetishism and Mass Surveillance under the ECHR, Verfassungsblog
(June 2, 2021), https://verfassungsblog.de/big-b-v-uk/.
Big Brother Watch, supra note 83, ¶ 347.
Zalnieriute, supra note 86; Eva Brems, Procedural Protection: An Examination of Procedural Safeguards
Read into Substantive Convention Rights, in Shaping R ights in the ECHR 135 (Eva Brems & Janneke
Gerards eds., 2013).
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regulation of a surveillance regime’s operations without scrutinising the
regime’s necessity and proportionality89 — rests on a theory of procedural
democracy which is inapposite in the context of military occupation. As
Janneke Gerards has argued, procedural democracy theories support judicial deference until and unless the relevant legislative or administrative
procedure is “suspected to be defective to the extent that even its own
corrective mechanisms cannot be trusted any more”.90 Accordingly, the
proceduralisation of data protection reflected by Big Brother Watch relies
upon the “formal jurisdictional division of tasks” on the national plane,
to say nothing of supranational judicial supervision.91
Military occupation does not admit of this jurisdictional division.
Whether or not the occupying power establishes a special administration for the occupied territory, even one staffed heavily by civilians, “the
government of an occupied territory is military per definitionem” and
invariably defaults to a military posture.92 Yael Berda has illustrated that
establishing a civil administration as the occupation’s bureaucracy in the
1980s and the Palestinian Authority as the local authority in parts of the
occupied territory a decade later counterintuitively increased the involvement of the military and the Shabak in the daily affairs of the Palestinian
population, as these institutions transitioned to indirect rule through
control of the population registry and a permit regime.93 When the second
intifada erupted, the Shabak, “through its monopoly of intelligence and
classification of Palestinians” according to the perceived security threat,
solidified a dominance over the bureaucracy which it maintains today.94
Judicial review of the military commander’s decisions does not
change this equation. While judicial review is a distinctive feature of
the Israeli occupation, it is premised on Israeli administrative law;95 it is
neither a requirement in the law of occupation nor a standard feature of
occupation regimes.96 Leaving aside questions over the purpose of judicial review in the occupation context,97 its availability feeds the liberal
89
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Big Brother Watch, supra note 83, Partly Concurring and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pinto
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Oddný Arnardóttir, The “Procedural Turn” under the European Convention on Human Rights and
Presumptions of Convention Compliance, 15 Int’l J. Const. L. 9, 33 (2017).
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Yael Berda, Living E mergency: Israel’s Permit R egime in the O ccupied West Bank 20–31
(2018).
Id. at 31–35.
David K retzmer & Yael Ronen, T he O ccupation of Justice, 31 (2d ed. 2021).
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impulse that “injustices are necessarily caused by ‘lawlessness’ and that
applying more norms will always be beneficial”.98 Berda has shown how
this impulse drove demands for a legally-defined and transparent Israeli
permit regime for Palestinians, and how this effort ultimately backfired.
Publication of the criteria for banning Palestinians from entering Israel
satisfied “the norms of liberal administrative justice” but did nothing
to rein in the discretion of the military, intelligence, and security services, other than to circumscribe their authority to make exceptions in
individual cases.99
With this incongruence between procedural democracy and military
occupation in mind, take Lubin’s question of whether the law of occupation obligates Israel to conduct an impact assessment before deploying
biometrics at checkpoints. Lubin reasons that the imperatives of data
protection apply at checkpoints because the occupying power’s activities there are administrative and bureaucratic, rather than military,
in nature.100 With respect, I cannot agree with that characterisation unless
we are prepared to rethink the law of occupation, or to peek behind the
curtain and make epistemological judgments about the nature and purpose of a given occupation.
Black-letter IHL regards checkpoints101 as a manifestation of an
occupying power’s authority to regulate, restrict and temporarily suspend freedom of movement of civilians of the enemy nationality.102 As an
exercise of a military prerogative, they are fundamentally and invariably
of a military character. Israel’s choice to bureaucratise and digitise the
checkpoints, with the effect that direct military-civilian encounters are
reduced, does not change their function from military to administrative/
bureaucratic. If data protection obligations attach at the checkpoints,
it must for a reason other than their newfound banality.
Lubin’s point, however, is that Israel’s checkpoints ostensibly have
little relation to this fundamental and invariable military character.
They are not temporary and contravene the Geneva law’s “idea of the
personal freedom of civilians remaining in general unimpaired”.103 It is
98

A eyal Gross, T he Writing on the Wall: R ethinking the International L aw of O ccupation
396 (2017).
99 Berda, supra note 93, at 122–23.
100 Lubin, supra note 53, at 485.
101 I speak here only of checkpoints within the occupied territory, and not crossing points between
the occupied territory and Israel. Given the territorial and functional integration of Israel/
Palestine, due partly to settlements but also to the “economic annexation” of the occupied
territory into Israel (see Benvenisti, supra note 96, at 241–44), Israeli jurisprudence concerning
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security. See K retzmer & Ronen, supra note 95, at 136–37.
102 Convention (IV) Commentary, supra note 57, at 201–2.
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questionable, then, whether the checkpoints are deployed consistent with
the object and purpose of the law of occupation, i.e., for legitimate military interests that facilitate governing the occupied territory in accordance with IHL. If they rather serve to colonise the territory and abuse
the protected population, an impact assessment of biometrics used at
these checkpoints seems a misguided initiative.
One way to think beyond black-letter IHL is on the theory that the
“normal” operation of checkpoints in accordance with security requirements, as opposed to their “exceptional” closure and re-militarisation,
is a policing function governed by the law enforcement paradigm of
human rights law. This is certainly true on the ground: virtually all the
checkpoints are now run by private security companies rather than army
personnel.104 The private security guards who run those checkpoints in
“normal” times clearly are neither combatants nor civilians taking a
direct part in hostilities.105 But the data gathering that occurs at checkpoints, and that enables their operation, remains a military prerogative.
Moreover, decisions arising at checkpoints in “exceptional” times, justified on the basis of military necessity or military operations, must be
made by military personnel.106
While I agree with Lubin that Palestinians do not lose their rights
as data subjects because military rather than civilian authorities collect
and process that data, there is something qualitatively different about
data in the hands of the occupying power’s armed forces. Although Lubin
does not specify the source of the “purpose and storage specification and
limitation” principle, one of the emerging norms he identifies, it might
be located in the norm prohibiting otherwise-lawful restrictions on rights
imposed for an improper purpose, reflected e.g. in article 18 ECHR and
article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights. This principle,
which originates in French administrative law, starts from the presumption that the executive acts in good faith107 and is constrained by functioning contre-pouvoirs (institutional controls).108 The occupying power’s
control of data does not warrant a presumption against détournement de
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pouvoir (misuse of power) because (i) the relationship between the occupying power and the protected population is fundamentally an adversarial
one and (ii) the concept of contre-pouvoirs is inapposite in the context
of the military commander’s unitary rule. The law of occupation, by its
architecture, would thus not seem to admit of such a limitation: if intelligence gathering and storage is a legitimate security measure, then any
bona fide military necessity would justify its use.
Let us revisit the Unit 8200 “refuseniks” who alleged that unit
personnel “were instructed to keep any damaging details of Palestinians” lives they came across, including information on sexual preferences,
infidelities, financial problems or family illnesses that could be “used
to extort/blackmail the person and turn them into a collaborator”.109
The data collection should be distinguished from its potential misuses.
An occupying power would insist that an enemy citizen’s peccadillos
(real or perceived) pose a threat to military security for the same reasons
that infidelity, drug use or debts may be grounds for denying a security
clearance to a prospective civil servant: they increase vulnerability to
co-optation by groups proscribed by the military authorities, just as they
do to recruitment as informants serving those authorities. The coordinated Western campaign against the Hamas social infrastructure in
the occupied territory and its network of donors abroad is premised on
just these assumptions: that “the mere provision of (often) free social
services … suffices to mobilise support for the Islamist agenda” and that
“the recipient community is deeply integrated into the operations and
management of Islamic associations (such that its members are able to
be indoctrinated and recruited).”110 The reality is more nuanced, as Sara
Roy has illustrated, and this recruitment scenario is quite reductionist.111
Nevertheless, an occupying power would seem to have the prevailing
“moral intuitions, … biases and preferences” of international authority
on its side in claiming the collection and storage of personal data for
this purpose as a reasonable security measure, recalling an occupying
power’s discretion to choose amongst security measures.112 So the data
collection would prima facie seem a legitimate security measure, recalling
an occupying power’s discretion in choosing such measures.
Misuse of that data for purposes of recruiting collaborators would
not be for an absence of norms: Article 31 of Convention (IV) prohibits
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an occupying power from obtaining information from protected persons,
and by logical extension recruiting informants, through “physical or
moral coercion”.113 The recruitment of collaborators nevertheless remains
an enduring feature of modern occupations generally, and of the Israeli
occupation.114 Berda’s cautionary tale of the unintended consequences
of pursuing liberal justice in an illiberal, coercive context should give
us pause. Do we genuinely need norms on data collection and storage to fill lacunae in IHL? Or are auxiliary norms that would constrain
the technological enhancement of unlawful practices attractive because
the primary norms against such practices have lost prescriptive force?115
These are important questions, but not those I endeavour to explore in
the remainder of this short contribution. Rather, in the next section,
I query whether the worm-eaten law of occupation paradigm offers a
sufficiently robust basis, even when combined with the evolving right to
digital privacy and data protection in human rights law, for regulating
the data practices of an occupying power.

IV

EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTIONS
The dust jacket to Yoram Dinstein’s original monograph on the law of
occupation calls the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory the “paradigmatic illustration” of belligerent occupation.116 That his second edition
drops this characterisation speaks to a growing recognition that the Israeli
occupation is anything but paradigmatic and that the law-of-occupation
paradigm fails to capture its reality. Even for want of better contemporary
examples, I have used the occupied Palestinian territory as a case study
here with considerable hesitation.
The pre-eminence of Israel/Palestine in the contemporary law of
occupation has reduced settlements and settlers to a topic within the
law of occupation rather than a first principle of settler-occupations.
The international lawyers who have countenanced this shift presumably
113
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have done so in the interest of cohesion — the desire not to fragment
the law of occupation between short-term occupations, transformative
occupations, settler-occupations, and other disfigurations of the paradigm — but at the expense of coherence. If the principles of IHL “operate
a balance between the demands of humanity and the necessities of war”,
as Alain Pellet put it, the balance cannot be struck without reference to
the war’s objective.117 The crisis in the law of occupation lies in the fact
that its limitations on the objective of an occupation have not kept pace
with IHL’s limitations on the conduct of hostilities. This crisis is the
theme of much contemporary scholarship on the law of occupation, and
it cannot be ignored here.
Not all settler-occupations are alike, of course.118 Situations like
Israel/Palestine, where the occupying power seeks to exclude the protected population from the territory which it claims, and ultimately to
disclaim responsibility for that population, must be distinguished from
situations like Morocco/Western Sahara, where the occupying power
claims the occupied territory and identifies the protected population as
its citizens.119 In the latter context, settlers and protected persons are, in
theory, subject to the same data gathering methods and the same legal
regime governing the data processing, usage and dissemination — the
municipal law of the occupying power. Of course, Morocco’s full and
explicit exercise of sovereign powers in Western Sahara, like Russia/
Crimea and other purported annexations, contributes nothing to the law
of occupation.
In settler-occupations of the Israel/Palestine variety, meanwhile,
settlers and protected persons encounter many of the same data gathering methods but are subject to different legal regimes governing data
processing, usage and dissemination. Indeed, data harvesting in settler-
occupations and the amount of data the State thereby acquires on settlers
relative to its non-settler citizens might conceivably push the occupying power towards increasing data privacy protections in its municipal
law. In the context of an indefinite occupation such as Israel/Palestine,
the disparity in data protection between settlers and protected persons
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For a comparative account of settler-occupations, see generally Settlers in Contested L ands:
T erritorial Disputes and Ethnic Conflicts (Oded Haklai & Neophytos Loizides eds., 2015).
Thereby violating the basic principles of the law of occupation, namely that protected persons
retain their nationality, do not acquire the nationality of the occupying power, and do not
owe allegiance to the occupying power. The law of occupation, in theory, continues to govern
notwithstanding these violations, as prescribed in Article 47 of Convention (IV).
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acquires the character of systemic discrimination.120 Insofar as human
rights law is offered as a way to overcome IHL’s silence on digital privacy and data protection, we must address the question of settlements
and settlers, if only provisionally, lest we cherry-pick from the menu
of human rights law while leaving aside its fundamental promise of
non-discrimination.
Viewing international law as a communications process in which
prescriptions are constantly challenged and are either reinforced by
international authority or allowed to wither and die, one must question,
however despairingly, whether the prohibition against settlements in
occupied territory enjoys the prescriptive force that its elevated place in
conventional IHL suggests,121 even when their permanent and appropriative character is clear. International authority has declined to impose
limits on extent of territorial change it would accept in a negotiated
settlement that would end the Israeli occupation.122 Further evidence of
a frayed prescription lies in the fact that Israeli jurisprudence is widely
accepted as a key component of the customary law of occupation, although
premised on the understanding that the settlement project is a nonjusticiable political matter and a certain practical equivalence between settlers
and protected persons.123
If settlers bend but do not break the law of occupation, one principle that cannot survive settlements is the notion of occupying power as
trustee. It is nonsensical to speak of a settler-occupier acting as trustee of
the protected population in administrative and bureaucratic affairs while
it transforms the demographic composition of their territory and erodes
the prospects of restoring popular sovereignty. Whether one reaches this
conclusion from the premise that settlements fundamentally pervert the
trust, as humanitarian lawyers are apt to,124 or simply because occupying
powers are not trustees, as military lawyers are apt to believe, matters
120 See Marco Longobardo, Preliminary but Necessary: The Question of the Applicability of the Notion of
Apartheid to Occupied Territory, Just Security (Dec. 2, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/79381/
preliminary-but-necessary-the-question-of-the-applicability-of-the-notion-of-apartheid-to-occupied-territory/ (concluding that “nothing in the law of occupation… would bar the
application of the notion of apartheid to occupied territory”, notwithstanding the distinction
between the legal regimes of the occupying power and of the occupied territory).
121 Protocol I, supra note 52, art. 85(4)(a).
122 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2334 (Dec. 23, 2016) ¶¶ 1, 3, reaffirming that establishment of settlements in
oPt “has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation under international law” while
declaring that the Council will not recognise any territorial changes “other than those agreed
by the parties through negotiations”; U.N. Doc. S/2014/916 (Dec. 30, 2014) (draft resolution on
parameters for Israeli-Palestinian permanent-status agreement, not adopted). On this topic,
see Ardi Imseis, Negotiating the Illegal: On the United Nations and the Illegal Occupation of Palestine,
1967–2020, 31 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1055 (2020).
123 K retzmer & Ronen, supra note 95, at 190–93, 217–31.
124 Gross, supra note 98, at 36–39.
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less than consensus on this point.125 If we are called upon to decide
between the law of occupation’s traditional conservationist impulses and
the legislative ambitions of self-professed “benevolent occupants”,126 in a
settler-occupation the conservationist principle must prevail, recognising
that this means a thinner law of occupation (or law of an occupation).
The settler presence dictates, at minimum, that the conservationism of
Hague law must prevail over the humanitarianism of Geneva law.
The question of settlements and settlers is thus relevant in identifying the source of the digital privacy and data subject rights of the occupied territory’s protected population, assuming they have any. One could
envisage locating these rights in (i) general international human rights
law; (ii) an occupying power’s general duty to “promote the interests of
the civilian population”;127 (iii) the occupying power’s domestic legislation; or (iv) the rights of settlers in the occupied territory, who are also
subject to the authority of the military commander but may benefit from
the extraterritorial application of wide swaths of the occupying power’s
domestic law and military orders applicable only to the settlements, as
in the Israeli context.128
None of these approaches seems satisfactory. As examined in Part
III, the principles comprising the right to digital privacy and data protection in human rights law remain nascent, at least outside the European
context, and at least some of these principles are of questionable inter
operability with the law of occupation. The application of Israeli domestic
law qua Israeli law would be annexation.129 Transposing Israeli domestic
law to the occupied territory by military order would exceed the military
commander’s legislative authority. While this approach might promote
the interests of the protected population in a narrow, decontextualised
sense, in the context of a settler occupation it must be rejected as “the
bear’s hug” of the occupying power.130 Certainly few would accept, for
data privacy purposes or for any purpose, formal equivalence between
settlers and protected persons. One might envisage, as a least-worst
option and even at the risk of legitimating the illegitimate, the occupying
power using its data handing and protection practices towards settlers as
125
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Yoram Dinstein, T he International L aw of Belligerent O ccupation 39 (2d ed. 2019).
K retzmer & Ronen, supra note 95, at 143–47.
Lubin, supra note 53, at 483–84.
See generally M ichael K arayanni, Conflicts in a Conflict: A Conflict of L aws C ase Study
on Israel and the Palestinian T erritories 37–40, 72–76 (2014); K retzmer & Ronen, supra
note 95, at 222–26.
129 Compare Lubin, supra note 53, at 485 and note 127, characterising the non-application of Israel’s
biometrics law to the Palestinian population of the occupied territory as unjustified discrimination; but see Longobardo, supra note 120.
130 See Dinstein, supra note 125, at 132.
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a reference in defining its duties towards protected persons, at least during
the occupation’s “normal” times and with respect to its administrative
and bureaucratic aspects.

CONCLUSION
The challenge in locating a doctrinally satisfactory source for the digital
privacy rights of protected persons and the data protection duties of
an occupying power speaks to a classic legitimacy-versus-effectivity
dilemma. When we speak of these rights and duties, are we envisaging the
Platonic form of an occupation, in which the occupying power recognizes
its status as such and thus the limits of its legislative authority, does not
establish settlements, stakes no claim to any part of the occupied territory
and seeks to end the occupation at the earliest opportunity? Or are we
addressing the contemporary reality wherein the only occupying powers
which acknowledge the applicability of the law of occupation also claim
licence to establish settlements, undertake a political and economic transformation of the occupied territory, and so on? Put another way, if Hague
Article 43 is a “mini-constitution” of an occupation regime,131 can the
law of occupation retain some semblance of universality when the few
occupying powers of the modern era to have recognized the “constitutional” limits to their rule have nevertheless presented bespoke visions of
l’ordre et la vie publique in the occupied territories? Any effort at developing
universal digital privacy and data protection standards in times of armed
conflict must reckon with this crisis in the law of occupation.
I do not suggest that the panoptic surveillance of occupied territory
is acceptable. Nor do I suggest that efforts to regulate it are necessarily
misguided or futile — only that such efforts pose fraught choices. IHL does
not per se prohibit mass surveillance in occupied territory. The enquiry
is rather defining where mass surveillance technologies and techniques
stray beyond legitimate measures of control and security, which is a policy
judgment. Human rights are a necessary but not sufficient component
of this policymaking. The procedural approach to digital privacy and
data protection emerging in human rights law is premised on a division of labour between legislator, data controllers and processors, and
131

Benvenisti, supra note 96, at 107.
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regulator. This approach is neither theoretically nor practically suited
to the structure of military occupation — nor would such congruence
be desirable. A swollen occupation bureaucracy devoted to the lawful
operation of surveillance regimes would invariably blur the distinction
between the “normal” state of self-determination/sovereign equality
and the “exceptional” state of alien rule/suspended sovereignty that
occupation represents.132
I close on this note of sobriety: the gap between the image and
contemporary reality of occupation may be vast enough to defy pragmatic regulation, as the example of biometric checkpoints illustrates.
Either we accept that the checkpoint expresses the military prerogative
to regulate and restrict movement of enemy nationals for public safety
and military security, i.e. that it results from the “exceptional” nature
of occupation, in which case the appeal to their “normal” administrative
and bureaucratic character as the source of data protection obligations
must fail. Or we are prepared to contemplate that ce n’est pas un point de
contrôle and to ask teleological questions regarding the checkpoints and
the occupation regime itself.133 A pragmatic approach to digital privacy
and data protection in occupation, if neither grounded in black-letter law
nor prepared to grapple with occupation as a normative phenomenon,
would be doubly unsatisfactory.

132 Much as efforts to humanise means and methods of warfare are charged with sanctioning
wars of indefinite duration; see Samuel Moyn, Humane: How the US A bandoned Peace and
R einvented War (2021).
133 Handel, supra note 47, at 259–61; Hagar Kotef & Merav Amir, Between Imaginary Lines: Violence and
its Justification at Military Checkpoints in Occupied Palestine, 28 T heory, C ulture & S oc'y 55 (2011).
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The Right to Privacy
and the Protection
of Data for Prisoners
of War in Armed
Conflict
Emily Crawford 1

INTRODUCTION
It is relatively uncontroversial nowadays to state that the law of armed
conflict (LOAC) and international human rights law (IHRL) can and do apply
concurrently and that persons in situations of armed conflict are entitled to
have their international human rights respected.2 In the context of prisoner
of war (POW) detention, all POWs are entitled to have their fundamental
human rights respected by the State3 that claims control over them, while
at the same time benefiting from the full suite of POW protections.
1
2

3

Associate Professor, University of Sydney.
On the relationship and interaction of the LOAC and IHRL, see further International Humanitarian L aw and International Human R ights L aw: Pas de Deux (Orna Ben-Naftali ed.,
2011); R esearch H andbook on Human R ights and Humanitarian L aw (Robert Kolb & Gloria
Gaggioli eds., 2013).
This raises the specter of the extraterritorial applicability of human rights law, which is not
uncontroversial. See further M arko M ilanovic, E xtraterritorial A pplication of Human
R ights T reaties: L aw, Principles, and Policy (2011), in particular ch. 2. However, this chapter
will follow the lead of Asaf Lubin:
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One of the fundamental human rights to which POWs are entitled is
the right to privacy — defined in international law as the right to not be
“subjected to arbitrary interference with [one’s] privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon [one’s] honour and reputation.”4 Yet
much of the detainee experience is anathema to the right to privacy. For
example, POWs are under surveillance by the detaining power (DP) at all
times and can have their personal correspondence and communications
monitored and censored by the DP. Admittedly, the right to privacy under
international law is framed as a right not to have one’s privacy interfered
with arbitrarily or unlawfully. Surveillance and monitoring pursuant to the
rules on detention in an armed conflict are therefore not arbitrary but
undertaken lawfully, because the POW meets certain criteria — namely,
the POW is a captured enemy combatant.
The lawfully obtained personal data on POWs that can be gathered
by a DP is noteworthy in volume and scope. Indeed, acquiring data on
persons detained in the context of armed conflict is paramount. At the
most basic level, it is fundamental for the detaining authority to know
the country of origin of the POW, and other identifying information, for
its own records. Under the law of international armed conflict,5 parties

4

5

Within the limits of this chapter, I do not wish to rehash the age-old debate around the extraterritorial application of human rights regimes. This chapter assumes that States must respect
and ensure human rights to all individuals subject to their jurisdiction, power, or effective
control, regardless of whether those individuals are situated within that States’ territory.
Asaf Lubin, The Rights to Privacy and Data Protection under International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights Law, in R esearch H andbook on Human R ights and Humanitarian L aw:
F urther R eflections and Perspectives 471 (Robert Kolb, Gloria Gaggioli & Pavle Kilibarda
eds., 2022). Whether persons held in detention by non-State actors are also to have their human
rights respected and observed by such non-State actors is more problematic, but there are
compelling arguments to suggest that non-State actors are under an obligation to respect the
human rights of persons under their effective control. See further Non-State Actors and Human
R ights (Philip Alston ed., 2005); A ndrew Clapham, Human R ights Obligations of Non-State
Actors (2006); Konstantinos M astorodimos, A rmed Non-State Actors in International
Humanitarian and Human R ights L aw: Foundation and Framework of Obligations, and
Rules on Accountability (2016); K atherine Fortin, T he Accountability of A rmed Groups
under Human R ights L aw (2017).
As defined in G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 12 (Dec. 10, 1948).
See also similar provisions on privacy in the Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 16, Nov.
20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families art. 14, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222;
American Convention on Human Rights art. 11, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Arab Charter on
Human Rights arts. 16, 21, May 22, 2004, reprinted in 12 International Human R ights R eports
893 (2005).
Comprising Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (II) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva
Convention or GC III]; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]; and Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. Also adopted at the
time was the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
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to the conflict must communicate information about a POW to the POW’s
country of origin and/or family6 and to any other stakeholder, such as
the protecting power,7 the International Committee of the Red Cross,8 or
the Central Prisoners of War Agency.9 This is only a fraction of the data
that exists and can be collected regarding POWs — information regarding
the personal effects they were carrying upon capture,10 their physical and
mental health,11 and even what they are occupied with on a day-to-day
basis12 form a significant corpus of information that is or can be collected
regarding POWs. Such data, of a highly personal nature, could be misused
by a DP, or any other person into whose hands it fell, against the POW,
their family and friends, and even their country of origin.
The LOAC contains no comprehensive rules on how such personal
data is compiled and stored, or whether anything other than the most
basic identifying information may be shared with other stakeholders —
for instance, during prisoner transfer from one DP to another. In terms
of rules regarding the privacy of POWs, including the protection of their
personal information, all that exists in the LOAC are the generic rules
that protect POWs from “insults and public curiosity”13—which could
conceivably include protecting POWs from the exposure of personal information that might be of a private nature. Additionally, there are some
limited rules on privacy-related matters, such as censoring personal
correspondence14 and when and how a POW may be placed under special
surveillance — for instance, in the case of a POW who has previously
escaped captivity.15
The primary sources of the LOAC—the Hague Regulations of 1907,16
the Geneva Conventions of 1949,17 and the Additional Protocols of 197718—
were adopted at a time when issues regarding privacy and data collection

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter AP II]. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem, Dec. 8, 2005, 2404 U.N.T.S. 261 adds an
additional protected emblem—that of the Red Crystal—to the existing Red Cross, Red Crescent,
and Red Lion and Sun emblems.
GC III, supra note 5, art. 70.
Id. art. 69.
See, e.g., id. arts. 9, 122.
Id. art. 123.
Id. art. 18.
Id. arts. 29–31.
For instance, if they are engaged in employment within or outside the detention facility,
per id. arts. 51–57.
Id. art. 13.
Id. art. 76.
Id. art. 92.
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention No. IV
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539.
Supra note 5.
Id.
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were not foremost in the minds of States and other stakeholders. However, in the last few decades, technology has developed to the point
that the collection of data from individuals is far easier and far more
comprehensive in scope than ever before. Alongside these technological
developments have been the growth and expansion of IHRL and its own
robust discourse on the individual right to privacy and the multitude of
issues that arise from data collection and management. There has been
no concomitant development in the LOAC to grapple with what rights to
privacy POWs have and what rules should govern the collection, management, and communication of data on POWs and detainees.
This chapter will examine the question of POWs and their right to
privacy, whether and how data collected on POWs must be managed, what
implications arise regarding the data collected on POWs, and whether
there are issues regarding privacy and the protection of personal data of
POWs. In doing so, the chapter will draw on the rules of both the LOAC
and IHRL to ascertain whether there is a gap in the law or whether
the existing rules are sufficient. Due to space limitations, the chapter
will focus solely on the issues of data protection and privacy of POWs
(as opposed to detainees in international armed conflicts and persons
detained in relation to non-international armed conflicts).19

I

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Before assessing whether the LOAC adequately deals with the concept of
the right to privacy and the protection of personal data, it is useful to first
understand what is meant by a right to privacy and how the protection
of personal data is fundamental to upholding that right. However, this
is easier said than done: the literature on what exactly “privacy” means
is vast, and there are competing and conflicting views on what privacy
actually entails.20 It has variously been theorized as:
19

20

For detailed analyses of the rights that accrue for security detainees in international armed
conflicts and detainees in non-international armed conflicts, see further L awrence Hill-
C awthorne, Detention in Non-International A rmed Conflict (2016); Ryan Goodman, The
Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103 A merican Journal of International L aw 48 (2009);
Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed
Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 85 International R eview of the R ed Cross 375 (2005).
See generally A ndrea Monti & R aymond Wacks, Protecting Personal Information: T he
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a choice, a function, a desire, a right, a condition, and/or a
need. Privacy has also been defined as the desire of individuals for solitude, intimacy, anonymity, and reserve. It has been
defined widely as “the right to be left alone” and narrowly as a
right to control information about one’s self.21
It is not possible in a chapter of this scope to undertake an analysis of
these differing philosophical theories of privacy. Instead, for the purpose
of this chapter, it will be the international legal concept of privacy, as
enshrined in treaty law, that will be used as the measure. That is to say:
what does IHRL understand privacy to be?

A THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful
attacks on his honour and reputation.”22 This provision is essentially
replicated in other IHRL instruments, such as the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights,23 and other international and regional human rights
instruments,24 as well as significant non-binding statements from various
UN bodies.25 Neither the case law nor the General Comment26 pertaining
to Article 17 has thoroughly defined the right to privacy.27 However, it
is clear that the right to privacy under international law encompasses
certain fundamental elements that relate to the “sphere of a person’s
life in which he or she can freely express his or her identity”28 and that

21
22
23
24

25
26

27
28

R ight to Privacy R econsidered 9–10 (2019); Jon M ills, Privacy: T he L ost R ight 4–5 (2008);
A lexandra R engel, Privacy in the 21st Century 27–39 (2013); Ken Gormley, One Hundred
Years of Privacy, 1992 Wisconsin L aw R eview 1335 (1992).
Sarah Joseph & M elissa C astan, T he International Covenant on Civil and Political
R ights: C ases, M aterials, and Commentary 533 (3d ed. 2013).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 4, art. 12.
See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note
4, art. 8; American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 4, art. 11; Convention on the Rights
of the Child, supra note 4, art. 16; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, supra note 4, art. 14; Arab Charter on Human
Rights, supra note 4, arts. 16, 21; International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 22, Jan. 24, 2007, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3.
For a complete accounting of these documents, see further Lubin, supra note 3, at 468–69.
U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), The Right
to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation, U.N.
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (Apr. 8, 1988) [hereinafter General Comment No. 16].
Joseph & C astan, supra note 21, at 534.
Coeriel et al. v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 453/1991, ¶ 10.2, U.N. Doc.
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the “notion of privacy revolves around protection of those aspects of a
person’s life, or relationships with others, which one chooses to keep
from the public eye, or from outside intrusion.”29
Specific aspects of the right to privacy have been identified by the
Human Rights Committee and in the case law as comprising rights to family and home,30 including the right not to have one’s person or residence
unlawfully or arbitrarily searched.31 The right to privacy also entails that
“[c]orrespondence should be delivered to the addressee without interception and without being opened or otherwise read. Surveillance, whether
electronic or otherwise, interceptions of telephonic, telegraphic and other
forms of communication, wire-tapping and recording of conversations
should be prohibited”;32 this right exists even for persons in detention—
subject to appropriate, non-excessive censorship regimes.33 In addition,
professional duties of confidentiality—such as those of medical and legal
professionals—must be respected,34 and persons should not be made to
undergo unlawful or arbitrary medical treatments.35 The right to privacy includes the right to have one’s honor and reputation respected and
protected;36 regulation based on one’s private sexual behavior37 or one’s
gender38 may amount to an infringement of one’s right to privacy.

29
30

31

32
33
34
35

36

37
38

CCPR/C/52/D/453/1991 (Dec. 9, 1994); see also Raihman v. Latvia, Communication No. 1621/2007,
¶ 8.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/100/D/1621/2007 (Oct. 28, 2010).
Hopu and Bessert v. France, Communication No. 549/1993, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/549/1993/
Rev.1. (July 29, 1997).
General Comment No. 16, supra note 26, ¶ 5; Vojnoviv v. Croatia, Communication No. 1510/2006,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1510/2006 (Mar. 30, 2009); Peiris v. Sri Lanka, Communication No.
1862/2009, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/103/D/1862/2009 (Apr. 18, 2012); Ngambi v. France, Communication
No. 1179/2003, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/1179/2003 (July 9, 2004); Tornel et al. v. Spain, Communication No. 1473/2006, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1473/2006 (Mar. 20, 2009); Aumeeruddy-Cziffra et
al. v. Mauritius, Communication No. 35/1978, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 67 (1984).
Rojas García v. Colombia, Communication No. 687/1996, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/71/D/687/1996
(Oct. 26, 2001); Yklymova v. Turkmenistan, Communication No. 1460/2006, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/96/D/1460/2006 (July 20, 2009).
General Comment No. 16, supra note 26, ¶ 8.
Pinkney v. Canada, Communication No. 27/1978, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 95 (1985); Angel
Estrella v. Uruguay, Communication No. 74/1980, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 93 (1990).
Cornelis van Hulst v. Netherlands, Communication No. 903/1999, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/82/D/903/1999 (Nov. 1, 2004).
M.G. v. Germany, Communication No. 1482/2006, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/93/D/1482/2006 (July 23,
2008); Brough v. Australia, Communication No. 1184/2003, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/86/D/1184/2003
(Mar. 17, 2006).
General Comment No. 16, supra note 26, ¶ 11; Tshisekedi v. Zaire, Communication Nos. 241/1987
and 242/1987, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/37/D/242/1987 (Nov. 29, 1989); Komarovski v. Turkmenistan, Communication No. 1450/2006, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/93/D/1450/2006 (July 24, 2008); I.P.
v. Finland, Communication No. 450/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/450/1991 (July 26, 1993);
R.L.M. v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No 380/1989, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/380/1989
(July 16, 1993); Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium, Communication No. 1472/2006, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (Oct. 22, 2008).
Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994).
Llantoy-Huamán v. Peru, Communication No. 1153/2003, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (Oct. 24,
2005); L.M.R. v. Argentina, Communication No. 1608/2007, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007 (Apr.
28, 2011); L.N.P. v. Argentina, Communication No. 1610/2007, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/102/D/1610/2007
(Aug. 16, 2011). See also U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (The
Equality of Rights Between Men and Women), ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000).
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B THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
Under the LOAC, there are few rules that specifically protect a POW’s
privacy. Indeed, POWs are subject to numerous measures that would
normally be considered an infringement on their privacy. Under the law
of international armed conflict, once captured, POWs have their personal effects searched and can have some of their belongings temporarily
confiscated.39 They are held in camps where their daily activities may be
monitored and tracked by the DP, including if they are put to work,40
if they have received sums of money,41 or if they have sent or received
correspondence.42 What is contained in such correspondence can be censored.43 In addition to the “regular” surveillance to which a POW camp
is subject, individual POWs may be subjected to heightened surveillance
regimes if they have unsuccessfully attempted escape from detention.44
There are expansive rules that provide protections for POWs in relation to nearly all aspects of their physical and mental well-being. However, these rules — contained primarily in the Third Geneva Convention — contain little in the way of specific rules on privacy and safeguards
regarding data collected about POWs. Instead, the Conventions provide
generalized protections within which protections for one’s privacy, particularly with regards to personal data, can be extrapolated. Foremost
among these is Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention, which provides
that “[p]risoners of war must at all times be humanely treated”45 and
that POWs “must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of
violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.”46 While
the right to privacy is not specifically mentioned in any of these articles,
the newly updated Commentary to the Third Geneva Convention makes
it clear that humane treatment, in the form of protection from public
curiosity, is especially important from a privacy perspective, particularly
because of advances in technology:
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GC III, supra note 5, art. 18.
Id. art. 56, requiring the camp commander to keep records of when a POW is seconded to a work
detachment.
Id. art. 64, requiring that accounts be kept for POWs that keep track of payments received, either
as working pay or as remittances from the exterior.
Id. arts. 71–72, which outline how many pieces of correspondence a POW may send or receive.
Id. art. 76, which outlines how and why a DP may search and/or censor POW correspondence.
Pursuant to id. art. 92.
Id. art. 13(1).
Id. art. 13(2).
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Protection from public curiosity has gained particular
relevance in the recent past owing to the rapid developments
in communication technology and the growing involvement
of mass media in the coverage of armed conflicts, together
with the ubiquity of social media as a means of distributing
both images and comment.47
Under the umbrella of humane treatment, the DP must therefore respect
the privacy of POWs by not subjecting them to such public curiosity
and must protect them from, for example, having identifying details or
humiliating or degrading imagery or information promulgated publicly,
for instance through social media.48 Arguably, the absolute requirement
to act humanely towards POWs would suggest that the release or distribution of private information about the POW to an unauthorized person
or institution would amount to an infringement on the dignity of the
POW and be contrary to the Conventions.
More specific provisions relating to privacy, such as the censorship of correspondence and special surveillance for failed escapees, are
also structured to protect the detainee, with limitations placed on the
DP’s ability to censor and the kinds of special surveillance to which the
detainee may be subject.49 These obligations extend to any authority in
control of the detainee or POW—under Article 12 of the Third Geneva
Convention, if the DP decides to transfer a POW, it can only do so if it
is transferring the POW to an authority that will likewise respect the
provisions of the Convention.50

47
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International Committee of the R ed Cross, Commentary on the T hird Geneva
Convention: Convention (III) R elative to the T reatment of Prisoners of War ¶
1563 (2020), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=3DEA78B5A19414AFC1258585004344BD [hereinafter 2020 GC III
Commentary].
For example, the release of photographs of Saddam Hussein undergoing medical examination was
condemned as a breach of the humane treatment requirement. See further Ian Roberts, Saddam
Hussein’s Medical Examination Should Not Have Been Broadcast, 328 BMJ 7430 (2004); David Stout,
U.S. Denounces Release of Candid Hussein Photos, N. Y. T imes, May 20, 2005, https://www.nytimes.
com/2005/05/20/international/middleeast/us-denounces-release-of-candid-hussein-photos.
html.
See further 2020 GC III Commentary, supra note 47, ¶¶ 3341–70, https://ihl-databases.
icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=13C85487D2430A5DC1258585004DA270; id. ¶¶ 3830–37, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.
nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=1EEEAA738B611702C12585850054171B.
GC III, supra note 5, arts. 1, 12.
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II

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
DATA PROTECTION
Moving now to the concept of data protection and its connection to the
right to privacy, it is helpful to define what is meant by “data” and/or
“personal data,” of the kind which requires protection. For the purpose of
this chapter, data is taken to mean information—whether in the form of
text, images, audio clips, and/or visual footage. This information may or
may not be stored digitally on computers, and may or may not exist separately in hard copy format—it is information that “can be read, viewed,
heard, or otherwise sensually consumed by humans.”51 This kind of information is what Heather Harrison Dinniss terms “content-level data”52—
data that “represents information which... is in principle intelligible to
humans.”53 For Harrison Dinniss, content-level data can be distinguished
from operational-level data, which is what would commonly be understood as computer code—software programs and operating systems that
are necessary for computer systems to function.54 In addition, it is also
possible to have metadata—data about data (that is, information about a
text, audio, or visual file created in digital form, such as the author, the date
of creation, the size of the file, and, potentially, the geographical location
of its creation). Finally, it is also possible to distinguish between personal
and non-personal data—photos that reside in digital form on a person’s
computer or phone would be personal data, while the software program
that allows someone to open the photo file would not be personal data.

A DATA PROTECTION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
The right to privacy necessarily includes the right to have personal information about oneself safely stored and protected from falling into the
hands of others not authorized to access it. The connection between
51
52
53
54

Robin Geiss & Henning Lahmann, Protection of Data in Armed Conflict, 97 INT’L L. STUD 556, 560
(2021).
Heather Harrison Dinniss, The Nature of Objects: Targeting Networks and the Challenge of Defining
Cyber Military Objectives, 48 Isr. L. R ev. 39, 41 (2015).
Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 51, at 560.
Harrison Dinniss, supra note 52, at 41.
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privacy and data protection was highlighted by the Human Rights
Committee in General Comment 16:
The gathering and holding of personal information on
computers, databanks and other devices, whether by public
authorities or private individuals or bodies, must be regulated by law. Effective measures have to be taken by States to
ensure that information concerning a person’s private life does
not reach the hands of persons who are not authorised by law
to receive, process and use it, and is never used for purposes
incompatible with the Covenant. In order to have the most
effective protection of his private life, every individual should
have the right to ascertain in an intelligible form, whether,
and if so, what personal data is stored in automatic data files,
and for what purposes. Every individual should also be able
to ascertain which public authorities or private individuals or
bodies control or may control their files. If such files contain
incorrect personal data or have been collected or processed
contrary to the provisions of the law, every individual should
have the right to request rectification or elimination.55
Privacy and data protection also necessitate data security — that the
personal information stored within an analog or digital storage facility
is kept confidential, secure, and accessible for those authorized to access
the information. For analog material — for example, paper files on POWs
containing information about their person — such material should be
kept under lock and key, with access granted only to persons authorized
to access it, and strict records kept of access, to ensure the integrity of
the information contained within the files. In the digital context, data
protection extends not just to the files themselves but to the computer
systems that house the files — again, to ensure the confidentiality of
the files, the integrity of the information contained therein, and that
“stored information is accessible and processable whenever needed or
desired.”56 For digital files, this would mean that the files and the systems
containing them are protected from “adversarial cyber operations that
delete targeted data”57 or those that otherwise manipulate, corrupt, or
unlawfully access data.
55
56
57

General Comment No. 16, supra note 26, ¶ 10.
Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 51, at 562.
Id.
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Given the centrality of data protection to the right to privacy, it is
noteworthy that there is little binding law regarding data protection under
IHRL. The binding instruments have primarily come from the European
sphere and include the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data,58 the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),59 and Article 8 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,60 which provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data
concerning him or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and
on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some
other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right
of access to data which has been collected concerning him or
her, and the right to have it rectified.
In addition, there are some non-binding instruments that provide guidance on data protection, including the OECD Guidelines on the Protection
of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data61 and the UN
Guidelines for the regulation of computerized personal data files.62 These
are joined by domestic laws from over 125 States.63

B DATA PROTECTION IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
If the IHRL on data protection is, at present, to borrow Lauterpacht’s
statement, “at the vanishing point,”64 then laws on data protection in the
LOAC are at the vanishing point of that vanishing point. There is general
agreement among experts and practitioners that military operations that
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Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, C.E.T.S. 108.
Regulation (EU) No. 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 32–33 [hereinafter GDPR].
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2012 O.J. (C 326).
C(80)58/FINAL, as amended on July 11, 2013 by C(2013)79.
Adopted by G.A. Res. 45/95, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/94 (Dec. 14, 1990). See also International Law
Commission, Report on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session, Annex IV: Protection of Personal
Data in Transborder Flow of Information, U.N. Doc. A/61/10, reprinted in [2006] 2 Yearbook of
the International L aw C ommission 217, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2006/Add.1.
Data Protection and Privacy Legislation Worldwide, UNCTAD, https://unctad.org/page/data-protection-and-privacy-legislation-worldwide (last visited Jan. 19, 2021).
Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 Brit. Y’B ook of Int’l L. 360,
382 (1952).
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destroy data physically (for example, a bombing raid that destroys a
collection of paper files) would be governed by LOAC rules on targeting.65
However, there is still debate over whether attacks, particularly digital
attacks, that delete or corrupt digital data are governed by the LOAC—
because, in theory, the data is not permanently lost and can presumably
be recovered because it has been saved in another format or location.
For some experts, if the data is not subject to destruction or damage
that “is visible and tangible in the real world,”66 then the data is not
properly considered an “object” under the LOAC and is not subject to
LOAC protections.67 There is even less agreement as to whether simply
accessing unlawfully the data of protected persons such as POWs (in
the absence of causing damage to such files) would be governed by the
LOAC,68 because “cyber operations that target the confidentiality of data
will, unless something unforeseen happens, harm neither the system
itself not the stored data”69 and would arguably not reach the level of
“attack” as defined in the LOAC.70
For persons in POW detention, considerable amounts of data may be
retrieved and retained. From the moment a POW is captured, the DP is
permitted to collect data such as the name, rank, date of birth, and any
army, regimental, personal, or serial number of a POW;71 what physical
items the POW is carrying at the time of capture;72 where the POW will be
housed;73 what kinds of work they might do on a given day;74 what kinds
and amounts of food they eat;75 what religion they observe;76 how many
letters and parcels they send and receive, including their provenance,
destination, and contents;77 and whether the detainee has any medical
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Michael Schmitt, Wired Warfare 3.0: Protecting the Civilian Population During Cyber Operations, 101
Int’l R ev. R ed Cross 333, 340 (2019).
Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 51, at 565.
Schmitt, supra note 65, at 340; Michael Schmitt, International Cyber Norms: Reflections on the Path
Ahead, 111 Netherlands M il. L. R ev. 12 (2018). For a contrary position, see Kubo Mačák, Military
Objectives 2.0: The Case for Interpreting Computer Data as Objects under International Humanitarian Law,
48 Isr. L. R ev. 55, 73 (2015); Tim McCormack & Rain Liivoja, Law in the Virtual Battlespace: The
Tallinn Manual and the Jus in Bello, 15 Y’book Int’l Humanitarian L. 45 (2012).
Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 51, at 563.
Id.
Defined in Article 49 of AP I, supra note 5, as “acts of violence against the adversary, whether
in offence or in defence,” and generally considered to include, as a minimum, kinetic damage.
See further the debate on the definition of “attack” in the Commentary to Rule 92 in Tallinn
M anual 2.0 on the International L aw A pplicable to C yber Operations (Michael Schmitt
ed., 2nd ed. 2017).
GC III, supra note 5, art. 17.
Id. art. 18; GC IV, supra note 5, art. 97.
GC III, art. 22; GC IV, supra note 5, art. 83.
GC III, supra note 5, arts. 50–57; GC IV, supra note 5, arts. 95–96; AP II, supra note 5, art. 5(1)(e).
GC III, supra note 5, art. 26; GC IV, supra note 5, art. 89; AP II, supra note 5, art. 5(1)(b).
GC III, supra note 5, art. 37; GC IV, supra note 5, art. 93; AP II, supra note 5, art. 5(1)(d).
GC III, supra note 5, arts. 71–76; GC IV, supra note 5, arts. 107–12; AP II, supra note 5, art. 5(2)(b).
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conditions or ailments.78 Beyond the already acknowledged LOAC rules
on humane treatment, there are no specific laws that outline how or even
whether a DP must protect such information from, for example, being
accessed by external actors or even lawfully provided to third parties by
the DP itself.

III

POWS, PRIVACY, AND DATA
As noted above, POWs are subject to significant interference with their
privacy, and considerable amounts of data on them are accrued during
their detention. However, it should also be noted that, as provided in
Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
as noted in General Comment 16, only unlawful interference with one’s
privacy is prohibited: “‘unlawful’ means that no interference can take
place except in cases envisaged by the law. Interference authorized by
States can only take place on the basis of law, which itself must comply
with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant.”79
The question then becomes: if data on POWs is lawfully obtained,
and the privacy of the POW is lawfully circumscribed, what, then, is the
problem? The problem lies in the fact that POWs are in a uniquely vulnerable position, reliant as they are on their captors to protect and care for
them. There is a distinct possibility that the information gathered about
their physical and mental condition, their place of origin, their family
connections, their religious affiliations, and so on could be used against
them, either by those who are detaining them or by third parties—not
unforeseen, given that the POW is in the hands of the “enemy” during
an armed conflict.
Indeed, this kind of abuse was evidenced in relation to persons
detained by U.S. authorities in Afghanistan, following the 2001 invasion.
On capture, detainees were stripped of clothing and frequently left naked
in front of their captors.80 U.S. personnel guarding the detainees engaged
in “taking photographs and video taping [detainees] for their personal
78
79
80

GC III, supra note 5, arts. 29–31; GC IV, supra note 5, arts. 91–92; AP II, supra note 5, art. 5(1)(a).
General Comment No. 16, supra note 26, ¶ 3.
L aurel E. Fletcher & Eric Stover, Guantánamo and Its A ftermath: U.S. Detention and
Interrogation Practices and T heir I mpact on Former Detainees 30 (2008).
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use”81 and threatened detainees with photos of their family to “make
[them] think there was a possibility that [their] family”82 was suffering
adverse impacts as a result of the detainee’s capture.
It is not difficult to imagine equivalent violations of POW privacy
and data that could be justified on the basis of legitimate data collection—
for example, a DP employing facial ID unlocking technology during POW
processing and interrogation to access a POW’s phone and social media
accounts, as well as any media stored on a device or application. Other
sensitive personal information, such as banking or medical information
that is resident on a device or application, could also be a possible target.
Indeed, accessing such information does not even need the consent of
the POW.83 This information could then be used against the POW as, for
example, part of a coercive interrogation.
Given that there is little in the way of LOAC rules that act to protect
POW data in such situations, IHRL could step in to address these gaps.
Data protection regimes, particularly the GDPR, ensure that private data
is subject to strict processing rules, including that:
Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade
union membership, and the processing of genetic data,
biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural
person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural
person’s sex life or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.84
The GDPR also contains protections that entitle persons to, inter alia, have
their data erased,85 as there are strict controls over the transfer of personal data to third parties.86 These rules would seem to address a number
of gaps that exist in the LOAC regarding data collection and protection.
However, the utility of the GDPR in situations of armed conflict is
limited in two key ways. First, the GDPR is limited jurisdictionally: it only
“applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities
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Id. at 31.
Id. at 37.
See, e.g., Davey Winder, Apple’s iPhone FaceID Hacked in Less Than 120 Seconds, Forbes, Aug. 10,
2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2019/08/10/apples-iphone-faceid-hacked-inless-than-120-seconds/?sh=5152168621bc. A basic Google search will bring up multiple sites that
indicate how to hack personal accounts on numerous types of social media, including Facebook,
Instagram, and WhatsApp.
GDPR, supra note 59, art. 9(1).
Id. art. 17.
Id. arts. 44–50.

127

Privacy and Data Protection for POWs

of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union”;87 where
the data “processing activities are related to” either “the offering of
goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject
is required, to such data subjects in the Union” or “the monitoring of
their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union”;88
or where data is processed “by a controller not established in the Union,
but in a place where Member State law applies by virtue of public international law.”89 Therefore, if the POWs are not located within European
Union jurisdiction, as outlined by Article 3 of the GDPR, the GDPR rules
do not apply.
The second limitation is contained in Article 2 of the GDPR, which
provides that it does not apply to:
issues of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms or the
free flow of personal data related to activities which fall outside
the scope of Union law, such as activities concerning national
security. This Regulation does not apply to the processing of
personal data by the Member States when carrying out activities in relation to the common foreign and security policy of
the Union.90
The “national security” limitation would, as Geiss and Lahmann point
out, “seem to preclude the application of this legislation from any State
activities in relation to conduct during situations of armed conflict.”91
One solution could be to apply a broad interpretative framework
to existing definitions of terms such as “attack,” to reconceive data as
being an “object” susceptible to attack in the same way that physical
property can be kinetically damaged.92 In this way, POW data could conceivably benefit from the protections that the person of the POW, and the
physical installations used to house POWs, enjoy under the LOAC. However, given the paucity of State practice and academic support for such
an approach, this solution seems unlikely to happen. Another approach
would be, as Geiss and Lahmann argue, “to take, as a starting point, the
principles of existing data protection, data security, and other pertinent
legal frameworks and attempt to apply them to contemporary armed
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id. art. 3(1).
Id. art. 3(2).
Id. art. 3(3).
Id. preamble ¶ 16.
Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 51, at 568.
See generally Mačák, supra note 67.

128

Emily Crawford

conflicts.”93 In doing so, the more developed IHRL rules on data could
serve as important gap fillers for the LOAC regime.
Another solution could be to follow the trend in LOAC rule development over the last 30 years94 and create a sui generis non-binding
instrument that sets out the relevant data protection and privacy rules
that should be applied in all situations of armed conflict (including POW
detention). Such an instrument could follow the framework established
by the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,95 now
known as the Mandela Rules.96 The Mandela Rules were first adopted as
the Standard Minimum Rules by the UN in 195597 and were designed as
guidelines on the basic minimum requirements necessary for housing
persons in detention98—essentially, a set of “best practice” guidelines.
The Rules contain numerous provisions regarding the health, welfare,
and well-being of prisoners. In the years following their adoption, over
60 States used the Rules to inform their own domestic prison legislation. The Rules have now been adopted and used in most States.99 From
the perspective of detainee privacy and data protection, most relevant
are Rule 1, which affirms that “[a]ll prisoners shall be treated with the
respect due to their inherent dignity and value as human beings”; Rule
6, which states that prisoner files should be carefully managed and that
“[p]rocedures shall be in place to ensure a secure audit trail and to prevent
unauthorized access to or modification of any information contained in
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Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 51, at 570.
See generally A nton Petrov, E xpert L aws of War: R estating and M aking L aw in E xpert
Processes (2020); E mily Crawford, Non-Binding Norms in International Humanitarian
L aw: Efficacy, Legitimacy, and Legality (2021).
Adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment
of Offenders, held at Geneva in 1955, and approved by the Economic and Social Council by its
resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of July 31, 1957, and 2076 (LXII) of May 13, 1977.
G.A. Res. 70/175, U.N. Doc. A/Res/70/175 (Dec. 17, 2015).
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, First United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/6/1, Annex I, A (1956).
The 1955 rules were themselves a development of earlier work undertaken by the International
Penal and Penitentiary Commission in 1926. On the drafting background, see further William
Clifford, The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 66 A m. J. Int’l L. 232 (1972);
Daniel L. Skoler, World Implementation of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of
Prisoners, 10 J. Int’l L. & Econ. 453, 454–55 (1975).
Skoler, supra note 97, at 455.
See U.N. Secretary-General, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: Progress Made in the Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 50/145 and 50/146, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. A/51/327 (Oct. 1, 1996).
See also the meetings of the UN-established Open-Ended Intergovernmental Expert Group on
the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, United Nations Office of Drugs
and Crime, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/justice-and-prison-reform/ieg-standards.html
(last visited Jan. 19, 2021); Open-Ended Intergovernmental Expert Group Meeting on the United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, Background Note, Vienna, 31
January – 2 February 2012, § 3.1, https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/
AGMs/Background_note.pdf; Council of Europe, Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers
to Member States on the European Prison Rules, Rec(2006)2 (Jan. 11, 2006), https://wcd.coe.int/
ViewDoc.jsp?id=955747; Nigel Rodley & M att Pollard, T he T reatment of Prisoners Under
International L aw 393 (3rd ed. 2009).
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the system”; and Rule 9, which states that all prisoner records “shall be
kept confidential and made available only to those whose professional
responsibilities require access to such records.” Additional rules serve
to protect the prisoner’s right to privacy, including limits on physical
searches of a prisoner’s accommodation and person.100 An instrument on
data protection and in armed conflict could incorporate similar rules
to those of the Mandela Rules to specifically protect persons in POW
detention.
The adoption of a non-binding document on data protection and
privacy in armed conflict would not be a radical step, or necessarily an
exercise in lex ferenda, even with the paucity of LOAC rules on privacy
and data protection for POWs. As Asaf Lubin notes, while “there is still
considerable fragmentation concerning core principles that govern this
space,”101 general trends regarding data protection in international law
can be discerned, including, and most pertinently for POWs (and indeed,
other detainees in situations of armed conflict), that:
[d]ata undergoing processing shall be kept in a form that
permits identification of data subjects for no longer than
is required for the purpose for which it is stored... that
data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards
from unauthorized or accidental access, destruction, use, or
modification... [and that there should be] a mechanism for
ensuring due process, supervision, and legal sanction, such
as through a data protection authority, to ensure that data
controllers and processors comply with these principles.102
Given the emerging customary and treaty law on questions of data protection, the issuance of a manual or other guidelines on the law on data
protection in the LOAC could therefore arguably be a justifiable exercise
in applying IHRL rules to LOAC situations.

100 Rules 50–52.
101 Lubin, supra note 3, at 475.
102 Id. at 14.
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS
For POWs, concerns about their privacy and the protection of their
personal data may not necessarily be at the forefront of their thoughts
upon capture. However, given the vast array of material collected on
POWs, the paucity of LOAC rules regarding what may be done with that
material, and the potential for abuse of the data in question, it is incumbent on stakeholders, such as States, intergovernmental organizations,
and civil society, to consider the question of privacy and data protection
of POWs in more detail. IHRL has much to offer in this context and could
provide useful instruction for future practice in armed conflicts, whether
that manifests itself as customary law, treaty law, or some non-binding
mechanism.
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Chapter 7

Face Value:
Precaution versus
Privacy in Armed
Conflict
Leah West1

INTRODUCTION
Following the American withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021,
Taliban forces moved through the country quickly, claiming control of
not only villages but also the arms and military equipment left behind
by US forces. The group seized a vast arsenal of weapons, vehicles, and
even helicopters that could significantly enhance the Taliban’s combat
power.2 Also left behind were devices known as Handheld Interagency

1
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Zachary Cohen & Oren Liebermann, Rifles, Humvees and Millions of Rounds of Ammo: Taliban
Celebrate Their New American Arsenal, CNN, Aug. 21, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/21/
politics/us-weapons-arsenal-taliban-afghanistan/index.html.
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Detection Equipment (HIDE), used to collect, store, and upload biometric
information collected from individuals in the field. These devices were
first used in 2002 to identify Taliban and Al-Qaeda prisoners in detention
centres in Afghanistan.3 By 2011, the New York Times was reporting that
an Afghan citizen “would almost have to spend every minute in a home
village and never seek government services to avoid ever crossing paths
with a biometric system.”4
The term “biometrics” refers to both a characteristic and a process.
As a characteristic, it means “a biological or behavioral feature of an
individual (such as the iris, fingerprint, or voice pattern) that can be
measured and used for automated recognition.”5 As a process, the term
refers to “the automated means of measuring and comparing these features, in order to establish the identity of an individual.”6
Military forces leverage biometrics to establish “identity dominance”
over the enemy.7 Unlike official/identity documents that can be forged
or shared, biometrics are much less susceptible to alteration and forgery.
They offer a more distinctive and definitive means of identifying the
enemy, “denying him the anonymity he needs to hide and strike at will.”8
In Afghanistan, information collected by HIDEs included a person’s
facial photograph, iris scan, fingerprints, and biographical information.
Coalition Forces used the data and devices to identify insurgents, verify
the identity of locals and third-country nationals seeking to access bases
and facilities, and link people to security events and criminal activity.9 All
data compiled by US forces was stored indefinitely in the Department of
Defense’s (DoD) Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS) and
used in combination with “watch lists” to facilitate the detention and
targeting of persons of interest who posed a threat to coalition forces
and Afghan security.10 In February 2007, the International Security Assis3
4
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Dep’t of Def. Biometrics M anagement Off., Department of Defense Biometric Standards
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Lessons Learned, U.S. Army Commander’s Guide to Biometrics in Afghanistan (2014), https://public
intelligence.net/call-afghan-biometrics/ [hereinafter U.S. Army Commander’s Guide].
William C. Buhrow, Biometrics in Support of M ilitary Operations: Lessons from the
Battlefield (2017), 8.
Id.
John D. Woodward, Using Biometrics to Achieve Identity Dominance in the Global War on Terrorism,
R and (2005), https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1194.html.
Buhrow, supra note 5, at 1.
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Privacy International (2021), https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/
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tance Force (ISAF) implemented the US biometric system as part of its
force protection and broader security efforts in Afghanistan.11 Finally, in
2011, coalition forces partnered with the Afghan government to conduct
“biometric enrolment” of the population to support the development of
the country’s digital identity card, known as the e-Tazkira.12
Despite US forces’ extensive collection efforts, assessments by the
US Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2008 and 2011 warned
that there were gaps in the US military’s policies and procedures around
the collection and storage of personal information.13 Defence officials
responded that the reason the biometrics program did not even meet
basic information technology standards was that it had been developed to
meet an urgent operational need.14 In essence, officials argued that when
first introduced, the technology and data were necessary to counter the
battlefield threat; protecting Afghan nationals’ privacy and informational
security was simply not a priority. It was not until 2013, after 11 years
of collection, that DoD established the Defence Forensics and Biometrics
Agency to oversee all of the military’s biometrics programs. The agency
lists “protecting privacy” as one of its five core objectives.15
Yet despite the establishment of this agency, in the immediate aftermath of the Taliban’s takeover, many feared that the group would leverage the abandoned HIDE machines and the data compiled by them to
root out and punish those who had worked with coalition forces or the
Afghan government.16 Little is known about what, if any, safeguards were
in place to ensure that the data collected by coalition forces remaining on
the devices or shared with the Afghan government could not be accessed
or leveraged by the Taliban or other malicious actors to target civilians.17
Once again, US forces appeared to ignore the privacy interests of Afghans
for the sake of operational expediency.
11
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Pierre Meunier, Qinghan Xiao & Tien Vo, Biometrics for National Security: The Case for a Whole of
Government Approach (2013), https://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc124/p537494_A1b.pdf, 2.5.
Library of Congress, Afghanistan: Distribution of Controversial Electronic Identity Cards Launched,
LOC, June 19, 2018, https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2018-07-19/afghanistan-
distribution-of-controversial-electronic-identity-cards-launched/; see also U.S. Army
Commander’s Guide, supra note 4, at i.
U.S. G ov. Accountability Off., DOD Can Better Conform to Standards and Share Biometric Information with Federal Agencies (2011), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-11-276; see also U.S.
Government Accountability Office, DOD Can Establish More Guidance for Biometrics Collection and
Explore Broader Data Sharing (2008), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0949.pdf.
Id. at 11.
Defense Forensics and Biometrics Agency, Core Objectives, DFBA (2020), https://www.dfba.mil/
functions/policy.html.
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Since the initial deployment of HIDEs in 2002, biometrics programs
have proven to be an effective offensive and defensive tool in armed conflicts. In 2017, the GAO conducted a follow-up study in which it noted
that since 2008, the biometrics program led the US DoD “to capture
or kill 1700 individuals and deny 92,000 individuals access to military
bases.”18 As an operations officer deployed in Kandahar in 2010–2011, my
job relied on intelligence collected through a variety of means, including
the persistent use of drones, surveillance balloons, audio sensors, communications intercepts, and information collected directly from Afghans,
through either human connection or the collection of biometrics. We
deployed HIDEs machines widely to collect data not only about those who
wanted access to military facilities but also about those who visited district centres, made claims for damages from forces, or otherwise engaged
with coalition forces. I was personally involved in an operation to detain
a prolific maker of IEDs (improvised explosive devices) after fingerprints
found on an IED were matched to a biometric record on file; that same
individual was a human source for another agency and was previously
given access to a military installation.
Biometric collection was critical to the coalition strategy to gain identity dominance over the enemy. In Afghanistan’s long-running counterinsurgency, battles were fought in built-up areas. Combatants could go
months without picking up a weapon and interacted openly with coalition
forces. Under such circumstances, identifying friend from foe was incredibly challenging but necessary to the mission. Yet I never once thought of
the privacy rights of the local population; nor did any operational policy
demand that I consider their privacy interests. My experiences occurred
in an era before facial recognition, before everyone carried a smartphone
and social media platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp were prolifically
relied upon in the region. Today, these tools generate troves of information that can be leveraged in connection with biometrics to not only
gain a tactical advantage over the enemy but also protect civilians in the
communities within which they are operating.
This chapter explores the tension between the operation and legal
requirement to gather intelligence in an armed conflict and the privacy
rights of the local population that may be affected by modern surveillance and analytical tools. It does so by using a case study, namely the
deployment of facial recognition technology (FRT) in an armed conflict.
18

U.S. G ov. Accountability Off., DOD Biometrics and Forensics: Progress Made in Establishing
Long-Term Deployable Capabilities, but Further Actions Are Needed (2017), https://www.gao.gov/
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This case study highlights the existence of this tension. It reveals a set of
legal obligations that arise during an armed conflict that both necessitate
and limit the use of modern surveillance technology. It also identifies core
policy and procedural questions that military leaders need to consider
before deploying FRT to meet those obligations.
FRT is an appropriate case study because combining biometric data,
like that amassed on the battlefield by US forces in Afghanistan and subsequently in Iraq and Syria,19 with this technology is the next development
in the race for identity dominance. Facial recognition is a biometric tool
used primarily to automatically identify, verify, or authenticate a person’s
identity. In short, it analyzes key facial features and compares those features to other representations of an individual’s face. In the future, FRT
may also identify potential threats and individuals contemplating criminal
or dangerous behaviour. Various studies suggest that artificial intelligence
can recognize individuals registering suspicious behaviour from facial
expressions, characteristics, involuntary gestures,20 and estimated heart
rate.21 Thus, rather than relying on a fingerprint or iris scan to identify
known combatants, FRT could give soldiers the ability to identify, in realtime, known and previously unknown enemy combatants at a distance,
be it through the use of facial recognition glasses or the deployment of
surveillance cameras mounted on structures, vehicles, or aircraft.
Chinese security officials are already using this technology at border
crossings, transitways, and large security events.22 Facial recognition
glasses worn by security agents record video that is instantly cross-
referenced against a database of images to identify known criminals.
Once identified, the individual’s name can be searched against additional
databases to quickly provide agents with a plethora of information about
the target. Similarly, Israel has incorporated FRT into its checkpoint and
surveillance systems within the Occupied Palestinian Territories.23
19
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Expression Recognition Techniques: A Survey 5:6 IJCSN 948 (2016).
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Computers That Learn Like Humans, Mother Jones, Sept.–Oct. 2014, https://www.motherjones.
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The use of FRT to identify combatants in an armed conflict is promising not simply because of the obvious efficiency and security benefits it offers but also from the perspective of international humanitarian law (IHL). A cardinal principle of IHL is that of distinction and the
related precautionary principle. This principle provides that parties to
an armed conflict must, at all times, distinguish between combatants
and non-combatants. Customary law requires that in both international
armed conflicts (IACs) and non-international armed conflicts (NIACs),
military leaders do everything feasible to verify that attack objectives
are not civilian and take all feasible precautions to minimize incidental
civilian casualties when selecting the means and methods of attack.
Complying with these obligations was arguably easier when wars
were waged between two uniformed State militaries on the battlefield.
Increasingly, however, armed conflicts, be they international or non-
international, are waged amid the population. Often, combatants are not
members of State militaries; nor do they wear uniforms or openly carry
arms. As such, the use of FRT to scan a crowd of faces and run those
images against a database of known combatants and non-combatants
could significantly enhance operational effectiveness and ensure compliance with IHL. Not only would it allow for the more efficient use of
violence, but FRT deployment could also augment a soldier’s decision-
making and save the lives of innocent civilians. That said, the use of
FRT in peacetime by law enforcement and border agents has come under
increasing scrutiny. Human rights advocates are concerned with the tools’
implications for privacy, free expression, and freedom of assembly.24
Additionally, the recognition algorithms that power FRT have, to date,
proven to be biased, resulting in false positives and false negatives disproportionately impacting racial minorities.25
This chapter does not revisit each of these concerns, although these
risks would persist with FRT deployment by armed forces. Instead,
I raise the potential use of FRT to explore the tension that arises between
the quest for identity dominance and knowledge of the battlespace
promoted by IHL and the privacy rights of civilians living through an
armed conflict. Ultimately, this chapter argues that we must consider the
privacy implications of facial recognition technology before its widespread
use in armed conflict so that military commanders can incorporate the
24
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necessary privacy-protective measures and processes into their operational protocols.
This chapter proceeds in three parts. It begins in Part I with a general
overview of the IHL principles of distinction and precaution, and the right
to privacy under IHL and international human rights law (IHRL). Part II
explains how to identify conflicts between the norms and rules of IHL
and IHRL and applies the complementary approach proposed by Oona
Hathaway. This part concludes that the right to privacy and the principle
of precaution are not in conflict; except in the rare instances of formal
derogation, they apply concurrently in an armed conflict. Finally, Part III
argues that the degree of control a party has over territory or a population,
and the level and nature of the threat of violence, significantly impact
what each obligation requires. Arguably, as State actors gain control over
a territory and population and the level of violence declines, the need
and challenge of routinely making snap decisions about an individual
or group’s combatant status decreases. As such, the need to rely on the
widespread use of highly intrusive technology to comply with the precautionary principle diminishes. Conversely, as an armed conflict shifts
from the uneasy end of the control/violence spectrum to the other, what
is required to comply with the human right to privacy increases. This part
concludes by warning military commanders that they must prepare for
this shift when deploying surveillance technology like FRT. It proposes
a function-based approach to designing policies and procedures capable
of adapting to these evolving privacy obligations.

I

LEGAL OVERVIEW
A DISTINCTION AND PRECAUTION UNDER IHL
IHL, or the law of armed conflict, regulates the conduct of hostilities. This
body of law applies only after an armed conflict arises and applies for the
duration of the conflict. Once an armed conflict develops, be it a NIAC or
IAC, then IHL applies to all States and non-State parties to the conflict.
IHL comprises both customary rules and treaties, most significantly the
Hague Regulations of 1907, and the four Geneva Conventions and their
Additional Protocols. The former sets out the rules for conducting war,
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while the latter focuses on protecting the victims of war. Only a limited
number of these treaty rules apply to NIACs, but the general principles
codified in these treaties apply in all conflicts.
The core principle of IHL is distinction, which requires that military operations be directed at “military objectives.”26 Military objectives
include “objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make
an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the
time, offers a definite military advantage.”27
This customary principle is codified in Articles 48, 51(2), and 52(2)
of AP I, to which no reservations have been made.28 Article 48 stipulates:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall
at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives
and accordingly shall direct their operations only against
military objectives.
Put simply, the principle of distinction partitions people into two categories: combatants and non-combatants. Combatants are members of
the armed forces who are party to an armed conflict, excluding medical
and religious personnel. Non-combatants are civilians (unless and for
as long as they directly participate in hostilities), persons hors de combat,
and medical and religious military personnel. Combatants may target
and kill other combatants without that conduct constituting a war crime.
Conversely, civilians may not be targeted, although they do not enjoy
absolute protection against being killed.29
IHL also requires belligerents to distinguish themselves from the
civilian population.30 Nevertheless, it is not uncommon in modern warfare for members of organized armed groups, especially in NIACs, to
not wear uniforms or to not identify themselves as combatants. Armed
26
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Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 48
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Id. art. 52(2).
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, art. 48.
International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary IHL, Rule 1. The Principle of Distinction between
Civilians and Combatants, ICRC, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_
rule1#:~:text=international%20armed%20conflicts-,Rule%201.,not%20be%20directed%20
against%20civilians.
AP 1, supra note 26, art. 44; common art. 3.
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groups who do not comply with IHL may also purposely seek to gain tactical advantage by blending in with the civilian population. Additionally,
members of armed groups may only support or participate in hostilities
intermittently, giving rise to the complicated dilemma of the “baker by
day, soldier by night.”31 Civilians are only protected against attack “unless
and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”32 The level of
participation that invalidates a civilian’s protected status, and for how
long civilians lose their protected status after they put down their rolling pin and pick up a weapon, is the subject of detailed guidance by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) but remains contested
by the international community.33
IHL also prohibits indiscriminate attacks. This means that attacks
not specifically directed at a precise military objective are unlawful.
The same is true for attacks that employ a method or means of combat
that cannot be targeted or whose effects cannot be limited to a military
objective or combatants.34 In other words, any attack must be narrowly
tailored to the military objective. Given all of the above, one quickly
realizes how the use of FRT could significantly enhance a military commander’s capacity to identify the enemy and comply with their humanitarian obligations.
Despite these requirements, IHL accepts that civilians and civilian
objects may be collateral damage. Civilians may, however, only be injured
or killed where the impact is proportionate to the concrete and direct
military advantage gained.35 This rule of proportionality “establishes a
link between the concepts of military necessity and humanity.”36
Tied to the concepts of both proportionality and distinction is the
precautionary principle. This customary rule is codified in Article 57
of AP I, which sets out a number of targeting rules. Most notably for
the purpose of this chapter, the law requires: “In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects,” and with respect to attacks,
“those who plan or decide upon an attack shall do everything feasible to
31
32
33
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International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary IHL, Rule 6. Civilians’ Loss of Protection from
Attack, ICRC, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule6.
International Committee of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation
in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (2009) at 33ff, https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/
files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf.
AP 1, supra note 26, art. 51(4).
International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary IHL, Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack, ICRC,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule14.
Canada, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Law of Armed Conflict Manual: At the Operational and
Tactical Levels, B-GJ-005-104/FP-02 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2001), at 2-2.
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verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian
objects.”37
According to the ICRC Commentary on Article 57, before the provision
was adopted, the phrase “everything feasible” was discussed at length.38
Some delegations, including the British one, understood the words to
mean “everything that was practicable or practically possible, taking
into account all the circumstances at the time of the attack, including
those relevant to the success of military operations.”39 The commentary
suggests this last requirement is too broad, as it could give the success
of the mission precedence over humanitarian obligations. Instead, the
requirement is that necessary identifications be carried out in a timely
manner to spare the civilian population to the furthest extent possible.40
As J.-F. Quéguiner explains, “When taking precautions in attack, armed
forces cannot be required to do the objectively impossible, nor can they
be content with merely doing what is possible.”41
Complying with the precautionary principle is, therefore, largely
reliant on the collection, analysis, and sharing of information about
potential targets, which is dependent on the capabilities and technical
resources of a party to the conflict.42 This does not mean that all parties
to a conflict must acquire, possess, and deploy the most sophisticated
means of technology.43 The Commentary notes, “Some belligerents might
have information owing to a modern reconnaissance device, while other
belligerents might not have this type of equipment.”44 Those States possessing advanced technology are required to use it if it offers the most
effective and reasonable means of obtaining reliable information.45 “In
other words,” explains Michael Schmitt, “belligerents bear different legal
burdens of care determined by the precision assets they possess.”46
However, simply because a State has a specific intelligence capacity,
like FRT, does not necessarily mean that a military commander must
leverage that asset in all cases. Interpreting the “everything feasible”

37
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AP 1, supra note 26, art. 57 [emphasis added].
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, at
680–82 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmerman eds, International Committee
of the Red Cross, 1987).
Id. at 680.
Id.
Jean-François Quéguiner, Precautions under the Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities, 88:864 IRRC
793, 809–10 (2006).
Id. at 797.
Michael N. Schmitt, Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law, 87:859 IRRC 445, 460 (2005).
Commentary, supra note 38, at 682.
Quéguiner, supra note 41, at 798.
Schmitt, supra note 43, at 460.
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standard requires “common sense and good faith.”47 One must consider
the time needed to leverage that asset and process additional information, the extent to which it would clarify existing uncertainty, competing
demands for the asset, and any potential risks associated with its deployment.48 Those risks could include privacy implications for the civilian
population and the failure to comply with a State’s obligations under IHRL.
Thus, the phrase “everything feasible” is highly contextual. As
Frederik Rosen writes, “due precaution may build on years of intelligence
or on a sound, split-second judgment.”49 However, he adds, generally
speaking, “Once a belligerent purchases equipment and supplies it to its
forces in the field, it must be used if it is available, makes good military
sense and will minimize civilian impact.”50

B PRIVACY UNDER IHRL AND IHL
IHRL governs the conduct of States in their relations with individuals and
groups subject to their jurisdiction. Made up of both treaty and customary
obligations, human rights law applies at all times.
Numerous international and regional human rights treaties protect
the right to privacy. First, Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights stipulates that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon
his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of
the law against such interference or attacks.”51
Similarly, Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates:
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.52
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Schmitt, supra note 43, at 461.
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J. Conf. & Sec. L. 113, 127 (2014).
Id. at 462.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12, Dec. 10, 1948, U.N.G.A. Res. 217 A(III) (1948)
[emphasis added].
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] [emphasis added].
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Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights also provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.53
Likewise, Article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights specifies that “Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his
dignity recognized” and that “No one may be the object of arbitrary or
abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his
correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation.”54
Similarly worded privacy rights are also embedded in a number more
narrow human rights instruments,55 leading some scholars to argue that
the right to privacy is part of customary international law.56
Persistent surveillance and the collection, retention, processing, and
sharing of a person’s biometric data by a State party to any of these treaties trigger these provisions’ application. A 2020 Report of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights noted that routine audiovisual surveillance used in combination with FRT “brings about significant risks for
the enjoyment of human rights,”57 including not only the right to privacy
53
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2008).
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and Other State Practice (2017), Oxford U Comparative L Forum 3.
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but also that of freedom of assembly and expression. Citing the European
Court of Human Rights, the report went on to note: “A person’s image
constitutes one of the key attributes of her or his personality as it reveals
unique characteristics distinguishing her or him from other persons.
Recording, analysing and retaining someone’s facial images without her
or his consent constitute interference with a person’s right to privacy.”58
Deploying FRT in, for example, built-up areas and urban centres means
that “these interferences occur on a mass and indiscriminate scale, as
this requires the collection and processing of facial images of all persons
captured by the camera equipped with or connected to a facial recognition
technology system.”59
Crucially, under each human rights instrument, the protection of
privacy is not absolute. Intrusions into an individual’s private life may be
permitted so long as they comply with certain criteria. After canvassing
the jurisprudence of treaty-interpreting bodies and UN human rights
bodies and rapporteurs, Asaf Lubin identified five general principles that,
if met, permit States to engage in activities that interfere with one’s
enjoyment of their right to privacy.60 The first principle Lubin identifies
is legality, meaning that interferences must be regulated by laws that
are public, accessible, clear, precise, and non-discriminatory.61 Second,
intrusions must be necessary for the achievement of a legitimate aim in
a democratic society.62 Third, any invasion of privacy must be proportionate to the achievement of that aim. Fourth, there must be adequate
safeguards and processes in place to ensure “information concerning a
person’s private life does not reach the hands of persons who are not
authorized by law to receive, process and use it.”63 Finally, where a State
violates any of these principles, affected persons must have access to
effective remedies.64
What is necessary to comply with each of these principles is highly
context-specific. Thus, what may be proportionate and necessary when,
for example, there is a direct and immediate threat to life may not be
when the State’s objective is less pressing or tangentially related to the
58
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intrusion. Nevertheless, where a State complies with these principles,
searches, surveillance, and data collection and analysis, whether general
or targeted, may be permissible under human rights law.
What is more, the human rights instruments referenced above permit
States to derogate from certain obligations (including those concerning
privacy) during an emergency that “threatens the life of the nation,”65
including armed conflicts. While the wording varies slightly, to formally
derogate, each instrument requires that States notify other parties to
the treaty and identify which provisions it is derogating from and why.
This notification requirement significantly raises the political costs of
derogation.66 Scholars contend that it is for this reason that States rarely
formally derogate from their human rights obligations.67
Where and when do a State’s human rights obligations apply? The
answer to this question varies because of the slightly different language
in the application provisions of human rights instruments and how their
relevant interpretive bodies construe those provisions. Generally, a State
owes human rights obligations to those subject to its jurisdiction, which
includes, at a minimum, those within the State’s sovereign territory.
However, States may exercise jurisdiction extraterritorially and therefore
may owe certain rights to those who fall under their effective control.
What degree of control is necessary, and how a State can achieve that
level of control, is subject to debate and disagreement between inter
national and regional adjudicative bodies and is the subject of numerous
academic studies.68 In brief, there are two generally recognized means
of extending a State’s human rights obligations abroad: (1) when a State
exercises physical control over foreign territory (the spatial model),69
and (2) when a State exercises physical control over an individual (or
individuals) in foreign territory (the personal model).70 Notably, much of
65
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67
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See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 4; ECHR, supra note 53, art. 15; ACHR, supra note 54, art. 27.
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M ilanović, E xtraterritorial A pplication of Human R ights T reaties: L aw, Principle and
Policy (2011); Marko Milanović & Tatjana Papić, The Applicability of the ECHR in Contested Territories, 67 ICLQ 779 (2018); Samantha Besson, The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on
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Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1992; Gentilhomme v. France, 441 Eur. Ct.
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146

Leah West

the case law recognizing the extraterritorial application of human rights
instruments arises from situations of armed conflict. Notably, uncertainty about IHRL’s extraterritorial application may be another reason
why derogations are unlikely when a State is a party to an armed conflict
abroad. Formal derogation would signal a State’s acceptance that IHRL
governs their foreign conduct and expose its actions to judicial scrutiny
by human rights bodies.
Does this mean the right to privacy ceases if no State has effective
control over a population or territory? In short, no. Some elements of the
right to privacy protected by IHRL are also protected under IHL. Article
46 of the Fourth Hague Convention on the Regulations concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land stipulates:
Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private
property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be
respected. Private property cannot be confiscated.71
This article, like most of the substantive provisions of the Hague Conventions, is considered customary international law. Article 27 of Geneva
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, universally ratified, expands on this obligation:
Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect
for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their
religious convictions and practices, and their manners and
customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall
be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats
thereof and against insults and public curiosity… However,
the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control
and security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary
as a result of the war.72
Similarly, Article 75 of AP I mandates that an occupying force shall respect
“the person, honour, convictions and religious practices” of all persons
subject to its power.73
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The language of Article 27 of GC IV is largely consistent with Article
17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
Unfortunately, there has been very little written about the scope of privacy
protections under the Geneva Conventions. It is clear from the provision
that privacy rights are not absolute. However, whether the right to privacy under IHL includes the full range of protections afforded by various
human rights instruments is untested and, given the fact that IHL applies
equally to State and non-State parties to a conflict, highly questionable.
At the very least, the ICRC commentary on this article explains that the
fundamental right to the protection of one’s honour includes respect
for a person’s physical and intellectual integrity. Stemming from the
need to respect one’s integrity is the obligation that “individual persons’
names or photographs, or aspects of their private lives must not be given
publicity.”74
Because of the uncertainty regarding the scope of IHL’s privacy protections, the remainder of this chapter will focus on the right to privacy
during an armed conflict under IHRL.

II

PRIVACY AND PRECAUTION —
A COMPLEMENTARY RELATIONSHIP
The previous section established that in times of armed conflict, IHL
governs the conduct of all parties to that conflict. By contrast, IHRL
governs the actions of State governments in relation to those subject to
their jurisdiction. In practice, this means that two distinct bodies of law
can and do govern the actions of States during an armed conflict, a fact
that is now firmly accepted by the International Court of Justice,75 the
UN Security Council,76 and universal and regional human rights bodies.77
74
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Thus, as long as there is no derogation and the right to privacy does not
conflict with a State’s obligations under IHL, there is no basis to suggest
that a home State is not entirely bound by its privacy obligations to
those within its territory.78 Moreover, where a State exercises effective
control over foreign territory or persons during an armed conflict, that
State will have obligations vis-à-vis the privacy of individuals subject
to their control.
Still, the 20-year Global War on Terror (GWOT) has highlighted that
the principles and rules under IHL and IHRL are often inconsistent and,
in some instances, diametrically opposed. The most obvious and widely
analyzed example is the right to life protected under various human
rights instruments and customary IHRL, and the right under IHL to target
and kill enemy combatants (and where proportionate and necessary, to
injure or kill civilians.)79 In the first decade of the GWOT, several scholars
studied the relationship between IHRL and IHL and proposed methods for
resolving conflicts between the two sets of obligations when they arise.80
In 2012, Professor Oona Hathaway and her students surveyed that
scholarship and the existing jurisprudence.81 They identified three theoretical approaches to understanding the relationship between the two
bodies of law: the displacement model, the complementarity model, and
the conflict resolution model. The displacement model, which suggests
that in times of armed conflict, IHL displaces human rights law, has now
largely fallen out of favour.82 The basis for this argument is that, in times
of conflict, IHL is lex specialis (specialized law) and therefore supersedes
IHRL, the lex generalis (general law). In other words, the two bodies of
law are mutually exclusive. As noted above, jurisprudence and opinions
of various adjudicative bodies have repeatedly affirmed that human rights
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law continues to apply during armed conflict. As Noam Lubell and Nancie
Prud’homme wrote in 2016, “The existence of a relationship between
international human rights law and LOAC [the law of armed conflict]
is now widely accepted. Their concurrent application is at present more
or less a fait accompli but there remain debates on the nature of their
interaction.”83
This second approach identified by Hathaway et al. is the complementary model. This model holds that both IHL and IHRL apply during
armed conflict and must be interpreted in light of one another.84 The
basis for this approach is that both humanitarian and human rights law
share a common goal: to protect human life and dignity.85 This model
provides that IHL can be used to inform our interpretation of a State’s
human rights obligations during hostilities in a way that allows us to
avoid conflict between the two legal doctrines. For example, in its Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found it
appropriate to use IHL to interpret what constituted an “arbitrary deprivation of life,” as prohibited by Article 6 of the ICCPR.86 As in that case,
the language, structure, and purpose of the two norms will often make
it relatively easy to resolve any tension between IHL and IHRL rules.
The third approach is the conflict resolution model, which asserts
that IHL and IHRL are complementary during an armed conflict unless
there is a conflict. When a conflict arises, a decision-maker must select
either the IHL or the IHRL rule, recognizing that the application of one
may lead to a breach of the other.
We know from Part 1 that IHL requires that a State with the capacity
to use advanced technology (like FRT) to distinguish combatants from
non-combatants more accurately is obligated to do so. At the same time,
IHRL tells us that the mass collection of biometric data and persistent
surveillance of a population infringes upon the right to privacy guaranteed under numerous human rights instruments. Viewed in absolute
terms, these two well-established rules of international law pull States
in opposing directions. To determine what effect this tension has on a
State’s legal obligations, we need to consider Hathaway’s models.
As explained above, practice and precedent have moved beyond the
displacement approach to conflict resolution. It is insufficient to suggest that due to the existence of an armed conflict, States no longer owe
83
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privacy rights to those within their territory or subject to their jurisdiction.87 Instead, we must ask whether these two obligations can be applied
and interpreted in a way that complements each other (i.e., can conflict
be avoided) or whether an actual conflict exists. To do so, Hathaway
tells us we must determine whether the rules are in a “relationship of
interpretation” or a “relationship of conflict.”88
I propose that in an armed conflict, the protection of privacy and
IHL’s targeting rules are always in a relationship of interpretation. As
such, their relation can be understood using the complementary approach.
This argument is persuasive because the right to privacy is not absolute. It is a right to be free from arbitrary and unlawful intrusions into
one’s private life by the State. A State may take actions that engage a
person’s right to privacy, but so long as those actions are prescribed by
law, necessary, and proportionate, and there are adequate safeguards,
those actions will be consistent with IHRL. Moreover, what is necessary,
proportionate, and adequate is highly contextual and fact-dependent.
As the ICJ remarked in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, we can use
IHL to help us interpret what is necessary, proportionate, and adequate
in an armed conflict, be it an IAC, NIAC, or a prolonged occupation.
For example, the precautionary principle under IHL stipulates that
military commanders must do everything feasible to verify that attacked
objectives are not civilian and take all feasible precautions when selecting
a means and method of attack to minimize incidental civilian casualties.
These rules obligate States to take positive steps to collect intelligence
and conduct surveillance so that they can efficiently and effectively distinguish friend from foe.89 Therefore the need to comply with the Geneva
Conventions must influence our interpretation of whether using a surveillance technique or program like FRT is necessary and proportionate
under IHRL during an armed conflict.
Recall, however, that States with FRT capabilities are not obligated in
every instance to use this technology to comply with Article 57 of AP 1. If
there are alternative means of safely and efficiently verifying the nature
of the target and satisfying the precautionary principle while having less
of an impact on civilians, a State with FRT does not need to use it in every
instance. Where possible, the IHRL right to privacy should, therefore, also
87
88
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influence the choice of surveillance programs and techniques employed by
military commanders, or at the very least, the safeguards and procedures
adopted to govern their use.
IHL accepts that, given the nature of war, it is not always possible
to select the least intrusive means of complying with Article 57. Moreover, it may be impossible, in the face of ongoing violence, to decide and
ensure that information collected on the battlefield is only that which is
necessary, let alone that the information is recorded and stored accurately
in a fair, transparent, and consensual process. Nevertheless, the right to
privacy, interpreted in light of IHL, is flexible enough to apply in times
of severe insecurity and violence.

III

OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT
TO PRIVACY
In an armed conflict, the right to privacy and the precautionary principles
must be interpreted in light of one another. This argument is sustainable
because both obligations are highly contextual. Therefore, what is required
to satisfy privacy and precaution is not static but driven by facts and must
reflect the operational environment. While this flexibility is critical to
the joint application of the rules around precaution and privacy, it will
also create significant uncertainty for those tasked with interpreting and
applying the law. This ambiguity is primarily a result of the fact that
armed conflicts are not static environments. The early years of the war in
Afghanistan may be characterized as an occupation, with widespread and
protracted violence between organized armed forces. That conflict ultimately evolved into a large multinational stability and counterinsurgency
operation in partnership with the Afghan government and, in later years,
became a counterterrorism and training mission. However, this evolution
was not linear; there were times later in the conflict when heavy fighting
occurred between the Taliban and coalition forces.
All this is to say that what qualified as necessary and proportionate
violations of privacy in the name of Afghan and coalition security at the
outset of the conflict were vastly different from what would have qualified
as necessary and proportionate intrusions in recent years. Likewise, the
challenges of complying with IHL, specifically the principle of distinction
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and precaution, varied significantly over the 20-year conflict, especially
as the mission moved from sustained force-on-force fighting into more
targeted covert and law-enforcement-like operations. Yet throughout the
conflict, US forces continued to collect, analyze, and use biometric data
collected from Afghans to maintain identity dominance over the enemy.
As far as has been reported, there was no additional consideration to the
privacy rights of the country’s civilian population.90 This practice was
inconsistent with IHRL.
The balance between the privacy rights of civilians and the operational necessity to leverage advanced surveillance techniques to comply
with the precautionary principles is not fixed. I suggest that where that
balance lies depends on two factors: (1) a State’s effective control over
a population or territory; and (2) the threat and level of violence.
Both factors are routinely relied upon to determine what measures
a State must undertake to meet its legal obligations under IHL and IHRL.
For example, in the Targeted Killings Case, Israel’s Supreme Court held
that, per the State’s human rights obligations, a civilian taking direct part
in hostilities should not be attacked if it is possible to use less harmful
means.91 (This limit, the Court held, was derived from the IHL principle
of proportionality.92) Instead, said the Court, “if it is possible to arrest,
interrogate and prosecute a terrorist who is taking a direct part in hostilities, these steps should be followed.”93 However, the Supreme Court
recognized that taking less harmful measures is not always feasible.
It noted explicitly that consideration must be given to the risk to life for
soldiers and civilians and whether the military controlled the territory
where the operation would take place.94 As Ken Watkin explains, “control
and risk (to both soldiers and civilians) are intimately intertwined.”95
More recently, in Georgia v. Russia (II), the Grand Chamber of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that the level of violence
or “the context of chaos” in an armed conflict is an important consideration when determining whether a foreign military (in this instance
Russia) has effective control, and by consequence, the scope of that State’s
human rights obligations.96 The ECtHR explained:
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that in the event of military operations—including, for
example, armed attacks, bombing or shelling—carried out
during an international armed conflict one cannot generally
speak of “effective control” over an area. The very reality of
armed confrontation and fighting between enemy military
forces seeking to establish control over an area in a context
of chaos means that there is no control over an area.97
However, once Russia gained control over the area of Georgia in question
and effectively occupied the region, the Court held that the spatial model
of extraterritorial jurisdiction triggered the application of Article 1 and
the full scope of the ECHR.98 The Court also found that when it came to
Article 2 and the deprivation of life, the personal jurisdiction model was
not applicable in the “active phase of hostilities.”99 However, the Court did
find that where Russia detained persons in the active phase of hostilities,
the personal model of asserting jurisdiction would satisfy Article 1. Moreover, the Court decided that the context of chaos did not impact Russia’s
procedural obligation under Article 2 to investigate potentially unlawful
uses of lethal force committed during the active phase of the conflict.100
Unfortunately, what the ECtHR failed to account for in its reasoning is
that the level of violence, and therefore a State’s effective control, not only
shift in a non-linear fashion across time but also may vary geographically.101 This fact is especially apparent in the context of Afghanistan.
The complexity of that operating environment is often explained using
Kurlak’s concept of the “three-block war.”102 On one block, forces engage
in traditional armed conflict; on the second, they conduct peacekeeping or
stabilization operations; and on the third, they provide humanitarian aid.
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this chapter, the Georgia v. Russia (II)
decision is helpful in two respects. First, it affirms that effective control
Id. para. 126.
Id. para. 174.
Id. para. 144.
Id. para. 332.
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is a very fluid thing, especially in a very short time-frame and with respect to a relatively
small area of territory, as on the facts of this case. But it is in principle perfectly possible for
an invading army to gradually establish reasonably stable control over areas of enemy territory,
as it advances through it, even though the hostilities may still be happening on the fringes of
that territory.” Georgia v. Russia No. 2: The European Court’s Resurrection of Bankovic in the Contexts
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and the level of violence are key factors when determining the scope of a
foreign State’s extraterritorial human rights obligations during an armed
conflict. Second, it recognizes that what is required to comply with IHRL
can vary throughout a single conflict.
What does this mean in practice? In times of sustained and intense
violence, we should expect that a State’s privacy obligations vis-à-vis
those within its territory or effective control will be minimal and likely
consistent with the limited protections afforded under IHL. Instead, the
emphasis should be on the State’s obligation to collect the necessary
intelligence and analysis to comply with the precautionary principles.
However, as the level of control over territory increases and the threat of
violence decreases, intrusions upon privacy will become less justifiable.
Recalling the five privacy principles, it would, therefore, be inconsistent with IHRL to deploy an intrusive FRT program at the height of
a conflict and then continue to employ and even expand the use of that
program as the nature of the conflict evolves, and with it, the range of
privacy-invasive activities that are necessary and proportionate in the
face of that conflict. As a conflict moves along the spectrum of insecurity
and violence, so too does a State’s privacy obligations to those subject to
its jurisdiction. A State’s surveillance and biometrics programs and its
operational procedures must, therefore, be able to adapt to meet those
changing obligations.
For this reason, policies and procedures need to be built into the
development of FRT before it is deployed widely in armed conflict. Those
policies should reflect privacy principles, evolving data protection norms,103
and a State’s domestic or regional data protection obligations.104 At a minimum, they should address the following questions:

• Under what circumstances may FRT be deployed, and by who?
• What data will the FRT draw on to identify individuals?
• How revealing or invasive is the use of that data in
conjunction with FRT?

• How will false positives and false negatives be corrected?

103 See Lubin, supra note 60, at 475–76.
104 Notably, many data protection regimes permit necessary and proportionate legislated exceptions from most data protection principles and obligations where required for national security,
defence, public security, and the prevention of crime. See, e.g., General Data Protection Regulation,
(EU) 2016/679, art. 23.
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• Will data be collected through the use of FRT? (E.g., name,
location, date/time, associations)

• If so, how will that data be stored and secured, and for how long?
• Who has access to that data?
• For what purposes can that data be used, processed, and shared?
• What will be done with the data once the armed conflict is over?
• What are the consequences for improper use of FRT or the
resulting data, and procedures for reporting improper use?
Additionally, policies must account for the fact that what IHRL requires
in terms of respect for privacy will shift along the spectrum of conflict.
Therefore, an appropriate way to account for fluctuating privacy obligations would be to consider what function or task the State’s forces
are carrying out and set policies and procedures for FRT use and data
collection consistent with those activities. Alternatively, returning to
the concept of the three-block war, FRT policies and privacy protections
should reflect the “block” on which forces are operating. Thus, on the
first block, policies around FRT use will be the least restrictive, reflecting
IHL’s targeting rules and aligning closely with IHL privacy protections.
On the second block, FRT policies might look more like privacy regimes
regulating domestic and foreign intelligence collection and surveillance.
Finally, on the third block, FRT use might be regulated similarly to its
deployment in a law enforcement context. Adapting this function-based
approach is consistent with the practice of calibrating rules of engagement around the use of force for each “block.”105
Ultimately, the technical capacity and policies must exist so that military commanders can appropriately modify the use of FRT as a conflict
moves along the spectrum of insecurity and violence. Deploying intrusive
and indiscriminate technology to meet an urgent battlefield need does
not absolve a State of its human rights obligations for however long an
armed conflict endures.

105 Watkin, supra note 95, at 15.
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CONCLUSION
FRT can enhance a military commander’s capacity to identify and distinguish combatants from non-combatants in armed conflicts. Given the
nature of today’s modern conflicts, this surveillance tool could significantly reduce civilian casualties and increase military effectiveness, two of
the underlying aims of IHL. However, the widespread and indiscriminate
use of FRT also poses significant privacy risks, protected by numerous
international and regional human rights instruments.
At first glance, the use of FRT may appear to pit a State’s obligations
under IHL against its IHRL obligations. Nonetheless, this chapter sought
to establish that the principle of distinction and precaution and the right
to privacy are not in true conflict but rather maintain a relationship of
interpretation that can be resolved using the complementarity approach.
As such, in an armed conflict, a State’s human rights obligations vis-à-vis
privacy should be interpreted in a manner that not only recognizes the
unique context of war but also is consistent with IHL’s targeting rules.
Nevertheless, when employing FRT, what is required to comply with a
State’s privacy obligations is likely to vary (and vary considerably) over
the course of an armed conflict. As such, commanders must be prepared
to adapt the use of FRT and have the policies, procedures, and safeguards
in place to meet their changing obligations. Therefore, it is recommended
that States adopt a function-based approach to ensure that the necessary
policies and technical capabilities exist to meet these obligations before
deploying FRT in an armed conflict.
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The Principle of
Constant Care,
Prolonged Drone
Surveillance and the
Right to Privacy of
Non-Combatants in
Armed Conflicts
Eliza Watt1

INTRODUCTION
The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones),2 satellite imagery
and other data collection techniques are a vital part of intelligence gathering methods used in armed conflicts.3 Information collection facilitated
1

2
3

Dr Eliza Watt is a Lecturer in Law at Middlesex University, London, United Kingdom; a Visiting
Lecturer at British Law Centre, University of Warsaw, Poland; and a guest speaker at the College
of Information and Cyberspace, National Defense University, Washington D.C. USA. I wish to
thank Professor Laurent Pech for his careful reviewing and commenting on this paper. Many
thanks to Dr Russell Buchan and Dr Asaf Lubin for their generous guidance and feedback on the
earlier drafts. I am also grateful to the participants of the 2021 NATO CCDCOE Berlin Scholars
Workshop for their commentary and observations.
See Ben Knight, Guide To Drones, DW (June 30, 2017), https://www.dw.com/en/a-guide-to-
military-drones/a-39441185.
Geneva Convention for Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field; 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
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by drones has a direct impact on a broad range of combat operations, from
the ability to locate potential military objects (such as missile launchers)
and mark them for destruction, in support of strategic and operational
reconnaissance missions and detecting enemy movements, to supporting
the safety of the ground forces through detecting surprise attacks and in
identifying combatants who may be lawfully targeted.
This latter deployment of surveillance drones is particularly controversial, because the obtained data has been used for targeted killings,4
including by armed drones.5 The legality of such operations has been the
subject of scrutiny at the United Nations (UN) and European levels and
assessed chiefly in the context of international human rights law (IHRL)6
(principally in relation to the arbitrary deprivation of life) and under the
law of the use of force (jus ad bellum)7 and international humanitarian law
(IHL, or jus in bello). Nevertheless, to date little attention has been paid to
States’ use of UAVs for surveillance purposes and its impact on non-combatants’ privacy. Yet, their constant presence causes “considerable and
under-accounted-for harm to the daily lives of ordinary civilians, beyond
death and physical injury”,8 terrorising men, women and children, thus
giving rise to anxiety and psychological trauma among those exposed to
persistent observation.
The primary legal regime that applies in situations of armed conflict is IHL. However, the relevant treaties, namely the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Conventions I–IV of 1949 (Geneva
Conventions) and their Additional Protocols of 1977 (AP I and AP II)9 do
not directly address the impact of belligerents’ intelligence operations
on civilians’ privacy and data protection rights. Conversely, peacetime
State surveillance, including mass interception and collection of foreign

4

5

6

7
8
9

War, common art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.135 [hereinafter Common art. 2].
In the main text, referred to collectively as “Geneva Conventions”.
For the definition of targeted killing, see Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur), Report on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) ¶ 1 [hereinafter A/HRC/14/24/Add.6].
See id.; International Human R ights and Conflict R esolution Clinic, Living Under
Drones. Death, Injury and T rauma to Civilians From US Drone Practices in Pakistan,
(Stanford Law School 2012) [hereinafter Living Under Drones].
See also Ben Emmerson (Special Rapporteur), Report on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/59 (Mar. 11, 2014)
[hereinafter A/HRC/25/59]; Eur. Consult. Ass., Drones and Targeted Killing: The Need to Uphold
Human Rights and International Law, Doc. No. 13731 (2015), 7 ¶ 18 [hereinafter CoE Report 2015];
Christof Heyns et al., The International Law Framework Regulating the Use of Armed Drones, 65 Int.
Comp. L aw Q. 791 (2016).
See A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, supra note 4; Heyns et al., supra note 6.
Living Under Drones, supra note 5, ¶ vii.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I];
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II].
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communications, is subject to a complex set of privacy and data protection
standards set out in international and regional human rights conventions,
including Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 1966 (ICCPR),10 Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights 1950 (ECHR),11 together with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.12
With the advancements in drone technology and the increase in
their deployment in armed conflicts, privacy concerns loom large, yet
they remain unaddressed in the existing IHL framework. Consequently,
this chapter asks how the right to privacy of civilians can be protected
during inter-State hostilities and examines what role IHRL may have in
safeguarding this right, and ultimately inquires into whether there is a
need for specific regulation of intelligence gathering operations by drones.
The study begins by outlining States’ use of UAVs and the impact of
prolonged surveillance in war zones (Part I). Against this backdrop, Part
II analyses the application of IHL and IHRL rules in such circumstances.
Specifically, it identifies the interplay between these legal regimes from
the perspective of intelligence gathering operations. The chapter argues
that in such cases IHRL rules apply alongside IHL. Furthermore, it identifies that the principle of constant care set out in Article 57(1) of AP I
to the Geneva Conventions and established under the general customary
principle of precautions in attack has a significant role to play in bridging
the gap left by the IHL to ensure respect of civilians’ privacy and data
protection rights. Part III discusses the relevance of the rules on privacy
of communications to drone surveillance in armed conflict and considers
when and how States are allowed to derogate from, or otherwise limit,
this right. Moreover, it proposes introducing minimum data protection
and privacy safeguards for drone surveillance, the latter akin to those
stipulated by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for bulk
collection of foreign communications.

10
11
12

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR].
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms amended
by Protocols Nos 11 and 14, Nov. 4, 1950 E.T.S. 5 [hereinafter ECHR].
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Oct. 2, 2000, C. 3031 [hereinafter EU
Charter].
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I

THE USE OF DRONES AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS IN WAR ZONES AND
BEYOND
A STATES’ USE OF DRONES IN MILITARY
OPERATIONS
Armed drones were initially operated by a handful of States, including the
US, the United Kingdom (UK), Israel and Russia, in a number of combat
zones, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen, with the predominant
aim of targeted killings. Recent reports attest to their increasing usage,
with at least another ten States having conducted drone strikes, thirty-nine States with armed drones and twenty-nine States developing
new generation armed drone technology.13
Drones for military use were originally designed for intelligence gathering and surveillance purposes. Equipped with high definition live-feed
video, thermal infrared cameras, heat sensors, radar and mobile phone
interception technology, together with such tools as licence plate readers,
face recognition software and GPS trackers, UAVs allow for continuous
surveillance and loitering over potential targets and/or areas and gathering of data which is then retained on military databases and shared
among armed forces and intelligence agencies. With the changing nature
of warfare, numerous regions across the world are seen as “battlefields”
of the “global war on terror”, as opposed to areas where an international
armed conflict exists. Consequently, unrestricted long-term surveillance
by drones is becoming commonplace.14 Commenting on these themes
on 31 August 202115 when marking the end of war in Afghanistan and
the withdrawal of US troops, US President Joe Biden explained that the
terror threat has spread beyond Afghanistan and metastasised across the
world. This is one of the reasons behind US policy swaying away from
the deployment of “thousands of American troops and spending billions
of dollars a year in Afghanistan (to) fight a ground war”,16 and why the
13
14
15

16

Peter Bergen et al., World of Drones, New A merica (July 30, 2020), https://www.newamerica.org/
international-security/reports/world-drones/.
CoE Report, supra note 6, ¶ 24 at 8.
Remarks by President Biden on the End of the War in Afghanistan, T he White House (Aug. 31, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-end-of-the-war-in-afghanistan/.
Id. at 6.
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President announced that US methods of engagement in future conflicts
would be more remote in nature. This seems also to be the preferred
policy goal of other governments and organisations, such as the European
Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As drones are likely
to proliferate, it becomes necessary to consider their impact on civilians,
and this is addressed next.

B CIVILIAN IMPACT OF PROLONGED
DRONE SURVEILLANCE AND PRIVACY
IMPLICATIONS
States’ UAV use has been shown to have a considerable detrimental effect
beyond the death, injury and destruction immediately caused by drone
strikes.17 For example, the presence of US drones in Pakistan has reportedly caused substantial levels of fear and stress in the local population,
with accounts of the experience of living under constant surveillance as
harrowing.18 Apart from common symptoms of anticipatory anxiety and
post-traumatic stress disorder, persistent drone surveillance has had
a negative effect on educational opportunities; on burial traditions and
willingness to attend funerals; on economic, social and cultural activities;
and it undermines community trust. In addition, the impact on non-
combatants’ privacy and data protection rights in situations of sustained
drone surveillance is significant and manifold.
First, such practices are harmful, as they encroach on the respect
for an individual’s existence as a human being and his or her autonomy.
These notions form the essence of the legal right to privacy guaranteed,
inter alia, by Article 17(1) of the ICCPR and Article 8 of the ECHR which
stipulate the right to privacy, family, home and correspondence. Second,
they likely implicate the right to family life under the aforementioned
provisions. Drone surveillance has been shown to impede civil liberties,
including participation in social events, thus hindering familial relationships. Third, the notion of privacy also extends to the protection of
individuals’ homes.19 In that sense, the “home” epitomises “a place of
refuge where one can develop and enjoy domestic peace, harmony and
17
18

19

Living under Drones, supra note 5, at 73.
Human R ights Clinic, T he Civilian I mpact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered
Questions, Columbia L aw S chool and Centre for Civilians in Conflict (2012), 81 [hereinafter Civilian I mpact of Drones].
See also ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 17; ECHR, supra note 11, art. 8; U.N. Human Rights Committee,
General Comment No.16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN//1/Rev. 1 (Apr. 8,
1988) [hereinafter General Comment 16].
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warmth without fear of disturbance”.20 Its protection relates not only to
dwellings per se, but also covers areas over which ownership (or any other
legal title) extends, including outside spaces, such as a garden.21 It follows
that every invasion of that sphere which occurs without consent of the
affected individual interferes with the right to privacy.22 Consequently,
forced or clandestine trespassing, electronic surveillance practices, listening devices, covert CCTV cameras and video surveillance23 have all been
held to amount to interfering with the protected rights. Fourth, drone surveillance also instils a constant feeling of being watched which, as shown
by Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon project,24 serves as a deterrent to leading
a relatively unconstrained existence. In the situation of armed conflicts,
this is exacerbated as it engenders fear of a possible drone attack. Fifth,
as observed by Harry Wingo, writing in the context of law enforcement
agencies’ use of non-lethal drones to respond to shooting accidents in the
US, “surveillance drones raise privacy concerns because of their ability to
harness powerful camera technology along with precision flight and pursuit capabilities that result in “drone stare”—the ability to observe persons in ways that have been previously impossible”.25 Such surveillance,
especially when a drone is not visible epitomises what Michel Foucault
called “the power of the gaze”,26 which creates a control mechanism by
the watchers over the watched. This invariably introduces anxiety that
alters how those under constant observation behave, think and interact.
Another implication of ubiquitous drone surveillance is from the
perspective of data protection27 and relates to the subsequent processing
of personal information which includes images (such as those of individuals, houses, vehicles, vehicle licence plates), sound geolocation data
and any other electromagnetic signals. Those subject to UAVs presence
are likely to be unaware that the processing of their personal data is carried out, how such information is intended to be used and by whom. In
addition, the volume of the gathered material far outpaces the operators’

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

William A. S chabas, Nowak’s CCPR Commentary: U.N. International Covenant on Civil
and P olitical R ights, 485 (N.P. Engel, 3rd ed., 2019) [hereinafter Nowak’s C ommentary].
Id.
Nowak’s Commentary, supra note 20, at 486.
See also Peck v. United Kingdom Eur. Ct. H.R. 2003-I; Perry v. United Kingdom 39 Eur. Ct. H.R.
2003-IX.
See Jeremy Bentham, T he Works of Jeremy Bentham (William Trait, 1838–43).
Harry Wingo, Set Your Drones to Stun: Using Cyber Secure Quadcopters to Disrupt Active Shooters, 17(2)
Journal of Information Warfare 55, 59 (2018).
M ichel Foucault, Discipline and P unish: T he Birth of the Prison (Vintage Books 1979).
Privacy and data protection are related but not identical rights. Unlike privacy, data protection
“regulates the processing of an individual’s personal data—be it private or non-private”
whereas “privacy protects an individual against intrusions in to his private sphere”. K riangsak
K ittchaisaree, P ublic International L aw in C yberspace, 59 (Springer 2017).
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capabilities to process and analyse it, thus creating an information overload, or “data crush”, consequently making it almost impossible for the
relevant personnel to make sense of and effectively use that information
for operational purposes.28 To help quickly turn enormous quantities of
data into actionable intelligence, some military forces have utilised artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) technologies with the
assistance of private sector industries. A case in point is the US Department of Defense Project Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team
(Project Maven).29 Since 2017, its specialist algorithms that are capable of
searching, identifying and categorising objects of interest within colossal
volumes of material including from surveillance drones have reportedly
increased efficiency and enabled decision making on the battlefield. The
success of the Maven Project arguably marks the beginning of “information-age war”, as the militaries are moving away from hardware-centric
organisations towards being driven by AI and ML. As a result of these and
similar developments, acquisition of data via drone collection is likely to
increase in the future.
For at least a decade the UN,30 a number of European institutions31
and human rights mandate holders32 have grappled with the issues of
States’ use of armed drones in conflict zones. In essence, to date these
efforts have focused mainly on their deployment in extraterritorial lethal
operations and the implication this has on a number of international law
rules, including State sovereignty, IHL (principles of distinction, necessity
and proportionality) and IHRL pertaining to the right to life. Little, or no
attention has been paid to privacy and data protection of non-combatants,
but there can be no doubt that these concerns call for the setting out of
international normative standards due to the likely future omnipresent
28
29

30

31

32

Civilian I mpact of Drones, supra note 18, at 40.
Richard H. Shultz and Richard D. Clarke, Big Data at War: Special Operations Forces, Project Maven,
and Twenty-First-Century Warfare, Modern War Institute (Aug. 25, 2020), https://mwi.usma.
edu/big-data-at-war-special-operations-forces-project-maven-and-twenty-first-centurywarfare/.
See also U.N. Human Rights Council, Ensuring Use of Remotely Piloted Aircraft or Armed
Drones in Counter-Terrorism and Military Operations in Accordance with International Law,
Including International Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law, (Mar. 28, 2014) U.N. Doc A/
HRC/25/L.32; UN Human Rights Council, Ensuring Use of Remotely Piloted Aircraft or Armed
Drones in Counter-terrorism and Military Operations in Accordance with International Law,
Including International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, (Mar. 19, 2015) UN Doc A/
HRC/28/L.2.
See also Eur. Consult. Ass., Drones and Targeted Killings: the Need to Uphold Human Rights and
International Law (Jan. 27, 2015); European Parliament, Written Declaration on the Use of Drones
for Targeted Killings, (Jan. 16, 2012) DC\889077EN.doc; Nils Melzer, Human Rights Implications
of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots in Warfare (2013); EU Parliament, Resolution of 27
February 2014 on the Use of Armed Drones, (Feb. 27, 2014) 2014/2567(RSP); European Parliament,
Resolution of 28 April 2016 on Attacks on Hospitals and Schools as Violations of International
Humanitarian Law, (Apr. 28, 2016) (2016/2662(RSP)).
A/HRC/25/59, supra note 6.
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use of drone technology. However, one question that needs to be addressed
from the outset is why should this particular surveillance method be
subject to specific regulation? After all, militaries have long used other
long-term and pervasive techniques to gather intelligence, such as satellites. This is simply because satellite and drone technologies are different
and therefore complementary, rather than rivalling each other because
they are designed for different purposes. The former, being remote from
the Earth’s surface, provide a “macro” perspective of the given area and
therefore much lower level of detail and resolution which is not useful
when high accuracy is required. UAVs fill in this gap, as they operate at
much lower altitudes than satellites and therefore give a “micro” view.
Consequently, they are far more intrusive due to the specific and accurate
information they gather and because they are easier to operate and are
more manoeuvrable. This necessitates more emphasis on privacy and data
protection when militaries engage in drone surveillance in and outside
of combat zones as discussed below.

II

THE APPLICATION OF IHL AND
IHRL TO PROLONGED DRONE
SURVEILLANCE IN ARMED CONFLICT
IHL seeks to limit the effects of an armed conflict by protecting those
who are not, or who are no longer, participating in the hostilities and
by restricting the means and methods of warfare. IHL distinguishes
between international armed conflicts (IAC) and non-international
armed conflicts and this classification is crucial as different rules apply
in each situation. Thus, an international armed conflict is defined in the
common Article 2(1) to the Geneva Conventions as that which may “arise
between two or more [States], even if the state of war is not recognized
by one of them”.33 The 2016 International Committee of the Red Cross’
(ICRC) revised Commentary to Geneva Convention I provides that “the
determination of (IAC) existence within the meaning of Article 2(1) must
be based solely on the prevailing facts demonstrating de facto existence
33

Common art. 2, supra note 3.
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of hostilities between the belligerents, even without a declaration of
war”.34 All four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I apply to an
IAC, whether or not it constitutes a declared war, regardless of parties’
to the conflict recognizing it as such. Conversely, a non-international
armed conflict entails a situation when the opposing parties are States
and organised armed groups, or only armed groups and is subject to
a more limited range of rules than those applicable to an IAC, set out
in Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol II.
IHRL is a body of rules prescribing States’ obligations to respect,
protect and fulfil human rights of individuals. The high watermark in
the development of this branch of international law was the adoption
by the United Nations General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in 1948,35 a document which for the first time in history
enumerated basic civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights
applicable to all. These rights were subsequently restated in, inter alia,
the ICCPR. Generally, the rights stipulated in the human rights treaties
are divided into two categories, namely absolute and qualified rights.
States cannot derogate from absolute rights, such as those set out in the
ICCPR, including the right to life (Article 6), the right not to be subjected
to torture (Article 7) and slavery (Article 8) even in cases of emergency.
By contrast, qualified rights, such as the right to privacy (Article 17), can
be limited, or derogated from, as they must be balanced against public
interest and can therefore be interfered with, subject to the stipulated
conditions provided therein.
IHL and IHRL developed separately and differ in a number of key
areas. First, IHRL predominantly applies in times of peace, whilst IHR
is intended to operate during war, or an armed conflict. Second, IHRL
deals with the relationship between a State and an individual. It obliges
States to respect and ensure human rights to all individuals within their
territory and subject to their jurisdiction.36 In comparison, IHL aims to
limit the effects of armed conflict and as such, it regulates the conduct
of hostilities by State parties, recognising that when a situation of armed
conflict exists between them a balance must be struck between humanity
and military necessity. Finally, unlike some qualified human rights, the
law of war cannot be derogated from, as it is specifically designed to
34

35
36

ICRC, Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Filed, Geneva 12 August 1946. Commentary of 2016. Article 2: Application of
the Convention, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCI-commentary.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, U.N.G.A. Res 217 A(III) (1948).
ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 2(1); ECHR, supra note 11, art. 1.

166

Eliza Watt

protect those who do not take part in the hostilities such as civilians,
medical and religious military personnel (non-combatants), together with
those who have ceased to participate in the conflict, such as wounded,
shipwrecked and sick combatants and prisoners of war. This protection
extends to respect for their lives, their physical and mental integrity,
affords them legal guarantees and ensures that they be treated humanely
in all circumstances.
Notwithstanding these differences between the two regimes, it has
been recognized that there is a complementary nexus between IHL and
IHRL in armed conflicts. Thus, the International Court of Justice (ICJ),37
the Human Rights Committee (HRC), international tribunals38 and some
States39 acknowledge that these bodies of law apply concurrently. To
this end, the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion40 and in the
Wall Advisory Opinion41 held that the protection offered by human rights
conventions, including the ICCPR, does not cease in times of war and/or
armed conflict, except by operation of a derogation of the kind to be found
in Article 4 of the ICCPR. In its General Comment 31, the HRC confirmed
this conceptual parallel between IHL and IHRL, stating that:
the Covenant applies also in situations of armed conflict
to which the rules of international humanitarian law are
applicable. While, in respect of certain Covenant rights,
more specific rules of international humanitarian law may
be specifically relevant for the purposes of the interpretation
of Covenant rights, both spheres of law are complementary,
not mutually exclusive.42
Nevertheless, it remains far from settled how these legal frameworks
apply to specific situations and if any normative conflict arises between
the rules in question due to their different scope and content, how it is
to be resolved. International jurisprudence and academic opinion43 offer
37

38
39
40
41
42

43

Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] I.C.J Rep.226 [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion]; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion [2004] I.C.J Rep. 136 [hereinafter Wall Advisory
Opinion].
Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., (2001) I.C.T.Y ¶¶ 467, 471.
US DoD, Law of War Manual, ¶ 1.6.3.1 (2016); Germany, Federal Ministry of Defence, Law of
Armed Conflict-Manual- Joint Service Regulation, ¶ 105 (2013).
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 37, ¶ 24.
Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 37, ¶ 106.
U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 on the Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13
(May 26, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment 31].
See also Oona A. Hathaway et al., Which Law Governs During Armed Conflict—The Relationship
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differing viewpoints. According to one approach, the IHL as lex specialis
takes precedence over the application of the IHRL, whereas another holds
that IHRL44 complements IHL by filling its gaps, or as its interpretative tool.45 The relationship between these two branches of law is often
analyzed with reference to specific rights, such as the right to life,46 the
right to fair trial,47 the prohibition of arbitrary detention48 and in the
context of military responses to terrorism.49 However, perhaps one of the
areas where this dichotomy is both most visible and difficult to reconcile
is in the field of intelligence gathering, as it takes place in peacetime
and during armed conflict alike. In the former situation, the question
of which regime applies is relatively uncomplicated — these operations
are mandated by both domestic statutes vesting surveillance powers to
designated State organs, together with human rights law aimed at protecting individuals’ privacy rights against a State’s arbitrary and unlawful
interference. In the context of armed conflict, the answer is more complex. This is because the law of war is the main legal framework, but as
already noted, it pays little direct attention to the issue of protection of
privacy. This matter is discussed next.

A INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND PRIVACY
IMPLICATIONS IN SITUATIONS OF IAC UNDER IHL
During armed hostilities, the main role of States’ intelligence gathering
operations is the identification of military targets. This is underpinned by
the principle of distinction which is set out in Article 48 of AP I. Accordingly, to ensure respect for and protection of civilian populations and
civilian objects, the parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian and

44
45
46

47

48
49

Between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 96:6 M inn. L. R ev. 1883 (2012);
William Schabas, Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law and
the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus ad Bellum, 40:2 Israel L. R ev. 592 (2007).
Hathaway et al., supra note 43.
Nicholas Tsagourias and A lasdair Morrison, International Humanitarian L aw. C ases,
M aterials and Commentary, 55 (Cambridge University Press 2018).
U.N. Human Rights Committee, Draft General Comment No. 36, Article 6: Right to Life, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/R.36/Rev (2015); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the International Commission of
Inquiry on Libya, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/68 (2012); Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom 55721/07
Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011; Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Columbia 259 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 2012.
U.N. Human Right Committee, General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to Equality Before
Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007); Case of Castilla Petruzzi
et al. v. Peru 52 I.A.Ct.H.R. 1999.
U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35, Article 9: Liberty and Security of
Person, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (2014); Hassan v. United Kingdom 29750/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.116 Doc. 5 Reve. 1 corr. (2002).
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military objectives and direct their operations only against the military
objectives.50
In addition, the rule of target verification contained in Article 57(2)
(a)(i) of AP I obliges those who plan or decide an attack to do “everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither
civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but
are military objectives”.51 To comply with these requirements, warring
States are required to engage in intelligence gathering, surveillance and
reconnaissance to identify the nature of the possible target to ensure that
they only attack lawful military objectives.
Belligerents must also comply with the principle of proportionality52
which prohibits attacks “which may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated”.53 This obligation recognizes, however,
collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects as part of an armed
conflict. Nevertheless, those in charge of attacks must strike a balance
between the military value of the destruction, neutralisation, or capture
of the target and the incidental harm that the attack may cause to civilians. Intelligence gathering therefore aids the process of determination
of such matters as whether there are civilians, or civilian buildings in the
vicinity of the target, as well as the nature and the scale of harm likely
to result from the attack.
Of equal significance in this context is also the principle of constant
care stipulated in Article 57(1) of AP I, which provides that “in the conduct
of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian
population, civilians and civilian objects”.54 Although the principle is
not defined in IHL, it has been described as “the obligation of conduct,
i.e. a positive and continuous obligation aimed at risk mitigation and
harm prevention and the fulfilment of which requires the exercise of due
diligence”.55 The rule has been referred to as a “general principle”, as
against one setting out specific obligations on States. That said, the use
of the word “shall” in Article 57(1) is legally binding on the parties to AP
I and as a consequence it applies to all domains of warfare and all levels
50
51
52
53
54
55

AP I, supra note 9, art. 48.
Id. art. 57(2)(a)(i).
Id. arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(ii) and 57(2)(b).
Id. art. 51(5)(b) (emphasis added).
Id. art. 57(1).
International Law Association Study Group on the Conduct of Hostilities in the 21st Century, The
Conduct of Hostilities and International Humanitarian Law. Challenges of 21st Century Warfare.
93 INT’L. L. Stud.322 (2017) [hereinafter ILA Study Group].
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of operations.56 However, since the title to Article 57 refers to “precautions in attack”, this provision is often read as applying only in situations of attacks (i.e. “acts of violence against the adversary, whether in
offence or in defence”)57 and therefore in conjunction with the scenarios
enumerated in Article 57(2)–(5). This view seems quite limited though,
as it has been advanced that the obligation to take constant care to spare
civilian population must necessarily apply to the entire range of military operations, not only to attacks.58 This broader reading is preferable because on the more restrictive interpretation, Article 57 would
only pertain to attacks and specific situations set out in sub-paragraphs
2–5,59 thus discounting a whole spectrum of military activities. Of note
in this context is the ICRC Commentary on AP I (ICRC Commentary)
which interprets “military activities” for the purposes of Article 57 as a
term which “shall be understood to mean any movements, manoeuvres
and other activities whatsoever carried out by the armed forces with the view
to combat”.60 The doctrine of constant care must therefore be construed
as a “stand-alone” obligation, that is, in addition to the general rules of
taking precautionary measures in attacks contained in Article 57(2)–(5).61
Some States, such as the UK, support such an expansive interpretation
of this provision. Thus, the UK Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict62
considers “military operations” to be a wider term than “attack”, as they
include the movement and deployment of armed forces.63 The document
further asserts that “the commander will have to bear in mind the effect
on the civilian population of what he is planning to do and take steps
to reduce that effect as much as possible. In planning or deciding on,
or carrying out attacks, however, those responsible have more specific
duties.”64 Therefore, based on the premise that the duty of constant care
applies throughout the entire spectrum of combat operations, the next
section examines whether it can serve to close the normative gap in the
IHL framework by placing privacy and data protection obligations on
States’ intelligence operations.
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Id. at 43.
AP I, supra note 9, art. 49(1).
ILA Study Group, supra note 55, at 42.
AP I, supra note 9, art. 57(2)–(5).
ICRC, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
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Id. ¶ 5.32.1.

170

Eliza Watt

B INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND PRIVACY
IMPLICATIONS IN SITUATIONS OF IAC
UNDER IHRL
International treaties, including the ICCPR and the ECHR, place an obligation on each State party to respect and ensure to all individuals the rights
recognized in these instruments, including the right to privacy contained
in Article 17 and Article 8 respectively. As drone surveillance is often
conducted extraterritorially, the question that arises is whether States
are bound by their treaty obligations in such instances. The matter of
extraterritorial application of human rights treaties is not entirely settled,
but as a general rule States owe human rights obligations predominantly
to those who are within their territory. However, when a State exercises
effective control over foreign area (the spatial model),65 or physical control
over an individual in a foreign country (the personal model),66 then the
human rights duties will extend beyond its borders.
As a general rule, States must adopt legislative or other measures
to give effect to the rights stipulated in the treaties and provide effective domestic remedies for their violation. However, these requirements
are subject to two caveats. First, States may derogate from their treaty
obligations by temporarily suspending certain rights during public emergencies. Second, they may limit non-absolute rights and freedoms on
the basis of permissible limitations clauses. The next part discusses both
these mechanisms in the context of the right to privacy.

1

Derogations
According to Article 4(1) of the ICCPR in times of officially proclaimed
public emergency which threatens the life of the nation, a State party to
the Covenant may derogate from some of its obligations67 which includes
Article 17.68 States can do so by adopting derogating measures, but these
must be of an exceptional and temporary nature. Moreover, prior to a
State invoking Article 4 a number of conditions must be met.69 First, the
situation has to amount to a public emergency, which threatens the life
of the nation.70 Although not every disturbance or catastrophe qualifies
65
66
67
68
69
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Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 37, ¶¶ 107–13.
General Comment 31, supra note 42, ¶ 10; Al-Skeini, supra note 46, ¶ 131.
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Id. art. 4(1). However, art 4(2) lists a number of non-derogable rights.
See U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No 29: Article 4: Derogations During
A State of Emergency, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11. (Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter General
Comment 29].
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as a public emergency, an international armed conflict falls within the
meaning of “public emergency” stipulated in Article 4(1) and consequently gives States the right to derogate from certain human rights.71
Secondly, a relevant government organ must officially proclaim a state
of emergency.72 Such prior pronouncement is a technical pre-requisite
for the application of Article 4, as without it any derogation from the
Covenant’s rights will constitute a violation of international law.73 Further,
the language of Article 4(1) makes an explicit reference to the principle of
proportionality, stating that the Covenant rights may be derogated from
only “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”.74
This provision represents the most important limitation on permissible
derogation measures and requires that “the degree of interference and
the scope of the measure must stand in a reasonable relation to what is
actually necessary to combat an emergency threatening the life of the
nation”.75 Whether or not States comply with the principle of proportionality when taking measures to derogate is subject to review by the HRC.76
In addition, Article 4(3) requires State parties to immediately inform the
other State parties through the UN Secretary-General of the provision(s)
it has derogated from and the reasons for such measures.77 The duty of
notification is essential, as not only does it enable the HRC to discharge
its functions when assessing whether the measures taken by the State
were strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, but it also permits
other State parties to monitor compliance with the provisions of the
Covenant.78 Thus far, there appears to be not a single country that has
taken measures to derogate from Article 17 specifically on the grounds
of the existence of, or the involvement in an armed conflict.
Unlike Article 4 of the ICCPR, Article 15 of the ECHR allows States
to derogate from their Convention obligations not only “during public
emergencies threatening the life of the nation”, but also in the time of
war.79 However, as in the case of Article 4 of the ICCPR by virtue of Article
15(2) of the ECHR, States may derogate from Article 8, but must meet both
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General Comment 29, supra note 69, ¶ 3.
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Nowak’s Commentary, supra note 20, ¶ 26.
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the substantive80 and the procedural81 requirements set forth in Article
15(1) and (3) respectively. In the context of armed conflicts, the ECtHR
considered the issue of derogation from Article 5 of the ECHR (right to
liberty and security) in Hassan v. United Kingdom,82 but there seem to be no
specific instances thus far of States derogating from Article 8 obligations
on the grounds of war or similar public emergency.

2

Permissible Limitations
States may be justified in limiting non-absolute rights on the basis
of proscribed purposes, such as national security; public order, health,
safety and morals; together with the protection of rights and freedoms
of others.83 Permissible limitations are subject to two conditions. First,
the limitation must be proscribed by domestic law in that it has to have
a clear legal basis.84 This means that the law authorising the limitation
of the given right must be publicly accessible, sufficiently precise and
cannot confer unfettered discretion on those in charge of its execution.85
Secondly, it must pursue a legitimate aim,86 be reasonable, necessary
and proportionate.87 Thus, the restriction has to be necessary to achieve
a legitimate objective, be rationally connected to attaining that purpose
and be no more restrictive than required to do so.
As already observed, governments rarely choose to derogate from
the obligations to protect the right to privacy, preferring instead to rely
on permissible limitations clauses.88 Recent decades have attested to a
discernible trend in the practice of States restricting this right on the
80
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See also U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27: Article 27 (Freedom of
Movement), ¶¶ 14–15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/2/21/Rev1/Add9 (Nov. 2, 1999); S and Mapper v. United
Kingdom, ¶ 118, 30562/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 4, 2008); Zakharov; Szabó; C-311/18 Data Protection
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basis of new, or amended legislation that allows for far reaching State
surveillance (such as bulk collection of communications’ content and
metadata) to facilitate fighting serious crime and cross-border terrorism.
A case in point is the UK Investigatory Powers Act 2016;89 the French
Intelligence Act 2015;90 and the Swedish Signals Intelligence Act 2016.91
There are a number of reasons as to why the permissible limitations
mechanism is preferable to derogations. First, States may find it difficult
to show that the circumstances in question de facto threaten the life of the
nation, as not every volatile situation necessarily reaches the threshold
of an armed conflict within the meaning of common Article 2(1) to the
Geneva Conventions. Second, permissible limitations are perceived as
giving States sufficient leeway to achˇieve effective emergency responses,
without having to give formal notification, or indeed provide reasons as
to why they seek to do so and when the derogation would end. In addition, the limitations procedure seems to be more permissible in relation
to the proportionality criteria which is common to the derogation and
limitations powers. Under Article 4 of the ICCPR this must be justified
by the exigencies of the situation, which is “a requirement that relates
to the duration, geographical coverage and material scope of the state of
emergency and any measures of derogation resorted to because of the
emergency”.92 Furthermore, States must provide careful justification not
only for their decision to proclaim a state of emergency, but also for any
specific measure based on such a proclamation.93 This can be contrasted
with the interpretation of the proportionality criteria for the purposes
of permissible limitations particularly in the context of the ECtHR case
law addressing foreign surveillance of communications. The Strasbourg
Court has long recognized that States face a difficult task of balancing
national security and human rights, thus granting them a wide margin of
discretion in regard to the implementation of security measures.94 Finally,
in a situation of armed conflict, States likely place little weight on their
duty to respect and protect the right to privacy, as the requirements to
adhere to other international law obligations, predominantly those set
out by the rules of jus in bello, are probably considered as more pressing.
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Equally, they might disregard the need for a formal derogation from
privacy rights or even not countenance that they are bound by privacy
and data protection obligations.
Bearing this in mind, the next section addresses the question of
whether the right to privacy set out in international treaties applies in
IAC and if so, how can they provide the normative foundations for States’
drone surveillance operations.

III

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND PROLONGED
DRONE SURVEILLANCE IN ARMED
CONFLICT — THE IHRL/IHL NEXUS
Privacy is not defined in international human rights treaties, but in
essence it is “the presumption that individuals should have an area of
autonomous development, interaction and liberty free from State intervention and excessive unsolicited intrusion by other uninvited individuals”.95 IHRL expressly recognizes privacy as a fundamental right and
a rule of customary international law. A dense body of law and opinion
has recently been developed at the UN and European levels pertaining
to the right to privacy as a result of States’ mass surveillance of digital communications, but the resultant courts’ interpretation appears to
be rather obfuscated. Thus, the UN human rights bodies and mandate
holders acknowledge arbitrary interference and violation of this right,
chiefly because bulk acquisition and retention of communications is seen
as inherently disproportionate.96 In contrast, the ECtHR has taken a more
permissive stance, holding that such methods of intelligence gathering
are an indispensable tool for States to safeguard national security, when
that is undertaken in accordance with adequate safeguards and oversights
mechanisms, which the Court’s Grand Chamber set out in 2021 in Big
Brother Watch v. UK.97 Drone surveillance in situations of armed conflict is
95
96
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equally if not more intrusive than bulk interception of digital communications in peacetime, as it directly encroaches on the privacy of home and
family life, as well as data protection rights. With the increase in these
activities and their almost certain spill over to situations which cannot
be readily pigeonholed as an armed conflict in legal terms, it becomes
imperative that militaries become mindful that privacy and data protection are legally binding rights also during hostilities in the absence of
States’ expressly derogating from them. The next section explores how
this can be achieved.

A THE DUTY OF CONSTANT CARE AND DRONE
SURVEILLANCE
The conceptual bridging of the IHRL/IHL gap in this context is the principle of constant care set out in Article 57 (1) of the AP I discussed above. As
it likely applies to all military operations, it should arguably be extended
to intelligence gathering by drones, placing a duty of care on military
leaders to respect the privacy and data protection rights of civilian populations in their decision-making cycle. It is submitted that such a progressive interpretation of Article 57(1) could fill in the normative lacuna
left by the IHL for at least five reasons.
First, it has been acknowledged that the constant care principle
requires the commander to bear in mind the effects on the civilian population of what he or she is planning to do and take steps to reduce those
effects as much as possible. This is recognized, inter alia, by the drafters
of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 in the context of States’ cyber operations. To this
end, the commentary to Rule 114 states that “in cyber operations, the duty
of care requires commanders and all others involved in the operations to
be continuously sensitive to the effects of their activities on the civilian
population and civilian objects, and to seek to avoid any unnecessary
effects thereon”.98 This supports a contention that Article 57(1) should
capture all military activities associated with combat, including intelligence collection. Such an expansive interpretation of this provision is
also garnering academic support. Thus, Asaf Lubin advocates that in the
digital age, Article 57(1) should apply to “all informational operations
necessary to support military activities”, such as intelligence collection
98

Tallinn M anual 2.0 on the International L aw A pplicable to C yber Operations, (Michael
N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul eds., Cambridge University Press 2017), Rule 114, ¶ 4 [hereinafter Tallinn
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and broader data collection by any actor, including private contractors
and civilian intelligence agencies, provided the necessary nexus exists
between gathering, storing, processing and sharing and advancing combat.99 Based on this reasoning, obtaining data from drone surveillance
conducted with the view of combat throughout the entire spectrum of
military operations should conceivably fall within the ambit of Article
57(1). This will place the necessity of amassing vast amounts of drone
data within commanders’ contemplation and entail a proportionality
assessment. Thus, in implementing drone surveillance measures, militaries will be under an obligation to strike a balance between attaining
the legitimate aim of target identification and safeguarding individuals’
privacy rights, by imposing geographical and temporal limits on the
surveillance and the amount of the collected data.
Second, the duty of care is constant which means it is of continuous
nature and therefore does not have time limitations. The word “constant”
according to the Tallinn Manual 2.0 denotes that:
the duty to take care to protect civilians and civilian objects is
of a continuing nature throughout cyber operations; all those
involved in the operation must discharge the duty. The law
admits of no situation in which, or time when, individuals
involved in the planning and execution process may ignore the
effects of their operations on civilians or civilian objects. In the
cyber context, this requires situational awareness at all times,
not merely during the preparatory stage of an operation.100
It follows that duty of constant care likely arises at all stages of armed
conflict — that is, before, during and after active hostilities.101 Based on
this reading, all information operations, including drone surveillance of
civilians, irrespective of the stage of hostilities at which they are conducted, must be subject to this obligation.
Third, it is submitted that Article 57(1) should be interpreted in such
a way as to recognize the type of harm inherent in prolonged surveillance, including continuous fear and trauma associated with a possible
drone attack, interference with privacy and data protection implications.
Admittedly the wording of Article 57(1) does not refer directly to harm,
Asaf Lubin, The Duty of Constant Care and Data Protection in War, in Big Data and A rmed Conflict:
Legal Issues A bove and Below the A rmed Conflict T hreshold 10 (Laura A. Dickinson and
Edward Berg eds., Oxford University Press, forthcoming, 2022).
100 Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 98, Rule 114, ¶ 5.
101 See Lubin, supra note 99, at 11.
99
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stating merely that civilians and civilian objects must be spared. Article
57(2) then goes on to refer to “attacks” setting out a list of precautions
that must be taken. This indicates that the drafters of AP I contemplated
that the harm to civilian population is of a physical nature, such as death,
personal injury and damage to civilian objects. However, as recognized
by Lubin, in the information age there is a bundle of individual rights
that have digital manifestation — that is, privacy, anonymity, access to
information, online freedom of expression, digital autonomy and dignity,
together with intellectual property.102 As the right to privacy extends to
the privacy of home and family life, individuals deserve protection against
the harm caused by unrestrained drone surveillance by foreign militaries
in particular because the strategic planning of militaries is increasingly
swaying towards relying on technological tools such as machine learning
and AI to enhance their military capabilities and decision making processes.103 For this reason the duty of constant care should extend beyond
physical harm and apply to protecting civilians from being subject to
arbitrary interference with all aspects of their privacy, including the right
to have a private sphere, that allows for autonomy and dignity.
Fourth, the duty of constant care should necessitate the adherence to
the minimum data protection standards. This entails the protection of the
data gathered in pursuance of intelligence operations from unrestricted
collection, retention, processing and sharing. Strong support for such a
progressive interpretation of Article 57(1) has been advanced in academic
writing. For example, Lubin postulates that without any specific IHL rules
in place, the duty of constant care as a data protection rule “stands as
the only possible lighthouse that could guide militaries in discharging
their duty”.104 In practical terms this would require commanders to take
reasonable steps to reduce where feasible the negative effects on civilians
of the information operations, through transplanting some of the fundamental principles of data protection such as that of fair, transparent and
lawful processing onto the military theatre of operations.105 To this end,
fairness dictates that the collection and further processing of personal
data must be carried out in such a way as not to interfere unreasonably
102 Id. at 14.
103 See also Stew Magnuson, DoD Making Big Push to Catch up on Artificial Intelligence, National
Defense M agazine (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/
articles/2017/6/13/dod-making-big-push-to-catch-up-on-artificial-intelligence; Cade Metz, As
China Marchers Forward on A.I. the White House is Silent, New York T imes (Feb. 12, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/technology/china-trump-artificial-intelligence.html.
104 Lubin, supra note 99, at 16.
105 See also Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Automatic Processing of
Individual Data, Jan. 28 1981, ETS 108 art. 5(a); General Data Protection Regulation, Apr. 27, 2016,
OJ L 119, (GDPR) art. 5(1)(a).
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with data subjects’ privacy-related interests. This connotes proportionality in the balancing of interests of data subjects and data controllers
and means that personal data must be “relevant” and “not excessive”
in relation to the purpose for which it is processed.106 Furthermore, the
processing of personal data must be transparent for the data subjects,
which means that data must not be processed surreptitiously, whilst
data subjects must not be deceived as to the nature and purpose of the
processing.107 The principle of lawfulness requires that data processing
may only be carried out pursuant to legal basis, which must specify
the circumstances where such processing may be lawfully conducted.108
As drone surveillance falls within military intelligence operations, the
legality, fairness and transparency principles should apply, necessitating
that the processing of data obtained through such methods complies with
these basic requirements.
The prerequisite that surveillance be conducted on the basis of
domestic law is also a fundamental principle of the right to privacy set
out in, inter alia, Article 17 of the ICCPR and Article 8 of the ECHR. In interpreting this basic condition, the HRC stated that “interference authorised
by States can only take place on the basis of the law, which itself must
comply with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant”.109
Moreover, in accordance with the principle of foreseeability, the law must
be sufficiently clear to give an adequate indication of the circumstances
and conditions empowering public authorities to resort to surveillance.
In accordance with this stipulation, the ECtHR in the context of State
interception of foreign communications developed minimum procedural
standards in the 2006 case of Weber v. Germany110 which laid down basic
guarantees that a surveillance law must meet to be compliant with the
ECHR. These safeguards have since been widened by the Grand Chamber of
the ECtHR in Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom and require the domestic
legal frameworks to stipulate: (1) the grounds on which bulk interception may be authorised; (2) the circumstances in which an individual’s
communications may be intercepted; (3) the procedures to be followed for
granting authorisation; (4) the procedures to be followed for selecting,
examining and using intercepted material; (5) the precautions to be taken
when communicating the material to other parties; (6) the limits on the
duration of the interception, the storage of the intercept material and
106
107
108
109
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the circumstances in which such material must be erased or destroyed;
(7) the procedures and modalities for supervision by an independent
authority of compliance with the above safeguards and its powers to
address non-compliance; and (8) the procedures for independent ex post
facto review of such compliance and the powers vested in the competent
body in addressing instances of non-compliance.111 Drone surveillance—
seen in the light of the principle of constant care—should be underpinned
by the positive and continuous obligation of risk mitigation and harm
prevention. This requires establishing minimum procedural safeguards
which in turn entails adopting legislation delineating the circumstances
in which such surveillance may be lawfully conducted. In practical terms,
a starting point might be that the carrying out of drone surveillance is
assessed on the basis of the aforementioned eight criteria and subject to
ex post review of the reasons for the retention, sharing and other utilisation of drone data.
What can be concluded from the above analysis is a need for a twopronged approach to prolonged drone surveillance in war zones. The first
is to develop clear standards of when drones may be present in a given
area setting out temporal and geographical limitations, together with
the minimum procedural standards for conducting such surveillance.
The second is to develop rules that address the processing, retention and
sharing of the obtained data, imposing minimum data protection standards encompassing the concepts of legality, fairness and transparency.
The rationale for this is the principle of constant care which must be
interpreted to reflect the general aims of the Geneva Conventions and
the Additional Protocols, namely to spare civilians from harm in times of
war and to provide minimum protection to the victims of armed conflict
by setting standards of humane treatment.

CONCLUSION
This chapter analyzed the issues concerning States’ deployment of drones
in wartime and the problems this creates outside of the usually discussed breaches of jus ad bellum, jus in bello and the right to life under
international human rights law. Having demonstrated an individual and
111
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collective surge in the use of surveillance drones both in the context of
international armed conflict and outside it, this chapter argued for a
dualistic approach to these practices. The first necessitates developing
procedural safeguards for States’ deployment of surveillance drones. To
assist in this, the set of guarantees stipulated by the ECtHR in the 2021
Big Brother Watch decision may be a useful benchmark to guide decisions
made by militaries regarding the use of UAVs to obtain intelligence. This
is due to the apparent similarities between these two methods of data
acquisition, including their indiscriminate nature and the vast amounts
of material obtained. The second is establishing data protection standards
in line with the principles of legality, fairness, transparency and proportionality. Underpinning this contention is the principle of constant care
which places a duty on military commanders to protect civilians throughout the entirety of military operations and means that those involved in
the planning and execution process must not ignore the effects of their
operations on civilians. In the digital age, this demands consideration be
given to privacy and data protection rights of non-combatants in armed
conflicts.
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Chapter 9

The Use of Cable
Infrastructure
for Intelligence
Collection During
Armed Conflict:
Legality and Limits
Tara Davenport1

INTRODUCTION
Since the first submarine telegraph cable was laid from Dover to Calais
in 1850, submarine fiber optic cables (the successor of submarine telegraph cables) have emerged as one of the most important innovations
of our time. Ninety-nine percent of the world’s telecommunications
are transmitted through fiber optic cables.2 As of 2021, approximately
464 submarine cable systems transmit dozens of Terabytes of data per
second, crisscrossing vast expanses of the seabed and traversing different
jurisdictions until they reach a cable landing station onshore.3 These
1
2
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submarine cables facilitate a wide variety of services that we take for
granted, from phone and internet banking to email and social media.
They have unsurprisingly been described as “critical communications
infrastructure” and as “vitally important to the global economy and the
national security of all States.”4 While fiber optic cables are used primarily
for the transmission of communications data, they are also utilized for
other purposes. For example, militaries depend on fiber optic cables for
both defense and warfare purposes;5 oil and gas industries utilize them
for platforms connectivity;6 and the placement of scientific sensors on
such cables facilitates oceanographic data collection.7
This chapter focuses on one specific use of cable infrastructure
(consisting of both submarine fiber optic cables laid on the seabed and
cable landing stations), namely, its use by States for intelligence collection
during armed conflict, which can be crucial in facilitating the success of
military operations both defensive and offensive.8 For example, during
World War I, Britain cut all but one of Germany’s undersea cables and
tapped the remaining one, which enabled the British to read any message
sent through it, including the Zimmerman telegram, which nudged a
reluctant United States (US) into the war.9 In peacetime, the ubiquity
of cable infrastructure has provided opportunities for States to conduct
mass surveillance ostensibly for national security purposes.10 In 2013,
Edward Snowden disclosed that the national security agencies of both
the US (National Security Agency or NSA) and the United Kingdom (UK)
(GCHQ or Government Communications Headquarters) had been “tapping
directly into the Internet’s backbone,” namely fiber optic cables, to gather
vast amounts of data concerning multiple actors including State actors,
officials of international organizations, religious leaders, corporations,

4
5

6
7
8
9
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UN General Assembly Resolution 65/37 ¶ 121 (Dec. 7, 2010).
For example, the US Department of Defense Global Information Grid, which is a “globally,
interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities for collecting, processing, storing,
disseminating and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers and support
personnel.” Global Information Grid, National Security Agency, https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-04-858/html/GAOREPORTS-GAO-04-858.htm (last visited Dec.
26, 2021).
Wayne F. Nielsen & Tara Davenport, Submarine Cables and Offshore Energy in Submarine Cables, in
Submarine C ables: H andbook on L aw and Policy, 351 (Douglas Burnett et al. eds., 2014).
Lionel Carter & Alfred H.A. Soons, Marine Scientific Research Cables in Submarine Cables, in Burnett
et. al., supra note 6, 323
Marco Longobardo, (New) Cyber Exploitation and (Old) International Humanitarian Law, 77 Z aoRV
809, 812 (2017).
From Australia to Zimmerman: A Brief History of Cable Telegraphy during World War One, in Innovating
in C ombat: T elecommunications and Intellectual P roperty in the F irst World
War, http://blogs.mhs.ox.ac.uk/innovatingincombat/files/2013/03/Innovating-in-Combateducational-resources-telegraph-cable-draft-1.pdf.
Eliza Watt, State Sponsored C yber Surveillance: T he R ight to Privacy of Communications and International L aw 74 (2021).
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non-governmental organizations, and suspected terrorists.11 In 2015,
reports of Russian submarines and spy ships patrolling areas near submarine cables in US waters prompted concerns from American and NATO
security forces.12 Most recently, the Trump administration called for the
boycott of Chinese cable equipment manufacturers and telecommunications operators due to concerns that China is using cables to collect
intelligence.13
The methods used to tap cable infrastructure for intelligence collection are shrouded in mystery and the prevalence of this activity cannot be
determined with certainty.14 First, it is said that tapping can be done by
“inserting backdoors during the cable manufacturing process.”15 Reportedly, any company that builds cables could potentially be requested by a
government to build backdoors into the equipment before deployment.16
This possibility prompted US concerns about Huawei’s involvement in a
variety of cable building projects.17 Second, it is speculated that intercept
probes can be installed at cable landing stations that capture the fiber optic
light and make a copy of it.18 This may not alert an operator that tapping
has occurred as there is no service interruption.19 This was the method
that was reportedly used by the NSA and GCHQ.20 The third method,
according to some reports, is the direct tapping of submarine cables on
the seabed, which involves the use of specially equipped submarines or
underwater unmanned vehicles which would lift the cable and install
a device to collect the data that passes through them.21 Such physical
tapping on the seabed is said to be necessary when cable-landing stations
11
12

13

14
15

16

17
18
19
20

21

RUSSELL BUCHAN, C yber Espionage and International L aw 4 (2018).
David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Russian Ships Near Data Cables are Too Close for US Comfort,
N. Y. T imes, Oct. 25, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/europe/russian-
presence-near-undersea-cables-concerns-us.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
Laurie Clarke, Geopolitical tensions over subsea cables may have big implications for internet infrastructure, T ech Monitor, Aug. 19, 2021, https://techmonitor.ai/policy/geopolitics-of-submarine-cables-us-china-facebook (last visited Dec. 26, 2021).
Jason Petty, How Hackers of Submarine Cables May be Held Liable under the Law of the Sea, 22 (1) Chi.
J. Int’l L aw 260, 266.
Pierre Morcos & Collin Wall, Invisible and Vital: Undersea Cables and Transatlantic Security, CSIS
Commentary, 11 June 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/invisible-and-vital-undersea-cables-and-transatlantic-security (last visited Dec. 26, 2021)
Justin Sherman, Cyber Defense Across the Ocean Floor: The Geopolitics of Submarine Cable Security,
Atlantic Council R eport, Sept. 13, 2021, 15, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-
research-reports/report/cyber-defense-across-the-ocean-floor-the-geopolitics-of-submarinecable-security/, (last visited Apr. 4, 2021).
Id.
Petty, supra note 14, at 266; Morcos & Wall, supra note 15.
Id.
Ewen MacAskill, Julian Borger, Nick Hopkins & James Ball, GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret
access to world’s communications, Guardian, Jun 21, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/
jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa (last visited Dec. 21, 2021).
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and eavesdrop on communications passing through them: see New Nuclear Sub is said to Have
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are on foreign soil.22 On the other hand, it has also been argued that
this method is “so technically challenging that little is publicly known
about specific methods and which countries have these capabilities.”23
Challenges include “identifying the fiber of interest, copying the data,
decrypting it, and evading monitoring systems that detect even minor
changes in traffic or physical interference.”24 The methods discussed
above involve both close and remote access—probes (for example) which
are installed usually require some human intervention, but the appropriated information is usually transmitted back to the operator via the
Internet. It can also occur prior to armed conflict or during armed conflict.
After data has been intercepted from cable infrastructure, it is retained
and specific selectors are applied and examined by analysts, after which
the “final product” is used, including the sharing of data with third
parties.25
This chapter will explore gaps and uncertainties in the international
law governing the utilization of cable infrastructure for intelligence collection in armed conflict. Given that such activity can be described as a
type of cyber operation,26 this chapter will examine the law applicable
during armed conflict (Part I) as well as other fields of law that are traditionally applicable during peacetime, such as the law of the sea and
international human rights law, on the basis that these regimes may also
be applicable during armed conflict (Part II). While the secretive nature
of cyber operations obfuscates attempts to delineate applicable norms,
this chapter will argue that the use of cable infrastructure for intelligence
collection in armed conflict does not exist in a legal vacuum. Indeed,
each field of law examined herein contains rules which can be applied,
albeit uneasily, to this activity and, more importantly, demonstrates that
it is not an untrammeled entitlement of States but one that is subject to
certain limits that are increasingly converging.
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Id.
Jonathan E. Hillman, Securing the Subsea Network: A Primer for Policy Makers, CSIS R econnecting
A sia Project, Mar. 9, 2021, 10, https://www.csis.org/analysis/securing-subsea-network-primerpolicymakers (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
Id.
Big Brother Watch and Others v. United Kingdom, App no 58170/13, ¶ 272 (Sept. 13, 2018) [BBW v.
UK], ¶ 325.
While there is no general consensus on a definition of cyber operations, the 2016 US Military
Manual’s definition provides a good starting point: operations that involve the “the employment
of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyber
space.” They “use cyber capabilities, such as computers, software tools, or networks” and “have
a primary purpose of achieving objectives or effects in or through cyberspace.” US Department
of Defense, L aw of War M anual (Updated Dec. 2016), 16.1.2. See also the definition in Tallinn
M anual 2.0 on the International L aw A pplicable to C yber Operations 258 (Michael N.
Schmitt ed., 2017) [hereinafter Tallinn M anual 2.0].
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A few qualifications are in order. First, this chapter does not engage
with the question of when an armed conflict arises (and the debates that
accompany this question).27 It proceeds on the basis of a broad definition
of armed conflict as a “resort to armed force between States or protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups or between such groups within a State,” 28 thus encompassing both
international and non-international armed conflict. Second, while this
chapter covers non-international armed conflict which involves nonState actors, its analysis is confined to activities that can be attributed
to a State, bearing in mind that States are most likely to have the financial and technological resources necessary to engage in such tapping.29
Third, this chapter is concerned with intelligence collection that occurs
during armed conflict, although it will examine the extent to which certain peacetime regimes may be applicable to this activity. Fourth, while
some cable infrastructure is exclusively used for military purposes by the
military,30 this chapter limits its analysis to dual-use cable infrastructure
that has both civilian and military uses.31 Fifth, this chapter focuses on
the use of cable infrastructure to gain information without affecting the
functionality of the system or deleting the data transiting therein, and
will only address to the extent relevant the applicable law when intelligence collection leads to damage to the cable.
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See, e.g., Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts, in T he Oxford Guide to International
Humanitarian L aw 29 (Ben Saul & Dapo Akande eds., 2020).
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IT-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995), ¶ 63. See also International Committee on the Red Cross (ICRC),
Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, Convention I for the A melioration of the
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80, ¶ 219.
DJ Pangburn, Wiretapping Undersea Fiber Optic Cables is Just a Matter of Money, Vice, Jul. 23, 2013,
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Ashley Roach, Military Cables, in Burnett et. al., supra note 6, 323.
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I

THE LAWS APPLICABLE IN ARMED
CONFLICT
A LEGALITY OF THE USE OF CABLE INFRASTRUCTURE
FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
International humanitarian law (IHL) and the law of neutrality are the
most salient regarding the use of cable infrastructure for intelligence collection in armed conflict, but neither provides a complete answer on the
legality and limits of this activity. Intelligence collection has traditionally
been deemed necessary to meet military objectives in armed conflict.
The 1863 Lieber Code recognized that “deception in war is admitted as a
just and necessary means of hostility, and is consistent with honourable
warfare.”32 Under Article 24 of the 1907 Hague Regulations on the Laws
and Customs of War on Land (Hague Regulations), “ruses of war and the
employment of measures necessary for obtaining information about the
enemy and the country are considered permissible.”33 Article 37(2) of the
1977 Additional Protocol I of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (AP I) similarly recognizes
that “ruses of war are not prohibited.”34 Moreover, an attacking State is
compelled to gather certain information in order to verify the nature of
the object of the attack and its consequences, and intelligence collection
is necessary for the State to implement the applicable principles of distinction and proportionality.35 Accordingly, in contrast to the uncertainty
that characterizes the legality of intelligence collection (and its different
permutations) in peacetime, IHL views intelligence collection in armed
conflict undertaken for the success of a military operation as lawful.36
32
33
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35
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Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field,
art. 101, (Washington, Apr. 24, 1863) [hereinafter Lieber Code].
Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, adopted Jul. 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 187
Consol. T.S. 456 [hereinafter HR].
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted Jun. 8, 1977, U.N. Doc. A.32/144/Annex II
(1977) [hereinafter AP I].
Id. art. 57 (2) (a); Longobardo, supra note 8, at 813.
Longobardo, supra note 8, at 813; John K ish, International L aw and Espionage 123 et seq.
(Martinus Nijhoff 1995). The peacetime practice of intelligence collection is more contested, with
different views being put forth that international law neither prohibits nor allows peacetime
intelligence collection, that it is legal, that it is illegal, or that it is subject to certain limits. For a
sampling of these different views, see, for example, Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in From
the Cold War: Intelligence and International Law, 27 (4) M ich. J. Int’l L 1071 (2006); Asaf Lubin,
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However, the means by which intelligence collection is undertaken
is not extensively regulated. IHL only explicitly regulates one specific
permutation of intelligence collection, namely espionage. Under IHL,
either civilians or members of the armed forces commit espionage if they
(1) obtain or endeavor to obtain information relevant for the conduct of
armed conflict and transmit this information to one of the parties to the
conflict;37 (2) act clandestinely or under false pretenses;38 and (3) carry out
such activities in a territory controlled by a belligerent or adverse party.39
If spies are captured, they are not entitled to prisoner of war status unless
they return to their armed forces before being captured and are subject to
the domestic criminal law of the State that captures them.40 Chesterman
observes, “spies… bear personal liability for their acts but are not war
criminals as such and do not engage the international responsibility of
the State that sends them.”41 IHL has also evolved to recognize certain
basic guarantees in the treatment of spies.42
The use of cable infrastructure for intelligence collection does not
fall neatly within IHL conceptions of espionage. It is also an uneasy
fit with more contemporary permutations of espionage, namely, cyber
espionage. While there is no universally accepted definition of cyber
espionage in times of armed conflict, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 provides
a useful starting point subject to the caveat that it does not necessarily
reflect existing international law.43 It defines cyber espionage in armed
conflict as “any act undertaken clandestinely or under false pretenses
that uses cyber capabilities to gather (or attempt to gather) information
with the intention of communicating it to the opposing party.”44 The
information must be gathered on behalf of a party to the conflict.45 The
Tallinn Manual 2.0 further notes that “cyber espionage and other forms
of intelligence gathering do not per se violate the law of armed conflict.”46
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The Liberty to Spy, 61 H arv. Int’l L. J. 185 (2020); BUCHAN, supra note 11, at 4–8.
Lieber Code, supra note 32, art. 88; HR, supra note 33, art 29; AP I, supra note 34, art. 46 (2).
Lieber Code, supra note 32, art. 88; HR, supra note 33, art. 29; AP I, supra note 34.
Lieber Code, supra note 32, art. 83; HR, supra note 33, art. 29; AP I, supra note 34.
Chesterman, supra note 36, at 1081.
Id.
See Longobardo, supra note 8, at 819–21.
The Tallinn Manuals were prepared by an international group of experts at the invitation of the
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence. Tallinn M anual 2.0, issued in 2017,
updated the first Tallinn Manual to cover cyber operations in both peacetime and times of armed
conflict. There is debate on how authoritative the Tallinn M anual 2.0 is and whether “it is
reflective of existing international law, or merely the articulation of the views of an international
group of experts on how international law should be applied to cyberoperations.” See Dan Efrony
& Yuval Shany, A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations and Subsequent State
Practice, 112:4 A m. J. Int’l L 583, 589 (2018).
Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, rule 89, at 409.
Id. at 411, ¶ 10.
Id. at 410, ¶ 5.
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Prima facie, if one considers the tapping of cable infrastructure to be
cyber espionage and analogizes it to espionage, it would be permitted in
armed conflict (provided, of course, that the intelligence collected is of
military value or has a nexus to the military operations). Yet, both IHL
and the Tallinn Manual’s conception of cyber espionage is limited to
situations in which the individual concerned engages in cyber espionage
while in “enemy-controlled territory.” The Tallinn Manual 2.0 states,
“[c]yber espionage that is performed from outside enemy-controlled
territory is not subject to this Rule” and “it does not encompass espionage conducted remotely by individuals from beyond enemy territory,
even though the exfiltration may take place on enemy-controlled territory.”47 In other words, remotely accessed data from outside enemy-
controlled territory would not be considered cyber espionage. Some
scholars have suggested interpreting this requirement less restrictively
so that an individual “can be considered physically present in the enemy
territory since their programs infiltrate systems and networks located
in that territory,”48 although others have countered that the operator’s
physical presence in enemy-controlled territory is an absolute requirement under IHL, including for contemporary permutations such as cyber
espionage.49 Using cable infrastructure for intelligence collection involves
both close access and remote access.50 If close access operations occur in
enemy-controlled territory during armed conflict, it can be argued that
it is akin to espionage and governed by the applicable rules. It would
not be considered cyber espionage if the close access operation occurs
during peacetime and remote access occurs during armed conflict if one
takes the position that remotely accessed data does not meet the physical
presence requirement.
Moreover, questions also arise on whether the scale of intelligence
collection during armed conflict impacts its characterization as cyber
espionage (and hence its permissibility). For example, the use of cable
infrastructure by the NSA and GCHQ is said to be better described as
mass cyber surveillance rather than targeted cyber espionage.51 Mass
cyber surveillance has become a pervasive practice of States ostensibly
for national security purposes and has been defined as a “state’s indiscriminate monitoring and capture of digital communications, comprising
their content and metadata, aimed at identifying future rather than
47
48
49
50
51

Id. at 411, ¶ 8.
Longobardo, supra note 8, at 823.
Id. (citing the work of Heather H. Dinniss).
BUCHAN, supra note 11, at 18–19 n. 29.
WATT, supra note 10, at 79.
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investigating known threats.”52 While contemporary discussions of mass
cyber surveillance have subsumed this activity within cyber espionage,
Watt has highlighted important differences: targets of cyber espionage
often consist of selected government organizations and entities, whereas
mass cyber surveillance primarily focuses on the interception of data of
entire populations; cyber espionage is sporadic and selective as opposed
to the sustained and constant nature of mass cyber surveillance.53 In
principle, any tapping of cable infrastructure would necessarily involve
the bulk interception of data which would only be targeted after certain
selectors are applied, which would differentiate it from the targeted
nature of cyber espionage. In this context some have proposed that a
proportionality assessment could control whether particular surveillance
operations may be deemed lawful.54
If espionage (and cyber espionage) is in principle permitted during
armed conflict under IHL, does this extend to surveillance that indiscriminately targets civilian populations, given that mass cyber surveillance is
not what was originally contemplated in IHL conceptions of espionage?
The majority of the experts of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 opined that the
nature of the information gathered has no bearing on the characterization of an activity as cyber espionage, provided it was gathered on
behalf of a party to the conflict, while the minority said that the information must be of some military value, which would arguably preclude
the type of bulk surveillance conducted by the NSA and GCHQ.55 This is
not an abstract question—the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) has observed in recent conflicts that “[u]nprecedented levels of
surveillance of the civilian population have caused anxiety and increasing
numbers of arrests, in some instances possibly based on disinformation.”56 International human rights law has developed significant limits
on mass surveillance, using the right to privacy as the foundational
bulwark against such intrusions, and its applicability in armed conflict
52
53
54
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Id.
Id. at 29.
Asaf Lubin, The Dragon-Kings’ Restraint: Proposing a Compromise for the EEZ Surveillance Conundrum,
57 Washburn L. J. 17, 58, 73 (2018) (proposing in the context of maritime surveillance, and
citing in part Kish, a proportionality assessment that takes into account the “balance of interest”
between the parties, that is, whether “the injury suffered by the aggrieved States exceeds the
benefit resulting for another State from the enjoyment of its own right.” Lubin includes in his
assessment such factors as: “the political atmosphere surrounding the operation; the aims that
stand at the heart of the decision to launch the surveillance operation; the likelihood of success of
the operation; and the potential risks to minimum order goals and to intrusion on coastal States’
rights in the exercise of the operation.”).
Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, at 411, ¶ 11; HPCR Manual produced by Harvard University’s
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, rule 118.
ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts,
21 (Oct. 2019).
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will be discussed below. It suffices to note that IHL does not address the
bulk interception of data for mass surveillance and the rights to privacy
in a meaningful manner.

B LIMITS
If intelligence collection using cable infrastructure is in principle permitted
during armed conflict under the rubric of espionage, are there any limits?
One may look to the law of neutrality, which does not explicitly address
this activity but does have rules on the extent to which belligerents can
use neutral cyber infrastructure in armed conflict.57 Neutrality dictates
that neutral territory should not be involved in the conduct of hostilities.58 Adapting the rules of neutrality to cyber operations, the Tallinn
Manual 2.0 adopts the general rule that “the exercise of belligerent rights
by cyber means in neutral territory is prohibited.”59 Belligerents cannot
use neutral cyber infrastructure located in neutral territory to conduct
cyber operations.60 At the same time, a neutral power is not under any
obligation to forbid or restrict the use of neutral cyber infrastructure by
belligerent States. If it does restrict belligerents from using such infrastructure, it must do so in a manner that is impartial to all parties to
a conflict.61 Neutral cyber infrastructure means public or private cyber
infrastructure located within neutral territory, which includes civilian
cyber infrastructure owned by a party to the conflict or nationals of that
party, or civilian cyber infrastructure that has the nationality of a neutral
State and is located outside of belligerent territory.62
However, applying these rules wholesale to prohibit the use of cable
infrastructure for intelligence collection is not straightforward. First,
the law of neutrality does not explicitly prohibit the use of neutral cyber
infrastructure for espionage.63 The Tallinn Manual 2.0 itself observes
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For an overview of the law of neutrality, see Michael Bothe, The Law of Neutrality, in T he
H andbook of International Humanitarian L aw 602 (Dieter Fleck et al. eds., 2021).
Hague Convention V respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907 (Hague Convention V), art. 1; Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, at
553–54.
Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, rule 151, at 555, based on Hague Convention V, supra note
58, art. 3 (a), which states that “belligerents are forbidden to erect on the territory of a neutral
Power a wireless telegraphy station or other apparatus for the purpose of communicating with
belligerent forces.”
Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, rule 151, at 556.
Hague Convention V, supra note 58, art. 8; Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, rule 151, at 556, ¶ 4.
Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, at 553, ¶ 2.
See K ish, supra note 36, at 125, who argues that Hague Convention V allows the belligerent use of
neutral communications systems for espionage.
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that the law of neutrality as adapted to cyber operations only prohibits
the exercise of belligerent rights against neutral cyber infrastructure, but
belligerent rights do not extend to espionage conducted against neutral
States.64 Second, even if the law of neutrality did apply to prohibit the
use of neutral cable infrastructure for intelligence collection, in principle
it would apply in the territory of a neutral State or in waters under the
territorial sovereignty of a neutral State (internal waters, territorial sea,
archipelagic waters).65 Would it apply to submarine cables laid outside
neutral territory (i.e., in the exclusive economic zone and high seas) but
owned and operated by corporations from neutral States? The definition
of neutral cyber infrastructure adopted by the Tallinn Manual 2.0 includes
infrastructure that “has the nationality of a neutral State and is located
outside of belligerent territory.”66 The Tallinn Manual 2.0 suggests in the
context of attacks against neutral cyber infrastructure that neutral cyber
infrastructure located on the high seas is protected by virtue of the State
of the nationality’s sovereignty.67 There is a lack of clarity on whether
submarine cables located in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and high
seas but owned or operated by nationals from neutral States would be
immune to tapping by belligerent States.
Third, as has been pointed out in the context of attacks on cable
infrastructure, the law of neutrality is increasingly impractical to apply
in today’s connected world.68 The law of neutrality was based on actions
in the physical domain and in a time when communications only served
the two States that were physically connected by that cable.69 Because
of the complex ownership and control of submarine cables (multiple
owners and operators from different States), it would be difficult for
belligerents to distinguish between cables which are owned or operated
by neutral States or located within neutral territory.70 There may be cases
where such cables are owned and operated by corporations from both
neutral and belligerent States. The Oslo Manual on Select Issues on Armed
Conflict acknowledges this in the context of attacks against submarine
pipelines/power cables and submarine communications cables, which
would be equally applicable in the context of the use of cable infrastructure to conduct intelligence collection. The Oslo Manual says submarine
64
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Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, at 554, ¶ 6.
Id. at 554, ¶ 5.
Id. at 553, ¶ 2.
Id. at 555, ¶ 2.
See James Kraska, The Law of Maritime Neutrality and Submarine Cables, EJIL: Talk!, Jul. 29, 2020,
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-law-of-maritime-neutrality-and-submarine-cables/.
Id.
Id.
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communications cables, whether or not connecting occupied territory
with neutral territory, should not be seized or destroyed even if they
are serving one or more belligerent States, and belligerent States must
take care to avoid damage to such cables, unless they qualify as lawful
targets.71 This is because it will only rarely be possible to determine that
submarine communications cables are exclusively serving one or more
belligerents, or one or more neutral States, given that today’s submarine
communications cables are interconnected and data packages travel along
unpredictable routes.72
The law of neutrality is unhelpful in determining whether there are
any limits to the use of cable infrastructure for intelligence collection.
Do the limits of distinction, proportionality and precaution recognized
by IHL in cases of attacks against cable infrastructure equally apply to
utilizing cable infrastructure for intelligence collection? Cyber espionage
per se does not fall within the concept of a cyber attack, which has been
defined by the Tallinn Manual 2.0 as a “cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to
persons or damage or destruction to objects.”73 It has not been settled
whether cyber espionage that interferes with the functionality of cable
infrastructure constitutes damage or destruction and thereby constitutes
an attack.74 The majority of experts on the Tallinn Manual 2.0 opined that
interference with functionality qualifies as damage if restoration requires
replacement of physical components, while others took the view that any
loss of usability constitutes damage that qualifies it as an attack.75 In this
regard, cable technology allows traffic to be automatically re-routed to
other transoceanic cable paths in the event of damage, but that cable
may still need to be repaired physically.76 Moreover, if many cables are
damaged during armed conflict, there are significant obstacles to easy
restoration of traffic.77 On this view, intelligence collection that does not
affect the functionality of the system or delete the transiting data will not
amount to a cyber attack. IHL governing cyber operations not amounting to
attacks is less developed than IHL governing cyber operations amounting
to attacks.78 However, there is scope to argue that intelligence collection
71
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Oslo M anual on Select T opics of the L aw of A rmed Conflict: Rules and Commentary,
rule 69, ¶ 4 (Yoram Dinstein & Arne Willy Dahl eds., 2020).
Id.
Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, rule 92, at 414.
Id. at 417, ¶ 10.
Id.
Burnett, supra note 3, at 1664.
Id. at 1664–65.
Laurent Gisel, Tilman Rodenhauser & Knut Dormann, Twenty Years On: International Humanitarian
Law and the Protection of Civilians against the Effects of Cyber Operations During Armed Conflicts, 102
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is a cyber operation that qualifies as a military operation and hence is
subject to some limitations, albeit not the full gamut.79
First, there is debate on whether the principle of distinction, which
stipulates that parties to the conflict should “distinguish between the
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against
military objectives,”80 applies to military operations (including cyber
operations) not amounting to an attack.81 As argued by some scholars,
however, such an interpretation would appear to be contrary to the plain
reading of Article 48 of AP I, which states that parties to a conflict shall
“direct their operations only against military objectives.”82 Military objectives have been defined as “those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”83
Cable infrastructure is unlikely to be considered a pure civilian object
considering that it is a dual-use object used for military and civilian
purposes.84 Indeed, State practice demonstrates that submarine cables
have traditionally been perceived as legitimate military targets in times
of armed conflict.85 The interruption to communications caused by such
deliberate damage can make an “effective contribution to military action”
and “offer a definite military advantage.”86 There is accordingly a widespread view that attacks against cable infrastructure are legally permissible
in times of armed conflict, arguably qualified by the law of neutrality that
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(913) IRRC 287, 321 (2020).
The ICRC Commentary to AP I defines “military operations” as “any movements, manoeuvres
and other activities whatsoever carried out by the armed forces with a view to combat” or
“related hostilities.” See Commentary on the A dditional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 ¶¶ 2191, 1936, 1875 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski
& Bruno Zimmerman eds., ICRC 1987).
AP I, supra note 34, art. 48.
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 states that only cyber operations against civilians or civilian objects that
rise to a level of an attack are prohibited by the principle of distinction and those rules of the law
of armed conflict that derive from the principle. See Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, rule
93, at 421, ¶ 5; Stefan Oeter, Methods of Combat, in T he H andbook of International Humanitarian L aw 237, ¶ 4 (Dieter Fleck et al. eds., 2021).
Gisel et al., supra note 78, at 324–25.
AP I, supra note 34, arts. 48, 52 (2).
Tallinn M anual 2.0 states that cyber infrastructure used for both civilian and military purposes
is a military objective, or in other words, all dual-use objects and facilities are military objectives,
without qualification. Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, rule 101, at 445–47.
For example, during the 1898 Spanish-American war, the US cut the Manila-Hong Kong
telegraph cable owned by a British company and laid under a Spanish concession. Both Britain
and Germany cut each other’s telegraph cables in World War I. During World War II, in 1945,
British submarines cut Japanese undersea cables between Hong Kong and Saigon and between
Hong and Singapore.
As required by the definition of “military objective” in AP I, supra note 34, art. 52 (2); San R emo
M anual on International L aw A pplicable to A rmed Conflicts at Sea, Jun. 12, 1994, art. 40.
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dictates that attacks against neutral cyber infrastructure are prohibited.87
This chapter takes the position that the principle of distinction should
apply to the use of cable infrastructure for intelligence collection, as it
would do to attacks. At the very least, this would require State parties to
identify which particular part of the cable infrastructure might have a
military objective and whether using that cable infrastructure for intelligence collection would confer a definite military advantage or, in other
words, provide information of military value, and whether in the event
of possible damage as a result of intelligence collection operations, data
can be re-routed.88
Second, does the rule of proportionality also apply to cable infrastructure intelligence collection not amounting to an attack? Even though
cable infrastructure is a legitimate target in armed conflicts, belligerents
must still satisfy the proportionality test. That is, the belligerent should
“refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”89 Because of
this, some scholars have suggested that the combination of the “scale of
impact on civilian social and economic infrastructure and the likelihood of
this damage spreading beyond the targeted State to neutral third States,
can only be excessive in relation to any military advantage.”90 In light of
this, it would be impossible for any military advantage to be considered
proportional to the “widespread collateral damage that would occur to
civilians resulting from the cutting of a submarine data cable.”91 The
use of cable infrastructure for intelligence collection would not automatically result in such widespread damage. However, parties to armed
conflict cannot completely exclude the possibility of communications
being interrupted by their methods of tapping, and the direct tapping
of cables on the seabed in particular would appear to pose the highest
risk of cables being damaged. Accordingly, it would not make sense if
such proportionality calculations were not made by States when deciding whether to conduct intelligence collection via cable infrastructure,
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Kraska, supra note 68; Burnett, supra note 3, at 1673–74; Tamsin Phillipa Paige, Douglas Guilfoyle
& Rob McLaughlin, The Final Frontier of Cyberspace: Ensuring that Submarine Data Cables are Able
to Live Long and Prosper (Part II), Opinio Juris, Oct. 16, 2020, http://opiniojuris.org/2020/10/16/
the-final-frontier-of-cyberspace-ensuring-that-submarine-data-cables-are-able-to-livelong-and-prosper-part-ii/.
Paige et al., supra note 87.
AP I, supra note 34, art. 57 (2) (a) (iii); Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, rule 113, at 470.
Paige et al., supra note 87.
Id.
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especially in view of the critical nature of cable infrastructure and the
potential ramifications.
Third, the requirement of precaution applies to military operations
and would apply to the use of cable infrastructure for intelligence collection. As recognized by the Tallinn Manual 2.0, constant care shall be
taken to spare the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian
objects in hostilities involving cyber operations.92 This requires “all those
involved in military operations to continuously bear in mind the effects
of military operations on the civilian population, civilians and civilian
objects, to take steps to reduce such effects as much as possible and to
seek to avoid any unnecessary effects.”93
There have been efforts to designate the data that travels through
such cable infrastructure as a civilian object so that operations against
data would be governed by the principles of distinction, proportionality,
precaution and the protection they afford to civilian objects.94 However,
while the ICRC has recognized the need to guard civilian data, it acknowledges that an operation designed solely to access data without deleting
or manipulating them would not be an attack against a civilian object.95

II

LAWS APPLICABLE IN PEACETIME
A LAW OF THE SEA
The law of the sea, as set out in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea (LOSC), governs the tapping of one particular type of cable
infrastructure, namely, submarine cables laid on the seabed.96 The law
of armed conflict does not automatically displace the law of the sea set
out in the LOSC.97 It will generally apply mutatis mutandis during periods
of armed conflict, subject to certain rules and prohibitions laid out in the
92
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Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, rule 114, at 476; AP I, supra note 34, art. 57 (1).
Gisel et al., supra note 78, at 324; Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, rule 114, at 476.
Gisel et al., supra note 78, at 317. The question of whether civilian data enjoys the same protection
as civilian objects “has been subject to significant debate and remains unsettled” since objects
need to be material, visible and tangible.
Id.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 397 (adopted Dec. 10, 1982, entered into
force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereafter LOSC].
Jann K. Kleffner, Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law, in T he H andbook of
International Humanitarian L aw 50, 79, ¶ 3.48 (Dieter Fleck et al. eds., 2021).
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law of naval warfare or law of armed conflict, which may either supplement or supplant the provisions of the LOSC.98 The LOSC also applies
to intelligence collection that occurs before armed conflict but is used
during armed conflict.

1

Legality
Intelligence collection in the maritime domain is not explicitly mentioned in the LOSC. It occasionally came up during negotiations as part
of a larger debate on the permissibility of military activities in the oceans
and was never the object of formal negotiations.99 At the time, that the
use of cable infrastructure for intelligence collection was forseen, is evidenced by the use of the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) for tracking
submarines.100 What was arguably not foreseen was the use of technology to intercept the data that was being transmitted through submarine
cables. As mentioned above, submarines or other underwater vehicles
are most likely to be used in such operations, although such operations
are undoubtedly technically challenging and cost-intensive, which may
reduce the possibility of it occurring. Nonetheless, the rules governing the
use of submarines and underwater vehicles for intelligence collection will
also determine the legality and limits of the use of cable infrastructure
for intelligence collection. These rules, arguably with the exception of
the high seas, can be subject to differing interpretations and arguments
and do not unequivocally provide answers on the legality of cable tapping
on the seabed.
The LOSC prima facie prohibits intelligence collection in the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea where the coastal State has sovereignty (subject
to the right of innocent passage and other rules of international law
not inconsistent with the LOSC).101 First, intelligence collection in the
territorial sea is akin to conducting espionage within the territory of
a State, which several scholars have argued is “inconsistent with the
essential norm of international law that States respect the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of other States.”102 Second,
Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, at 233, ¶ 5.
Military activities include intelligence gathering, training of forces, testing and use of vessels,
equipment and installations, weapons tests, and military engagements either short of or
amounting to armed conflict: Natalie K lein, M aritime Security and L aw of the Sea 43
(2011). See also George V. Galdorisi & Alan Kaufman, Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic
Zone: Preventing Uncertainty and Defusing Conflict 32 C al. W. Int’l L. J. 253, 271 (2002).
100 See generally Samuel Robinson, O cean S cience and the British Cold War State (2018)
156–57.
101 LOSC, supra note 96, art. 2.
102 James Kraska, Putting Your Head in the Tiger’s Mouth: Submarine Espionage in Territorial Waters, 54
Colum. J. T ransnat’l L 164, 181 (2015).
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while foreign ships, including foreign warships, have the right of innocent passage, certain activities that are considered “prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security of the coastal State” will render passage
non-innocent, including any act aimed at collecting information to the
prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal State, any act aimed at
interfering with any systems of communications or any other facilities
or installations of the coastal State, and carrying out research or survey
activities or any other activity not having a direct bearing on the passage.103 Third, all submarines and other underwater vehicles are required
to navigate on the surface and to show their flag, which obviously limits their ability to conduct underwater activities.104 These rules would
appear to prohibit, at the very least, submarine intelligence activities in
the territorial sea and, consequently, the tapping of cable infrastructure
directly on the seabed of the territorial sea.105 The Tallinn Manual 2.0
also considers that the tapping of submarine cables in the territorial sea
using submarines or underwater vehicles constitutes a violation of that
State’s sovereignty (although not the sovereignty of the State that laid
or operates the cable).106
On the other hand, it has been suggested that while submarines that
navigate underwater are not entitled to claim innocent passage, their
intelligence activities while submerged may not necessarily be unlawful
per se.107 This is also consistent with the position taken by many scholars that intelligence collection in peacetime is not prohibited by general
international law.108 Moreover, questions are raised on whether a foreign
submarine that is tapping a submarine cable in a coastal State’s territorial sea is collecting information that prejudices the defense and security of
that coastal State. Only after selectors are applied would it be possible to
determine the nature of the information collected. It is also arguable that
tapping cables that transit the territorial sea without making landfall in
the coastal State may not prejudice the defense and security of that coastal
State, for example, because the data is related to other States.109 On this
view, the tapping of cables located in the territorial sea but not making
LOSC, supra note 96, art. 19 (c), (j) (k) and (l).
LOSC, supra note 96, art. 20.
Kraska, supra note 102, at 219.
Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, at 257, ¶ 17.
Kraska, supra note 102, at 227–28; Natalie Klein argued that “intelligence gathering activities are
not specifically outlawed as a matter of international law but affect the characterization of the
passage of foreign vessels.” K lein, supra note 99, at 215.
108 Kraska, supra note 102, at 246.
109 Id. at 219, 246. A counterargument may be that the tapping alone may be prejudicial, especially
if it is bulk surveillance, because the assumption is that all communications that go through the
cable—and may include those of the coastal State—are caught in the dragnet.
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landfall may also not be considered an interference with the “systems
of communications or any other facilities or installations of the coastal
state.”110 Similarly, the tapping of submarine cables in the territorial sea
for the interception of data running through them would also not constitute “the carrying of research or survey activities,” although it may be
considered an activity “not having a direct bearing on passage.”
In other maritime zones under coastal State sovereignty, that is,
archipelagic waters and straits used for international navigation, the
legal position is even more ambiguous. For example, the Tallinn Manual
2.0 states that cable tapping that occurs in archipelagic waters would be
considered cyber infrastructure subject to the sovereignty of the coastal
State.111 As mentioned above, submarine cables transiting these maritime zones without making landfall in the coastal/archipelagic State may
not be considered the coastal State’s cyber infrastructure. Moreover, the
transit passage and archipelagic sea lane passage regimes permit submarines to traverse in normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous
and expeditious transit,112 which is said to mean that submarines can
traverse submerged.113 On this basis, tapping submarine cables for intelligence collection may be consistent with transit passage, provided it
is not tantamount to a threat or use of force against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of the strait State or archipelagic State.114
In the EEZ outside coastal State sovereignty but where the coastal
State has sovereign rights over natural resources, all States have the
freedom to lay submarine cables and other internationally lawful uses
of the sea related to those freedoms, including those associated with the
operation of submarine cables, subject to the obligation to have due regard
to the rights and duties of the coastal State.115 This sui generis zone is arguably the stage for the most contentious debates on the permissibility of
110
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112
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Although note that it is said that States enjoy sovereign authority over cyber infrastructure
physically located within their territory regardless of whether that infrastructure belongs to or
is operated by government institutions, private companies or private individuals and includes
computer networks and systems supported by that cyber infrastructure: Tallinn M anual 2.0,
supra note 26, rule 2, at 13. At the same time, sovereign authority over cable infrastructure could
be construed as merely a right to regulate rather than cable infrastructure belonging to or serving
the coastal State.
Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, rule 54, at 257, ¶ 17.
LOSC, supra note 96, arts. 39(1)(c), 54.
Jia Bin Bing, Article 39: Duties of Ships and Aircraft During Transit Passage, in United Nations
Convention on the L aw of the Sea: A Commentary 302, ¶ 5 (Alexander Proelss ed., Hart 2017).
LOSC, supra note 96, arts. 39(1)(b), 54; Kraska, supra note 102, at 222; Klein notes that while
transit passage may technically permit intelligence gathering, “a wide variety of intelligence
gathering activities during transit passage should not be read into the “normal mode” characterization.” K lein, supra note 99, at 217.
LOSC, supra note 96, art. 58(1).
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military activities, including intelligence collection.116 These debates play
out against the backdrop of the escalating geopolitical rivalry between the
US and China with the former arguing that military activities, including
intelligence collection, are permissible in another State’s EEZ, and China
rejecting such arguments on the basis, inter alia, that the LOSC does not
explicitly mention it and it comes under the regime of marine scientific
research requiring the consent of coastal States.117 For present purposes,
this chapter adopts the position that the tapping of cables in the EEZ
can be subsumed under military activities (permissible in the EEZ), and
there is nothing in the LOSC to suggest that it is prohibited, especially
since submarines can travel submerged in the EEZ.118
On the high seas, the maritime area in which States have the most
latitude, all States have freedoms of the seas, including the freedom of
navigation and the freedom to lay submarine cables.119 While not mentioned, intelligence collection is a military activity that is considered a
freedom of the high seas. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 correctly notes that
“there is no rationale for excluding cyber activities from the notion of
high seas freedoms and other lawful uses of the seas.”120

2

Limits
The above discussion illustrates that arguments can be made for and
against the legality of cable tapping in maritime zones under the sovereignty of coastal/archipelagic States; and in areas beyond sovereignty,
arguments against the permissibility of this activity become weaker.
If the tapping of cables is not explicitly prohibited in any of these zones,
there would certainly be limits. Indeed, scholars have suggested limitations on the right to conduct intelligence collection particularly within
the EEZ, where it is most contentious.121 The most salient express limitation is the obligation to exercise due regard for the rights and duties of
the coastal State in the EEZ and the interests of other States in their

For a snapshot of the different views, see Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Preserving Navigational Rights and
Freedoms: The Right to Conduct Military Activities in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone, 9 Chinese J.
Int’l L 9 (2010); Zhang Haiwen, Is It Safeguarding the Freedom of Navigation or Maritime Hegemony
of the United States? Comments on Raul (Pete) Pedrozo’s Article on Military Activities in the EEZ, 9
Chinese J. Int’l L 31 (2010).
117 Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, at 240, ¶ 4, at 257, ¶ 17.
118 See also Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, at 257, ¶ 17.
119 LOSC, supra note 96, art. 87.
120 Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, at 234, ¶ 3, at 257, ¶ 17.
121 Moritaka Hayashi, Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities in the EEZ: Definition of Key Terms, 29
M ar. Pol. 123 (2005); Stuart Kaye, Freedom of Navigation, Surveillance and Security: Legal Issues
Surrounding the Collection of Intelligence from Beyond the Littoral 24 Aust. YB Int’l L 93 (2005);
Lubin, supra note 54.
116
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exercise of high seas freedoms.122 The due regard obligation has been
interpreted in the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration as not imposing
any rule governing universal conduct, or a uniform obligation to avoid
any impairment of the other State’s rights or an entitlement to the other
State to proceed as it wishes, merely noting such rights.123 The extent of
the regard required by the LOSC will depend upon the nature of the rights
held by the relevant State, their importance, the extent of the anticipated
impairment, the nature and importance of the activities contemplated,
and the availability of alternative approaches.124 The majority of cases will
require some form of consultation with the State holding the rights.125 As
noted by Lubin, this echoes the necessity and proportionality requirements. Indeed, Lubin has suggested jus ad bellum rules such as necessity,
immediacy and proportionality as a possible framework to limit intelligence collection in the EEZ.126 The imposition of these rules for cable
tapping on the high seas or in the EEZ matches the intent and reasoning
of the Chagos Marine Protected Arbitration and would necessitate States
to conduct a similar analysis to that described in the section below and
to consider, inter alia, whether it is necessary to tap cable infrastructure
to meet their objectives, whether there are alternative approaches, and
what precautions can be taken to prevent unintended consequences. The
“due regard” obligation does not expressly apply in areas under coastal
State sovereignty. However, it would seem even more pressing that when
States are utilizing submarines or underwater vehicles to tap cables in
areas under coastal State sovereignty (to the extent that it is considered
permissible in the territorial sea), this should be subject to the same
limitations that are applicable in areas beyond sovereignty.

B INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
While human rights law has traditionally been perceived as applicable
in times of peace, it has now been generally accepted that human rights
continue to apply during armed conflict.127 In most cases, there will be no
122 Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. the United Kingdom), Annex VII Arbitration,
Award of Mar. 18, 2015, ¶ 519.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 See generally Lubin, supra note 54.
127 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996, ICJ Reports, ¶ 25
(July 8); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004, ICJ Reports, ¶¶ 102–42 (July 9); Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005, ICJ Reports, at 168, ¶ 219
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conflict between the two regimes and, instead, IHL is most likely silent
on the issue, and human rights law will be able to fill the gap.128 This is
particularly so when it comes to the use of cable infrastructure for intelligence collection and the concomitant violations of the right to privacy.
Privacy has been defined as “the presumption that individuals should
have an area of autonomous development, interaction and liberty from
State intervention and excessive unsolicited intrusion by other uninvited
individuals.”129 As put by Watt, “[p]rivacy is also vital to society as a
whole, as it permits and facilitates the making of democratic choices;
protects against the state’s arbitrary interference; and enables the exercise of other rights, including those of free expression and assembly.”130
International human rights law has consistently affirmed the right to
privacy in UN documents and international treaties such as the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (“no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence”);131 the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
(“everyone has the right to respect for his private life, his home and his
correspondence”);132 and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) (“no one shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his family, home or correspondence”).133 With the
profound transformations caused by the digital revolution, the right to
privacy has emerged as a critical human right, particularly after the 2013
Snowden disclosures, with numerous initiatives within and outside the
UN recognizing and elaborating on what the right to privacy means in
the digital age.134 It is now recognized “that the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online,” and that States must
“respect and protect the right to privacy, including in the context of
digital communication.”135
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(Sept. 23, 2014).
WATT, supra note 10, at 93.
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WATT, supra note 10, at 15–20.
Human Rights Council, The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the
Internet, U.N. Doc A/HRC/20/L.13, (June 29, 2012); U.N. GA, The Right to Privacy in the Digital
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Bulk interception of data transmitted through civilian cables will
inevitably intercept private individuals’ communications and hence implicates the right to privacy.136 The ability of the right to privacy to constrain
the use of cable for infrastructure depends on several threshold questions
being answered. First, it is not clear whether the right to online privacy
has crystallized into customary international law and claims relating to
the infringement of the right to privacy are confined to human rights
treaties that affirm the right to privacy and to States parties thereto.137
Second, the arguments relating to the extraterritoriality of the application of human rights treaties are particularly relevant for intelligence
collection by cable infrastructure. This chapter will not revisit the already
comprehensive discussion on whether the right to privacy protects persons (citizens and foreigners alike) situated outside the intercepting
State.138 It suffices to note that it has progressively been accepted that
States will be held accountable for their human rights violations either
where they exercise effective control over an area spatially (i.e., a State
will have effective control over individuals who are located outside its territory if it exercises effective control over that territory) or over a person
(i.e., when the State exercises authority and control over an individual).139
The meaning and scope of such effective control remain subject to diverse
interpretations. Narrow interpretations require that physical control over
territory or individuals be met,140 while more expansive interpretations
contend that effective control is met if the State has effective control over
the person’s rights.141 Human rights courts have not comprehensively
examined the jurisdictional clauses in the specific context of intelligence
collection via cable infrastructure.142 In the most recent decision of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) between Big Brother Watch and
the UK (discussed below), the Court did not address extraterritoriality as
at least some applicants were clearly within the UK’s territorial jurisdiction and the Court proceeded on the assumption that the complaint fell
within the jurisdictional competence of the United Kingdom.143
The narrow interpretation of “effective control” as confined to physical control will mean that States’ obligations on privacy will only be
implicated if cable infrastructure is located within their territory and the
136
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BUCHAN, supra note 11, at 95–96.
WATT, supra note 10, at 141.
BUCHAN, supra note 11, at 96–105; WATT, supra note 10, at 142–92.
WATT, supra note 10, at 173–86.
Tallinn M anual 2.0, supra note 26, at 185, ¶ 10; BUCHAN, supra note 11, at 100.
WATT, supra note 10, at 335–36.
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BBW v. UK, supra note 25.
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individuals affected are within their control. However, bulk interception
of data encompasses all communications transmitted on a particular cable
and, consequently, involves the interception of information on entire
populations outside the intercepting States’ territories.144 The narrow test
would not cover the scenarios where the interception takes place remotely
wholly outside the territory and territorial sea of a State (e.g., through the
backdoor installation of equipment or the tapping of cables on the seabed
of a coastal State’s EEZ and the high seas). The narrow interpretation
would cover the interception of data at cable landing stations (which was
directly in question in the Big Brother Watch case) but would be limited to the data of individuals within the surveilling State’s jurisdiction,
which would result in differentiation in treatment between nationals
and aliens, raising issues of discrimination and equality of treatment.145
The more expansive interpretation of effective control, which focuses on a
State’s control over individuals whose rights it has effective control and
power over or has a detrimental impact on the human rights of persons
outside its borders, would better cover the use of cable infrastructure
for the interception of data because the way in which communications
travel makes it difficult or impossible in practice to distinguish between
communications along nationality/location lines.146
The next question is whether the use of cable infrastructure for
intelligence collection is an infringement of the right to privacy. Relevant
human rights bodies and courts have adopted different approaches on
this. UN bodies such as the Human Rights Council and the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights as well as UN Special Rapporteurs
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms have consistently found
that mass surveillance programs constitute an interference with the right
to privacy of communications protected by Article 17 of the ICCPR.147 These
UN bodies have found, inter alia, that mass surveillance interferes with
the right to privacy when the data is collected, irrespective of whether the
data is analyzed. They have circumscribed the legitimate aims for which
mass surveillance can be carried out and have recognized that mass or
bulk surveillance programs may be deemed arbitrary for being neither
necessary nor proportionate because of the amount of data collected, and
hence do not meet the requirement that measures should be the least
intrusive on human rights.148
144
145
146
147
148

WATT, supra note 10, at 161, 173.
See generally WATT, supra note 10, at 142–92.
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The European human rights system, on the other hand, has adopted
a different approach. The ECtHR has considered the bulk interception of
data post the Snowden disclosures in Big Brother Watch and Others v. United
Kingdom and Centrum for Rättvisa v. Sweden brought by NGOs to challenge
the bulk surveillance regimes of these States.149 The complaints centered
on (1) the bulk interception of communications (i.e., the tapping into
and storage of volumes of data drawn from fiber optic cables); (2) the
obtaining of communications data from communication service providers;
and (3) receipt of intercepted material from foreign governments. The
ECtHR found that bulk interception regimes did not per se fall outside
the States’ margin of appreciation, given the “proliferation of threats
that States currently face from networks of international actors, using
the Internet both for communication and as a tool, and the existence of
sophisticated technology which would enable these actors to avoid detection.”150 Notably, the Court found that at the first stage of interception, the
interception and retention of communications data was not a particularly
significant interference with an individual’s right to privacy, and that the
degree of interference with individuals’ rights will increase as the bulk
interception processes progress.151 Nonetheless, bulk interception had to
be subject to certain end-to-end safeguards, and at the domestic level, an
assessment of proportionality should be made at each of the four stages
of the process of the necessity and proportionality of the measures being
taken.152 These include the requirement that bulk interception “should
be subject to independent authorization at the outset, when the object
and scope of the operation are defined; and that the operation should be
subject to supervision and independent ex post facto review.”153
From the above discussion, it appears that human rights bodies and
courts have differing views on whether the actual collection of data via
tapping into cable infrastructure constitutes an infringement of the right
to privacy. Nonetheless, even the ECtHR found that an assessment of proportionality must be made at the stage of collection, which would appear
to be the minimum safeguard required to be met by States and, again,
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BBW v. UK, supra note 25; Centrum för Rättvisa v. Sweden, Grand Chamber of the European Court
of Human rights, Judgment, 2021 (May 25).
BBW v. UK, supra note 25, ¶ 340.
Id. ¶ 330.
The Court in BBW v. UK described the stage of bulk interception as follows: (a) the interception
and initial retention of communications and related communications data; (b) the application
of specific selectors to the retained communications; (c) the examination of selected communications data by analysts; and (d) the subsequent retention of data and use of the final product,
including sharing the data with third parties. See BBW v. UK, supra note 25, ¶ 325.
Id. ¶ 350.
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echoes the limits discussed above in relation to the laws applicable in
armed conflict and the law of the sea. Therefore, while the right to privacy
may not prohibit the use of cable infrastructure for intelligence collection,
it at the very least imposes some important limits which become even
more stringent as the collected data is analyzed and shared.154

CONCLUSION
The use of cable infrastructure for intelligence collection, like most intelligence-related activities, occurs in the “parallel track of State conduct”
that flies below the radar, which often means that unless this activity
causes significant collateral harm, there will not be an obvious response.155
This chapter is an attempt to determine how selected fields of international law may be interpreted to apply to intelligence collection via
cable infrastructure in armed conflict. Several tentative conclusions can
be made. First, determining the permissibility of intelligence collection
via cable infrastructure in each separate field of international law under
discussion is not clear-cut. There is some uncertainty about the wholesale
applicability of IHL and the law of the sea governing intelligence collection via cable infrastructure. Second, and notwithstanding the first point,
it would seem that this activity is not expressly prohibited by any of the
fields of law under discussion, and this is consistent with the general
position in international law that intelligence collection is permitted in
armed conflict. Third, the law applicable to armed conflict, the law of the
sea and human rights law can be used to extrapolate general limitations
on this activity, including the principles of distinction, proportionality
and precaution, all of which would apply to States when making the
decision to tap cable infrastructure. This calculation is essential when
considering the importance of cable infrastructure to States and individuals alike, particularly in times of armed conflict.

154 For a discussion on this, see BUCHAN, supra note 11, at 109–21; Lubin, supra note 128, at 467–76.
155 Efrony & Shany, supra note 43, at 596, 691.
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Chapter 10

Military Subject
Access Rights:
A Comparative
and International
Perspective
Tim Cochrane 1

INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a villager paralyzed during a special forces combat raid
requests access to body camera data to support their claim that the attack
was unlawful.2 Suppose a retired citizen needs data from a local administrative agency under the authority of an occupying power to prove
their entitlement to emergency pension payments.3 Consider a serving
member of a nation’s armed forces, recently returned from an armed

1

2

3

The author would like to thank Dr. Russell Buchan and Dr. Asaf Lubin for their detailed
comments throughout, as well as the participants of the conference for their feedback on an
earlier draft. The usual disclaimers apply.
Mark Willacy, Video Shows Australian SAS Soldier Shooting and Killing Unarmed Man at Close Range in
Afghanistan, ABC News, (Mar. 16, 2020, at 10:12 AM, updated Mar. 20, 2020, at 4:01 AM),
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-03-16/video-shows-afghan-man-shot-at-close-range-byaustralian-sas/12028512.
James D obbins et al., O ccupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority
199–200 (2009).
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conflict, who seeks their military health records to track the progression
of a newly diagnosed respiratory illness.4 These varied scenarios have a
unifying theme: all involve individuals seeking their personal data from
armed forces in the context of (what are assumed to be) armed conflicts.
This theme is the focus of this chapter, which explores “subject access
rights” in armed conflicts through the lenses of comparative and international law.
“A review of the roles that the rights to privacy and data protection play in regulating [wartime military behavior] is long overdue,”
Asaf Lubin recently remarked.5 This chapter responds to Lubin’s call,
focusing on the potential of subject access rights to obtain personal data
from military agencies during armed conflicts—referred to throughout
as military subject access rights (or MSARs). It assumes that individual
rights, including privacy and data protection, should be prioritized by
States. From that rights-based perspective, it examines MSARs in four
dualist common law jurisdictions—Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and
the United Kingdom—under data protection, as well as applicable international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law
(IHL) obligations. This chapter has two aims. First, and primarily, it offers
a roadmap for individuals seeking to make MSARs in the four comparator
States. Secondly, and more generally, it hopes to inform States and others
working on data protection frameworks applicable to military agencies—
both within the comparator jurisdictions and elsewhere—about how to
reform or implement MSARs in a rights-protective manner.
Part I provides background information, contextualizing subject
access rights, outlining their significance during armed conflicts, and
explaining this chapter’s choice of comparator jurisdictions. Focusing on
domestic data protection law, Part II outlines MSARs, including redress
mechanisms, in these four jurisdictions. Part III then evaluates the extent
to which these MSARs are effective in practice, using the three hypothetical scenarios above as case studies, and considering applicable IHL
and IHRL. While Parts II and III largely speak to individuals seeking to
make MSARs, this chapter concludes with recommendations for States,
international organizations, and others.

4
5

Michael J. Falvro et al., Airborne Hazards Exposure and Respiratory Health of Iraq and Afghanistan
Veterans, 37 Epidemiologic R evs. 116 (2015).
Asaf Lubin, The Rights to Privacy and Data Protection under International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights Law, in R esearch H andbook on Human R ights and Humanitarian L aw:
F urther R eflections and Perspectives 491 (Robert Kolb, Gloria Gaggioli & Pavle Kilibarda
eds., 2022).
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I

BACKGROUND
A SUBJECT ACCESS RIGHTS,
DATA PROTECTION, AND IHRL
Subject access rights—enforceable legal powers to obtain your own
personal data from others—have a long pedigree in data protection
law.6 Data protection generally protects information privacy, meaning
the ability to control the “acquisition, disclosure and use” of personal
data by mandating “core principles” of data processing.7 Subject access
rights are described as “the most important” of these principles.8 They
are “a necessary first step enabling the exercise of most other data subject
rights” and “a strategic tool to assess compliance with data protection
law more broadly.”9 They are typically enforceable through domestic
data protection statutes, including in the four comparator jurisdictions
outlined here.10 They are also recognized regionally within the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the European Union (EU),11 as well
as “Convention 108+,”12 the “only legally binding international instrument on data protection universal in scope.”13
Data protection overlaps with, but is often seen as materially distinct from, the right to privacy in IHRL.14 The latter protects individuals
6
7

8

9
10
11

12

13

14

See Jef Ausloos & Pierre Dewitte, Shattering One-Way Mirrors—Data Subject Access Rights in Practice,
8 Int’l Data Priv. L. 4, 5–7 (2018).
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session, Annex IV: Protection
of Personal Data in Transborder Flow of Information, ¶ 23 (2006) UN Doc Supplement No. 10
(A/61/10) (2006) [hereinafter ILC Report]; Lubin, supra note 5, at 475.
E.g., ILC Report, supra note 7, ¶ 23; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, Explanatory
Memorandum, ¶ 58 (Sept. 23, 1980) C(80)58/FINAL 1980, revised as T he OECD Privacy
Framework (2013), https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf; see
Ausloos & Dewitte, supra note 6, at 7.
Ausloos & Dewitte, supra note 6, at 7.
See sources cited infra note 50.
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),
art. 15 (2016) O.J. (L119) 1 [GDPR].
Comm. of Mins., Modernised Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data (consolidated text), Preamble, art. 9(b), 128th Sess., CM/Inf(2018)
15-final (May 17–18, 2018) (Convention 108+), https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.
aspx?ObjectId=09000016807c65bf; see Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, art. 8(b), opened for signature Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. No. 108
(entered into force Oct. 1, 1985).
Alessandra Pierucci, Chair of the Comm. of Convention 108, & Jean-Phillippe Walter, Data Prot.
Comm’r, Council of Eur., Speech at 40th Annual Convention 108 on Data Protection, Jan. 25, 2021,
https://rm.coe.int/40th-anniversary-convention108/1680a1307e.
E.g., ILC Report, supra note 7, ¶¶ 13–15; Lubin, supra note 5, at 468–76; see Juliane Kokott &
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“against arbitrary or unlawful interference” with privacy, including in
relation to home, correspondence, and similar realms, from (at the very
least) public authorities (meaning governments and others exercising
public functions).15 The right to privacy has wide recognition within IHRL,
including in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) and Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).16 It is also regularly reflected within domestic human
rights or constitutional frameworks—including at least partly in three
of the comparator jurisdictions,17 Australia being the exception.18 Indeed,
Lubin suggests that the right to privacy is now “part of customary international law”19—in contrast with data protection, which he suggests
“awaits further crystallization.”20
Although subject access rights are more commonly discussed in relation to data protection rather than IHRL21—presumably because (only)
the former expressly provides for them—IHRL is nonetheless relevant.
Most significantly, while the complete gamut of data protection rights is
assumedly not (yet) recognized by IHRL22—indeed, full respect for such
digital rights may require more than merely readapting existing IHRL
frameworks23—subject access rights specifically may be, at least when
personal data is sought from public authorities. The European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) has gone “a long way towards introducing such a
general right to access” in its Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence, Orla Lynskey
argues.24 Similar comments have been made regarding ICCPR Article 17.25
The IHRL right to freedom of expression (FOE) may contain a related
right to access government information26—often provided in domestic

15

16
17

18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

26

Christoph Sobotta, The Distinction between Privacy and Data Protection in the Jurisprudence of the CJEU
and the ECtHR, 3 Int’l Data Pri. L. 222, 223 (2013).
E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
Id.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss 7–8, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 (Can.),
being Schedule 2 of the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.); New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, ss 21,
28; Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, sch. 1, art. 8 (U.K.).
See Thomas v. Mowbray [2007] HCA 33, 233 CLR 307 ¶¶379–380 (Kirby J dissenting on other
grounds); Moira Paterson, Freedom of Information & Privacy in Australia: Information
Access 2.0 ¶ 1.102 (2nd ed., 2015).
Lubin, supra note 5, at 472 (citing A lexandra R engel, Privacy in the 21st Century 108 (2013)).
Id. at 14.
E.g., id. at 6–15; Kokott & Sobotta, supra note 14, at 223.
See source cited supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See generally Dafna Dror-Shpoliansky & Yuval Shany, It’s the End of the (Offline) World as We Know It:
From Human Rights to Digital Human Rights—A Proposed Typology, Eur. J. It’l L. (forthcoming 2021).
Orla Lynskey, T he Foundations of EU Data Protection L aw 128 (2015) (citing K.H. v.
Slovakia, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 391).
E.g., Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection Pursuant to the Right to Privacy in Human Rights Treaties, 6 Int’l
J.L. & Inf. T ech. 247, 253–54 (1998) (citing United Nations Human Rts. Comm., General Comment
No. 16, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev 9 vol. I (April 8, 1988)).
United Nations Human Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 34, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, ¶ 18–19
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freedom of information (FOI) statutes.27 However, while FOE will often
support privacy and data protection rights, on other occasions the two
sets of rights conflict.28 They have “different policy underpinnings”: FOE
promotes government transparency, while subject access rights seek to
provide individuals control over personal data, which may be sensitive
and intended to remain confidential.29 This chapter therefore grounds
MSARs in privacy and data protection rather than FOE.

B MILITARY DATA, IHL, AND THE
COMPARATOR JURISDICTIONS
Individuals increasingly need MSARs to obtain their personal data from
military agencies in the context of armed conflicts, given the quality and
quantity of personal data these agencies routinely collect and retain. The
U.S. military obtained vast amounts of data, including sensitive biometric
information, on citizens of Afghanistan and Iraq during these armed conflicts.30 Service members’ own data is routinely processed on the battlefield: military personnel, for example, may be expected to use “wearable
smart devices” continuously monitoring their health.31 Artificial Intelligence systems being deployed in armed conflicts require “[l]arge data
pools” implicating privacy concerns,32 leading to predictions that “States
will be ever more inclined to obtain a full take of all data relevant to a
given theater of combat.”33 The hypothetical scenarios with which this
chapter opened—which Part III revisits—provide further examples. As

27
28

29
30

31

32
33

(Sept. 12, 2011); see Maeve McDonagh, The Right to Information in International Human Rights Law,
13 Hum. Rts. L. R ev. 25, 26 (2013).
E.g., Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth.) (Austl.) [AUFOI].
See Gabriela Zanfir-Fortuna, Article 15 Right of Access by the Data Subject, in T he EU General Data
Protection R egulation (GDPR): A Commentary 449, 452 (Christopher Kuner, Lee A. Bygrave,
Chris Docksey & Laura Drechsler eds., 2020); David Banisar, The Right to Information and Privacy:
Balancing Rights and Managing Conflicts (World Bank Institute Governance Working Paper Series
80740, 2011).
Id.
Eileen Guo & Kimat Noori, This is the Real Story of the Afghan Biometric Databases Abandoned
to the Taliban, MIT T ech. R ev. (Aug. 30, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.
com/2021/08/30/1033941/afghanistan-biometric-databases-us-military-40-data-points/;
Spencer Ackerman, U.S. Holds on to Biometrics Database of 3 Million Iraqis, Wired (Dec. 21, 2011, 6:30
AM), https://www.wired.com/2011/12/iraq-biometrics-database/.
Caitlin Doornbos, Navy Pilot Program Uses Wearable Smart Devices in Effort to Prevent Sleep Deprivation among Soldiers, Stars and Stripes (Aug. 19, 2021), https://www.stripes.com/branches/
navy/2021-08-19/navy-sleep-pilot-program-sailors-fitzgerald-mccain-2607983.html; Kyle
Mizokami, Smart Fibers Could Turn Army Uniforms into Wearable Computers, Popular M echs. (June
17, 2021), https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/research/a36732071/army-uniform-fibers-create-wearable-computers/.
See Cong. R es. Serv., R45178, A rtificial Intelligence and National Security 8–9 (v. 10,
updated Nov. 10, 2020).
Robin Geiss & Henning Lahmann, Protection of Data in Armed Conflict, 97 Int’l L. Stud. 556,
571–72 (2021).
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those indicate, individuals may want to obtain their own data for various
reasons, including to enforce other legal rights.34
“Despite this evolving reality,” explains Lubin, “there is practically
no international legal jurisprudence… applying these rights during armed
conflict,” either in relation to MSARs or privacy and data protection generally.35 Armed conflicts were traditionally governed by the laws of war,
now known as IHL.36 It is increasingly understood, and assumed here,
that IHRL concurrently applies alongside IHL,37 although IHRL will be
“interpreted against the background of” IHL, the latter typically serving as
lex specialis.38 Additionally, while IHL regulates armed conflicts at all times,
States must respect IHRL only in respect of persons within their “jurisdiction”39—a term the ECtHR has interpreted as “primarily territorial,”
extending extraterritorially “only in exceptional cases.”40 Crucially, States
also remain subject to applicable domestic law during armed conflicts.41
Given the dearth of relevant international jurisprudence, this latter legal
framework—domestic law, specifically domestic data protection legislation—is the focus of this chapter’s analysis of MSARs.
This chapter assesses the MSARs given by Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom specifically for several interlinked reasons. First, this focus is practically useful: these jurisdictions all recognize
MSARs and have a significant combined military influence worldwide.
Even the smallest, New Zealand, has service members deployed within
theaters in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific.42 This chapter’s
MSAR roadmap is thus potentially broadly applicable. Secondly, as these
are similar common law jurisdictions, all taking a dualist approach to
public international law,43 they are readily internally comparable:44 differences in the scope and operation of MSARs in one country may credibly
inform potential reforms in another. This chapter’s comparative analysis
34
35
36
37
38

39
40
41

42
43
44

See supra text accompanying note 9.
Lubin, supra note 5, at 466.
Dieter Fleck, T he H andbook of International Humanitarian L aw 20 (4th ed. 2021).
See id. at 450; Lubin, supra note 5, at 481–83.
Hassan v. United Kingdom [GC], 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 [102]–[107]; Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 25 (July 8); see Fleck, supra note
36, at 453; Lubin, supra note 5, at 481.
Fleck, supra note 36, at 499; Lubin, supra note 5, at 471–72.
Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom [GC], 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99 [130]–[142]; cf. Lubin, supra note 5,
at 471.
See Marco Sassòli, International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, in T he
Oxford Guide to International Humanitarian L aw 381, 401–2 (Ben Saul & Dapo Akande eds.,
2020); Lubin, supra note 5, at 483; A nne Peters, Beyond Human R ights: T he Legal Status of
the Individual in International L aw 217–20 (2016).
Our Operations and Engagements, New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), https://www.nzdf.mil.
nz/nzdf/our-operations-and-engagements/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2022).
See generally James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of International L aw 45 (9th ed.,
2019).
E.g., Sheldrake v. Dir. of Pub. Pros. [2004] UKHL 43 [33] (Lord Bingham), [2005] 1 AC 264.
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may also be externally useful outside these jurisdictions: the comparator States’ laws, including the specific legal areas canvassed here, are
typically considered robust and influential;45 this analysis may therefore
potentially inspire the implementation or reform of MSARs elsewhere.
Indeed, most States now have data protection laws.46 These appear to
commonly include MSARs, including in States retaining conscription, such
as Austria and Singapore.47 Many international organizations operating
during armed conflicts also have data protection guidelines with quasi-
MSARs.48 Finally, the similarities and differences in MSARs—indeed, subject access rights generally—across these four jurisdictions may contribute
to ongoing discussions as to whether such rights now form part of IHRL.49

II

COMPARING MILITARY DATA ACCESS
RIGHTS (MSARS)
A ARTICULATING THE RIGHT:
SCOPE AND EXCEPTIONS
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom each provide
individuals with a right to obtain their own personal data from government agencies,50 generally including the armed forces and other military
45

46

47

48
49
50

E.g., Claudia Geiringer, A New Commonwealth Constitutionalism?, in T he C ambridge Companion
to C omparative C onstitutional L aw 554, 570–71 (Roger Masterman & Robert Schütze eds.,
2019); Sandesh Sivakumaran, Asia-Pacific States and the Development of International Humanitarian
Law, in A sia-Pacific Perspectives on International Humanitarian L aw 118 (Suzannah
Linton, Tim McCormack & Sandesh Sivakumaran eds., 2019); Graham Greenleaf, A World Data
Privacy Treaty? “Globalisation” and “Modernisation” of Council of Europe Convention 108, in E merging
Challenges to Privacy L aw: Comparative Perspectives 92, 119 (Normann Witzleb et al. eds.,
2014). But see sources cited supra note 18 and accompanying text.
Data Protection and Privacy Legislation Worldwide, United Nations Conf. on T rade and Dev.
(updated Dec. 14, 2021), https://unctad.org/page/data-protection-and-privacy-legislation-worldwide; see supra text accompanying notes 6–13.
For Austria, see Bundesgesetz über den S chutz personenbezogener Daten (Datenschutzgesetz – DSG) [F ederal Act concerning the P rotection of P ersonal Data
(DSG)] No. 165/1999, as amended, ss 4, 44, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/
ERV_1999_1_165/ERV_1999_1_165.html (Austria). For Singapore, see Public Sector (Governance) Act 2018, ss 2, 6–8; G overnment Instruction M anual on Infocomm T echnology &
Smart Systems M anagement (Sing.) (not publicly available); see Smart Nation & Digital
G ov’t Off., G overnment Personal Data Protection Policies 9–10 (2021).
E.g., Int. Comm. of the R ed Cross, Rules on Personal Data Protection 2, 12–13 (2015,
updated and adopted 2019); Int. Org. for M igration, Data Protection M anual 66 (2010).
See supra text accompanying notes 19–25.
Privacy Act 2020, s 22, Information Privacy Principle 6 (N.Z.) [NZPA]; Privacy Act 1988 (Cth.) sch
1 para 12.1 (Austl.) [APA]; Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21, s 12(1) (Can.) [CPA]. For the UK, see
GDPR, art. 15; Data Protection, Privacy and Electronic Communications (Amendments etc) (EU
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agencies, such as departments of defense.51 All include this right within
dedicated privacy legislation.52 For three of the four comparator jurisdictions, this chapter analyses these dedicated privacy statutes. Australia,
however, provides a “complementary” and more “comprehensive” procedure for obtaining personal data in its Freedom of Information Act 1982
(AUFOI);53 thus, this chapter focuses on that instead.
Subject access rights to obtain data from military agencies—MSARs—
have an expansive scope in all four jurisdictions. “Personal data” (or
“personal information”) is defined broadly, capturing both electronic
and paper records.54 MSARs apply to data merely under the control of
military agencies,55 as well as apparently extending extraterritorially to
data created and/or stored overseas.56 In three of these jurisdictions,
MSARs are given to all (living) natural persons, regardless of nationality
or residence.57 The one outlier is Canada, which restricts this right to
citizens and permanent residents.58
Access may nonetheless be refused under “exceptions” or “withholding grounds,”59 including what may imperfectly be called a “national

51

52
53

54

55

56

57

58

59

Exit) Regulations 2019, SI2019/419, regs. 2–3, sch. 1 (incorporating the GDPR in UK law with
amendments) [UKGDPR]; Data Protection Act 2018, c. 12, Pt. 2 (U.K.) [UKDPA].
APA, ss 6(1) (definitions of “agency,” “APP entity,” “Defence Department,” “Defence Force,”
“Department”), (6), s16A(1); CPA, s 8 (definition of “government institution”), sch. (reference
to “Department of National Defence (including the Canadian Forces)”); NZPA, s 7 (definition of
“public sector agency”); UKGDPR, art. 86A; UKDPA, s 7; Freedom of Information Act 2000, c. 36
(UK), sch. 1, paras. 1, 6 [UKFOI]; e.g., Knowles v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Def. [2020] FCA 1328 ¶ 35 (17
September 2020) (Austl.); e.g., Garnhum v. Can. (Deputy Att’y Gen.) (1996), 30 C.H.R.R. 152, para.
7 n. 12 (Fed. Ct.) (Can.); Plumtree v. Att’y-Gen. HRRT 29/01, Oct. 2, 2002 [23] (Hum. Rts. Rev.
Trib.) (N.Z.); Crosbie v. Sec’y of State for Def. [2011] EWHC (Admin) 789 [74] (U.K.). Exceptions
apply. See, e.g., text accompanying infra note 121.
See supra sources cited note 50.
Office of the Aus. Info. Comm’r, FOI Guidelines: Guidelines Issued by the Australian
Information Commissioner under s 93A of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 ¶¶ 7.1,
7.5 (June 2020) [hereinafter AUFOI Guidelines]; Office of the Aus. Info. Comm’n Australian
Privacy Principles Guidelines: Privacy Act 1988 ¶¶ 12.22, 12.24, 12.30 (July 2019). Analogous
APA caselaw is referenced below.
APA, s 6 (definition of “personal information”); AUFOI, s 4 (definitions of same and
“document”); NZPA, s 4 (definitions of same); CPA, s 8 (definition of “personal information”);
UKGDPR, arts. 2(1)–(1A), (5), 4(1); see recitals (26), (30); see also CPA, ss 18, 36 (permitting
exemptions for “information banks” in Canada but providing for review mechanisms).
AUFOI, ss 4 (definition of “document of an agency”), 6C; CPA, s 12(b); NZPA, s 10; UKGDPR, art.
4(7); see “OV” v Common. Sci. and Indus. Research Org. [2018] AICmr 48 (22 March 2018) ¶¶ 12–32
(Austl.); Can. (Info. Comm’r) v. Can. (Min. of Def.), 2011 SCC 25 paras. 47–63, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 306;
Case C-25/17, Procs. brought by Tietosuojavaltuutettu (Jehovan todistajat), ECLI:EU:C:2018:551 [75],
[2019] 1 CMLR 5 (CJEU); Williams v. N.Z. Police [2020] NZHRRT 26 [28]–[35].
This is explicitly stated in New Zealand and UK law. NZPA, ss 4(1)(a), (2); UKGDPR, art. 3;
UKDPA, s 207. A similar interpretation is long-standing in Australia, Re O’Grady v. Austl. Fed.
Police [1983] AATA 390, and appears in early Canadian guidance. See Can. Post Corp v. Can.
(Minister of Public Works), [1995] 2 FC 110 para. 39 (F.C.A.) (Marceau J.A. dissenting).
AUFOI, s 11(1); NZPA, s 7 (definition of “individual”); UKDPA, § 3 (definitions of “Identifiable
living individual” and “Data subject”); see recitals (2), (14); Re Lordsvale Finance Ltd and Dep’t of
Treasury [1985] AATA 174, 3 AAR 301.
CPA, s 12(1). Canada and New Zealand take the same restrictive approach to freedom of information. See Access to Information Act 1982, R.S.C., 1985, c. A-1, s 4 (Can.); Official Information
Act 1982, s 12(1) (N.Z.) [NZOIA]. Contrast AUFOI, s 11; UKFOI, § 1.
AUFOI, ss 7, 31B, 33–47; CPA, ss 18–28; NZPA, ss 49–53; UKDPA, §§ 24(5), 25–28; UKGDPR, art.
12(5).
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security” exception60—assumedly the key ground for military agencies.
While statutory language differs, this exception generally applies where,
to quote the Australian statute, disclosure “would, or could reasonably
be expected to cause damage to” security, defense, international affairs,
or similar.61 A relatively high threshold is needed to trigger it. Australia
mandates “reasonable grounds [of] at least a real, significant, or material
possibility” of damage from disclosure.62 Canada and New Zealand use
broadly similar language.63 Whether the UK threshold is “reasonably necessary” or a “more exacting test” of “essential” is unclear.64 Even where
the national security exception is available, reliance on it is optional;
a military agency could theoretically decide to release the data.65

B ENFORCEMENT: COMPLAINT MECHANISMS
AND DEROGATIONS
To understand a right, it is important to consider the extent to which
it can be meaningfully enforced.66 While internal reconsideration of an
unsuccessful MSAR request may be requested—as Australia and the UK
expressly recommend67—an individual’s first external option will typically be a designated “Privacy” or “Information” Commissioner (Commissioner).68 The Commissioner is an independent legal officer tasked
with (among other roles) investigating data access complaints.69 Commissioners normally have extensive investigatory powers,70 including
being entitled to compel production of any data withheld on national
security grounds for review.71 These powers by default usually override
60

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

70
71

AUFOI, s 33(a); CPA, s 21; NZPA, s 51(a); UKDPA, § 26; see, e.g., Ruby v. Can. (Sol. Gen.), 2002
SCC 75 para. 5, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3; Zhou v. Chief Exec., Dep’t of Labour [2011] NZEMPC 36 [88]; see
also Orna Ben-Naftali & Roy Peled, How Much Secrecy Does Warfare Need?, in T ransparency in
International L aw 321, 322, 327–30 (Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters eds., 2013).
AUFOI, s 33a; see CPA, s 21; NZPA, s 51(a); UKDPA, § 26(1).
AUFOI Guidelines, supra note 53, ¶¶ 5.15–5.18; see Prinn v. Dep’t of Def. [2016] AATA 445
¶¶ 58–96, 152 ALD 162.
See Ternette v. Can. (Sol.-Gen.), [1992] 2 F.C. 75 para. 34(4); Beattie v. Official Assignee [2021]
NZHRRT 21 [78], appeal denied, [2021] NZHC 1607.
Aven v. Orbis Bus. Intel. Ltd. [2020] EWHC (QB) 1812 [110]–[112], [129].
See APA, ss 3A, 11A(4), 31A; CPA, ss 8(2), 21; UKDPA, § 21; UKGDPR, art. 23(1)(a); NZPA, ss 24(1)
(a), 51(a); e.g., Cemerlic v. Can. (Sol. Gen.), 2003 FCT 133 paras. 8, 24, 228 F.T.R. 1.
See generally 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries 109.
AUFOI, s 54, pt. VI; UKGDPR, arts. 57(1)(f), (2); see AUFOI Guidelines, supra note 53, ch 9; ¶¶
4.59, 9.3–9.5; Rosemary Jay, Data Protection: L aw and Practice ¶ 13-068 (5th ed. 2020).
AUFOI, s 54L(1)–(2)(a), 54N; CPA, ss 29–35; NZPA, ss 69(3)(a), 70–72; UKGDPR, art. 77; UKDPA, § 165.
APA; s 54L; CPA, s 29(1)(b); NZPA, s 20; UKGDPR, arts. 57(1)(f), (2)–(3), 77, recitals (20), (122).
See generally Australia Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth.) (Aus.); CPA, ss 53–67; NZPA, ss 13,
17–18, 21; UKGDPR, arts. 51–59; UKDPA, pt. 5, sch. 12.
AUFOI, ss 55R–X; CPA, s 34; NZPA, ss 85–87; UKGDPR, arts. 31, 39(d), 58(1).
AUFOI, ss 55R–U; CPA, ss 34(1)–(2); UKGDPR, arts. 58(a), (e)–(f); UKDPA, §§ 115(7), 142–145,
154, sch. 15; see Can. (Royal Can. Mounted Police) v. Can. (Att. Gen.), 2005 FCA 213 paras. 31, 37,
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legal privilege and even “public interest immunity”72—a common law
doctrine discussed below.73 The UK, however, generally limits its Commissioner’s override powers.74 Indeed, the UK “purport[s] to wholly exclude
the powers of the Commissioner to scrutinise” the use of the national
security exception.75 In each country, the Commissioner and their staff
must maintain strict confidentiality.76 A withholding military agency
may potentially provide submissions to the Commissioner ex parte (without the other side) and in camera (in private).77 Except for the Canadian
Commissioner, who may only make non-binding recommendations,78 a
Commissioner may issue an enforceable disclosure order if it concludes
that personal data was improperly withheld.79
Secondly—usually only if a Commissioner complaint is dismissed80—
an individual may seek judicial redress: in New Zealand and Australia,
these complaints are normally heard by specialist tribunals,81 while in
Canada and the UK, they go to general courts.82 Special judges may sit
where national security concerns are alleged.83 These judicial bodies have
similarly broad investigatory powers.84 In all jurisdictions, the military
agency may be permitted to provide submissions ex parte and in camera.85

72

73
74

75

76
77
78
79
80

81
82
83
84

85

68, 2006 1 F.C.R. 53; NZPA, ss 87–88; Dir. of Human Rights Procs. v. Richardson Human Rights
Review Tribunal HRRT 36/05, Dec. 21, 2005 [32] (N.Z.); AUFOI Guidelines, supra note 53, ¶¶
10.91–10.96; ICO, R egulatory Action Policy 18–19 (2018).
This is made express in Canada and New Zealand. CPA, s 34(2)–(2.2); NZPA, ss 88(1)–(2), 90(2)–
(3), (6), 89, 209(1)(a); see Jeffries v. Priv. Comm’r [2010] NZSC 99 [10], [2011] 1 NZLR 4. It is
implied in Australia under s55X of the AUFOI regarding privilege and recent legislative amendments regarding public interest immunity. See infra notes 103–104; e.g., Xenophon and Dep’t of Def.
[2016] AICmr 14 (16 March 2016) ¶¶ 4–5, 8.
See sources cited infra note 94 and accompanying text.
On privilege, see UKDPA, §§ 143(2), sch. 15, paras. 11–13; UKGDPR, recital (164); Colin Passmore,
Privilege ¶¶ 1.49–1.51 (4th ed. 2019). On public interest immunity, see by analogy Wallace Smith
Trust Co. Ltd (In Liq.) v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells (a firm) [1997] 1 WLR 257 (EWCA).
Jay, supra note 67, ¶¶ 20-004, 20-038 to 20-039 (citing R (Home Sec’y) v. Info. Trib. [2006] EWHC
(Admin) 2958, [2008] 1 WLR 58); see UKDPA, § 26(2), (g)(i), (h). But see UKGDPR, art. 77; R (Open
Rights Grp.) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2021] EWCA (Civ) 800 [11]–[13], [2021] WLR 3611.
AUFOI, ss 55T(5), 55U(4); CPA, ss 62–63, 65; NZPA, ss 81(6), 90(1), 206.
See AUFOI Guidelines, supra note 53, ¶ 10.104; CPA, s 33(1)–(2); e.g., “PN” v. Aus. Taxation Off.
[2018] AICmr 71 (12 December 2018) ¶¶ 11–17.
CPA, s 35; see H.J. Heinz Co. of Can. Ltd. v. Can. (Att. Gen.), 2006 SCC 13 paras. 33–39, [2006] 1
S.C.R. 441.
AUFOI, s 55K; NZPA, s 92, UKGDPR, art. 58(2)(c); see AUFOI, ss 55ZA–D.
AUFOI, s 57A(1); CPA, ss 35(5), 41; NZPA, s 98(1); e.g., Mitchell v. Privacy Comm’r [2017] NZHC
569 [31], [36]; cf. UK GDPR, art. 79; UKDPA, § 167; see also Dotcom v. United States of America
[2014] NZHC 2550 [54]–[59], [69]–[72] (citing NZPA, s 31(2)).
AUFOI, pt. VIIA; NZPA, ss 96–99, 104–106. See generally Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975
(Cth.) (Austl.) [AATA]; Human Rights Act 1993, pt. 4 (N.Z.) [NZHRA].
UKGDPR, art. 79; UKDPA, §§ 167, 180; see Scranage v. Info. Comm’r [2020] UKUT 196 (AAC).
AUFOI, ss 58B–D; CPA, s 51(1); see Sogi v. Can. (Min. of Citizen. and Imm.), 2004 FCA 212 para.
45, [2005] 1 F.C.R. 171.
AUFOI, ss 58A, 57AE, 60A; CPA, s 45; NZPA, ss 109(2)(a), (3), 111(2), 209(1)(b); NZHRA, s 106;
Section 167 – Compliance Orders, [2021] 2 White B ook ¶ 3G-44 (June 3, 2021) [hereinafter White
B ook]; see Ternette v. Can. (Sol. Gen.), [1984] 2 FC 486 [14].
AATA, s 35; AUFOI, ss 63–64; CPA, ss 51(2)(a), (3); NZPA, s 109(2)(b), (3); White B ook, supra note
84, ¶ 3G-44; see Ruby v. Can. (Sol. Gen.), 2002 SCC 75 paras. 53–60, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3; Beattie
v. Official Assignee [2021] NZHRRT 21 [5]–[6]; e.g., Re OJG Engineering Pty Ltd v Comm’r of
Taxation [2019] AATA 4293.
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While specific rules differ, each court or tribunal will normally conduct a
full “merits review” as to whether the military agency was correct to rely
on the national security ground.86 An enforceable disclosure order may
ultimately be issued.87 Beyond this, domestic appeals may be possible.88
An individual may also separately seek judicial review of the process
(rather than merits) of how their MSAR request was handled.89 Courts
may, however, be slow to entertain judicial review where individuals
have not exhausted the above redress options.90 Finally, international
remedies may theoretically be available—the most obvious being through
an application to the ECtHR from an individual dissatisfied with a UK
military agency withholding decision.91 A withholding decision from one
of the other States may potentially be the subject of a complaint to the
United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC).92
The above domestic mechanisms may, however, be short-circuited
through derogations known as “ministerial certificates”—expansive
statutory powers allowing a Government Minister to resist disclosure,
even in the face of a court order, by signing a certificate claiming that
withholding is necessary on national security grounds.93 These build on
the longstanding common law public interest immunity doctrine, giving
governments special powers to resist court disclosure by asserting that
national security or similar interests were engaged, which courts were
traditionally loath to second-guess.94 While judicial bodies confronted
86

87
88

89
90

91
92

93

94

See VMQD v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2018] AATA 4619 [21]–[22]; Leahy v. Can.
(Citizen. and Imm.), 2002 FCA 227 paras. 98–99, [2014] 1 F.C.R. 766; Dotcom v. Crown Law
Office [2018] NZHRRT 7 [18]–[23], 11 HRNZ 420; Ittihadieh v. 5-11 Cheyne Gardens RTM Co Ltd
[2017] EWCA (Civ) 121, [2018] QB 256.
AUFOI, s 58(2); CPA, s 49; NZPA, s 102(d); UKDPA, § 167(2); see AUFOI, s 60.
AUFOI, s 56; AATA, pt 6A; Federal Courts Act, R.S.C., 1986, c. F-7, s 27 (Can.) [FCA]; Supreme
Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, ss 33, 37.1, 40(1) (Can.); NZPA, s 111(2); NZHRA, ss 123–126;
Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI1998/3132, r. 52 (U.K.).
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth.) (Austl.); FCA, s 18.1; Judicial Review
Procedure Act 2016 (N.Z.); Senior Courts Act 1981, c. 54, s 31 (U.K.); see also UKDPA, s 166.
E.g., Knowles v Sec’y, Dep’t of Def. [2021] FCAFC 215 ¶¶ 59, 69, 75; Mitchell v. Privacy Comm’r
[2017] NZHC 569 [19], [38]–[43]; R (Hussain) v. Sec’y of State for Justice [2016] EWCA (Civ) 1111
[32], [2017] 1 WLR 761. But see Banlgadesh v. Can. (Att’y Gen), 2019 FC 1177 para. 13.
ECHR, supra note 15, arts. 34–35.
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, supra note 15, arts. 1–2, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter Optional Protocol]. All comparator
jurisdictions other than the UK have ratified. See Status of Ratification: Interactive Dashboard,
United Nations Hum. R ights Office of the High Comm. (last updated Dec. 16, 2021),
https://indicators.ohchr.org/ [select “Optional Protocol” from drop-down menu and navigate to
individual jurisdictions].
CPA, s 70.1(1); Canada Evidence Act 1985, c. c-5, 38.13(1) (Can.) [CEA]; NZPA, s 88(3); Crown
Proceedings Act 1950, s 27(3); UKDPA, § 27. Alternative statutory powers allow greater balancing
of public interest factors. E.g., AATA, s 34; Evidence Act 2006, s 70 (N.Z.); High Court Rules, r 8.26
(N.Z.).
Conway v. Rimmer [1968] AC 910 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.); see Sankey v. Whitlam (1978) 142
CLR 1, 38–46 (HCA) (Austl.); Carey v. Ontario, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 637 paras. 79–85 (Can.); Choudry
v. Attorney-General [1999] 2 NZLR 582, 593–94 (CA) (N.Z.). See generally Kenneth Keith, Freedom
of Information and International Law, in Freedom of E xpression and Freedom of Information:
Essays in Honour of Sir David Williams 349, 351–55 (J. Beatson & Y. Cripps eds., 2000).
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with ministerial certificates today normally at least reserve the ability
to confidentially review withheld documentation,95 their ability to set
aside such certificates is typically strictly limited, falling far short of a
full merits review.96 For example, the Canadian Supreme Court described
the applicable statutory power as a “narrow right of review provid[ing]
no effective judicial means or challenging or correcting a debatable decision by the [Minister] in balancing the public interest.”97 In Canada, the
potential—now actual98—use of ministerial certificates has long been
criticized.99 Similar concerns have been echoed by the New Zealand Law
Commission,100 as well as recently voiced within the UK Parliament101—
in the UK, ministerial certificates may prospectively exempt entire categories of data altogether.102 The status quo regarding ministerial certificates
in those three jurisdictions contrasts somewhat with Australia, where
“conclusive” AUFOI certificate powers were removed in 2009, promoting
transparency.103 While ministerial certificates may still be deployed before
the Australian tribunal assessing withholding complaints, these have
much less force and do not restrict the tribunal’s evaluation.104

95

96

97
98
99

100

101
102
103

104

This appears express in Canada and New Zealand. CEA, ss 38.11–12, 38.131(5)–(6); Dotcom v.
Attorney-General [2019] NZCA 412 [22], [33]–[36], [2020] 3 NZLR 397, leave to appeal dismissed,
[2020] NZSC 1. It seems implied in the UK. See UKDPA, §§ 27, 201; Tribunal Procedure (First-Tier
Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009, SI2009/1976, r 19(1A) (U.K.); Tribunal
Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, SI2008/2698, rr. 5(d), 14, 15, 37, sch. 2 (U.K.). By
analogy, see also UK Courts and T ribunal Judiciary, Practice Note: Closed M aterial in
Information R ights C ases (2013).
For the Canadian approach, see CEA, s 38.131(10). Certain New Zealand and UK certificates may be
challenged on “judicial review grounds” only. UKDPA, § 27(3)–(4); Dotcom [2019] NZCA 412 [22];
Hitchens v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2003] UKIT NSA5 [44]. But see Baker v. Sec’y of
State for the Home Dep’t [2011] UKHRR 1275 [63]–[76] (Info. Trib., Nat’l Sec. Appeals).
R v. Ahmad, 2011 SCC 6 para. 23, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 110.
See R v. Huang, 2021 ONSC 221 para. 5; Huang v. Can. (Att’y Gen.), 2019 FC 1122.
E.g., Kent Roach, “Constitutional Chicken”: National Security Confidentiality and Terrorism Prosecutions after R. v. Ahmad, 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 357, 375 and 375 n. 63 (2011); Craig Forcese, Clouding
Accountability: Canada’s Government Secrecy and National Security Law “Complex,” 34 O ttawa L. R ev.
49, 81–82, 84 (2004); Kathy Grant, The Unjust Impact of Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act on an Accused’s
Right to Full Answer and Defence, 16 Windsor R ev. Legal & S oc. Issues 137, 149–50 (2003).
N.Z. L aw Comm’n, T he Crown in Court: A R eview of the Crown Proceedings Act and
National Security Information in Proceedings, chs. 5–7 (R135, December 2015) [hereinafter
NZLC, Crown in Court].
E.g., Data Protection Bill [Lords] Deb (15 Mar. 2018) cols. 111–14.
See UKDPA, § 27(2); Re Ewing [2002] EWHC (QB) 3160 [53].
AUFOI, ss 33(2)–(7), repealed by Freedom of Information (Removal of Conclusive Certificates and Other
Measures) Act 2009 (Cth.) (Austl.); see Warren & Chief Exec. Off., Servs. Austl. [2020] AATA 4557 (9
November 2020) ¶ 82.
AATA, s 36; see Fewster v. Nat’l Archives of Austl. [2014] AATA 295 ¶ 18, 63 AAR 440; e.g.,
Fernandes v. National Archives of Australia [2011] AATA 202 (28 March 2011).
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III

APPLYING MSARS: CASE STUDIES
A SERVICE MEMBER SEEKING OVERSEAS
HEALTH DATA
The service member seeking their own health data generated during an
armed conflict overseas is the most straightforward case study. Each
jurisdiction extends MSARs to service members105—assumedly either
citizens or permanent residents. Health data collected and retained by
a military would presumably be under its control under each State’s
law, even if created overseas.106 While domestic legislation should, where
possible, be interpreted consistently with IHL and public international
law generally,107 providing MSARs to service members appears entirely
justifiable under IHL, not least because service members remain subject
to their own State’s law when operating overseas, including during
armed conflicts.108 Each State also has resources specifically confirming
service members’ MSARs.109 Indeed, although information is limited—
the contents of personal data requests are typically confidential unless
litigated—MSAR requests by service members appear common, including
for health records.110
Service members appear to have credible redress options in practice.
Speaking generally, domestic judicial bodies evaluating MSAR complaints
by service members and military agency employees scrutinize withholding
grounds relatively closely.111 Outside Australia, the possibility that a ministerial certificate may ultimately be issued to stymie complaints is nonetheless concerning, given the limited scope to challenge these.112 Further
105 See sources cited supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
106 See sources cited supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
107 Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v. N.S.W. [2001] HCA 7 ¶¶ 29–31, 205 CLR 399; Nevsun Resources Ltd
v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5 para. 170, 443 DLR 4th 183; LM v. R [2014] NZSC 110 [52], [2015] 1 NZLR
23; Assange v. Swedish Pros’n Auth. (Nos. 1 and 2), [2012] UKSC 22 [10], [98], [112], [115], [122],
[160], [176], [201], [206], [217], [265], [2012] 2 AC 471 (appeal taken from Eng.). See generally A.
Nolkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of L aw, ch. 7 (2011).
108 E.g., Austl. Def. Force, L aw of A rmed Conflict, Austl. Def. D octrine P ub. 06.4, ¶ 1.4 (2006).
109 E.g., Service Records, NZDF, https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/nzdf/medal-and-service-records/
service-records/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2021); Requests for Personal Data and Service Records: A
Detailed Guide, UK M in. of Def. (updated Aug. 6, 2021), https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/requests-for-personal-data-and-service-records.
110 E.g., Francis v. Dep’t of Def. [2008] AATA 486 (12 June 2008) (Austl.); Re 100002721759, 2018
CanLII 78506 (June 27, 2018) (Can. Veterans Rev. and Appeal. Board); see also supra note 51.
111 E.g., “SRTTT” v. Dep’t of Def. [2004] AATA 1175 (9 November 2004); Frezza v. Can. (Nat’l Def.),
2014 FC 32, 445 F.T.R. 299; Plumtree v. Att’y-Gen. HRRT 29/01, Oct. 2, 2002 (N.Z.). But see Info.
Comm’r of C an., Access at Issue: Nine R ecommendations R egarding the Processing of
Access R equests at National Defence (2020).
112 See supra text accompanying notes 93–104.
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recourse may be available internationally. Most significantly, assuming
subject access rights to data held by public agencies form part of the IHRL
right to privacy,113 UK service members may obtain recourse before the
ECtHR: they will likely be “within the jurisdiction” of the UK for ECHR
purposes when its armed forces collect and retain their data, whether at
home or abroad.114 Service members of the other three States may possibly
bring UNHRC claims.115 However, as Marko Milanovic explains, while the
UNHRC traditionally has a “more generous” attitude towards questions
of extraterritoriality, its regime is less robust and non-binding.116

B VILLAGER WANTING COMBAT CAMERA DATA
While the first case study outlined above may, at least in some respects,
appear simple, the remaining two deal with relatively unchartered territory, and thus analysis must be much more speculative. With that caveat
in mind, the villager seeking special forces camera data theoretically
appears to be in a similar position as the service member above—other
than in Canada, given that its legislation restricts MSARs to citizens and
permanent residents.117 While States’ data protection obligations likely
apply “more flexibly in the context of a military operation than in situations of relative normalcy,”118 the UK Commissioner has expressly recognized that camera footage of overseas military engagements may contain
personal data triggering UK data protection law.119 This data would again
be under the armed forces’ control.120 Indeed, other than in the UK, which
has a carve-out for its special forces,121 this data would still appear to be
under armed forces’ control even if only recorded on a soldier’s personal
electronic device.122 This extraterritorial application of MSARs similarly
appears consistent with IHL: “subject to compliance with minimum standards of humane treatment,” IHL “leaves it to states to determine, usually

See supra text accompanying notes 21–25.
See ECHR, supra note 15, arts. 1, 8, 10; Smith v. Min. of Defence [2013] UKSC 41 [42]–[55], [102],
[153], [2014] 1 AC 52 (appeal taken from Eng.).
115 See sources cited supra note 92.
116 See Optional Protocol, supra note 92, arts. 4–5; Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign
Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age, 56 H arv. Int’l L.J. 81, 111 and 111 n. 122 (2015).
117 See sources cited supra note 58 and accompanying text.
118 See Marko Milanovic, Intelligence Sharing in Multinational Military Operations and Complicity under
International Law, 97 Int’l L. Stud. 1269, 1397 (2021).
119 Ministry of Defence (Central Government) [2008] UKICO FS50099223 (Jan. 21, 2008).
120 See supra sources cited notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
121 UKFOI, sch. 1, para. 6(a); see UKDPA, § 7.
122 See supra sources cited notes 55–56 and accompanying text; e.g., Peter Boshier, Request for Footage
of Battle of Baghak, Case No. 411501 (Nov. 1, 2017) (interpreting an analogous NZOIA section).
113
114
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under domestic law,” what further protections may apply.123 Additionally,
to the extent that MSARs enhance transparency,124 such extraterritorial
application may respond to calls for this within IHL.125
Whether this villager would have effective scope to enforce MSARs
in practice is less clear. There is little evidence that overseas persons
have attempted to exercise MSARs, perhaps due to a lack of awareness.126
They may also face practical and other difficulties in pursuing redress.127
Conceivably, given the fact-sensitive nature of the national security
exception,128 the mere fact that a person—here, the villager—is overseas
may be a relevant factor favoring the application of the exception and
may further reduce the (already limited) scope the villager would have to
challenge a ministerial certificate.129 The villager would also have fewer
international redress options: while they might have recourse before the
UNHRC,130 they would likely be barred from the ECtHR in relation to a
UK military agency withholding decision—ECHR States are apparently
not exercising ECHR “jurisdiction” when conducting military operations
“during the active phase of hostilities” of international armed conflicts.131

C RETIREE WITHIN OCCUPIED TERRITORY
REQUESTING PENSION DATA
The case of the retired citizen seeking data from an occupying power
held by a local administrative agency raises even more difficult questions. Like the villager, the retiree, at first glance, appears entitled to
MSARs in all States other than Canada.132 A threshold issue is, however,
whether the local administrative agency’s data is under the control of
123 See Al-Waheed v. Min. of Def. [2017] UKSC 2 [276] (Lord Reed dissenting on other grounds),
[2017] AC 821 (appeal taken from Eng.); e.g., Geneva Convention (IV) relating to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, arts. 3, 107, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention (IV)]; NZDF, M anual of A rmed Forces L aw, vol. 4 L aw of A rmed Conflict, DM
69 ¶¶ 11.2.25–11.2.26 (2nd ed. 2019); UK M in. of Def., T he Joint Service M anual of the L aw
of A rmed C onflict, Joint Service P ub. 383 ¶ 15.41 n. 96 (2004).
124 Cf. text accompanying note 29.
125 E.g., Ben-Naftali & Peled, supra note 60; Lesley Wexler, International Humanitarian Law Transparency, 23 J. T ransnat’l L. & Pol’y 93 (2013–2014); Eyal Benvenisti, T he International
L aw of O ccupation 346 (2nd ed. 2012).
126 Cf. text accompanying supra notes 109–110. See generally Ausloos & Dewitte, supra note 6, at 7.
127 See, e.g., R. (Begum) v. Special Imm’n Appeals Comm’n [2021] UKSC 7 [85], [2021] AC 765 (appeal
taken from Eng.).
128 See, e.g., Arnold v. Queensland (1987) 73 ALR 607 ¶ 19 (FCA); Aven v. Orbis Bus. Intel. Ltd. [2020]
EWHC (QB) 1812 [123].
129 See supra text accompanying notes 93–104.
130 See sources cited supra note 92. But see text accompanying supra note 116.
131 Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], App. No. 38263/08, App. No. 38263/08, ¶¶ 83, 125–144 (Jan. 21, 2021),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-207757; see ECHR, supra note 15, art. 1.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 58, 117.
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the occupying power.133 As both the IHL law of occupation and IHRL, as
currently interpreted, are triggered by effective control over territory,134
this question may initially appear straightforward. MSARs as recognized
by the domestic laws of the comparator States may, however, theoretically
impose a more demanding test for assessing control.135 This domestic law
MSAR test must be separately considered, albeit while taking into account
the particular international law context within which the occupying power
is operating.136 While doing so is ultimately a fact-sensitive exercise, the
law of occupation accords an occupying power ample authority over agencies in occupied territory that may well meet domestic law MSAR control
requirements—a corollary of the occupying power’s duty to “restore and
ensure, as far as possible, public order and [civil life].”137
As noted, the scope and application of MSARs must, where possible,
be interpreted consistently with international law, including IHL and
IHRL.138 This interpretative task raises further difficulties in relation to
this final case study. Traditionally, the IHL law of occupation strictly
constrained legislative changes in occupied territory.139 On that basis,
assuming no indigenous data protection regime was previously in place,
permitting a retiree to rely on an occupier’s MSARs may be viewed as
introducing de facto legislative changes in that territory in breach of IHL.140
This chapter, however, assumes that IHL must now be applied concurrently with IHRL:141 consistently with that, there is now “recognition
of broader powers” to enact welfare-enhancing laws in occupied territory.142 Whether such powers would permit the introduction of MSARs—
or, indeed, public sector subject access rights generally—nonetheless
merits “closer attention.”143
On the one hand, we may consider the de facto introduction of an
occupier’s MSARs as welfare-enhancing and perhaps even “mandated”
by IHRL.144 But whether public sector subject access rights have now
133 See sources cited supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
134 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 42, Annex to Hague
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2297,
T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]; see supra note 40.
135 See sources cited supra note 55.
136 See sources cited supra notes 107, 118 and accompanying text.
137 Benvenisti, supra note 125, at 68–84 (quoting Hague Regulations, note 134, arts. 42–43); see
Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 123, art. 64.
138 See sources cited supra note 107 and accompanying text.
139 See generally Benvenisti, supra note 125, at ch. 4;; Yoram Dinstein, T he International L aw of
Belligerent O ccupation, ch. 5 (2011).
140 See Benvenisti, supra note 125, at 93.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 37–38.
142 Benvenisti, supra note 125, at 92; Dinstein, supra note 139, at 120–23.
143 Benvenisti, supra note 125, at 92–93; Dinstein, supra note 139, at 120–21.
144 Benvenisti, supra note 125, at 75, 92–93, 102–4; e.g., Lubin, supra note 5, at 483–86.
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crystallized as part of IHRL is debatable145—and ultimately beyond the
scope of this chapter to resolve. It is, in any event, conceivable that the
introduction of an occupier’s own MSARs “might not fit the needs of
the occupied peoples.”146 Hypothetically, an occupied population may be
entirely unfamiliar with subject access rights. Their culture may view
data, even personal data, as strictly confidential and altogether inaccessible once handed over to public agencies.147 Alternatively, even if IHRL
requires an occupier to provide public sector subject access rights in some
form,148 the wholesale introduction of an occupier’s own MSARs may
be insufficiently tailored to the particular needs of the local population
and amount to improper “annexation” of that territory.149 Given these
matters, while we may sympathize with the retiree’s desire to use an
occupier’s MSARs, the consequences that this may bring for that territory
may conceivably be unwelcome by the broader occupied population and
potentially breach IHL.
The consequences of such a conclusion should be clearly stated.
Most obviously, permitting such reliance by the retiree would put the
occupying power in breach of IHL, regardless of what the occupying
force’s domestic law provided.150 Conversely, however, any expressly
extraterritorial MSARs, including those given by New Zealand and the
UK,151 would likely be given effect by that occupying force’s domestic
courts even if inconsistent with IHL152—a consequence of the dualist
approach these comparator States take to public international law.153 With
that in mind, the retiree’s ability to enforce MSARs in practice appears
mixed. That individual’s domestic redress options will likely be no better
than that of the villager.154 Both administrative and judicial institutions
have traditionally been reluctant to provide effective oversight over their
own armed forces when acting as an occupier155—Israeli courts being a
notable, albeit inconsistent, exception.156 Assuming that the extension
145 See supra text accompanying notes 20, 24–25.
146 Benvenisti, supra note 125, at 93; see Dinstein, supra note 139, at 123–25.
147 See Jeanne Saliou, Data Protection and Privacy Through the Lens of Cultural Relativism, Le laboratoire d’Innovation Numérique de la CNIL (Oct. 27, 2021), https://linc.cnil.fr/fr/data-protection-and-privacy-through-lens-cultural-relativism.
148 See supra text accompanying notes 142, 144.
149 Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 123, art. 64; Benvenisti, supra note 125, at 93; see Dinstein,
supra note 139, at 122; e.g., Int. Comm. of Jurists, T he Road to A nnexation: Israel’s
M aneuvers to Change the Status of the O ccupied Palestinian T erritory 26 (2019); see
also Benvenisti, supra note 125, at 228–33, 241.
150 See Crawford, supra note 43, at 45.
151 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
152 See Crawford, supra note 43, at 45; sources cited supra note 107.
153 See source cited supra note 43 and accompanying text.
154 See supra text accompanying notes 126–129.
155 Benvenisti, supra note 125, at 326.
156 Id. at 217–24, 327.
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of MSARs within that occupied territory had in fact been consistent with
IHL and IHRL, the retiree may, however, fare better internationally: an
indigenous population is undoubtedly under the control of an occupier
and thus within IHRL jurisdiction.157

EVALUATION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
MSARs as implemented by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
United Kingdom appear to offer genuine scope to individuals to obtain
their personal data from the armed forces and other military agencies.
While this scope varies depending on circumstances and jurisdiction, this
chapter has set out a practical roadmap for individuals seeking to exercise
such rights. This may inform individuals implicated in armed conflicts
involving any of these comparator States, as well as other jurisdictions
with analogous MSARs.
This chapter closes with recommendations for both these comparator States and others. First, from a rights-based perspective, its analysis reveals gaps in the domestic law scope and application of MSARs in
the comparator States. To better protect the privacy and data protection
rights that underlie MSARs—indeed, public sector subject access rights
generally—these jurisdictions should consider plugging these gaps.
Ongoing legislative reforms in each State may provide this opportunity.158 Most significantly, to ensure effective judicial oversight and thus
protection of MSARs, the remaining States may wish to follow Australia’s
lead by removing or amending ministerial certificate powers.159 Worryingly, a recently introduced New Zealand Government bill would do the
opposite, proposing new conclusive certificate powers restricting judicial
oversight.160 Canada should also contemplate expanding its MSARs to
157 Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], App. No. 38263/08, App. No. 38263/08, ¶ 196 (Jan. 21, 2021), https://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-207757; see id. ¶¶ 83, 161–175; Benvenisti, supra note 125, at 331–32.
158 Att’y-Gen.’s Dep’t, Austl. G ov’t, Privacy Act R eview: Discussion Paper (2021); UK Dep’t
for Digital, C ulture M edia & Sport, Data : A New Direction (2021); Modernizing Canada’s
Privacy Act, G ov’t of C an. (updated Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/pa-lprp/
modern.html; Kris Faafoi, Security Information in Proceedings Legislation Bill Passes First Reading,
Beehive.govt.nz (Dec. 15, 2021), https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/security-information-proceedings-legislation-bill-passes-first-reading.
159 See supra sources cited notes 93–104 and accompanying text.
160 Security Information in Proceedings Legislation Bill (97-1), pt 3, sch 2 (N.Z.); see (14 Dec. 2021)
756 NZPD (Security Information in Proceedings Legislation Bill – First Reading). Contra NZLC,
Crown in Court, supra note 100, ¶¶ 6.69–6.72.
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overseas persons,161 while the UK should similarly reconsider its purported restrictions on its Commissioner’s investigatory powers.162 While
Australia’s MSARs appear relatively more robust, this may be because
the absence of a federal rights framework has led there to more detailed
legislative scrutiny163—the absence of such a framework is, however,
itself concerning.
This analysis and set of recommendations may also inform additional
States with MSARs, as well as international organizations and others
interacting with personal data during armed conflicts.164 This chapter may
even inform hold-out States without MSARs.165 Even if such rights are
merely “best practice,”166 holdouts may wish to implement MSARs to aid
their armed forces’ “legal interoperability” with others167 or in response
to international pressure.168 Australia and New Zealand, for example,
extended subject access rights to overseas persons at the urging of the
EU,169 and Canada may soon do the same.170 Finally, holdout States should
also consider seriously the possibility that MSARs are required pursuant
to IHRL.171 While it is beyond our scope here to resolve this question, this
chapter has offered conflicting evidence intended to inform this debate:
while MSARs as implemented by these comparator States have much in
common, they retain material differences, and the ability to derogate
through ministerial certificates is significant. Regardless, MSARs—again,
like government subject data access rights generally—will likely only
increase in importance. Robust rights-protective frameworks to give
effect to these rights should be prioritized.

Cf. text accompanying supra note 58.
Cf. text accompanying supra note 75.
See sources cited supra note 18.
See supra text accompanying notes 46–48.
See Lubin, supra note 5, at 483.
Id.
See David S. Goddard, Understanding the Challenge of Legal Interoperability in Coalition Operations, 9 J.
Nat’l Sec’y L. & Pol’y 211, 225–28 (2017).
168 See A nu Bradford, Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World 132–36
(2020).
169 Privacy Amendment Act 2004, No. 49, 2004, s 4 (Cth.) (Austl.); Privacy (Cross-border Information) Amendment Act 2010, No 113, s 3(a) (N.Z.); see Aust. L aw R eform Comm’n, For Your
Information: Australian Privacy L aw and Practice, vol. 2 ¶¶ 31.21–31.22 (ALRC108, 2008);
N.Z. L aw Comm’n, R eview of the Privacy Act 1993: R eview of the L aw of Privacy Stage 4
¶¶ 14.31–14.34 (IP17, March 2010).
170 See Dep’t of Just. C an., Privacy Principles and Modernized Rules for a Digital Age 19–20
(2019).
171 See Lubin, supra note 5, at 482–83; supra text accompanying notes 20, 24–25.
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
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Chapter 11 Data Privacy in Multilateral Coalition Operations

Managing Data Privacy
Rights in Multilateral
Coalition Operations’
Information Sharing
Platforms: A “Legal
Interoperability”
Approach
Deborah A. Housen-Couriel1

INTRODUCTION
A BACKGROUND: LEGAL INTEROPERABILITY
IN MILITARY COALITION OPERATIONS
Military coalitions have always shared large quantities of diverse types
of data. Joint operations require the common use of operational specifications, identification details for combatants and other personnel,
communications and geolocation data, medical and health records, and
other mission-critical details.2 The exchange of such information requires
1
2

Faculty of Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Chief Legal Officer and VP Regulation,
Konfidas Digital Ltd.
Tien Pham & Greg Cirincione, Sensor, Data and Information Sharing for Coalition Operations, in
Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on K nowledge Systems for
Coalition Operations Conference (2012), http://ksco.info/ksco/ksco-2012/papers/KSCO-2012Pham-Sensor%20-Data-Info-Sharing.pdf.
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a high level of confidentiality and trust among the sharing organizations. Examples of military coalitions, both ad hoc and permanent,3 that
have established such information sharing (IS) platforms include the
Multi-National Force—Iraq (MNF-I) set up by UN Security Council Resolution 1546;4 the Multinational Force and Observers under the Egypt-Israel peace treaty;5 the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of Nigeria,
Niger, and Chad;6 the forces envisioned under the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Treaty of Amity and Cooperation;7 the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO);8 and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).9 Figure 1 depicts a simplified scheme of typical
information sharing requirements within such multinational coalitions.
Beyond the operational aim of efficiently communicating information to achieve coalition aims, IS also serves to mitigate potential
informational asymmetries among members concerning coalition aims,
capabilities and performance, ultimately impeding coalition objectives.
Crucial issues such as personnel and equipment capacity and availability,
communications capabilities, tactical and strategic planning, and operational timelines rely on robust, accurate, and rapid IS. Due to the radical
digitization of operations data and the use of “big data” to support military activities overall, such accelerated and deepened data sharing has
become increasingly critical for military coalitions’ operations over the
past few decades.10 Thus, effective information sharing among coalition
members provides a valuable shared asset.11

3

4
5
6

7
8
9
10

11

Military coalitions (including alliances, joint task forces, and multinational forces) are established
on a permanent basis by treaty, or to address a specific strategic objective. See U.S. Joint Chiefs
of Staff, JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Oct. 22, 2018); U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-08,
Interorganizational Cooperation (Oct. 12, 2016).
S.C. Res. 1546 (June 8, 2004). See also Maryanne Lawlor, Iraqi Communications Transition from
Tactical to Practical, Signal, Nov. 2004.
Protocol to the Treaty of Peace of Mar. 26, 1979, arts. 29–31, Egypt-Isr., Aug. 3, 1981, https://
mfo.org/documents-and-downloads.
David Doukhan, Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram, Int’l Inst. for Counter-T errorism, May 1, 2020, https://www.ict.org.il/Article/2640/Multinational_Joint_Task_
Force_against_Boko_Haram_Reflections#gsc.tab=0.
See Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Nov. 20, 2007, https://asean.org/
wp-content/uploads/images/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf.
Permanent Structured Coop., https://pesco.europa.eu/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2022) [hereinafter
PESCO].
Operations and Missions: Past and Present, NATO, Sept. 10, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/topics_52060.htm.
In many other non-military contexts, IS also constitutes a widely recognized measure for inter-
organizational, inter-sectoral, and inter-governmental data exchange that is relevant to the
resolution of a common challenge. See Deborah Housen-Couriel, Information Sharing as a Critical Best
Practice for the Sustainability of Cyber Peace, in C yber Peace: Charting a Path Toward a Sustainable,
Stable, and Secure C yberspace 39-63 (Scott Shackelford et al. eds, forthcoming 2022).
Mario Scerala, John Ahmet Erkoyuncua & Essam Shehaba, Identifying Information Asymmetry
Challenges in the Defence Sector, 19 Procedia M fg. 127 (2018); Charles Phillips, T.C. Ting & Steven
Demurjian, Information Sharing and Security in Dynamic Coalitions, SACMAT ’02: Proceedings of
the Seventh ACM S ymp. on Access C ontrol Models & T ech., June 2002.
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Figure 1. Combined Operations Information Sharing. Based on C. Phillips, T.C. Ting & S. Demurjian,
Information S haring and S ecurity in Dynamic C oalitions (2002) at 89

In parallel with its criticality, digitized data sharing among coalition
members presents both operational and legal challenges, and our analysis
herein focuses on two of the latter, in particular.12 The first legal challenge
is that of ensuring the “legal interoperability” of coalition members’
activities, defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
as “a way of managing legal differences between coalition partners with
a view to rendering the conduct of multinational operations as effective
as possible, while respecting the applicable domestic law constraints
of coalition members.”13 The management of these “legal differences”
has until now focused chiefly on issues of international humanitarian
law (IHL). We will briefly explore herein some of the ways in which IHL
interoperability has been traditionally managed by coalitions, as a basis
for the principal analysis of the second legal challenge.
This next challenge focuses on the coordination—and, ultimately,
the interoperability—of coalition members’ domestic regimes for the
12
13

The analysis does not address, for example, the important issue of the operative necessity to
provide confidentiality of coalition IS as a matter of military field security.
Int’l Comm. of the R ed Cross, International Humanitarian L aw and the Challenges of
Contemporary A rmed Conflicts 32 (2011), www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescentmovement/31st-international-conference/31-int-conference-ihl-challenges-report-11-51-2-en.pdf [hereinafter ICRC Challenges].

230

Deborah A. Housen-Couriel

protection of personal data privacy, where such personal data is defined
as any identifier “such as a name, an identification number, location
data, an online identifier or… one or more factors specific to [an individual’s] physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or
social identity.”14
While these two issues both require the coordination of legal and
policy constraints among coalition members, the data privacy challenge
is a relatively new one in the military context. This is because domestic
personal data privacy safeguards have come to the fore in an unprecedented way in recent years, introducing stringent regulatory requirements for the use of data by both private and public organizations in
many national and regional jurisdictions. We argue here that data privacy
protections can no longer be ignored in military contexts, as military
bodies are in fact public organizations that process large quantities of
combatants’ sensitive personal data; and that information sharing in
coalitions thus requires coordination of members’ domestic law regimes
which currently mandate data privacy protections and safeguards for
combatants as data subjects.

B DATA PRIVACY VULNERABILITY ON
MILITARY COALITION PLATFORMS:
WHAT’S THE PROBLEM?
Vulnerabilities in the use, storage, and transmission (“processing”) of
combatants’ personal data on coalition platforms exist in both the operational and legal contexts. We address the operational vulnerabilities first,
as they highlight the underlying justification and need for addressing the
legal vulnerabilities and exposures.
The operational vulnerabilities exposed by military coalitions’ processing of personal data of military personnel are illustrated by the 2015 Ferizi
data breach incident. In March 2015, the Islamic State Hacking Division
and Cyber Khalifat hacking group published “kill lists” of U.S. military
personnel and their families, based on personal data these groups received
14

This is the definition of “personal data” in Article 4 of European Union Regulation 2016/679
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 3016 O.J. (L 119) arts. 4, 32
[hereinafter GDPR]. The same definition appears in Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with
regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001; Decision No
1247/2002/EC, 2018 O.J. (L 295) [hereinafter Institutional GDPR].
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from Ardit Ferizi, a Kosovo-based hacker. Ferizi had hacked into the
servers of a civilian company that contained information outsourced by
the military, accessing the names, addresses, and photos of approximately
1,300 U.S. soldiers on active duty, as well as personal details about their
families. These terrorist groups published the exfiltrated data, calling
for attacks on the listed personnel and threats against them and their
families, warning:
[W]e are in your emails and computer systems, watching and
recording your every move, we have your names and addresses,
we are in your emails and social media accounts, we are
extracting confidential data and passing on your personal
information to the soldiers of the khilafah, who soon with the
permission of Allah will strike at your necks in your own lands!15
Other such leaks of personal data of military personnel that have been
made public include the exposure of 12,000 U.S. military reservists’ data
in the New York area in 2010,16 the publication of thousands of troops’
information via the Strava fitness app in 2018,17 the breach of 200,000
personal data files at the U.S. Defense Department in February 2020,18 and
the June 2021 hack of more than 1,182 UK Special Forces personnel whose
personal data was leaked from the WhatsApp commercial platform.19
It should be noted that not all such data leaks have involved a military
“digital adversary”: some have been caused by the unprotected sharing
of personal data inside military organizations, data breaches of military
suppliers’ systems, and the unsupervised utilization of non-military,
commercial digital platforms by military personnel.20 Nevertheless, such
increasingly frequent leaks underscore the potential operational risks
15

16
17
18

19

20

See ISIL-Linked Kosovo Hacker Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison, US Dep’t Justice, Sept. 3, 2016,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/isil-linked-kosovo-hacker-sentenced-20-years-prison; and
Josh Constine, ISIS “Cyber Caliphate” Hacks U.S. Military Command Accounts, T echcrunch, Jan. 12,
2015, https://techcrunch.com/2015/01/12/cyber-caliphate/. Ferditi was convicted to 20 years in
prison for providing material support to terrorist groups through unauthorized computer access.
Martin Evans, Army Warns Reservists of Identity Theft Threat, Newsday, Apr. 22, 2010, https://www.
newsday.com/news/new-york/army-warns-reservists-of-identity-theft-threat-1.1876244.
Alex Hern, Fitness Tracking App Strava Gives Away Location of Secret US Army Bases, Guardian, Jan.
28, 2018.
See Kevin Collier & Mosheh Gains, Likely Military Data Breach May Have Compromised Service
Members’ Personal Information, NBC News, Feb. 20, 2020, 3:39 PM, https://www.nbcnews.com/
tech/security/dod-communications-hub-reports-likely-data-breach-n1140071.
The leaked data included details of 1,182 recently promoted troops as well as personnel in
sensitive units such as the Special Reconnaissance Regiment. See Gareth Corfield, UK Special Forces
Soldiers’ Personal Data Was Floating Around WhatsApp in a Leaked Army Spreadsheet, R egister, June 2,
2021, https://www.theregister.com/2021/06/02/uk_special_forces_data_breach_whatsapp/.
This is the case with the WhatsApp leak; see id. The overlapping of military and civilian digital
identities of coalition troops, a key issue for future research, is revisited in the conclusion.
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stemming from the unmanaged, unrestricted, and unprotected use of
combatants’ personal data.21
It is admittedly difficult to ascertain whether similar attacks on coalition IS platforms have occurred and compromised combatants’ personal
data, as such breaches are not likely to be publicized. Yet such cyber
attacks, which present an operational threat through the exposure of
combatants’ personal data, are openly recognized as an ongoing vulnerability in the overall security of coalition operations.22
Although coalition cyber security controls and cyber risk-mitigation processes are beyond the present scope of analysis, these measures
remain an ever-present background concern when considering mechanisms to protect personal data in coalition operations. This is because
the safeguarding of personal data privacy is inherently connected to the
cyber security of the computerized systems in which such data is stored,
processed, and transmitted. Moreover, domestic and regional data privacy
regimes regularly incorporate such controls and processes. For example,
the well-known European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) and its ancillary regulation applicable to governmental entities (the Institutional GDPR)23 both require organizations to implement
“technical and operational measures.” These include widely recognized
technological cyber security controls such as encryption; protocols for
data confidentiality, integrity, availability, and resilience; system audits;
data minimization; and access management as necessary aspects of the
safeguarding of data privacy.24 The GDPR and Institutional GDPR regimes
will be further explored herein as leading contemporary examples of the
regulatory safeguarding of individuals’ data privacy rights.
Thus, it is argued that data privacy vulnerabilities have operational
implications for coalition activities, chiefly with respect to the sensitivity
21

22

23
24

Moreover, the cyber security vulnerabilities of high-security governmental and military platforms
are well-known, and attacks on such targets are no longer rare events. Examples include the
2014 hacks of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. military’s Transportation
Command, the 2015 hack of Germany’s Bundestag, the 2017 exposures of Singapore and South
Korea’s ministries of defense, the 2019 attacks on Iranian missile launch systems, and the 2021
attack on the Ukrainian naval forces.
For example, NATO’s June 2021 Brussels Summit Communique states that “Resilience and the
ability to detect, prevent, mitigate, and respond to vulnerabilities and intrusions is critical….
NATO as an organisation will therefore continue to adapt and improve its cyber defences.” See Press
Release, NATO, Brussels Summit Communique, June 14, 2021, § 32, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/news_185000.htm. See also Robin Geiss & Henning Lahmann, Protection of Data in Armed
Conflict, 97 Int’l L. Stud. 556, 557–59 (2021); Heather Harrison Dinniss, The Nature of Objects:
Targeting Networks and the Challenge of Defining Cyber Military Objectives, 48 Isr. L. R ev. 39, 41 (2015).
GDPR, supra note 14; Institutional GDPR, supra note 14.
GDPR, supra note 14, art. 32; Institutional GDPR, supra note 14, art. 33. See also Protection of
Privacy Regulations (Data Security), 5777-2017 (Isr.), https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/legalinfo/
data_security_regulation/en/PROTECTION%20OF%20PRIVACY%20REGULATIONS.pdf; California
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, C al. Civ. Code § 1798.40 (a)(3)(A), (j)(1)(c), (ag)(1)(d) (West 2019).
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of external exposure of combatants’ personal data. Technical and operational safeguards of data privacy that are, as a rule, required by domestic
regimes should be fully synchronized and merged with similar measures
that may already be in place on IS platforms.25
The legal vulnerabilities and exposures with respect to personal data
constitute a new aspect of coalition information sharing. Recent years have
seen rapid growth in the regulation of personal data privacy. As stated
above, the European Union’s GDPR governing private sector entities is a
leading example of a regional regime—bolstered by the accompanying
Institutional GDPR applicable to governmental entities. All 30 of the
EU and European Economic Area member States have incorporated both
regulatory measures into national “GDPR laws.” In addition, approximately 90 other countries26 have legislated data privacy regimes, often
bolstered by vigorous enforcement mechanisms that include financial
and administrative sanctions.27 Such safeguards are also included in the
data privacy policies of several international organizations, including the
United Nations and its specialized agencies, the OECD, and the ASEAN.28
While these regulatory developments have not yet established a binding
international standard for data privacy protection,29 the wide adoption of
key provisions makes them relevant to the analysis of coalition IS, and
we review them below in Part I.

25

26
27

28

29

IS for coalition operations is, of course, governed by additional cyber security and military
field security requirements beyond those included in data privacy regimes. See supra note 12.
Further study is needed of the confluence of these requirements with data privacy “technical
and organizational measures.”
See Data Protection Laws of the World, DLA Piper, https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/
(last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
See International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP), Global Privacy and Data Protection
Enforcement Database, https://iapp.org/resources/global-privacy-and-data-protection-
enforcement-database/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2021).
Alexander Beck & Christopher Kuner, Data Protection in International Organizations and the New
UNHCR Data Protection Policy: Light at the End of the Tunnel? EJIL: Talk! Aug. 31, 2015. See also
Privacy Policy, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/privacy/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2022); ASEAN Data
Management Framework and Model Contractual Clauses on Cross Border Data Flows, Personal Data
Protection Comm., https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/help-and-resources/2021/01/asean-data-management-framework-and-model-contractual-clauses-on-cross-border-data-flows (last visited
Jan. 12, 2022). Examples of regional treaties include the Council of Europe’s Convention for the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and the African Union
Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection. See Comm. of Ministers, Modernised
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, 128th Sess.,
https://edoc.coe.int/en/international-law/7729-convention-108-convention-for-the-protection-of-individuals-with-regard-to-the-processing-of-personal-data.html; African Union
Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection, June 27, 2014, 56 I.L.M. 166.
For an assessment of the current state of data privacy protections under international law in
general, and international human rights law in particular, see Ana Beduschi, Rethinking Digital
Identity for Post-COVID-19 Societies: Data Privacy and Human Rights Considerations, 3 Data & Pol’y 15
(2022); and Kirby Abbott, A Brief Overview of Legal Interoperability Challenges for NATO Arising from
the Interrelationship Between IHL and IHRL in Light of the European Convention on Human Rights, 96
Int’l R ev. R ed Cross, no. 893, Mar. 2014, at 107.
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Although less immediately obvious than the operational challenges,
the legal vulnerabilities caused by insufficient protections for data privacy
are also critical for coalitions. Despite the widespread adoption of similar
legal safeguards, domestic regimes differ in their substantive definitions
of data privacy.30 Take the example of one member’s law forbidding a person with a background of specified illnesses to use certain weapons, and
another’s forbidding the sharing of such medical information. Another
example is the differences in the legality of mapping the geolocation
of combatants who are on leave from active service. Such instances are
critical to the viability of coalition operations, yet they increasingly reflect
differences of approach to privacy issues at the national level.

C STRUCTURE
The structure of the chapter proceeds as follows. Part I briefly reviews
the concept of legal interoperability for joint operations, beginning with
IHL interoperability and deriving some principles for data privacy using
an analysis of the GDPR and Institutional GDPR regimes. Part II provides
a case study of NATO’s coalition IS, including some current data privacy
developments. Finally, in the chapter’s conclusion it is proposed that, due
to the present state of data privacy regulation at both the domestic and
international levels, coalition members should be bound to apply privacy
protections in accordance with their respective domestic regimes, as they
share combatant information via IS platforms.

30

See Mary Sanford & Taha Yasseri, The Kaleidoscope of Privacy: Differences across French, German,
UK and US GDPR Media Discourse (Working Paper arXiv:2104.04074, 2021), https://arxiv.org/
pdf/2104.04074.pdf; Eugenia Ha Rim Rho, Alfred Kobsa & Carolyn Nguyen, Differences in Online
Privacy & Security Attitudes based on Economic Living Standards: A Global Study of 24 Countries
(26th European Conference on Information Systems, Research Paper No. 95, 2018),
https://eugeniarho.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ECIS-rho.pdf.
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I

APPLICABLE LEGAL REGIMES AND
LEGAL INTEROPERABILITY
A THE RATIONALE FOR LEGAL
INTEROPERABILITY OF COALITION
OPERATIONS
The rationale for ensuring the legal interoperability of military coalitions
is based not only on rule-of-law considerations, but also on the practical
interests of coalition participants. Goddard succinctly summarizes this
confluence:
[I]ndividual States may be responsible in law for some, though
not necessarily all, of the activities conducted under the
auspices of a coalition of which they are a part. As a result,
each coalition member has a particular interest in satisfying
itself, to its own standards, as to the lawfulness of the conduct
for which it may be held responsible. Because the legality of
conduct attributable to a State must be considered in light of
that State’s own legal obligations, substantive legal differences
can arise between coalition members [and] the members
may differ in how they interpret those obligations and how,
or even if, they are to be fulfilled. Therefore, while taking
account of legal differences is an important component of legal
interoperability, the challenge ultimately concerns the need for
States to protect their own legal interests, while minimizing the
impact on the effectiveness of operations.31
States’ “own legal interests” are, of course, wide-ranging. The analysis in this section focuses on the challenges of legal interoperability in
coalitions, beginning with IHL and then deriving some implications for
data privacy regimes.32

31
32

David Goddard, Understanding the Challenge of Legal Interoperability in Coalition Operations, 9
J. Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y 211, 212 (2017) (emphasis added).
On this point, see also ICRC Challenges, supra note 13; and Marten Zwanenberg, International
Humanitarian Law Interoperability in Multinational Operations, 95 Int’l R ev. R ed Cross, no.
891/892, Dec. 2013, at 681.

236

Deborah A. Housen-Couriel

B LEGAL INTEROPERABILITY IN COALITION
OPERATIONS FOR IHL: TRADITIONAL
APPROACHES AND THE CURRENT DEBATE
Military coalitions operate under complex, multilayered legal frameworks.
Even where coalition members agree on operational objectives, they
may disagree about the legal classification of the conflict—for instance,
whether a given conflict should be defined as international or non-international, humanitarian assistance or border security, or one of the “new
forms of conflict, for which there may be no ready characterization.”33 In
addition to differences in the applicability of specific treaty obligations,
States also adopt diverse approaches to their interpretations of IHL, such
as the determination of the necessity of joint military actions, the choice
of targets, and the classification of certain individuals as combatants.
Goddard concludes that:
even where States’ substantive [IHL] obligations are the same,
there is still significant latitude for divergence in the positions
they adopt. Such differences may not be… known—or even
knowable—in advance of a particular operation. However, they
ultimately lead to situations where specific conduct may be
deemed lawful by some States within a coalition, but unlawful
by others.34
To address these gaps, mechanisms have evolved for the coordination
and management of coalition members’ diverse legal positions regarding IHL. For instance, members may specifically agree on applicability
and interpretation in the documentation authorizing operations. They
may declare national “caveats,” which reflect IHL interpretations that
restrict one member’s troops’ actions without constraining other members.35 In cases where national interpretations of IHL are incompatible, coalition members may “red-flag” operations or their own troops’
participation in them.36 One example of the acuteness and relevance of
the academic and practitioner debate around IHL interoperability is the
NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) coalition operations
33
34
35
36

Laurie R. Blank, Complex Legal Frameworks and Complex Operational Challenges: Navigating the
Applicable Law Across the Continuum of Military Operations, 26 E mory Int’l L. R ev. 87, 87 (2012).
Goddard, supra note 31, at 228. See also Zwanenberg, supra note 32 (providing several examples).
Marius Frost-Nielsen, Conditional Commitments: Why States Use Caveats to Reserve Their Efforts in
Military Coalition Operations, 38 Contemp. Sec. Pol’y 371 (2017).
Steven Hill & David Lemetayer, Legal Issues of Multinational Military Operations: An Alliance
Perspective, 55 M il. L. & L. War R ev. 13 (2016).
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in Afghanistan. At the height of coalition operations, more than 130,000
troops from 51 countries participated in extended and varied operations
on the basis of a number of UN Security Council resolutions.37 Although
some of the previously mentioned interoperability mechanisms were
employed, conflicts of IHL interpretation among coalition participants
were ongoing and included, inter alia, the rules on detention of combatants
and non-combatants,38 targeting,39 and rules of engagement.40
Thus, the current debate around IHL interoperability is by no means
settled. Both scholars and practitioners remain concerned about the
potential effects of gaps in both the pragmatics and the legitimacy of
coalition operations.41 A central element of the controversy is the applicability of international human rights law during armed conflicts (including
the data privacy rights of the adversary’s combatants and civilians), either
as part of IHL, as lex specialis, or in parallel with IHL, in accordance with
combatants’ domestic law regimes. This important topic is set aside for
the purposes of the present analysis. Nevertheless, the mechanisms which
have developed for legal interoperability have already become integral
to coalition management. We now explore their relevance for managing
coalition diversity in the context of data privacy.

C DATA PRIVACY PROTECTIONS APPLICABLE
TO COALITION OPERATIONS
The applicability of data privacy safeguards on the part of military organizations in wartime provides a special case of the IHL interoperability
issues touched on in the previous section.42 Data privacy rights under IHL
for the adversary’s combatants and civilians will be examined briefly.
However, current gaps in the interpretation of this issue are complex
and preclude IHL’s reliable safeguarding of these rights at present. Our
core analysis thus focuses on data privacy protections that lie outside
of IHL: those rights enjoyed by coalition combatants as data subjects of
37
38
39
40
41
42

See ISAF’s Mission in Afghanistan (2001–2014), NATO, Aug. 19, 2021, 14:41, https://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm.
Marco Sassòli, The International Legal Framework for Stability Operations: When May International
Forces Attack or Detain Someone in Afghanistan? 39 Isr. Y.B. H. Rts. 177 (2009).
Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting and International Humanitarian Law in Afghanistan, 39 Isr. Y.B. H.
Rts. 99 (2009).
Robin Geiss & Michael Siegrist, Has the Armed Conflict in Afghanistan Affected the Rules on the Conduct
of Hostilities? 93 Int’l R ev. R ed Cross, no. 881, March 2011, at 11.
Hill & Lemetayer, supra note 36; Goddard, supra note 31; Zwanenberg, supra note 32.
See Patrick Mello, National Restrictions in Multinational Military Operations: A Conceptual Framework,
40 Contemp. Sec. Pol’y 38, 49 (2019) (analyzing structural, procedural and operational restrictions on interoperability, he categorizes national legal constraints as “structural”).
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their respective national data privacy regimes, using the GDPR and the
Institutional GDPR as sample regulatory paradigms.

1

IHL and Data Privacy for Adversary’s Combatants and
Non-Combatants: Current Gaps
The current legal guidance on the impact of personal data privacy
regulation on the conduct of armed conflict is minimal. Several scholars
have recently analyzed aspects of personal data privacy under IHL as it
applies to an adversary’s combatants and civilians (e.g., combatants’
families, civilian casualties, NGO personnel).43 For instance, in reviewing
the ICRC’s database of customary IHL, Asaf Lubin has concluded that,
at present, this authoritative source “excludes any real mention of privacy within the 161 rules it identifies as constituting the common core
of humanitarian law binding on all parties to all armed conflicts today”
and that “[s]uch lack of regulation is troubling.”44 He proposes that “the
pace of technological innovation is outmatching the intellectual stamina
and regulatory capacities of IHL rule-prescribers and rule-appliers” and
that a review of the relationship of IHL to data privacy rights “is long
overdue.”45 Geiss and Lahmann concur.46
Furthermore, data privacy analysis under IHL so far has focused
on non-combatants’ rights and their potential abuses by belligerents,
such as a ransomware attack against a hospital that leaks non-combatants’ personal health data; belligerents’ surveillance of their adversary’s
civilian email communications; and the ongoing collection of biometric
data at military checkpoints from the civilian population by an occupier.47 These examples exclusively implicate the privacy rights of the
43

44
45
46

47

See, e.g., Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 22; H andbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian
Action (Christopher Kuner & Massimo Marelli eds., 2d ed. 2020); Adriana-Maria Sandru &
Daniel-Mihail Sandru, Humanitarian Law and Personal Data Protection, 18 Pandectele Romane
58, 58–66 (2018) (Romanian); Asaf Lubin, The Rights to Privacy and Data Protection under International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, in R esearch H andbook on Human R ights and
Humanitarian L aw: F urther R eflections and Perspectives 464 (Robert Kolb, Gloria Gaggioli
& Pavle Kilibarda eds., 2022).
Lubin, id., at 464.
Id.
Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 22 (“A complete collapse of privacy during armed conflict, as a consequence of adversarial military cyber operations, would be a paradigm shift of how wars are fought
and could in principle conceivably lead to a paralysis of the targeted civilian society at large”).
See id.; M ichael N. S chmitt (Ed.), Tallinn M anual 2.0 on the International L aw A pplicable to C yber Operations 189–90 (2017); Lubin, supra note 43, at 483–86. In a troubling
example of a violation of non-combatants’ privacy rights, reports indicate that U.S. military
officials supplied the Taliban with a list of “American citizens, green card holders and Afghan
allies” to expedite the evacuation of those individuals from Afghanistan in the wake of the U.S.
withdrawal in autumn 2021. However, this undoubtedly violated the data privacy of civilians in
a life-threatening context. See Lara Seligman, Alexander Ward & Andrew Desiderio, U.S. Officials
Provided Taliban with Names of Americans, Afghan Allies to Evacuate, Politico, Aug. 26, 2021, https://
www.politico.com/news/2021/08/26/us-officials-provided-taliban-with-names-of-americans-
afghan-allies-to-evacuate-506957.
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adversary’s non-combatants under IHL. The privacy protections that
might be required for a belligerent’s own combatants in bello, including
coalition operations, have been largely unexplored.

2

Combatants as Data Subjects under National Data Protection Laws
Coalition combatants are not only subject to their country’s interpretation and application of IHL in the context of their military conduct: they
also act under the jurisdiction of their nation’s domestic laws, including
those relating to personal data privacy. Moreover, examples are emerging
of the adoption of formal privacy policies for national armies that sharpen
the status of combatants as subjects of such domestic privacy laws.48
The GDPR regime that is used as a basis for the present analysis is
founded on an understanding of the right of the individual (the “data subject”) to personal data protections as a matter of his or her fundamental
human rights and dignity.49 These include consent to the use, storage, and
transfer (“processing”) of personal data by commercial and governmental
entities. Processing must be secure, in accordance with specific technical
and organizational measures such as encryption and access management
(referred to in the introduction to this chapter). These measures must
be transparent to data subjects, who have the right to correct and delete
information and to object to certain types of processing.50 They also enjoy
options for remedying any abuse of these rights, including the right to
lodge a complaint with supervisory authorities, the right to an effective
judicial remedy, and the right to compensation where organizational
liability for the breach of privacy rights has been established. These and
other data subject rights are all supported by robust enforcement mechanisms, including heavy fines for organizations’ violation of mandated
safeguards, be they private or governmental entities.51
Data subject rights under GDPR-type privacy protection regimes are,
of course, not absolute. A full review of the instances where these rights

48

49
50
51

Two instances are the UK’s Ministry of Defence Privacy Notice, which applies to all personal data
processed by the Army’s Personnel Campaign Office for all defense functions and “maintaining
and administering Her Majesty’s Armed Forces” (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
ministry-of-defence-privacy-notice/mod-privacy-notice); and the Australian Government’s
Ministry of Defense Privacy Policy (May 2021), https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/
files/2021-03/Defence-Privacy-Policy.pdf (Austl.). The U.S. Department of Defense’s Data
Strategy does not directly mention personal data privacy: it addresses “data interoperability”
with coalition members, stating: “Properly exchanging data between systems and maintaining
semantic understanding are critical for successful decision-making and joint military operations.” U.S. Dep’t of Defense, E xecutive Summary: DoD Data Strategy 8 (2020), https://
media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/08/2002514180/-1/-1/0/DOD-DATA-STRATEGY.PDF.
GDPR, id., recitals 1, 2, 4.
GDPR, supra note 14, ch. 3, “Rights of the data subject.”
For the liability of governmental entities, see Institutional GDPR, supra note 14, art. 66.
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are limited or superseded is beyond the scope of the present article. However, examples in which processing of personal data by an organization
remains lawful without the need for data subject consent include law
enforcement (criminal investigations), where required by statute (reporting to tax authorities), and where an overriding public interest exists.
Military activities, including coalition tasks, may also permit exemptions
from safeguards, but they are by no means completely excluded from the
applicability of data privacy rules, as we shall explore in the following
section.

3

The Case of GDPR/Institutional GDPR
Applicability to Military Uses of Combatants’ Personal Data
At this juncture, we turn to an analysis of the GDPR and Institutional
GDPR applicability to the processing of military coalition combatants’
personal data, where coalition member states are also members of the EU
and thus bound by these two regulatory measures. The outcome clarifies
which military coalition activities fall under their ambit (and, as relevant,
the national GDPR laws transposing them) to safeguard combatants’
personal data. These include NATO treaty obligations of EU member States
(including coalition operations), some additional multilateral coalition
operations, European Defense Agency activities, and EU permanent structured military and security cooperation (see examples below). Figure 2
provides a schematic matrix of the textual analysis herein.
At first glance, there is an explicit exemption from GDPR applicability to the processing of personal data by military bodies. Article 2(2), in
establishing the material scope of the GDPR, states that the regulation
does not apply to processing for “…activities which fall within the scope
of Chapter 2 of Title V of the [Treaty of the European Union, or TEU],” the
chapter which addresses common EU foreign and security policy.52 Thus
military entities which process combatants’ personal information within
the framework of this common policy—for example, in UN peacekeeping missions, collective self-defense operations under Article 51 of the
UN Charter, and humanitarian and rescue tasks—are ostensibly exempt
from GDPR provisions.
Yet, notably, that is not the case. In circumstances in which EU
governmental authorities, including military entities, are the data controllers, Article 2(3) of the GDPR explicitly transfers the bulk of its data

52

Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union arts. 23–46, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J.
(C 326) 1 [hereinafter TEU].
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protection safeguards to the complementary Institutional GDPR regime.53
The legal effect is to in fact ensure privacy protections for data processing
by military entities, even under the abovementioned TEU provisions.
Thus, the Institutional GDPR takes up the applicability-to-coalitioncombatants issue where the GDPR has left off. It applies data privacy
protections to activities listed under TEU Articles 42(2)-(7), 45, and 46,54
including:

• The framing of a common EU defense policy
• NATO treaty obligations (including coalition operations)
• EU civilian and military capabilities for implementing the common
security and defense policy (including some multinational forces)

• European Defense Agency (EDA) operations, and
• EU permanent structured military and security cooperation
(PESCO) operations.
Examples of such activities are the EDA development of a human resources
management software tool for EU missions and operations,55 an airborne
medical evacuation program;56 and PESCO projects for a joint mobile
military transport coordination hub, a European Medical Command, and
military command (operating “either independently or in cooperation
with NATO”).57 Further emphasizing the applicability of the Institutional
GDPR to the above coalition operations, the EDA’s organizational privacy
policy specifies that it processes personal data in accordance with the
Institutional GDPR, while its privacy statement details GDPR-based data
subject rights with respect to the personal data processed by the EDA.58
53

54

55
56
57

58

“For the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies,
Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 [superseded by the Institutional GDPR] applies.” See GDPR, supra
note 14, art. 2(3).
The Institutional GDPR excludes some specified types of common EU foreign and security
policy missions. The exempted missions under TEU Articles 42(1), 43, and 44 are: Article 42(1),
“missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter”; and Articles
43 and 44, “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and
assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, [and] tasks of combat forces in
crisis management”; and related joint “tasks.”
Eur. Def. Agency, Fact Sheet: J1 F unctional A rea Service, July 10, 2017, https://eda.europa.
eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2017-07-10-factsheet_j1fas.
Eur. Def. Agency, Fact Sheet: A irmedevac, Feb. 6, 2019, https://eda.europa.eu/docs/defaultsource/eda-factsheets/2019-02-06-factsheet-airmedevac.
PESCO, supra note 8. Asked about data protection policies for these programs, a PESCO project
official responded that “…the interactions between Member States via email in the project follow
normal procedures, where data protection is ensured.” Email with PESCO Project Official
(Oct. 8, 2021) (on file with author).
See Data Protection, Eur. Def. Agency, https://eda.europa.eu/who-we-are/how-we-work/
data-protection (last visited Sept. 14, 2021).
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Applicability Issue
for Combatants who
are EU Data Subjects

Conclusion/Outcome

Definition of
“personal data”

Identical GDPR and Institutional GDPR Art. 4(1)
definitions

Art. 3(1)

Applicability in general

The GDPR does not apply when EU
“institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies,” including military entities,
process personal data of combatants.

Arts. 2(1)
and 3

GDPR

Art. 2(3)

Institutional
GDPR

The Institutional GDPR applies.
Institutional GDPR
applicability to EU
data subjects who are
combatants

The Institutional GDPR applies to
–
the framing of a common EU defense
policy, NATO treaty obligations (incl.
coalition operations), EU civilian
and military capabilities (incl. some
multinational forces), EDA operations,
and PESCO operations.

TEU Arts.
42(2)–(7),
45, 46

Exceptions to
Institutional GDPR
applicability to EU
data subjects who are
combatants

The exempted missions in Arts.
42(1), 43, and 44 TEU include
peacekeeping missions outside the
EU; joint disarmament operations;
humanitarian, rescue, military advice
and assistance tasks; tasks relating
to conflict prevention, peacekeeping,
crisis management; and additional
joint tasks

Art. 2

–

Figure 2. Schematic Analysis of the Interaction between the GDPR and Institutional GDPR with
respect to Combatants’ Personal Data Protection

This applicability of the Institutional GDPR to some EU combatants thus
provides an example of a non-military data privacy regime that specifically extends its safeguards into the context of joint military operations,59
including NATO coalition operations, which are reviewed as a case study
in the following section.

59

The practical application of these safeguards is still developing. See, e.g., Sebastian Cymutta,
Biometric Data Processing by the German Armed Forces during Deployment, CCDCOE (2021). With
respect to future regulatory developments, see TEU, supra note 52, art. 39 (establishing that “the
[EU] Council shall adopt a decision laying down the rules relating to the protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data” for security and defense activities which are
presently exempted).
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II

THE NATO CASE STUDY FOR
COALITION INFORMATION SHARING:
CURRENT DATA PRIVACY
CHALLENGES
A OPERATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY FOR
INFORMATION SHARING IN NATO COALITIONS
Information sharing among NATO coalition members constitutes an integral part of the organization’s mission.60 It takes place within the over
arching, NATO-wide coordination of members’ forces that is implemented
on an ongoing basis,61 through the adoption of a wide variety of technical
interoperability standards and other measures to support common missions.62 NATO coalitions provide an especially interesting challenge to
data privacy interoperability, as coalition members are subject to diverse
domestic regimes: not only the EU regimes reviewed above but also,
inter alia, the U.S.’s Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996 (HIPAA),63 Canada’s Personal Information and Protection and
Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA),64 and Turkey’s Law on Personal
Data Protection of 2016.65
Interoperability specifications for information sharing are established
via the adoption by all coalition members of NATO Interoperability Standards and Profiles (NISP).66 Members submit the standards and technical
specifications required by each national military force, which are then
merged into a common NISP prescribing “the necessary technical standards and profiles to achieve interoperability of Communications and
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Szilveszter Szeleczki, Interpreting the Interoperability of NATO’s Communication and Information
Systems, 24 S ci. Bull., June 2019, at 95.
Hill & Lemetayer, supra note 36.
Paddy Larkin & Jan Bartels, A Foreign Perspective on Legal Interoperability, A rmy L aw., no. 2, 2020,
at 40.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1939
(1996) [hereinafter HIPPA].
Personal Information and Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c 5 (Can.)
[hereinafter PIPEDA].
Law on Personal Data Protection, Law No. 6698, Official Gazette 29677 (Mar. 24, 2016) (Turk.)
[hereinafter T urkey LPDP].
NATO, ADatP-34, 1 NATO Interoperability Standards and Profiles: Introduction (M. ed.
2020) [hereinafter NISP 1]; NATO, ADatP-34, 2 NATO Interoperability Standards and
Profiles: Agreed Interoperability Standards and Profiles (M. ed. 2020) [hereinafter
NISP 2]; NATO, ADatP-34, 3 NATO Interoperability Standards and Profiles: C andidate
Interoperability Standards and Profiles (M. ed. 2020) [hereinafter NISP 3].

244

Deborah A. Housen-Couriel

Information Systems in support of NATO’s missions and operations.”67
This technical coordination is mandatory.68
Thus, NATO promotes operational interoperability among coalition
members, creating and maintaining a collaborative coalition information
system.69 The interoperability is an iterative process: an annual revision
is prescribed,70 and ad hoc Requests for Change can be made by coalition
members, should their national requirements change.71 Hundreds of NISP
standards have been instituted through this process: a key example is
the Secure Communications Interoperability Protocol.72
Several NISP standards also have clear implications for personal
data privacy. These include the standards for Biometrics Data Interchange, Watchlisting and Reporting;73 Captured Persons, Materiel and
Documents;74 Machine Readable Travel Documents;75 Geolocation API
Specification;76 Authentication Methods and Security Mechanisms;77 Definition of the inetOrgPerson LDAP Object Class;78 and User Location.79
All of these types of IS require the coalition members to process personal data, either of NATO coalition combatants, adversary combatants,
or both. However, their legal interoperability is not explicitly addressed
as part of the NISP process.80 A turning point is approaching that will
require a more transparent NISP or other NATO process for coordination
of domestic law privacy mandates, driven partially by the Covid-19 pandemic. Recently, NATO has developed IS capabilities in tracking pandemic
breakouts among combatants that may affect coalition capabilities—an
example to which we will return below.
67
68
69
70
71

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
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This takes place in accordance with Alliance C3 Strategy (Ref. C-M(2014)0016) all NATO
Enterprise (ref. C-M(2014)0061)).
NISP 1, supra note 66, at 3, Provision is also made for conflict resolution (at 1).
NISP 2, supra note 66, at 3.
Id. at 8.
These interoperability standards and profiles must support NATO’s Consultation, Command
and Control (C3) interoperability and related “common funded Communication and Information
Systems... including their development and operations.” NISP 1, supra note 66, at 8.
NATO, Secure Communications Interoperability Protocol, Mar. 3, 2017,
https://nisp.nw3.dk/standard/nato-acomp-5068-ed.a-v2.html.
NATO, Biometrics Data, Interchange, Watchlisting and R eporting, Oct. 4, 2013,
https://nisp.nw3.dk/standard/nato-aedp-15-ed.a-v1.html.
NATO, C aptured Persons, M ateriel and D ocuments, Aug. 8, 2007, https://nisp.nw3.dk/
standard/nato-ajp-2.5-ed.a.html.
M achine R eadable Passport (2008), ISO/IEC 7501-1:2008, https://www.iso.org/
standard/45562.html.
Geolocation API Specification (W3C Working Draft, 2021), https://www.w3.org/TR/geolocation/.
Internet Eng’g Task Force (IETF), Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (2006), RFC 4513:2006,
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4513.txt.
Internet Eng’g Task Force (IETF), Definition of inetOrgPerson LDAP Object Class (2000), RFC
2798:2000, https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2798.txt. “LDAP” refers to a Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol that enables data location for individuals, groups and other resources on a given network.
Joe Hildebrand & Peter Saint-Andre, XEP-0080: User Location (v.1.9, 2021), https://xmpp.org/
extensions/xep-0080.html.
See id. at 9, 17 (noting the criterion for approval of non-NATO standards: “Some key criteria for
inclusion of non-NATO standards... [are f]reedom from legal issues”).
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B NATO LEGAL INTEROPERABILITY IN
THE IHL CONTEXT: RAMIFICATIONS
FOR DATA PRIVACY
Colonel Kirby Abbott, who has served as assistant legal adviser at NATO’s
military headquarters, writes that “[t]here is no NATO doctrinal definition of ‘legal interoperability’” beyond the ability of NATO States to work
together in an operation.81 Abbott argues that while such interoperability
has been possible in the past, the present challenges of members’ legal
diversity with respect to their IHL and international human rights law
requirements make such harmonized cooperation unfeasible and “will
[eventually] hinder operational interoperability.”82 Other observers concur
with Abbot’s assessment.83
This is a troubling lacuna. The mechanisms for bridging legal gaps
among members via caveats and red flags, discussed in Part I above, allow
for a certain degree of legal interoperability, but they are unsatisfactory
in the long term, as they skew the assumption of operational risk to the
detriment of coalition members whose troops are fully engaged with the
joint mission. This shortcoming is also indicative of the difficulty facing
coalitions for the implementation of the legal interoperability of personal
data privacy protections. In fact, as shown above, NATO has not yet incorporated data privacy protections into the NISP database of operational
standards at the organizational level. Yet the current diversity of coalition members’ legal constraints is wide: the 30 NATO member countries
include 21 EU members, three additional countries that implement the
GDPR and the Institutional GDPR, and six countries with non-GDPR data
privacy laws: Albania,84 Canada,85 Montenegro,86 North Macedonia,87
Turkey,88 and the United States.89 The range of regulatory requirements
contained in these national laws, including the scope of any exclusions for
military personnel that may be engaged in coalition activities, constitutes
a substantive legal challenge for NATO and its members.
81
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Abbott, supra note 29, at 111.
Id.
See id.; Jerrod Fussnecker, The Effects of International Human Rights Law on the Legal Interoperability
of Multinational Military Operations, A rmy L aw., no. 5, May 2014, at 7; Victor Tunon, State Responsibility in NATO for the ECHR and Its Effect on Legal Interoperability, Dec. 31, 2019 (Master’s thesis,
Uppsala University), https://core.ac.uk/display/328383615.
Law No. 9887 on Protection of Personal Data (Mar. 10, 2008) (Alb.).
Pipeda, supra note 64.
Law on Protection of Personal Data, Official Journal of Montenegro, nos. 79/2008, 70/2009,
44/2012, 22/2017.
Law on Personal Data Protection, Official Gazette of the Republic of North Macedonia, no. 42/20.
T urkey LPDP, supra note 65.
HIPPA, supra note 63 (relating to personal health data, as there is no U.S. federal data privacy law).
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The time is fast approaching for NATO to address its legal responsibility for mapping and incorporating these variations into its coalition
IS platform. This necessity is highlighted by a relevant recent example
of NATO coalition members’ engagement with a specific data privacy
issue—as in so many other contexts, because of the Covid-19 pandemic.
In October 2020, the organization adapted its Health Information System at the full scale of coalition operations to promote “medical situational awareness” (e.g., monitoring combatants for Covid-19 infection).
Concurrently, the Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Communications and
Information Systems was also adopted by all NATO member States,90
requiring that personal data use be minimized, based on a risk assessment that explicitly balances “privacy, [UK] Caldicott, GDPR and security
considerations.”91 The Doctrine adds that IS “is likely to be constrained
by the national medical privacy regulations.”92 Currently, the creation
of an all-NATO electronic treatment record for combatants has been
delayed, pending the coordination of the privacy requirements of all
coalition members.93
This recent, Covid-19-related example is cogent. Although it has not
prompted formal caveats or red flags, NATO’s explicit recognition of GDPR
and other national privacy provisions as a constraint on the processing of
combatants’ personal medical data indicates, at the very least, a growing
organizational awareness of the need for legal interoperability for the
sharing of such data. This is a key development worth monitoring.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: DATA PRIVACY

CHALLENGES POSED BY THE INCREASING
DIGITIZATION OF WARFARE
Several points emerge from this analysis of legal interoperability as an
inherent aspect of coalition information sharing. For IHL interoperability,
necessity has been the mother of invention: coalitions have produced
mechanisms such as national caveats that allow, however imperfectly,
for a diversity of legal positions on the applicability of IHL while enabling
90
91
92
93

AJMedP-5, A llied Joint D octrine for M edical Communications and Information Systems
(B ed. 2020).
Id. n. 21.
Id. ¶ 5.4.b.
Id. 24.
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joint operations. For data privacy safeguards, substantive legal diversity is
now presenting a strategic challenge.94 The NATO case study is indicative,
as the sharing of pandemic-related personal health data of combatants
becomes a more transparent and critical coalition issue.
We have argued that the present state of personal privacy regulation at both the domestic law and international levels requires coalition
members, in sharing combatants’ information, to apply personal data
protections in accordance with their respective domestic privacy regimes.
This imperative is notwithstanding the need to resolve the inherent legal
ambiguity at the nexus of IHL, international human rights law, and
national data privacy protections for coalition IS platforms. This overarching issue awaits further work.
Moreover, present trends signal the increasing complexity and sensitivity of combatants’ digital identities, such as the overlapping of their
military and civilian digital personas and the tracking of pandemic-
related behavior. Perhaps most daunting are the future types of combatant data that may be shared on coalition IS platforms: deep biometrics
(DNA, haptics, and olfactory information); and a synthesis of combatants’ military status, tasks, and behavior, including their digital behavior
on social media and other non-military platforms (already seen in the
Strava hack).95 Even digital tracking of specific combatants’ use of digitized weaponry and the identities of those whom they have targeted may
become identifiable and thus shareable.
Beyond the typology of personal data into the future—and its operational and legal vulnerabilities— coalition IS platforms should continue to develop robust technical and operational measures to protect all
aspects of information sharing. As the legal accountability and overall
effectiveness of such platforms continue to develop and mature, so will
the incentives for coalition members’ trusted sharing of information,
including combatants’ personal data, to meet mission tasks and goals.

94
95

ICRC Challenges, supra note 13; and Zwanenberg, supra note 32.
See Hern, supra note 17; and Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 22.
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Data Protection
as an International
Legal Obligation
for International
Organizations:
The ICRC as
a Case Study
Asaf Lubin1

INTRODUCTION
On 16 February 2022, Robert Mardini, the Director-General of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) issued an open letter in which
he apologized for failing to adequately protect the servers that stored the
personal data of over 515,000 people worldwide.2 This cyber attack first
began on 9 November 2021 and involved a nation State that exploited a
known but unpatched vulnerability in a web-based office communications management program that the Red Cross was internally using for
1

2

Dr. Asaf Lubin is an Associate Professor of Law at Indiana University Maurer School of Law and
a Fellow at IU’s Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research. He is additionally an Affiliated Fellow
at Yale Law School’s Information Society Project, a Faculty Associate at the Berkman Klein Center
for Internet and Society at Harvard University, and a visiting Scholar at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem Federmann Cyber Security Research Center.
Statement: ICRC cyber-attack: Sharing our analysis, ICRC (Feb. 16, 2022) https://www.icrc.org/en/
document/icrc-cyber-attack-analysis [hereinafter: ICRC Cyberattack Statement]

249

Data Protection Obligations of International Organizations

work purposes.3 Those impacted by the attack included “missing people
and their families, detainees and others receiving services from the Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement as a result of armed conflict, natural
disasters, or migration.”4 Once inside the system the hackers installed
web shells to carry out “post-exploitation activities,” which included
among other things “compromising administrator credentials, moving
throughout the network, and exfiltrating registry and domain files.”5 Following the incident the ICRC launched a campaign to notify victims of the
data breach by the use of “phone calls, hotlines, public announcements,
letters and in some cases in-person visits to remote communities.”6
The cyber attack on the ICRC’s servers highlights the importance of
implementing and enforcing data protection and cybersecurity standards
in the work of international organizations (IOs). These entities engage in
a wide variety of data collection and processing work, that is only likely
to increase in scope and volume in the years to come, and which includes
personally indefinable information and confidential and sensitive materials. As Buchan and Tsagourias noted, “maintaining the confidentiality
of this information is critical to enabling the IO to discharge its tasks and
achieve its objectives.”7 This is especially true in the context of humanitarian action where “poor information management may spark violence
and discrimination… may lead to stigma and ultimately threaten the
actors’ reputation, putting both employees and beneficiaries at risk.”8
As this chapter will discuss, while some IOs have developed and put
in place data protection frameworks, the practice is far from uniform.
Even more troubling, the IOs that have introduced such frameworks have
not done so out of a sense of an international legal obligation. Rather,
data protection is introduced as a best practice or out of market or reputational demands. This chapter will explain why such a construction is
3

4
5
6

7

8

Carly Page, Red Cross says “state-sponsored” hackers exploited unpatched vulnerability,
Tech Crunch (Feb. 16, 2022), https://techcrunch.com/2022/02/16/red-cross-links-january-
cyberattack-to-state-sponsored-hackers/.
See ICRC Cyberattack Statement, supra note 2.
See Page, supra note 3.
See ICRC Cyberattack Statement, supra note 2. See also ICRC Rules on Personal Data
Protection, Art. 20: Data Breaches (updated and adopted by the ICRC Assembly on Dec. 19,
2019) (“(1) Any breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss or
alteration of — or to the unauthorized disclosure of, or access to — Personal Data transmitted,
stored or otherwise processed must always be reported to the ICRC Data Protection Office; (2)
The persons affected must be notified of a Data Breach by the Staff in Charge, in close coordination with the Data Protection Office, without undue delay when the Data Breach puts them at
particularly serious risk…”) [hereinafter: ICRC RPDP].
Russell Buchan and Nicholas Tsagourias, Hacking International Organizations: The Role of Privileges
and Immunities, A rticles of War (Dec. 14, 2021), https://lieber.westpoint.edu/hacking-inter
national-organizations-privileges-immunities/.
Theodora Gazi, Data to the rescue: how humanitarian aid NGOs should collect information based on the
GDPR, 5 J. Int’l Humanitarian Action 1 (2020),
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problematic for the further development of international data protection
law applicable in both war and peace.
While this chapter focuses on the ICRC as a case study, its arguments extend beyond this important organization. The past two decades
have seen a large number of IOs voluntarily adopting data protection
regimes, frameworks, and statements, including: The UN International
Organization for Migration (IOM),9 the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),10 the UN World Food Programme (WFP),11
the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA),12 Oxfam,13 and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).14 While these
organizations should be commended for their pioneering data protection
work, all of them have failed to explicitly opine on whether international law constrains their data collection and processing practices. As
a result, legal ambiguity remains as to the extent to which the practices
of these IOs are sufficient, by themselves, to generate customary norms
and expectations of behavior that could govern the actions of other IOs
and non-State actors.
This brief chapter follows a two-part structure. Part I focuses on
the needs for data protection frameworks in the work of humanitarian
actors and further highlights the core framework that governs the data
processing work of the ICRC. Part II shifts the discussion to the challenge
9

10

11

12

13

14

IOM was “one of the first international organizations to develop its own internal guidance
concerning data protection, the IOM Data Protection Principles in 2009.” See Data Protection,
IOM, https://www.iom.int/data-protection. In 2010 the IOM released an even broader articulation
of its data protection standards as part of the IOM Data Protection M anual (2010). The IOM
was further a member of the UN Privacy Policy Group (UN PPG), which released the UN Principles
on Personal Data Protection and Privacy. These principles were adopted by the UN High-Level
Committee on Management (HLCM) at its 36th Meeting on 11 October 2018. The principles
bind all members of the UN system and represent a high-level framework for the processing of
personal data.
See UNHCR Policy on the Protection of Personal Data of Persons of Concern to UNHCR
(May, 2015), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/55643c1d4.pdf; See also, UNHCR Guidance on
the P rotection of P ersonal Data of P ersons of C oncern to UNHCR (Aug. 2018), https://
www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=5b360f4d4. Since producing these two
overarching documents, the UNHCR has been one of the most prolific in generating specialized
data protection principles to address key aspects of its work. For example, consider the UNHCR
Procedural Standards for R efugee Status Determination under UNHCR’s M andate (Aug.
2020), https://www.unhcr.org/4317223c9.pdf.
See WFP Guide to Personal Data Protection and Privacy: Principles and operational
standards for the protection of beneficiaries’ personal data in WFP’s programming
(June, 2016), https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/e8d24e70cc11448383495caca154cb97/
download/.
See OCHA Center for Humanitarian Data, OCHA Data R esponsibility Guidelines
(Oct. 2021), https://data.humdata.org/dataset/2048a947-5714-4220-905b-e662cbcd14c8/
resource/60050608-0095-4c11-86cd-0a1fc5c29fd9/download/ocha-data-responsibility-guidelines_2021.pdf.
See Responsible Program Data Policy (Feb. 17, 2015), https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/
bitstream/handle/10546/575950/ml-oxfam-responsible-program-data-policy-en-270815.
pdf;jsessionid=A1F3301F89806B21BA1F5EB6F708DFAE?sequence=1.
See MSF Privacy and Personal Data Protection policy (Jan. 22, 2019), https://msfaccess.org/privacy-and-personal-data-protection-policy.
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of holding IOs accountable for potential privacy and data protection violations. This part explores both the general challenge of holding non-State
actors responsible for protecting and ensuring human rights law, and the
more specific concern in applying data protection rules as a matter of a
customary international legal obligation applicable to IOs. The chapter
concludes by briefly discussing the importance of recognizing data protection as an international legal obligation. This conclusion therefore
recommends that all IOs adopt data protection frameworks and that
they explicitly state that they have done so out of a sense of a binding
international legal rule.

I

DATA PROTECTION IN HUMANITARIAN
ACTION AND AT THE ICRC
The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement brings together
the ICRC and 192 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies as well
as their International Federation. As the largest humanitarian network in
the world, it has a global reach. The ICRC alone has 20,000 staff working
in over 100 countries.15 The organization’s work is based on the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 as well as on
the Movement’s statutes and the resolutions of the International Conferences of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. Its core mandate is to ensure
“humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of armed conflict
and other situations of violence” by promoting “respect for international
humanitarian law and its implementation in national law.”16
To achieve this mandate in the digital age the ICRC relies on extensive data collection, processing, storage, and dissemination. As Figure 1
demonstrates, this is prevalent across every aspect of the work undertaken by the ICRC and its sister societies: from the use of data analytics
and artificial intelligence to predict emergencies and allocate resources
for disaster relief, through the use of cash transfer programs and biometrics collection in the management of facilities for refugees and asylumseekers, all the way to the use of drones and social media applications in
15
16

See ICRC, The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, https://www.icrc.org/en/
who-we-are/movement.
See ICRC, Mandte and Mission, https://www.icrc.org/en/who-we-are/mandate.
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Figure 1. Use Cases for Humanitarian Data Processing. Source: H andbook on Data Protection in
Humanitarian Action 16-17 (C. Kuner & M. Marelli eds., 2nd ed., 2020).

the collection of evidence of abuses of rules of international humanitarian
law (IHL).
The 37th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy
Commissioners, which convened in Amsterdam in 2015, adopted a resolution on privacy and international humanitarian action. In their Explanatory Statement the Commissioners described the increased need for both
data in humanitarian action and rules to protect it:
Identifying people and personal data processing are an integral
part of the performance of the mission of humanitarian
actors. The introduction of technology increases the number,
nature and flow of data collected. In particular, this data is
used to improve knowledge of beneficiaries, strengthen the
effectiveness of humanitarian action and be accountable to
beneficiaries. This trend may be beneficial if properly framed
through privacy and data protection guarantees. However, if not
properly framed, it could jeopardize human rights protection…
Specific privacy and security risks are identified, including the
potential for development of monitoring systems, which could
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be increased by technologies such as management information
systems and electronic transfers; digital identity registration
and biometrics, mobile phones but also drones. Humanitarian
organizations not benefiting from Privileges and Immunities
may come under pressure to provide data collected for
humanitarian purposes to authorities wishing to use such data
for other purposes (for example control of migration flows and
the fight against terrorism). The risk of misuse of data may
have a serious impact on data protection rights of displaced
persons and can be a detriment to their safety, as well as to
humanitarian action more generally.
Strong data protection regimes and protocols will thus often complement
and reinforce humanitarian action. On occasion, however, there may be
“instances of friction” between the two. In such cases IOs will need to rely
on “specific working procedures” to “justify derogations from the principles and rights” recognized under personal data processing regimes.17
In other words, data protection frameworks should be seen as checks on
IOs’ effective execution of their mandates. When an IO introduces a new
data-intensive practice into its sphere of operations, such practice should
not result in counterproductive situations or undue risk of digital abuse
or physical harm. After all, humanitarian actors are expected to follow
the “do no harm” principle and to endeavor not to cause any further
damage or suffering as a result of their activities.18
Against this backdrop it is perhaps surprising to learn that the ICRC
only recently incorporated data protection norms and standards throughout the organization. The ICRC’s Rules on Personal Data Protection (hereinafter: RPDP) were adopted in 2015 and, at the time, were one of the
first comprehensive sets of data protection rules ever developed by a large
humanitarian organization. The framework was meant to enable the
ICRC “to remain at the forefront of international humanitarian action.”19
The framework itself echoes and mirrors parallel regional and international data protection regimes. It generates a set of institutions within
the ICRC with authority and capacity to ensure effective implementation

17
18

19

See H andbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian Action 29 (C. Kuner & M. Marelli eds.,
2nd ed., 2020) [hereinafter: Data Protection H andbook].
See generally, Jean Martial Bonis Charancle & Elena Lucchi, Incorporating the Principle of “Do
No Harm”: How to Take Action Without Causing Harm: Reflections on a Review of Humanity & Inclusion’s Practices (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/
donoharm_pe07_synthesis.pdf.
See ICRC RPDP, supra note 6, at 2.
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(including a Data Protection Office and a Data Protection Commission).20
It further establishes a set of principles to be followed by the ICRC in the
conduct of its work:
1. Lawful, Fair, and Transparent Processing.21
2. Requirements for Specification and Minimization of Data.22
3. Requirements for Adequate and Relevant Data Storage.23
4. End-to-End Safeguards around Retention, Deletion, and
Archiving.24
5. Data Subject Rights to Information, Access, Correction,
Objection, Deletion, and in the context of Profiling.25
6. Data Protection Impact Assessments and Documentation
Requirements.26
7. Specialized Rules for Data Breaches, Data Security, and Data
Transfers.27
Within the limits of this chapter, I am unable provide a detailed account
of this framework. Overall, however, the rules are designed “to reduce
the risk of unauthorized use or access to personal data” by requiring
the ICRC to follow “a ‘data protection by design’ approach.”28 Such an
approach seeks “to minimize the collection of personal data to that which
is necessary for the operation and ensure that data subjects’ rights are
respected.”29

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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Id., at 25-27 (Articles 26-28).
Id., at 5-6 (Articles 1-2).
Id., at 6 (Article 3).
Id., at 7 (Articles 4-5).
Id., at 8 (Article 6).
Id., at 11-15 (Articles 7-14).
Id., at 18 (Articles 17-18).
Id., at 19-23 (Articles 20-25).
Q&A: Humanitarian operations, the spread of harmful information and data protection: In conversation with
Delphine van Solinge, the ICRC’s Protection Advisor on Digital Risks for Populations in Armed Conflict, and
Massimo Marelli, Head of the ICRC’s Data Protection Office, 102 Int’l R ev. R ed Cross 27, 34 (2020).
Id.
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II

THE CHALLENGE OF HOLDING IOS
ACCOUNTABLE FOR DATA PROTECTION
VIOLATIONS
In 2018 the Brussels Privacy Hub and the Data Protection Office of the
ICRC joined forces to produce a “Handbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian Action.” The handbook, now in its second edition, was produced
with the desire to serve as a “useful tool to raise awareness and assist
humanitarian organizations in complying with personal data protection standards.”30 The handbook was “inspired by a wide variety of data
protection instruments”31—including the RPDP—“without being based
solely on any single one of them.”32
The handbook was explicit in suggesting that IOs are shielded from
any meaningful domestic obligations concerning data protection. In the
view of the editors, IOs “enjoy privileges and immunities to ensure they
can perform the mandate attributed to them by the international community under international law in full independence and are not covered by
the jurisdiction of the countries in which they work. They can therefore
process Personal Data according to their own rules, subject to the internal
monitoring and enforcement of their own compliance systems; in this
regard they constitute their own ‘jurisdiction’.”33
The ICRC therefore does not consider itself bound by any domestic
legal obligation to employ data protection standards. Any norms internalized are voluntary, non-binding, and reflective of “recognized best
practices.”34 The ICRC further invites other international humanitarian
organizations to follow this interpretive guidance. The ICRC therefore
strongly believes that IOs’ privileges and immunities should trump any
external accountability or legal enforcement. Article 19 of the RPDP is in
fact clear about that. While it does not preclude the possibility of cooperation with national or regional data protection authorities (DPAs), the
Article simultaneously affirms that the ICRC “cannot be compelled to
30
31

32
33
34

Data Protection H andbook, supra note 17, at 11.
Christoper Kuner & Massimo Marelli, Creating International Frameworks for Data Protection: The
ICRC/Brussels Privacy Hub Handbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian action, EJIL: Talk! (July
13, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/creating-international-frameworks-for-data-protection-the-icrcbrussels-privacy-hub-handbook-on-data-protection-in-humanitarian-action/.
Id.
Data Protection H andbook, supra note 17, at 35.
Id.
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disclose any information acquired while carrying out its work.”35 Instead
of relying on external bodies like DPAs or local courts, the ICRC created the
Data Protection Commission as the authority responsible to interpret the
RPDP and to render decisions about their implementation, in particular
in the context of arbitrating complaints by data subjects.36
It should be noted that the question of the applicability to IOs of
domestic and regional data protection regimes, like the European General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), is far from settled. “There is little
precedent dealing with whether EU data protection law can apply to IOs”
as these questions have “not arisen often in practice.”37 At least some
scholars take the position that the application of these regimes to IOs
“cannot be automatically excluded.”38
Even assuming arguendo that IOs’ privileges and immunities supersede any domestic application of data protection rules, such exclusion
does not extend to international obligations. This is a crucial point so far
ignored in prior discourse. All of the IOs who have produced internal data
protection regimes have so far failed to address two crucial questions:
(1) To what extent does data protection constitute a human right that is
reflective of customary international law; (2) assuming that it is, could the
obligations derived from that right extend to non-State actors, such as IOs.
Both of these points are highly controversial. As I have written
elsewhere:
Differences in legal cultures and perceptions mean there is still
a lack of international consensus about basic questions of privacy and data protection, and there is still considerable fragmentation concerning core principles that govern this space.
As such there is difficulty to verify the existence of any one
principle as reflective of custom as a matter of “general practice accepted as law” under Article 38(1)(B) of the ICJ Statute.39
In other words, it is at least an ongoing question whether we can even
articulate the right to data protection as a customary human right of
relevance for our analysis. That said, it is certainly a possibility that over
35
36
37
38
39

See ICRC RPDP, supra note 6, at 18 (Article 19).
Id., at 27 (Article 28).
Christopher Kuner, International Organizations and the EU General Data Protection Regulation, 16
Int’l Org. L. R ev. 158, 187 (2019).
Id., at 188.
Asaf Lubin, The Rights to Privacy and Data Protection under IHL and HRL, in R esearch H andbook on
Human R ights and Humanitarian L aw: F urther R eflections and Perspectives 463, 475
(Robert Kolb, Gloria Gaggioli, & Pavle Kilibarda eds., 2022).
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time the obligation could crystallize as more and more nations adopt data
protection as a mandatory legal framework. Let us therefore proceed for
the sake of argument with the assumption that the right to data protection is, or might become in the future, a right of customary character.
Even then, there will be a set of challenges applying the right to the
ICRC as an IO. International human rights law (IHRL) generally places
primary obligations on States. IOs “are rarely formal parties to human
rights treaties, which usually address states and are drafted with the
characteristics of states in mind.”40 Surely UN organs, which are bound
by the Charter might be required to comply with human rights obligations
as they are derived from the Charter.41 Other human rights obligations
might be considered jus cogens and therefore binding on all IOs. Data
protection as a right, however, does not seem to be a good contender for
a jus cogens status. Nor can data protection meaningfully be described as
an obligation neatly derived from the general and vague commitments
to human rights enshrined under the Charter.
More progressive interpretations of the human rights obligations
of IOs do exist. These interpretations cite to “evolving practice in the
Security Council and in the reports of some special rapporteurs”42 which
“increasingly consider that under certain circumstances non-State actors
can also be bound by international human rights law and can assume, voluntarily or not, obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights.”43
In any event, the point of this brief discussion is only to demonstrate
the doctrinal complexity of trying to rely on international law, namely
on customary rules of IHRL, to further cement the obligations of IOs to
proactively produce and effectively enforce data protection standards in
both peacetime and in war.
As a matter of future and evolving law there can be no question that
a better articulation of IOs customary obligations, particularly in the
data protection space, is of increasing importance. IOs now play a core
function in our cotemporary world order. These organizations “effectively reflect transnational concerns and in turn strengthen the sense of
global, human interdependence… creating an alternative world, one that
40

41
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Gerald L. Neuman, International Organizations and Human rights – The need for Substance, H arvard
L aw S chool Human R ights Program R esearch Working Paper Series, (Apr. 2019),
http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Gerald-Neuman_HRP-19_001.pdf.
The preamble to the UN Charter speaks of “fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” Article
1(3) similarly speaks of international cooperation “promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human R ights, International Legal Protection
of Human R ights in A rmed C onflict 24 (2011).
Id.
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is not identical with the sum of sovereign states and nations.”44 From a
normative perspective surely international law should be imbued with
the power to prevent gaps in legal coverage generated by the growth in
scope and size of IOs. After all, States should not be allowed to create IOs
to do their bidding which are then free from customary law or human
rights obligations. In this regard there seems to be signs that courts are
prepared to apply custom to non-State actors as a general international
law that is sufficiently comprehensive to bind all actors on the inter
national plane (although they may not be subject to the full gamut of
legal rights and duties applicable to States).45 This trend of expanding the
reach of international custom to cover IOs should extend, where possible
and relevant, to the areas of digital rights, informational privacy, data
protection, and cybersecurity.

CONCLUSION:
A CALL TO RECOGNIZE DATA
PROTECTION AS AN INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATION ON IOS
At least one commentator has suggested that as IOs’ data protection
policies “become more widely adopted, they may lead to the gradual
crystallization of international law.”46 This position would be true only if
IOs adopted these data protection standards out of a sense of an international legal obligation. IOs, however, have so far treated data protection
merely as a non-binding best practice.

44
45
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A kira Iriye, Global Community: T he Role of International Organizations in the M aking
of the C ontemporary World 7 (2002).
See e.g. Nevsun Resources Ltd v Araya [2020] Supreme Court of Canada 5, para 107 (noting that
“international law has so fully expanded beyond its Grotian origins that there is no longer any
tenable basis for restricting the application of customary international law to relations between
States.”); Reparations for Injuries in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep.
(1949) 174, 178 (noting that “the subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical
in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends on the needs of the
community.”). For a broader reading see Robert McCorquodale, An Inclusive International Legal
System, 17 Leiden J. Int’l L. 477 (2004).
Christopher Kuner, The Internet and the Global Reach of EU Law, in EU L aw Beyond EU B orders:
T he E xtraterritorial R each of EU L aw 112, 131 (Marise Cremona & Joanne Scott eds., 2019)
(referring in the immediate footnote that follows specifically to the possibility of crystallization
of customary norms).
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This book centers around the proposition that countries need to
develop more robust international data protection legal regimes for wartime. Yet, if the ICRC—the primary IO whose mandate it is to promote
respect for IHL—is unable to publicly declare that data protection is a
customary human right of global enforcement, why should we ever expect
States to do so?
United Nations organs and the ICRC are role models and are expected
to lead by example. They set the tone that could ultimately usher in the
progressive development of the law in the direction of enhanced digital rights and humanitarian protection of data. It is simply not enough
therefore for the ICRC, and for parallel organizations, to merely “talk the
talk” of data protection by adopting internal rules that they fully control
and enforce without any sense of an external legal obligation to do so.
The growth of the datasphere generates new opportunities and complex legal and ethical challenges for the management of digital humanitarian spaces. For data protection regimes to offer an effective compass
in traversing this new legal terrain, their role as a binding compass
must first be recognized. The ICRC and other IOs must play their part in
advancing the new agenda for wartime data protection by reaffirming
their own legal commitments and obligations to the evolving international rule of law controlling in this area.
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Chapter 13 Digital Evidence, Privacy, and International Criminal Procedure

The Investigation of
Grave Crimes:
Digital Evidence,
the Right to Privacy,
and International
Criminal Procedure
Kristina Hellwig1

INTRODUCTION
International criminal courts and tribunals (ICTs) have been entrusted
with the crucial but demanding task of prosecuting the most serious
crimes in the fight against impunity. Technology has the potential to support this endeavor by providing valuable information. Since digital devices
and new technologies have become integral parts of military operations
and everyday civilian life, there is an ever-growing amount of digital
data2 with evidentiary value.3 Therefore, digital evidence,4 such as sat1
2
3

4

Lecturer, Hamburg University, Germany.
Hereinafter “data.”
See, e.g., Lindsay Freeman, Law in Conflict: The Technological Transformation of War and Its Consequences for the International Criminal Court, 51 N.Y. Univ. J. Int. L aw Politics, 808, 860–61 (May
2019); Sean E. Goodison, Robert C. Davis & Brian A. Jackson, Digital Evidence and the U.S. Criminal
Justice System: Identifying Technology and Other Needs to More Effectively Acquire and Utilize Digital
Evidence, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR890.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2021).
A commonly used definition is that “[e]lectronic evidence is any data resulting from the output
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ellite imagery, communication data, drone footage, and user-generated
content (such as videos and photography), is becoming an essential tool
in the fact-finding process.5
Interestingly, the use of such evidence is not entirely new. For example,
at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
the Prosecution introduced aerial images provided by the U.S. military as
evidence for the Srebrenica massacre.6 Similarly, the introduction of videos, photographs, and other types of digital evidence is becoming common
before the International Criminal Court (ICC) as well.7 Recently, the ICC’s
Prosecution presented videos originally shared on social media, allegedly
showing executions carried out by Mahmoud al-Werfalli8 to prove its case.
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Prosecutor also made use of video
footage, special algorithms, and telecommunication data to determine
the parameters of an explosion and connected actors in the Ayyash case.9
With the prevalence of new technologies and current developments
in the fact-finding community, this trend will continue, and the role of
digital evidence will likely increase. As technology develops, so does the
way States and armed groups operate, especially in times of war. They
utilize advanced technologies for law enforcement, military, and intelligence purposes,10 thus producing large amounts of data with evidentiary value.11 Given recent breakthroughs in robotics, machine learning,
AI, and autonomous weapons, this development is unlikely to change.12
Additionally, as social platforms and the World Wide Web are also utilized

5

6
7
8
9
10
11
12

of an analogue device and/or a digital device of potential [probative] value that are generated,
processed, stored or transmitted using any electronic device. [And] [d]igital evidence is that
electronic evidence that is generated or converted to a numerical format.” See, e.g., European
Commission, European Evidence Project, European Data Informatics Exchange Framework for Courts
and Evidence, http://www.cordis.europa.eu/project/id/608185/reporting/de (last visited Nov. 29,
2021); Maria A. Biasiotti et al., Introduction: Opportunities and Challenges for Electronic Evidence, in
H andling and E xchanging Electronic E vidence across Europe, 3, 4 (Maria A. Biasiotti et
al. eds., 2018). For a different proposal, see, for example, Burkhard Schafer & Stephen Mason,
The Characteristics of Electronic Evidence, in Electronic evidence, 18, 19 (Daniel Seng & Stephen
Mason eds., 4th ed. 2017). For an analysis of the characteristics of digital evidence, see Kristina
Hellwig, The Potential and the Challenges of Digital Evidence in International Criminal Proceedings,
Int. Crim. L. R. (Advanced Articles 2021).
For an analysis of the evolution of digital evidence in ICL, see, for example, Lindsay Freeman,
Digital Evidence and War Crimes Prosecutions: The Impact of Digital Technologies on International
Criminal Investigations and Trials, 41 Fordh. Int. L. J. 283, 291–307 (2018).
Prosecutor v. Krstić, IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 114, 223, 229 et seq., 250 (ICTY Aug. 2, 2001);
Prosecutor v. Popović et al., IT-05-88-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 73–75 (ICTY June 10, 2010).
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of
the Statute, ¶ 93 (Mar. 14, 2012).
Prosecutor v. Al-Werfalli, ICC-01/11-01/17, Public Warrant of Arrest, ¶¶ 11–22 (Aug. 15, 2017)
[hereinafter Al-Werfalli].
Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al, STL-11-01/T/TC, Judgment, at 107–11, 512–86, 605–39 (Aug. 18, 2020).
See generally Simone M. Friis, “Beyond Anything We Have Ever Seen”: Beheading Videos and the
Visibility of Violence in the War against ISIS, 91 Int. A ff. 725 (July 2015).
For more details, see, for example, Freeman, supra note 3; Goodison et al., supra note 3.
E.g., Warren Chin, Technology, War and the State: Past, Present and Future, 95 Int. A ff. 765, 772 et
seq. (July 2019); Freeman, supra note 3, at 813.
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by some armed groups and States to spread propaganda, radicalize, or
broadcast atrocities,13 evidence of these actions exists in a digital format.
For instance, ISIS uploaded videos showing beheadings,14 which could
serve as evidence in future trials, as is already evident by the socialmedia-derived evidence that has been introduced in Al-Werfalli.15
The growing importance of digital evidence is also spurred by civil
society and NGOs. The fact-finding community has taken advantage of
current technological developments within their documentation efforts,16
allowing for an increase in third-party involvement17 and open-source
investigation.18 Various activities, such as collecting, securing, analyzing,
cataloging, and publishing large amounts of data on core crimes,19 are
carried out by NGOs, particularly for the purpose of enabling future criminal proceedings.20
Given the increase in digital information and its use as evidence, as
well as the sheer volume of information being collected by various actors,
the question arises as to what role the right to privacy plays in the investigation of core crimes and before ICTs in general. Thus, this chapter will
attempt to provide an inventory of the right to privacy in international
criminal procedure (ICP) with special regard to digital evidence and will
address the role of ICTs in the protection of this right. While this topic
is of paramount importance to all criminal tribunals dealing with core
crimes, this inquiry will focus primarily on the ICC and use its procedural
13
14
15
16

17

18
19
20

See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 3, at 833–34; see generally, Friis, supra note 10.
E.g., Freeman, supra note 3, at 834; Friis, supra note 10.
Al-Werfalli, supra note 8, ¶¶ 11–22.
E.g., Susann Aboueldahab & Inês Freixo, App-Generated Evidence: A Promising Tool for International
Criminal Justice, 21 Int’l Crim. L.R., 505, 505 et seq. (2021); Rebecca J. Hamilton, User-Generated
Evidence, 57 Colum. J. T ransnat’l. L., 1 (2018); Dia Kayyali et al., Digital Video Evidence, When
Collected, Verified, Stored and Deployed Properly, Presents New Opportunities for Justice, ICC Forum,
http://www.iccforum.com/cyber-evidence#Kayyali (last visited Nov. 29, 2021); Brianne M. Leyh,
Changing Landscapes in Documentation Efforts: Civil Society Documentation of Serious Human Rights
Violations, 33(84) Utr. J. Int’l & Eur. L. 44, 49 (2017).
In this context, the term “third party” refers to investigations by parties who are not directly
involved in the proceedings and have no obligation to investigate, e.g., civil society organizations
and NGOs.
Human Rights Center, UC Berkeley School of Law & UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Berkeley Protocol, HR/PUB/20/2 (Dec. 1, 2020).
See generally Kayyali et al., supra note 16.
See, e.g., the projects WITNESS (https://www.witness.org/our-work/, last accessed Jan. 22, 2022:
“We coordinate with local citizens and organizations, conduct on-the-ground trainings, and
provide free online resources in multiple languages”), Eyewitness (https://www.eyewitness.
global/our-work, last accessed Jan. 22, 2022: “EyeWitness develops close partnerships with
frontline organisations which document human rights violations that can amount to core international crimes, and with public interest litigators bringing these cases to trial”; “EyeWitness
approach is based on three pillars”; “First, the… app allows you to capture photos and video
that are embedded with metadata…”; “Second, when you send footage to the eyeWitness server
we create a trusted chain of custody”; “Third, eyeWitness ensures the captured information
is processed for justice”) or Benetech (https://www.benetech.org/lab/ethical-ai-to-promotejustice/, last accessed Jan. 22, 2022: “By applying machine learning and computer vision to these
videos, we hope to help them assess human rights violations and promote accountability and the
rule of law in Syria and conflict settings worldwide”).
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rules as a case study having only limited opportunity to address the
procedural perspective of the mixed tribunals. This chapter is structured
as follows. Part I will focus on potential interference with the right to
privacy that may occur during the investigation of core crimes. Part II
will address the scope and effect of the right to privacy in ICP in general,
while Part III will focus on the application of the right to privacy within
the different investigative stages, focusing on the specific ICP rules of
the ICC. By way of conclusion, this chapter will examine the future role
that privacy rights could and should play before ICTs.

I

COLLECTING DIGITAL EVIDENCE OF GRAVE
CRIMES AND POTENTIAL INTERFERENCE
WITH THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Before analyzing the approach of ICTs regarding the right to privacy, it
is necessary to at least briefly visualize how the collection of evidence on
grave crimes may interfere with this right. Given how digital evidence
is created, collected, and shared, an almost infinite number of scenarios
are conceivable that may raise questions of the applicability and interference with the right to privacy. Thus, a complete representation will not
be feasible in this chapter. However, this part will attempt to provide a
general and manageable structural breakdown of what are arguably the
most central groups of interventions.
Generally, privacy issues may arise during the creation or the use
and processing of data. For instance, interference may occur when drone
footage is recorded, video surveillance takes place, or audiovisual material
is created by witnesses. Furthermore, interference may take place during
the collection, storage, or transfer and sharing of such data. Gaining
access to the content of data does not always require accessing the physical storage medium. It can be obtained by seizing the medium or device
it is stored on but also by remote access to the data. Remote access may
include sharing it via the internet, viewing the data digitally, or gaining
access to the system and copying it (e.g., by interception or malware).21
21

See, e.g., Goodison et al., supra note 3, at 5–8; Kayyali et al., supra note 16.
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Additionally, as data is not bound to a single medium, it can be copied
and widely disseminated rapidly.22 In all these steps, multiple actors
might take different roles, leading to new types of privacy issues. Overall,
the applicable rules and standards may differ depending on the context,
e.g., whether the collection was conducted during armed conflict or in
peacetime.23
From the perspective of ICTs, digital evidence can be created by
witnesses, journalists, and victims present on-site (e.g., videos or photographs of attacks or killings, mass graves or destruction of buildings) or
gathered by the investigating bodies (e.g., independent investigations
by the Prosecution, open-source investigation, etc.). They can also be
created, collected, and provided to ICTs by a cooperating entity (e.g.,
States or NGOs). Which party is carrying out the measures can play
a role in the determination of who can and should primarily ensure
privacy protection or how far such responsibilities reach.24 If ICTs wish
to access certain data, then from a (criminal) procedural perspective,
they can seek to use coercive means, such as interception or search and
seizure,25 but they may also get the data by voluntary transfer, such as
by an NGO or a specific individual.26 In general, coercive investigative
measures regularly involve a privacy interference that may or may not
be lawful depending on the adherence to the applicable procedural rules
and national and international human rights standards. And while the
determination of the applicable law can be a source of heated debate
even in this more common context, the situation with voluntary disclosures is even more ambiguous. It is submitted here that interference
with the right to privacy may also occur in cases where no coercive
or covert means are applied and information is provided voluntarily,
such as by NGOs or individuals.27 This follows above all from the fact
that the party collecting and providing the data to ICTs and the one
whose privacy is affected can be different and can have contrasting
standpoints. In this context, it must be asked whether, despite the fact
that interference is primarily caused by others, the acceptance and use
of third-party generated data by ICTs may nonetheless perpetuate the
intrusion upon privacy rights. It is thus worth exploring the extent to
which ICTs should take privacy rights into account in the context of such
22
23
24
25
26
27

See, e.g., Kayyali et al., supra note 16.
See, e.g., O’Connell (ch. 1 of this collection).
See Part III.A.
However, for the execution of coercive means, the ICT may have to rely on State cooperation.
See Part III.A.
See Part III.
See Part III.B and the conclusion.
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voluntary transfers, and the extent to which they can and should safeguard the protection of privacy rights even outside the scope of their own
immediate activities.

II

GENERAL APPLICABILITY OF THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The right to privacy is codified in various human rights instruments28 with
broadly analogous scopes of protection, and many national constitutions
and criminal codes recognize the importance of this right.29
By contrast, there is a lack of general reference to and recognition of
this right within the ICTs’ legal frameworks. It is explicitly mentioned
only in the context of the rights of victims and witnesses and confidential
communications.30 During the drafting process, an interim version of the
Rome Statute referred to the right and contained a provision on searches
and seizures.31 Ultimately, however, this provision was not included in
the final version.32
However, the absence of an explicit reference does not mean that the
right to privacy is not applicable before ICTs. For the ICC, this follows
from Article 21 of the Rome Statute,33 according to which internationally recognized human rights are an integral part of the applicable law,
including the right to privacy.34 And while such a rule is missing in the
legal frameworks of the ad hoc tribunals, there is a strong rationale for

28

29
30

31
32
33
34

ICCPR, Art. 17; AmCHR, Art. 11; UDHR, Art. 12; ECHR, Art. 8. While the AfCHR does not refer to
this right, many African constitutions and statutes do. See George Edwards, International Human
Rights Law Challenges to the New International Criminal Court: The Search and Seizure Right to Privacy,
26 Yale J. Int’l L. 324, 401–5.
For a detailed overview, see, for example, Edwards, supra note 28, at 400–5.
See, e.g., ICTY, Rules of procedure and evidence, adopted Feb. 11, 1994, last amended July 8, 2015
[hereinafter ICTY RPE], Rule 75(A); ICTR, Rules of procedure and evidence, adopted June 25, 1995,
last amended May 13, 2015 [hereinafter ICTR RPE], Rule 75(A); Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute], Art. 57(3)(c),
68(1).
For a detailed illustration of the different versions of this provision, see, for example, Edwards,
supra note 28, at 350–52.
Edwards, supra note 28, at 352.
Rome Statute, supra note 30, art. 21(3).
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo et al., ICC-01/05-01/13, Judgment on the appeals of
Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Mr. Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Mr. Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo,
Mr. Fidèle Babala Wandu, and Mr. Narcisse Arido against the decision of Trial Chamber VII
entitled “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” ¶ 284 (Mar. 8, 2018) [hereinafter
Bemba II].
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its applicability.35 Accordingly, the ad hoc tribunals stressed that the lack
of an explicit reference did not limit the need to act in conformity with
recognized human rights,36 including the right to privacy.37 To interpret
the scope of human rights, ICTs have relied on human rights juris
prudence in the past.38 At the same time, they emphasized that this
jurisprudence is not binding and that the context of international criminal
law (ICL) may call for an adaptation of that scope.39 It has been argued
that some departures from domestic standards can be justified, given the
sui generis goals of ICTs, the complexity and atrocity of the crimes they
process, and the innate weaknesses of these tribunals40 and also that, as
ICL deals with crimes often committed in armed conflicts, insisting on
peacetime due process standards would be unrealistic.41
Accordingly, due to this at least partial divergence from international
human rights jurisprudence,42 it is necessary to further analyze the different areas in which the right to privacy can be of relevance before ICTs
and how the courts and tribunals apply this right in practice.

35

36
37
38

39
40
41
42

Arguments brought forward were, e.g., the applicability of the rules on international organizations, including human rights, references to human rights by the UN SC in their context, and the
rule of law. For further details, see, for example, Lorenzo Gradoni, The Human Rights Dimension
of International Criminal Procedure, in International Criminal Procedure, 74, 81 (Göran Sluiter
ed., 2013); Yvonne McDermott, The Influence of International Human Rights Law on International
Criminal Procedure, in International Criminal L aw in Context, 281 (Philipp Kastner ed., 2018).
See, e.g., Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision, ¶ 40 (Nov. 3, 1999).
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, IT-99-36-T, Decision on the Defence “Objection to Intercept
Evidence,” ¶¶ 28–29 (ICTY Oct. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Brdjanin].
See, e.g., Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-135-tEN, Decision on the
Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the Chamber’s Decision of 17 January 2006 on the
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and
VPRS 6, ¶ 34–40 (Mar. 21, 2006).
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective
Measures for Victims and Witnesses, ¶¶ 27–31 (ICTY Aug. 10, 1995) [hereinafter Tadić].
Mirjan Damaška, The Competing Visions of Fairness: The Basic Choice for International Criminal
Tribunals, 36 2 N.C. J. Int’l L. 365, 380 (2010); Brdjanin, supra note 37, ¶ 63(7)–(9).
Cf. David Luban, Human Rights Thinking and the Laws of War, in Jens D. Ohlin (ed.), T heoretical
B oundaries of A rmed Conflict and Human R ights, 45, 68 (2016).
For an in-depth analysis, see Amal Alamunddin, Collection of Evidence, in Principles of E vidence
in International Criminal Justice, 231, 286 et seq., 301 et seq. (Karim A. Khan et al. eds.,
2010); K rit Zeegers, International Criminal T ribunals and Human R ights L aw, 180 et seq.
(2016).
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III

THE PROTECTION OF THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY DURING THE
INVESTIGATION
To carry out this analysis on the privacy rights approach before ICTs,
this part will primarily focus on the procedural rules of the ICC, with
some references to and examples from the ad hoc tribunals. The idea
here is that the principles embodied in these procedural rules and the
resulting problems are transferable, at least in their broad outlines, to
other tribunals.

A THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY DURING STATE COOPERATION
Within the model of ICP, most investigative activities that go beyond voluntary cooperation with ICTs are intended to be conducted by the States
obligated to cooperate.43 In principle, this means that the collection of
(digital) evidence, to the extent that disclosure is not voluntary, should
be carried out by the cooperating States after a request by the ICT. For the
ICC, Article 93 of the Rome Statute names various investigative measures
that can be requested of Member States, including the execution of search
and seizures (Article 93(1)(h)) and any other type of assistance, such as
modern investigative techniques (Article 93(1)(l)).44
This naturally raises the question of the extent to which ICTs can
influence the way the measures are carried out and thus have an impact
on the observance of the right to privacy in this process. Following the
general approach within ICP, as States conduct the requested measures
according to their national procedure,45 they should be mainly responsible for the protection of human rights during the execution of these
43

44

45

Rome Statute, supra note 30, Art. 86; S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 4 U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993);
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827 (May
25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute], art. 29(1); S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8,
1994); Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter
ICTR Statute], art. 28(1).
Zeegers, supra note 42, at 166–67; Claus Kress & Kimberly Prost, Article 93: Other Forms of Cooperation, in Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2078, 2086 (Otto Triffterer &
Kai Ambos eds., 3rd ed. 2016). See also Rule 39(iii) of ICTY RPE, supra note 30, and of ICTR RPE,
supra note 30.
E.g., Rome Statute, supra note 30, art. 96 (3), 99(1).
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measures, including the right to privacy.46 However, this approach has
clear shortcomings and leads to gaps in protection.47 These gaps will
be summarized here in a cursory manner. Furthermore, while ICTs are
not mainly responsible for the conduct of the measures, it is possible to
identify some instances where, at a minimum, it would be possible for
the ICC (and the ad hoc tribunals) to consider and review the adherence
to the right to privacy.

1

Request for Cooperation
An initial review of the measure’s potential interference and compatibility with privacy rights by ICTs and their bodies could take place during
the request for cooperation. However, this is not explicitly provided for in
the ICT’s legal framework, and some safeguards envisaged in the international human rights law (IHRL) jurisprudence are not fully applied.
In general, the ICC’s Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor
states that the Prosecution should respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized by international law in conformity with
the Statute.48 However, as there are no public records of the requests for
assistance and this rule is of a rather general nature, it is unclear which
considerations are to be made before the request and how extensive any
written reasoning should be.49
Additionally, while some authors have argued in favor of the need
for a judicial warrant,50 the ICC has not applied this approach until
now.51 Rather, the ICC emphasized that the Prosecution has independent
authority to make cooperation requests under Article 93(1) Rome Statute.52
This issue was also discussed before the ad hoc tribunals, where the tribunals have generally rejected the need for a judicial warrant approach.53
In addition, while the procedure regarding the formulation of the
request envisaged in Article 96(2) of the Rome Statute could be utilized
to weigh the conflicting interests against each other, including the rights
46
47
48
49
50

51

52
53

Cf., Edwards, supra note 28, at 352 et seq.
For a detailed analysis, see Zeegers, supra note 42, at 113–86; Edwards, supra note 28, at 357.
ICC, Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor, Chapter 1, ¶ 8(1) (Sep. 5, 2013).
See also Zeegers, supra note 42, at 169.
See, e.g., K arel de M eester, T he Investigation Phase in International Criminal
Procedure: In Search of Common Rules, 518 et seq. (2014); G öran K. Sluiter, International Criminal A djudication and the C ollection of E vidence, 125–28 (2002).
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Prosecution’s applications for a
finding of non-compliance pursuant to Article 87(7) and for an adjournment of the provisional trial
date, ¶¶ 28, 33 (Mar. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Kenyatta]; Robert Cryer et al., A n Introduction to
International Criminal L aw and Procedure, 533 (2014); Zeegers, supra note 42, at 167.
Kenyatta, supra note 51, ¶ 33.
See in detail, e.g., M ark K lamberg, E vidence in International Criminal T rials: Confronting
Legal G aps and the R econstruction of Disputed E vents, 252 (2013); Zeegers, supra note 42,
at 153 et seq.
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of those affected, there is no guarantee that such a process will take place
in every case. The primary purpose of the obligation to provide certain
information and reasoning is to enable the State to act under its national
procedure,54 and the rights of individuals are not explicitly mentioned.55
And while Articles 96(2)(d) and 99(1) of the Rome Statute would allow
the Court to proscribe procedural requirements, this possibility is rarely
used.56 Therefore, some authors have rightly argued that the request for
State cooperation lacks sufficient and effective safeguards for the right
to privacy.57

2

The Execution of the Request
There is reason to doubt the assumption that all national procedures applicable during the execution of cooperation requests uphold
human rights standards and thus provide sufficient protection.58 Even
those States whose procedural rules comply with human rights in general
might diverge from them in the context of State cooperation in a manner
incompatible with privacy rights.
According to Article 96 of the Rome Statute, the Court must provide information on the case and the reasons for the request, such as
the legal grounds and the circumstances of the case. Hence, in a bestcase scenario, the State would have sufficient information to assess the
request’s conformity with human rights.59 In case of non-conformity,
the State could reject the request, as Part 9 of the Rome Statute gives
grounds for refusal such as conflicting treaty obligations60 or incompatibility with existing fundamental legal principles of general application.61
Both grounds could be used to refuse investigative means contrary to
human rights standards.62
In many cases, however, the procedure for State cooperation with
the ICC, which is often conducted in a manner similar to inter-State
cooperation, does not provide sufficient safeguards that at the end of
the process, one of the parties, either the requestion or the executing
party, will verify that the measures are compatible with human rights.63
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
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Zeegers, supra note 42, at 169 et seq.
See also id. at 169–70.
Id. at 170–71.
Id. at 171.
Id.
Id. at 173.
Rome Statute, supra note 30, art. 97(c).
Id. art. 93(3).
See, e.g., Kenyatta, supra note 51, ¶ 37; Claus Kress & Bruce Broomhall, Implementing Cooperation
Duties under the Rome Statute: A Comparative Synthesis, in T he Rome Statute and D omestic Legal
Orders, Vol. II, 515, 531 (Claus Kress et al. eds., 2005); Zeegers, supra note 42, at 172.
Zeegers, supra note 42, at 174; Cryer et al., supra note 51, at 534.
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As some authors rightly argue, without specific legislation, there is an
increased risk that cooperative States trying to support ICTs will fail to
sufficiently protect human rights.64 If requested, they might be unwilling
to perform a genuine test for political reasons or due to the strength of
mutual trust.65 As a result, some States are implementing the requests
without any review or special procedure.66 Hence, even though the Rome
Statute provides grounds for refusal, States may not use these means in
order to attend to their duty to cooperate.67 In addition, the human rights
situation in some cooperating States makes it inappropriate to rely on
them to protect human rights.68

3

Ex Post Review during the Evaluation of Evidence
One remaining option is the ex post review of the compatibility of
measures with human rights. The procedural rules on the admissibility
of evidence require such an analysis to some extent, as evidence obtained
by means violating internationally recognized human rights is inadmissible if the violation casts substantial doubt on its reliability or if the
admission would be antithetical to and seriously damage the integrity
of the proceedings.69 This assessment requires a determination of first,
whether the evidence was obtained illegally, and second, whether this
violation is sufficient to render it inadmissible.70
An analysis of the jurisprudence shows a positive trend, especially
in the context of the ICC, towards the increasing review of alleged violations of privacy rights within the investigative stage of proceedings. For
instance, when confronted with allegations that evidence was obtained
illegally and in violation of the right to privacy, the ICTY often reviewed
the legality in only a limited manner.71 A frequently chosen approach
was to focus on the good faith of the investigators.72 By contrast, the ICC
has developed a more detailed review. While the ICC does not elaborate
on the process’s compatibility with national procedure,73 it has reviewed
compliance with the internationally recognized standard of protection
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
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E.g., Zeegers, supra note 42, at 173–74.
Id. at 173; Kress & Broomhall, supra note 62, at 526 et seq.
Zeegers, supra note 42, at 173; Kress & Broomhall, supra note 62, at 526 et seq.
Zeegers, supra note 42, at 172.
See also id. at 173–74.
See, e.g., ICTY RPE, supra note 30, Rule 95; ICTR RPE, supra note 30, Rule 95; Rome Statute, supra
note 30, art. 69(7).
See, e.g., Bemba II, supra note 34, ¶ 280; Brdjanin, supra note 37, ¶¶ 57–68.
See, e.g., Brdjanin, supra note 37, ¶¶ 57–60; Prosecutor v. Haraqija et al., IT-04-84-R77.4,
Decision on Morina and Haraqija Second Request for a Declaration of Inadmissibility and
Exclusion of Evidence, ¶ 19 et seq (Nov. 27, 2008) [hereinafter Haraqija].
E.g., Brdjanin, supra note 37, ¶ 63(1); Haraqija, supra note 71, ¶ 19 et seq.
Rome Statute, supra note 30, art. 69(8).
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for the right to privacy and in some cases decided that there was indeed
a violation of these standards.74 However, in Mbarushimana, the Chamber
argued that the defense had failed to provide sufficient information on
the illegality of the collection of evidence and that therefore there was no
burden on the Prosecution to show that the evidence was not obtained in
violation of the Statute or internationally recognized human rights.75 The
Chamber also noted that there is a presumption that the investigative
activities were carried out in accordance with the provisions applicable
in that State. This approach of shifting the burden of proof regarding the
measures’ incompatibility with the applicable law is problematic. It limits
the scope and extent to which the ICC assesses and takes responsibility
for the way investigative measures are conducted. Furthermore, this
limiting interpretation of Article 69(7) of the Rome Statute and the divergence from IHRL (according to which the defense must merely prove the
occurrence of an interference and not that this interference was unlawful, which from an IHRL perspective must be proven by the State) was
made without providing sufficient rationale.76 A preferable approach was
taken later on by the Appeals Chamber in Bemba II, where the Chamber
emphasized the need to determine whether an action was in accordance
with internationally recognized human rights, including whether the
interference was proportionate to legitimate investigative needs.77 The
proportionality determination must take the nature of the information
and the sensitivity of such data into account, and these interests must be
weighed against the pursued investigative need warranting the access.78
The extent to which illegally obtained evidence is admitted is also
pertinent because declaring such evidence inadmissible could indirectly
reinforce the right to privacy for future proceedings. ICTs have brought
forward different lines of argumentation for the admissibility of evidence
in privacy violation circumstances.79 For instance, the ICTY has argued
that neither international law nor (a relevant number of) national legal
systems prescribe the automatic exclusion of illegally obtained evidence.80
Furthermore, a Chamber has noted that, particularly in the context of
74
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E.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 81 (Jan. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Lubanga]. For instance, in Lubanga, the
Chamber found that the search and seizure of hundreds of documents and items, including
correspondences, photographs, diaries, and many more, was disproportionate.
Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 60
(Dec. 16, 2011).
See also Zeegers, supra note 42, at 178.
Bemba II, supra note 34, ¶ 330 et seq.
Id. ¶ 333.
See in detail, e.g., Alamunddin, supra note 42, at 296; Damaška, supra note 40, at 365–88.
Brdjanin, supra note 37, ¶ 31 et seq.

274

Kristina Hellwig

armed conflicts, intelligence can be essential in uncovering the truth.81
It is also argued that, in light of the gravity and seriousness of the charges
and the jurisdiction and purpose of the tribunals, even illegally intercepted evidence obtained in a pre-armed conflict period must be regarded
as admissible.82 The ICC has regularly come to the same conclusion and
has not excluded evidence obtained in violation of privacy rights.83 For
instance, the ICC has argued that even though there is no consensus in
international law, the majority is of the view that only serious human
rights violations can lead to the exclusion of evidence.84 Accordingly, since
evidence is rarely excluded based on violations of the right to privacy,
such an indirect influence is questionable.

B THE PROTECTION DURING INVESTIGATIONS
BY THE ICT’S PROSECUTORS
Another area of importance is whether there are sufficient safeguards for
the protection of privacy rights in the context of investigative activities
by the Prosecution and the overall activities of ICTs.

1

General
It should first be emphasized that ICTs, and the ICC in particular,
have very limited authority to implement coercive measures outside the
context of State cooperation. Rather, search and seizures and interceptions are regarded as on-site investigative activities that depend on the
cooperation of States or their approval.85 While the ad hoc tribunals had
limited independent investigative means,86 the Rome Statute provides
this possibility only in a very restricted manner.87 The Prosecution can
only conduct such independent on-site investigations in the context of
Article 54, 57(3)(d) of the Rome Statute, that is, when a State is unable to
execute a request for cooperation due to the unavailability of any authority
or any component of its judicial system.
81
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Id. ¶ 61.
Id. ¶ 63(8).
Bemba II, supra note 34, ¶ 44; Lubanga, supra note 74, ¶¶ 83–90.
Lubanga, supra note 74, ¶ 86.
See, e.g., Alamunddin, supra note 42, at 258.
The ad hoc tribunals were provided with more extensive direct investigative rights. See, e.g.,
ICTY Statute, supra note 43, art. 18(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 43, art. 17(2); Prosecutor v.
Blaškić, IT-95-14-AR108 bis, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of
the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, ¶ 53 (Oct. 29, 1997); R ichard M ay & M arieke
Wierda, International Criminal E vidence, 62, 67 (2002).
See, e.g., M eester, supra note 50, at 516; Zeegers, supra note 42, at 147.
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However, even aside from this area, it is relevant to consider what
role the right to privacy may play in the Prosecutor’s investigations. This
is especially true given the increase in open-source investigation and
data sharing by a wide variety of actors, even without what are known
as coercive measures. Moreover, it should be noted that the voluntary
disclosure of data to the Court does not necessarily mean that the data
has been obtained in a way consistent with the right to privacy or that
there has been no interference with it.88 In addition, data protection and
protection from third-party interference is especially important in the
context of sensitive data that may be in the possession of ICTs.
To date, there has been only a very limited general policy in place
that could sufficiently protect the right to privacy. While the ICC has
developed an E-court Protocol89 on digital evidence, this protocol does
not refer to privacy rights but rather aims at standardizing technical-data-type-related questions. The ICC’s Code of Conduct for the Office of the
Prosecutor does state that the Office of Prosecution should respect the
human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized by international law
in conformity with the Statute.90 Similarly, the Regulations of the Office
of the Prosecution refer to the privacy in relation to confidential correspondence,91 and Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute provides that the ICC
is bound to respect internationally recognized human rights. However,
as these provisions are of a very general nature, there is no certainty in
how they are applied to privacy issues.
Therefore, it would be desirable for ICTs to develop specific standards
for investigations performed by the ICTs bodies, especially in relation
to the right to privacy.92 These standards should find a balance between
the investigative interests and the rights of those affected. They could
address issues such as the protection of victims or potential witnesses
visible in digital materials, or the outstanding issue of the types of data
to be collected or the means of data collection, storage, and processing.
While it would be desirable to include such standards in the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence (RPE) of ICTs, as these new types of investigative
methods will only increase in the future, this option could be difficult to
achieve in practice. Nevertheless, official statements and policies could
88
89
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See also Kayyali et al., supra note 16.
Unified Technical protocol for the provision of evidence, witness and victims’ information in
electronic form, ICC-01/14-01/18-64-Anx (Jan. 23, 2019).
Chapter 1, ¶ 8(1).
Reg. 21; Reg. 28(2).
See also, e.g., Asaf Lubin, The Rights to Privacy and Data Protection under International Humanitarian
Law and Human Rights Law, in R esearch H andbook on Human R ights and Humanitarian
L aw: F urther R eflections and Perspectives, 490–91 (Robert Kolb et al. eds., 2022).
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provide some clarity on ICTs’ approach regarding the right to privacy in
the digital domain.

2

The Special Protection of Victims and Witnesses
As noted, the only explicit reference to the right to privacy within
ICP can be found in the context of victims and witness protection and
confidential correspondences. In the context of ICL, the protection and
the privacy of victims and witnesses has a particularly important role. The
dangers for them are not only of a theoretical nature and were already
evident in the first years of the ad hoc tribunals. For instance, in the first
years of the tribunal, some witnesses who testified before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were killed upon arriving back
home.93 Hence, the ad hoc tribunals attached particular importance to the
protection of witnesses and victims.94 Similarly, the ICC’s legal framework
entails rules on the protection of witnesses. According to Article 68(1) of
the Rome Statute, the Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the
safety and privacy of victims and witnesses. This general provision aims
at placing on all organs of the Court the obligation to take appropriate
measures.95 In this regard, the Court must consider all relevant factors,
including age, gender, and health, as well as the nature of the crimes.96
Possible measures may be the prevention of releases to the public or the
media on the identity or location of a victim, witness, or other person
at risk.97 Hence, witnesses are, in general, not named publicly and are
known by pseudonyms in proceedings.98
This raises the question of what protection might look like in the
context of modern technologies and digital evidence. So far, there is little
experience to go on regarding the impact of the increased prevalence of
digital evidence. It is important to bear in mind that audiovisual evidence
in particular can show not only the perpetrators but also third parties,
victims, and witnesses, and metadata and personal information can be
used to identify individuals. Some have argued that the existence of
audiovisual evidence could ensure the safety of witnesses and victims,
as they are not the only ones providing incriminating proof.99 However,
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See, e.g., David Donat-Cattin, Art. 68, in Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:
A commentary, 1681, 1683 (Otto Triffterer & Kai Ambos eds., 3rd ed. 2016).
Id.
E.g., William S chabas, T he International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome
Statute, 1058 (2016).
S chabas, supra note 95, at 1058.
Id.
Id.; cf. Tadić, supra note 39, ¶¶ 27–31.
E.g., Keith Hiatt, Open Source Evidence on Trial, 125 Yale L. J. Forum 323, 325 (2016).
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others have rightly expressed concerns regarding identifiability via digital
evidence,100 which could endanger parties not present before the ICTs.
Especially in the early stages of investigations, where witnesses are still
being sought, the prevalence of digital media could pose a threat to victims and witnesses. Moreover, during ongoing conflicts, the availability
of information on informants, witnesses, and victims could be harmful
to them. As practice shows, civilian populations are increasingly active
in collecting evidence on grave crimes. NGOs and civil society in particular tend to use digital data for the collection.101 Collections that do not
sufficiently protect the privacy of the identifiable individuals could pose
immeasurable threats to those on site.
The latter norms could be used to protect those affected. There are
still some legal uncertainties, especially concerning whether the standards
can be interpreted to apply to victims shown in digital and documentary
evidence. While an overly broad interpretation of the above-mentioned
provisions may make their fulfillment impossible, an overly narrow interpretation might harm those trying to support investigations. Hence this
rule should generally also apply in the context of digital evidence; however, the interpretation and understanding of the appropriate means may
vary in this context. Conceivable technical means here could be to make
faces unrecognizable if they are not relevant for the proceedings and
establish data collection in a manner that protects personal information
that could be used to identify specific individuals. An additional safeguard
would be to not share potential evidence publicly.
Overall, States and ICTs should seek to adopt approaches that do not
pose additional harm to victims and witnesses, regardless of whether
they testify in person or by providing documentary proof.

3

Protection during Cooperation with NGOs and Civil Society
As elaborated above, NGOs are engaging more and more in fact-finding or quasi-investigative functions, especially by using digital data.
They collect information shared on social media or provided to them by
individuals and create large data collections with considerable potential
to support ICP. However, there are also risks involved, especially in relation to the protection of human rights. This follows above all from the
fact that the party collecting and providing the data to ICTs and the one
100 See, e.g., Beth van Schaack, Fourth Industrial Revolution Comes to the Hague, http://www.iccforum.
com/cyber-evidence#Van-Schaack (last visited Nov. 29, 2021); Kayyali et al., supra note 16; Hiatt,
supra note 99, at 324; Hamilton, supra note 16, at 60; Aboueldahab & Freixo, supra note 16, at 523.
101 E.g., Hellwig, supra note 4.
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whose privacy is affected can differ and that both can have contrasting
standpoints. For example, while a portion of data is shared with ICTs by
individuals willing to take the risks involved, other information is collected or shared without consent and, in some cases, by the perpetrators.
Furthermore, if recordings and large data collections are openly accessible, they could be used to identify not only alleged perpetrators but also
collectors, victims, and witnesses. This may significantly affect their right
to privacy and sometimes also their safety, especially in ongoing conflicts.
Therefore, the protection of potentially affected parties throughout the
process is essential.102
However, there is a lack of internationally applicable law in this
framework. Data collections today are rarely established and overseen
by ICT’s Prosecutions; instead, this is typically done by various NGOs.
Within the current international legal framework, there are no clear internationally binding obligations for NGOs to respect human rights. While
attention should be drawn to NGOs’ efforts to develop voluntary standards
on these issues, such as with the Berkeley Protocol,103 precisely because of
the voluntary nature of these instruments, there is still a pressing need to
find additional safeguards. Furthermore, while these entities largely act
independently, the acceptance and use of the data by ICTs may perpetuate
interference in the affected individuals’ right to privacy.
As a number of collections are aimed specifically at enabling criminal proceedings, ICTs are in a unique position to influence this sector towards a more privacy-conscious approach. Thus, while it may
be difficult to argue that ICTs and other fact-finding bodies have an
obligation to regulate this sector, they could take a more active role in
safeguarding the protection of such rights even outside the scope of
their own activities.
Therefore, the question arises of how to achieve higher standards
in this area. As ICTs rarely exclude evidence based on privacy violations,
it is unlikely that the threat of exclusion of the collected evidence alone
could lead everyone to adhere to privacy regulations. Possible solutions
include the implementation of additional (binding) guidelines104 or contract relations with the ICT’s Prosecutions105 or other fact-finding bodies. The latter possibility in particular could help to realize the potential
102 See also, e.g., Aboueldahab & Freixo, supra note 16, at 507, 521.
103 Berkeley Protocol, supra note 18.
104 E.g., Elena A. Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, 14 UCLA J. Int’l L. Foreign A ff. 121, 146 (2009);
International Bar Association, Evidence Matters in ICC Trials, 26 (Aug. 2016); Alexander Heinze,
Private International Criminal Investigations, Z. Int. Str. D ogm. 169, 181 (Feb. 2019).
105 Hamilton, supra note 16, at 53–61.
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offered by these activities without excessive strain on the rights of the
persons concerned if contracts would contain provisions on the respective
rights to be protected.

CONCLUSION: WHAT IS THE ROLE OF
ICTS IN THE PROTECTION OF THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY?
This chapter has provided an overview of the areas in which the right to
privacy could be of relevance in ICP and where future issues may occur.
It is not yet apparent if ICTs have sufficiently adapted to the increasing
relevance of digital evidence. Overall, while the right to privacy is recognized in ICL, better approaches to enforcing this right are desirable.
Two main areas for action can be identified.
First, standards and policies should be established for ICTs’ own
activities.106 This would be beneficial in light of transparency concerns,
existing responsibilities to witnesses and victims, and the commitment
to human rights. In this context, there is a need to develop sufficient
standards to protect victims and witnesses but also find a sufficient
procedure for open-source investigation. It should be borne in mind that
open-source investigations and voluntary disclosures of data are not
completely free of potential interference with the rights of data subjects.107
Second, the role of the right to privacy in the context of cooperation
must be reevaluated. In many ways, ICTs must deal with rather limited
availability of evidence, and the crimes they deal with are of such seriousness that violations of the “mere” right to privacy do not take a prominent
role. Therefore, some have argued that this right must yield second place
to the interests of the victims seeking justice and the interests of the
international community.108 However, this line of argument is not fully
convincing. While it is correct that ICTs do not have the function of disciplining national armies or authorities,109 ICTs and national authorities
are bound to respect international human rights. If commonly applied
investigative procedures are incompatible with such rights, they must be
106
107
108
109

See also, e.g., Lubin, supra note 92, at 490.
Kayyali et al., supra note 16.
Brdjanin, supra note 37, ¶ 63(7); Lubanga, supra note 74, ¶ 86.
Brdjanin, supra note 37, ¶ 63(9).
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adjusted. In many cases, the issue is not so much whether the measures
should be implemented at all but rather that procedural standards and
safeguards must be complied with, or in some cases, developed in the first
place. There needs to be a structural adjustment within the investigative
process to ensure the predictability and monitorability of measures. For
this reason, authors have rightly called for ex ante checks on the ordering
of coercive measures ensuring compliance with the right to privacy.110
Ex post checks are also crucial.111
Given the increasing relevance of the digital domain, limiting the
scope of the right to privacy and the acceptance of an approach to ICP
in which the imperative for human rights protection is outweighed by
the need for evidence112 is concerning. Upholding human rights standards, and not only to a minimum, conveys respect for human rights by
demonstrating fairness and adherence to legal rules even in the context
of prosecuting mass atrocities.113 Omitting privacy rights could have an
overall derogatory effect on the rights in question, as well as on the
approval of ICTs by the international community and the acceptance of
their rulings by local communities. This holds at least the risk that some
entities question their legitimacy. In addition, privacy protection can
also safeguard other human rights (e.g., the right to life and the right
to freedom from arbitrary detention), especially in the context of ICP.
Therefore, ICTs should take a more prominent role in promoting these
rights and upholding human rights standards.
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Zeegers, supra note 42, at 186.
Id.
Damaška, supra note 40, at 386.
See generally Y vonne McDermott, Fairness in International Criminal T rials (2013);
Salvatore Z appalà, Human R ights in International Criminal Proceedings (2005).
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Chapter 14

The “Right to be
Forgotten” and
International Crimes
Yaël Ronen1

INTRODUCTION
The ubiquity of information in cyberspace has brought new challenges
to the concept of privacy and has led to the development of new forms
of protection of the right to privacy. Among those is the notion of a right
to be “forgotten” or “erased.”2 These terms cover a variety of measures
aimed at removing personal information from the public sphere or making it less accessible, through, among other things, the deletion of news
articles, the de-linking of web pages in search results on search engines,
and the redaction of personal information on existing web pages.3
1
2

3

Professor of Law at the Academic Center for Science and Law at Hod Hasharon, and a Research
Fellow at the Minerva Center for Human Rights at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.
K ieron O’H ara et al., A Pragmatic A pproach to the R ight to Be Forgotten 2–3 (Centre for
International Governance Innovation and Chatham House, 2016), https://www.cigionline.org/publications/pragmatic-approach-right-be-forgotten. For a critique of the term “forgetting,” see Ignacio
Cofone, Google v. Spain: A Right to Be Forgotten, 15 Chi.-Lent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1, 8–9 (2015).
Under European law, the term refers specifically to a qualified right of individuals to have their
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“Forgetting” and “erasing” are largely misnomers, as information
is not fully removed from cyberspace. First, the removal of news items
and page links does not affect the availability of the information on
legal databases and archives. What is removed is only the likelihood that
the information be found by someone who is not deliberately seeking
it. Moreover, there are ways to circumvent the “loss.” For example,
de-linking on Google has, in some cases, prompted the original website
to publish articles about the de-linking itself, including details about
the content of the original story. Secondly, despite apparent erasure and
deletion, the information may still be available in a cache.4 This chapter
will nonetheless employ the phrase “the right to be forgotten,” which
has taken root in both legal and technological discourse.5
The chapter concerns the right to be forgotten for individuals who
have been convicted of, and punished for, the commission of international
crimes. It may well be asked whether the suppression of information
would have any effect when international crimes are at issue. However,
not all convictions for such crimes necessarily have a high public profile
or a long-lasting effect. Are Paul Slough, Janis Karpinski, Calvin Gibbs,
Yuri Budanov, Fadil Covic, Donald Payne, Dragan Kolundzija, or Ahmad
al-Mahdi household names?6
Part I of this chapter considers the value of forgiving and forgetting
and the need to replicate the fading of memory with technical means
when human memory is replaced by the technological storage of information. Part II frames the individual and public interests involved in
the removal of information relating to the criminal past of identified
individuals as an exercise in balancing competing human rights and
interests. Part III examines how the balance is affected when the crimes
in question are international crimes. It first analyzes the implications of
two characteristics of international crimes that distinguish them from
ordinary crimes: the fact that they are committed in the course of a

4

5
6

personal data erased from filing systems, primarily when the personal data is no longer necessary
in relation to the purposes for which it was collected or otherwise processed. Council Regulation
2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, art. 17(1)(a) [hereinafter GDPR]; or, in the words of the CJEU,
when the data becomes inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive for the purposes of its processing.
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317,
¶¶ 92–94 (May 13, 2014), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62012CJ0131 [hereinafter Google Spain].
Eduard Fosch Villaronga et al., Humans Forget, Machines Remember: Artificial Intelligence and the
Right to Be Forgotten, 34 Comp. L aw & Sec. R ev., 304 (2018). Google refused to de-list these
articles on the grounds that the search links were relevant and in the public interest. For the
decision of the Information Commissioner’s Office, see Data Protection Act 1998 Supervisory
Powers of the Information Commissioner, Enforcement Notice, Info. Comm’r’s Office, Aug. 18,
2015, https://www.pdpjournals.com/docs/88469.pdf.
GDPR, supra note 3, art. 17, entitled “Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’).”
All these persons have been convicted of war crimes or offences that amount to war crimes.
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communal conflict and their status as violations of peremptory norms
of international law. It then analyzes how the general considerations
regarding the removal from cyberspace of personal information relating
to crime apply when international crimes are at issue.

I

THE IMPORTANCE OF FORGETTING
Forgiveness encapsulated the idea that former criminal offenders need
not be defined exclusively by their criminal past. Forgiveness is intended
not to erase the criminal acts themselves but to demarcate the context
in which they are to be regarded as relevant, thereby limiting their
place in historical consciousness and the weight of the guilt associated
with them.7
The notion of forgiveness is assisted, to some extent, by the natural
process of human forgetfulness. While written documentation has reduced
the dependence of society on human memory, digitization has all but
eliminated the notion of information loss. The use of cyberspace, on
which this chapter focuses, has eliminated the geographical and temporal
containment of information. Information of all types, including on individuals’ involvement in the commission of a crime and specifically international crimes, is available from a variety of sources: formal records,
judicial archives, news archives, and private sources. Hyper-connectivity
through search engines allows retrieval of those sources. Personal information linked to the commission of international crimes is now accessible
to information consumers everywhere and virtually forever, even when
they do not actively seek it.8
In a rational society, abundance and availability of information may
appear to be an optimal situation, as more information enables the making of better informed—and therefore better—decisions. But the unlimited availability of information exacts a price when it hinders individuals
from turning a new page. For this reason (as well as other reasons, some
not so virtuous), there is nothing novel or surprising about the wish of
7
8

Ugo Pagallo & Massimo Durante, Legal Memories and the Right to Be Forgotten, in Protection of
Information and the R ight to Privacy: A New Equilibrium? 17, 26 (Luciano Floridi ed., 2014).
Cécile de Terwangne, The Right to be Forgotten and Informational Autonomy in the Digital
Environment, in T he Ethics of M emory in a Digital Age 82–89, 85 (Alessia Ghezzi, Ângela
Guimarães Pereira & Lucia Vesnić-Alujević eds., 2014).

284

Yaël Ronen

individuals to remove unflattering information about themselves from
the public sphere, especially information on criminal activity.9
Since nothing is ever naturally forgotten, the obstacle to forgiveness
has to be removed through active measures. This is a costly, resource-consuming process.10 Yet legal regulation of information management has
been limited and partial.11 The rise of bureaucracy generated legislation
on the erasure of spent convictions.12 In the EU, the retention of information on databases became regulated in the 1990s and is now governed
by the GDPR, whose impact goes far beyond EU borders.13 Elsewhere,
the removal of information from databases and archives, as well as the
de-linking of web pages on search engines, have been sought through
private tort actions.14 There is a whole spectrum of means for dealing
with lingering personal online information that causes individuals significant harm,15 from erasure of the information itself to the addition of
contextualizing information.16 In between are measures such as limiting
access to the information, redacting it, and anonymizing it. A separate
type of measure concerns search engines, where individuals’ names can
be de-linked from web pages.17
Different jurisdictions adopt different balances between conflicting
rights and interests relating to personal information on criminal
9

10
11
12

13

14

15
16
17

Theo Bertram et al., Five Years of the Right to Be Forgotten, Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM, 2019), https://dl.acm.org/
doi/10.1145/3319535.3354208.
Id.
O’H ara et al., supra note 2, at 1.
Human rights: Comparative table of legislation on spent convictions, Australian Human R ights
Commission (2004), https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/human-rights-comparative-table-legislation-spent-convictions (last visited Nov. 20, 2021); T.J. McIntyre & Ian O’Donnell,
Criminals, Data Protection and the Right to a Second Chance, 58 Irish Jurist 27, 34–35 (2017);
Dominic McGoldrick, Developments in the Right to Be Forgotten, 13 Hum. Rts. L. R ev. 761, 763
(2013) (mentioning the French “voluntary Charter of Good Practices on the right to be forgotten
on social networks and search engines”); W. Gregory Voss & Céline Castets-Renard, Proposal for
an International Taxonomy on the Various Forms of the Right to Be Forgotten: A Study on the Convergence
of Norms, 14 Colo. T ech. L.J. 281, 310–13 (2015) (discussing American privacy regulation).
For practice in Europe relating to newspaper archives and search engines based on the GDPR, see
Dawn C. Nunziato, The Fourth Year of Forgetting: The Troubling Expansion of the Right to Be Forgotten,
39 U. PA. J. Int’l L. 1 (2018).
Franz Werro, T he R ight to Be Forgotten: A Comparative Study of the E mergent R ight’s
Evolution and A pplication in Europe, the A mericas and A sia (2020); Jasmine E. McNealy,
The Emerging Conflict Between Newsworthiness and the Right to Be Forgotten, 39 N. Ky. L. R ev. 119
(2012); Ashley Messenger, What Would a “Right to Be Forgotten” Mean for Media in the United States?
29 Comm. L. 29, 29–30, 35 (2012). In France this was known as “le droit á l’oubli,” a predecessor
in both name and form to the modern digital counterpart. Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten,
64 Stan. l. R ev. Online 88, 88 (2012). For Japanese law, see Frederike Zufall, Challenging the EU’s
Right to Be Forgotten: Society’s Right to Know in Japan, 5 Eur. Data Prot. L. R ev. 17 (2019).
Meg Leta Jones, Ctrl + Z in Legal Cultures, in CTRL + Z: T he R ight to Be Forgotten 147–49 (2016).
Jones, supra note 15, at 147–49; McGoldrick, supra note 12, at 775.
O’H ara et al., supra note 2, at 8–9; Andrew Neville, Is it a Human Right to Be Forgotten? Conceptualizing the World View, 15 Santa Clara J. Int’l L. 157 (2017); Ivan Szekely, The Right to be
Forgotten and the New Archival Paradigm, in T he Ethics of M emory in a Digital Age: Interrogating the R ight to Be Forgotten 33–34 (Pereira Ângela Guimarães, Alessia Ghezzi &
Vesnić-Alujević Lucia eds., 2014).
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activities.18 This chapter does not second-guess these choices; nor does
it focus on what specific technical means should be used for erasure or
de-listing. Rather, it examines whether and how the balancing should
be modified when what is at issue is information revealing a particular
aspect of an individual’s involvement in the commission of international
crimes. Such information may encompass a whole variety of matters:
allegations, indictments, convictions, acquittals, civil proceedings against
a person convicted of such a crime, a person’s family relationship with
an individual who has been the victim of international crimes, and much
more. However, the chapter is limited to information on persons who have
been convicted and punished.19 One reason for this is that the chapter
concerns the notion of forgiveness and considers the erasure or de-linking
of information specifically on the grounds that the passage of time has
rendered the information inaccurate or excessively harmful, rather than
on the grounds that the information should not have been made public
to begin with or that it provides an incomplete and therefore misleading
account. A separate discussion should be dedicated to issues relating to
information on allegations and indictments that have come to naught,
as well as to issue relating to persons other than the former offenders
themselves. These issues are informed less by considerations of forgiveness and more by questions such as the relationship between the legal
truth and factual truth, and between the presumption of innocence and
freedom of information. The chapter follows existing practice, whereby
requests for the removal or de-linking of information are considered only
when made by the subjects of the information themselves.20

18

19
20

For comparative studies, see Franz Werro, The Right to Inform v. the Right to Be Forgotten: A Transatlantic Clash, in Liability in the T hird M illennium (Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, Christine Godt,
Peter Rott & Leslie Jane Smith, eds., 2009). Werro, supra note 14. In the US recently, see G.W. v.
Gannett Co., Inc., No. 2082CV0629, 2020 WL 9076502, at *1 (Mass. Super. Dec. 29, 2020).
Under European law, such information is regarded as personal data, namely information relating
to the social identity of a natural person. GDPR, supra note 3, art. 4(1).
The GDPR explicitly states that erasure will be considered only when requested by the data subject.
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II

COMPETING RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
A PRIVACY AND REPUTATION
The right to be forgotten in the sense of removal of information from the
public sphere or de-linking of information stems from individuals’ interest to protect their reputation. Under the universal human rights system,
the right to protection from unlawful interference with one’s reputation
and honor is an independent right.21 The European human rights system
formally recognizes reputation and honor not as independent rights, but
as legitimate grounds for restricting other rights.22 Nonetheless, over the
years the European Court of Human Rights has expanded the right to
privacy to encompass what the domestic law of many European States
recognizes as “personality rights,” namely individuals’ interest in representing themselves in a public context and developing their identity
and personality.23
Privacy as personality is underpinned by the notion of human dignity,
from which derives the perception of individuals as autonomous agents,
able to determine freely the development of their life.24 This autonomy
justifies holding individuals accountable for their bad choices. But by the
same token, human dignity requires that individuals not be reduced to
their bad choices and not be forever burdened and stigmatized by them.25
Instead, they should be allowed to differentiate themselves from their
past selves.26 In the context of criminal activity, what is at issue is the
(re-)integration of former offenders into law-abiding society. This involves
21
22
23
24

25

26

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
Bart van der Sloot, Privacy as Personality Right: Why the ECtHR’s Focus on Ulterior Interests Might Prove
Indispensable in the Age of “Big Data,” 31 Utrecht J. of Int’l and Eur. L. 25, 31–32 (2015).
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Voss & Castets-Renard, supra note 12, at 291, citing Alessandro Mantelero, The EU Proposal for a
General Data Protection Regulation and the Roots of the “Right to be Forgotten,” 29
Comp. L. & Sec. R ev. 229, 229 n. 1 (2013).
Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, Oblivion: The Right to be Different... from Oneself: Re-Proposing
the Right to be Forgotten, in T he Ethics of M emory in a Digital Age (Alessia Ghezzi, Ângela
Guimarães Pereira & Lucia Vesnić-Alujević eds., 2014); Luciano Floridi, “The Right to Be Forgotten”:
A Philosophical View, 23 Jahrbuch F ür R echt Und Ethik/A nn. R ev. L. & Ethics, 163, 155
(2015); Christiana Markou, The “Right to Be Forgotten”: Ten Reasons Why It Should Be Forgotten, in
R eforming European Data Protection L aw, vol. 20 (S. Gutwirth, R. Leenes & P. de Hert eds.,
2015); McGoldrick, supra note 12, at 764–65.
De Andrade, supra note 25, at 73–74; Terwangne, supra note 8, at 90–91. For a critique that
the right to reinvent oneself is tantamount to a right to misrepresent, see John W. Dowdell,
An American Right to Be Forgotten, 52 T ulsa L. R ev. 311, § V (2016).
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developing new personal connections and distancing oneself from old
ones, finding new income sources, and numerous other aspects of social
life. Moreover, (re-)integration is in the interest not only of the former
offenders themselves but also of society at large, since the successful
adjustment and civic engagement of former offenders reduces financial
and social burdens.27 Without opportunities for social re-integration, the
risk increases that a criminal underclass will emerge, endangering public
safety. In addition, exclusion creates marginalized populations that are
burdened with multiple layers of disadvantage, thereby depriving society
of skills and talents while imposing on it the costs of unproductivity.28
The availability of information in cyberspace presents a serious challenge to the reconstruction of personal identity, especially when it does
not contextualize the information. Perhaps least problematic are judicial records, which are usually not generally accessible and which, like
institutional databases and archives, by nature delineate the context of
the information very strictly.29 They could be regarded as a repository
where information is left to sediment. In contrast, news articles offer
the reader a social interpretation of the information, which remains fixed
and eternally available, despite changes that may have taken place over
time. If those changes are not taken into account, the original context
may become misleading as to the relevance of the information. Finally,
hyperconnectivity makes information available entirely out of context and
to audiences that did not seek it.30 News websites and search engines are
therefore the platforms that present the greatest difficulty for individuals
seeking to reform and develop a new personality. They are the focus of
this chapter.

B FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND INFORMATION
The right of news organizations to impart information as part of their
freedom of expression31 needs no elaboration. Concerning search engines,
the matter is more complicated. One question is whether the results

27
28
29
30
31

Jones, supra note 15, at 141–43.
McIntyre & O’Donnell, supra note 12.
They are also likely to provide the most accurate information. However, this chapter does not
address problems arising from inaccurate or fake information as such.
Google Spain, supra note 3, ¶ 80.
ICCPR art. 19, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 10, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, E.T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter ECHR]; American Convention on Human Rights art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36,
1144 U.N.T.S. 143 [hereinafter ACHR].
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of a search constitute “expressions” protected under the freedom of
expression. Given the broad interpretation of the term “expression” as
inclusive of every communicable form of subjective ideas and opinions,
value-neutral news and information, and more,32 there is no reason to
exclude search results from the scope of the term. Not only do such
results indicate a substantive link between a person’s name and certain
conduct, but often the titles of websites and snippets of content contain
enough information for the user to understand the underlying facts.33
The 2014 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) Google case—
a landmark for holding that the activity of a search engine constitutes
the “processing of personal data” for the purpose of EU law and that a
search engine may be regarded as the “controller” in respect of that processing34—did not address the matter in terms of freedom of expression
or of information. When the Court mentioned the considerations to be
weighed against the individual’s right to private life and to protection of
personal data, it mentioned access to information only as “the legitimate
interest of internet users.”35 It did not mention freedom of expression
as a right of the data controller.36 In other courts, search results have
at times been held to be “expression”37 and thereby protected by the
right. A separate question is whether search engines, as nonhuman
entities, possess and may invoke human rights. This question, too, may
be answered differently depending on the jurisdiction.38
Freedom of expression protects internet users’ right to seek and
receive all generally accessible information and ideas.39 Clearly, a news
organization is not obligated to make its archives (digital or other) available to the public; nor are search engines obligated to provide search
opportunities.40 Users cannot claim a right to such information. Nevertheless, as the CJEU noted, there does exist a public interest in having
the information available. While mere curiosity may not be sufficient to
justify interference with individuals’ right to privacy,41 criminal activity
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

M anfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political R ights: CCPR Commentary 443–44
(N.P. Engel, 2005).
Zufall, supra note 14, at 19.
Google Spain, supra note 3, ¶ 41.
Both quotes from Google Spain, Id. ¶ 81.
Nor, for that matter, did it consider the availability of the information as reflective of the right to
freedom of expression of the publisher of the information.
For a judicial articulation of this view, see Zufall, supra note 14, on the Japanese case law of 2017.
For example, under Japanese law, Google benefits from the right to freedom of expression, Zufall,
supra note 14, at 22.
ICCPR art. 19, ECHR art. 10, ACHR art. 13. ECHR Art. 10 does not provide the right to actively seek
information explicitly, but this is inferred from the case law. Nowak, supra note 32, at 446.
If a substantive right exists that is within the power of a non-State actor to “respect,” the
government is obligated to ensure that the non-State actors supply the information.
Google Spain, supra note 3, ¶ 81.
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is usually regarded as a matter of public relevance, and information about
it is pertinent to various legitimate public interests that may at times
override the right to privacy, such as concerns that the transgression will
be repeated. In addition, the formal, State-imposed punishment does not
dispense with social censure.42 Thus moral judgment has been recognized
as a legitimate concern with regard to public figures of persons seeking
to hold public positions.43
The public may also have interests that are not related directly to specific former offenders but for which the personal information of former
offenders may be pertinent. For example, the demographics of offenders,
at least in aggregated form, are important in developing a rational policy
to reduce crime.44

III

IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES FOR THE BALANCING OF
RIGHTS
Numerous factors have been cited in international case law and scholarship as pertinent for balancing the right to privacy against the public
interest when online information on criminal activity is at issue. These
include the nature and content of the information, including the severity
of the offense; the concrete harm caused to the individual by the availability of the information; the social position and influence of the individual;
the platform on which the information is presented; the purpose and
meaning of the article containing the information; the social situation
when the information was posted and subsequent changes; the need to
reveal particular facts; and, of course, the passage of time.45
42

43
44

45

For a judicial articulation of this in Japanese law, see Zufall, supra note 14, at 22. Zufall criticizes
the granting to Google, a private corporation, the power to determine public interest beyond the
legal limitation periods, id. at 24.
Google Spain, supra note 3, ¶ 81.
The name of specific offenders may not be required for this purpose. Whether the name can
be separated from the information depends on the information source. Furthermore, at times
individuals may be identifiable even without the explicit mention of their name.
Google Spain, supra note 3, ¶ 81; Supreme Court of Japan, Decision of Feb. 8, 1994 (Minshū 48,
No. 2) 149 (nonfiction “gyaku-ten” jiken) ¶ 7; Information Commissioner’s Office, supra note 4,
¶¶ 23–29; Róisin A. Costello, The Right to Be Forgotten in Cases Involving Criminal Convictions: Nt1 &
Nt2 V Google and the Information Commissioner, 3 Eur. Hum. Rts L. R ev. 268 (2018).
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In what follows, I consider various factors that may be relevant to the
balancing process when the information concerns convictions specifically
for international crimes. Some of these factors are unique to international
crimes. Other factors apply also with regard to ordinary crimes but may
have specific angles when considered in relation to international crimes.

A THE RIGHT TO TRUTH WITH REGARD
TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
International human rights law requires that crimes be investigated,
that they be prosecuted where appropriate, and, when convictions are
secured, that perpetrators be punished. With respect to some serious
crimes, State obligations have been expanded to the provision of victims’
families with information about the crimes that have been committed
and the circumstances that have led to that commission.
Transitional justice scholarship suggests that the requirements of
accountability for international crimes may go further. A successful
process of social reconstruction cannot be limited to criminal tools and
requires genuine self-reckoning by the communities involved. Recent
years have seen the emergence of new expectations and principles that
suggest that, beyond the rights of direct victims of crimes to have their
individual cause vindicated through courts of law, the public at large is
entitled to know the truth about past events concerning heinous crimes
and the circumstances and reasons that led to those crimes.46 Truth
seeking, also outside the courtroom, is therefore an essential aspect of
a society’s efforts to address a past that involves international crimes.47
It is too early to declare a legal right to truth, since this public entitlement has yet to be formally accepted by States as legally binding, and
its content has yet to be elucidated. But the underlying rationale of the
“right” to truth (the term henceforth being used loosely) may inform the
balancing of conflicting rights and interests with regard to accessibility
46

47

Principles 2 and 4 of the Report of the independent expert to update the Set of principles to
combat impunity, Diane Orentlicher, Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion
of human rights through action to combat impunity, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (2005), http://
daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/109/00/PDF/G0510900.pdf?OpenElement; El-Masri v.
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No. 39630/09, Grand Chamber Judgment, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2012) ¶ 191; Al-Nashiri v. Poland, App. No. 28761/11, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014)
¶ 495; Abu Zubaydah v. Poland App. No. 7511/13, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014) ¶ 489; Association “21 December 1989” and others v. Romania App. No. 33810/07, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2011) ¶ 144.
Eva Brems, Transitional Justice in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 5 Int’l J.
T ransitional Just. 282, n. 25 (2011), and cases cited there.
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online to personal information about convictions of international crimes.
Opposite the notion of a right to be forgotten, there is an obligation to
prevent oblivion.
Two issues that merit consideration are the identity of the duty
holder, namely the relationship between States and private actors, and
the type of “truth” to which the public has a right.48 To be sure, the right
to truth is addressed to States and not to private actors. At present, the
requirement from States is to preserve and enable access to public records
and archives but not to regulate the management of information held
by private parties. In other words, it is hard to argue categorically that
information about international crimes, even once published online, must
remain accessible and that States must therefore force news organizations to provide online access to their archives or prohibit search engines
from removing links to such archives. On the other hand, when a person
seeks to have information about a conviction for an international crime
removed, perhaps States must ensure that the decision-making body gives
the right to truth, expressed in the availability of information, especially
weighty consideration. This, too, would be a far-reaching requirement.
A separate question is whether the “truth” to which there is a right
necessarily includes the naming of individuals. Some guidance may be
found in the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance,49 probably the most detailed and concrete
legal expression of a right to truth. The Convention cites the right to
truth as inclusive of the right to know the progress and/or results of any
and all official investigations of the crime.50 Even this wording does not,
in itself, imply that the names of perpetrators must be available without
restriction. The ECtHR, for its part, has held that freedom of expression
and the right to know require States to allow debate on the rights-violating past itself, as well as on the approach taken toward the legacy of
that past. But it does not require them to interfere with the privacy of
individuals involved in the rights-violating past.51
Another consideration regarding the relationship between the right
to truth and the right of individuals to privacy is that since international
crimes are often a matter of mass perpetration and few persons are
brought to legal account, it is all too easy for others, individually and
48
49
50
51

Grażyna Baranowska & Aleksandra Gliszczyńska-Grabias, “Right to Truth” and Memory Laws, 47
Polish Pol. S ci. Y.B. 97, 98–99 (2018).
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, art.
24.2, Dec. 20, 2006, 2716 UNTS3 (entered into force Dec. 23, 2010).
Id.; Baranowska & Gliszczyńska-Grabias, supra note 48, at 97.
Brems, supra note 47, at 287–88, n. 31; Antoon De Baets, A Historian’s View on the Right to Be
Forgotten, 30 International R eview of L aw, Computers & T echnology 57, 61 (2016).
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collectively, to distance themselves from their own moral responsibility
by holding that the particular individuals who had been prosecuted are
the only ones responsible for the crimes. This results in the apparent
scapegoating of certain individuals. In the criminal process, the inability to hold everyone accountable is not a justification for impunity. But
in the context of accessibility of information online, there is valence to
the argument that the availability of information on specifically named
individuals may give the false impression that moral and social responsibility, too, lies exclusively with them, and easily absolve the community
at large from engaging with its past and present. It should nonetheless
be noted that while the availability of personal information on specific
perpetrators may indeed enable a particular society to disregard its past
and avoid engagement with its collective responsibility, the removal of
that personal information would obviously not have the opposite effect,
namely to force a society to contend with its collective responsibility.
If anything, it may simplify that disregard even further. Thus any scapegoating of individuals should be prevented by other means.
Arguably, an analogy could be made from the often-cited statement
of the international military tribunal in Nuremberg (IMT) that “[c]rimes
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the
provisions of international law be enforced.”52 Like legal accountability,
communal self-reckoning requires that the crimes be concretized for
there to be genuine engagement. The mention of names may be a powerful reminder to members of the general public of their own potential
proximity to the act. It may force a discussion of “crimes we (as a society)
have committed” as opposed to “crimes that have been committed.”

B THE PEREMPTORY CHARACTER OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
It is generally recognized that the prohibitions on the commission of
international crimes are peremptory norms,53 which, by their nature, prevail over other norms of international law. The question arises as to how
52
53

France et al. v. Goering et al., 22 IMT 411, 466 (Int’l Mil. Trib. 1946).
ILC, Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens), Text of the Draft Conclusions
and Draft Annex Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee on First Reading, annex, 23,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.936 (May 29, 2019); Alexander Orakhelashvili, State Immunity and Hierarchy
of Norms: Why the House of Lords Got It Wrong, 18 European Journal of International L aw 955,
963 (2007).
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far the character of peremptory norms extends and, specifically, whether it
has consequences in the public sphere after punishment has been served.
There is a strong, albeit controversial, view that the obligation of
States to prosecute and punish the perpetrators of international crimes is
also a peremptory norm.54 This view is reflected in international practice
with respect to norms related to the prescription of prosecutions and
the granting of amnesty. The first matter is addressed in the 1968 Convention, which requires States parties to ensure that statutory or other
limitations shall not apply to the prosecution and punishment of international crimes.55 There is also a view that amnesties for perpetrators of
international crimes are impermissible, although practice varies.56
By contrast, international tribunals have consistently ruled that the
fact that the subject matter of criminal or civil proceedings in a domestic court is the commission of an international crime does not create
an exception to the rules on State immunity and immunity of officials.
This position has been grounded primarily in the reasoning that immunity creates a procedural obstacle that does not conflict directly with
the substantive prohibition, and therefore no conflict arises between a
peremptory norm and an ordinary one.57 This analysis has been strongly
criticized (as has been the practice of granting amnesties) on the grounds
that if the remedies for the violations of a peremptory norm are considered derogable, then effectively the peremptory norm itself becomes
derogable.58 But even if one adopts the stricter view—that the peremptory
character of the norm dictates that there must not be procedural or other
obstacles to the provision of remedies for international crimes—it should
be stressed that the remedies at issue are those offered by the criminal
process. Thus if a crime has been committed, it must be investigated and
prosecuted; and if a conviction is secured, punishment must be served.
But when the criminal process ends, the peremptory character of the
norm ceases to have consequences.
54
55

56
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Id. at 304–7.
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, art. 4, 26 November 1968, 754 UNTS 73 (entered into force Nov. 11, 1970). While a few
States have ratified the Convention, the travaux préparatoires suggest that many States regarded
the prohibition on prescription for international crimes as already constituting a customary norm
that the convention merely codified. William Schabas, Time, Justice and Human Rights: Statutory
Limitation on the Right to Truth? in Understanding the Age of T ransitional Justice: Crimes,
Courts, Commissions, and Chronicling 37–55 (Nanci Adler ed., 2018).
The Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgment of Dec. 10, 1998, IT-95-17/I-T, at ¶ 155; Prosecutor
v. Morris Kallon & Brimma Bazzy Kamara, SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E) & SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E),
Decision of Mar. 13; Orakhelashvili, supra note 53.
Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 21, 2001); Jurisdictional
Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening) (Germany v. Italy), Judgment (Feb. 3,
2012), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16883.pdf.
Orakhelashvili, supra note 53, at 243, expanded in ch. 10 and on pages 226–50, 304–7.
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The normative hierarchy analysis takes an interesting turn even if
one accepts the view expressed by international tribunals that procedural
norms resulting in impunity do not defer to substantive peremptory
norms. Unlike statutes of limitation, amnesties, and immunities, which
are procedural mechanisms that undermine legal accountability, the (procedural) right to truth strengthens this accountability. Where the tension
lies is between the peremptory prohibition and the right to privacy, which
is a substantive norm. In this tension, the peremptory character of the
norm dictates its superiority. However, this superiority does not mean
that the right to privacy may be entirely obviated. What the right to truth
entails, and how far the right to privacy should be curtailed, are questions
that still require consideration.

C GRAVITY
In considering how long personal information relating to criminal conduct should legitimately be retained in the public sphere, the criterion
most often used is the gravity of the criminal act. The graver the crime,
the longer the public interest should be considered a legitimate factor.59
In what follows, I consider how the factor of gravity operates when the
crime at issue is an international one.
One line of examination is whether keeping information available
online should be subject to the same standards that apply to preserving
criminal records. Just as international crimes are not subject to statutes
of limitation, should online information related to their perpetrators
likewise not have an expiration date? Statutory limitations, by which
ordinary crimes are limited, have various justifications. One argument,
developed with regard to minor offenses, is that alleged offenders can
and, at times, do mend their ways. If the alleged offenders were not
promptly punished, and over time the crimes have all but been forgotten,
and the offenders have mended their ways and become better members
of society, then legal impunity is no longer a strong concern.60 Statutes
59
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Joran Spauwen & Jens van den Brink, Dutch Google Spain Ruling: More Freedom of Speech, Less Right
to be Forgotten For Criminals, Inforrm’s Blog, Sept. 27, 2014, https://inforrm.org/2014/09/27/
dutch-google-spain-ruling-more-freedom-of-speech-less-right-to-be-forgotten-for-criminals-joran-spauwen-and-jens-van-den-brink/.
Cesare Beccaria, A n Essay on Crimes and P unishments 112 (2nd ed., 1872), cited by Comm’n
on Human Rights, Twenty-second Session, “Question of Punishment of War Criminals and of
Persons Who Have Committed Crimes against Humanity, Question of the Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitation to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity,” Study Submitted by the
Secretary-General, ¶ 104 C/CN.4/906 (1966), https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.4/906.
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of limitation also developed as a matter of expediency, driven by considerations such as the reduced reliability of witnesses and other types of
evidence when the crimes in question were committed a long time ago.
These make prosecution for long-gone crimes excessively burdensome
on governmental resources and increase the risk of false convictions.
These two sets of considerations were discussed in the negotiations
on the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. With respect to the
former, several States argued that it was unrealistic to believe or hope
that Nazi criminals would repent and become decent members of any
civilized community.61 In addition, it was argued that atrocious crimes in
general are long-remembered62 and that, with respect to Nazi atrocities
in particular, world opinion would never forgive them or become indifferent to them.63 In other words, legal impunity would forever remain
the overriding concern.
With respect to resources, throughout the negotiations there was
controversy over whether gravity (of the acts or of crimes64) should be a
limiting factor for the non-applicability of statutory limitations.65 Ultimately, the Convention rejected the distinction,66 thus conveying the
message that no international crime is light enough to enjoy impunity,
even on practical grounds.
How do these considerations operate when applied not to statutory
limitations on prosecution but to the balancing of conflicting interests
after a sentence has been served? The development of IHRL appears
to be crucial in this respect, since the argument that perpetrators of
61
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Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the Twenty-First Session, 39 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 8) 87,
¶ 544 UN Doc E/4024, E/CN.4/891 (1965).
Beccaria, supra note 60.
Comm’n on Human Rights, supra note 61.
Comm’n on Human Rights, Twenty-third Session, Preliminary draft convention, prepared by
the Secretary-General, on the non-applicability of statutory limitation to war crimes and crimes
against humanity E/CN.4/928 (1967); Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the Twenty-third
Session, 49 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 6), ¶¶ 142, 146–48, 155, UN Doc E/4322, E/CN.4/940 (1967);
U.N. General Assembly, Question of punishment of war criminals and of persons who have
committed crimes against humanity: Report of the Secretary-General UN Doc A/7174 (1968); U.N.
General Assembly, Third Committee, Summary records of meetings nos. 1564 to 1568, UN Doc
A/C.3/SR.1564–68 (1968).
Comm’n on Human Rights, Question of the punishment of war criminals and of persons who
have committed crimes against humanity: United Kingdom: amendment to the draft convention
(A/7174, annex) A/C.3/L.1564/Rev.1 (1968).
E.g., US proposed amendment in Comm’n on Human Rights, supra note 61, ¶ 520: “Deeply
concerned that those guilty of the gravest war crimes of the Nazi period shall not escape the bar
of justice,” https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/4024(SUPP), rejected in favor
of Commission Res 3(XX)) Question of Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes Against Humanity, adopted 9 April 1965, available in Comm’n on Human
Rights, supra note 61, ¶ 567: “Deeply concerned that no one guilty of war crimes or of crimes
against humanity of the Nazi period shall escape the bar of justice…,” https://www.un.org/ga/
search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/4024(SUPP); Vote rejecting to amendments to draft article I on
this matter, Id. A/C.3/SR.1568, ¶ 37, rejecting UK and 4-power amendments.

296

Yaël Ronen

international crimes cannot be reasonably expected to repent directly
contradicts the notion of privacy as personality rights. It is one thing
to gauge that perpetrators of international crimes are beyond reform
as a matter of fact;67 but it is another to categorically deny them the
opportunity for reform. If the right to personal identity is an element in
the human right to privacy, no one may be altogether deprived of it, not
even a perpetrator of international crimes. Persons who have been held
to criminal account should be protected from being forever reduced to
nothing but former offenders. Accordingly, international crimes do not
merit a categorical bar to removal or de-linking of personal information
relating to their commission.
That said, the gravity of international crimes as categories of crime,
irrespective of the gravity of a particular act that formally falls within
these categories, may justify attaching weight to them when determining
the proper balance between conflicting rights and interests relating to
online availability of the information. The categorical gravity of international crimes lies in the fact that, in addition to the harm to life, limb,
and property that they cause to direct victims, these crimes offend the
tenets of global society as envisaged by international law, one in which all
persons are equally valued and deserving, individually and in groups. Each
of the categories of international crimes addresses a different aspect of
this humanness. The category of war crimes indicates that humanness is
innate and inalienable and therefore may not be denied even to the enemy
with whom one is locked in armed conflict. Crimes against humanity
represent the failure of political organization, which is a necessity for
individual security and well-being.68 The crime of genocide concerns an
attack on the human need for collective identity.69
Case law and policy on the erasure and de-linking of online information take into account the gravity of the acts when determining the
balance between the perpetrator’s right to personal identity and countervailing interests. This gravity is usually reflected in (and gauged by)
the punishment actually meted out. Social censure thus operates as an
extension of the formal censure and on the basis of the same standard:

67
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For discussion of the genuineness of repentance among defendants in international courts,
see Frédéric Mégret, The Repentant Defendant and the Potential of International Criminal Justice, 21
Contemporary Justice R eview 432 (2018).
David Luban, A Theory of Crimes against Humanity, 29 Yale J. of Int’l L. 85, 109–10, 117, 119–20
(2004). Darryl Robinson attributes to Kress and Schabas, Darryl Robinson, Essence of Crimes
Against Humanity Raised By Challenges at ICC, EJIL: Talk! (2011), https://www.ejiltalk.org/essenceof-crimes-against-humanity-raised-by-challenges-at-icc.
Michael Ignatieff, Lemkin’s Word, New R epublic, Feb. 26, 2001, at 27–28, cited in Luban, supra
note 68, n. 102.
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the graver the act, the longer it can legitimately be held against the
individual even beyond the serving of their sentence. This means longer
retention of the information. At first glance, it may seem that applying
the criterion of gravity to requests for the removal and de-listing of information requires no particular modification for international crimes, since
punishments for acts constituting international crimes are severe enough
already. Ratko Mladić and Jean-Paul Akayesu, for example, have been
sentenced to life imprisonment by the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR), respectively. The repercussions of their criminal conduct will never be in their past. Similarly, the criminal conduct of Bosco
Ntaganda, who in 2043 will be released at the age of 70 after serving 30
years in prison following his conviction by the International Criminal
Court,70 will remain a legitimate matter of public interest for the rest
of his life, justifying retention of his personal information online under
the existing standard based on the severity of the punishment. Even
if that conduct were not considered under the rubric of “international
crimes,” a request for the removal or de-linking of information relating
to Ntaganda would probably be rejected. However, not all convictions for
international crimes lead to life sentences or decades-long imprisonment.
In the ICTY, some individuals have been sentenced to imprisonment for
periods ranging between two and six years.71 The ICTR, too, sentenced
some individuals to less than 10 years’ imprisonment.72 Domestic courts
have convicted individuals for “minor” acts that constituted international
crimes and have imposed much lighter sentences.73 The persons mentioned in the introduction to this chapter have been sentenced to short
periods of imprisonment. Their past might not haunt them forever if
online information linking them to it is not easily available.
At the time of the negotiations over the 1968 Convention, the drafters
must have been aware that criminal proceedings against perpetrators of
70
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Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, Decision on the Confirmation
of Charges, Public Redacted Version, PTC I, ¶ 233 (Feb. 8, 2010), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2010_00753.pdf [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda].
E.g., Amir Kubura—two years (Apr. 22, 2008); Rasim Delić—three years (Sept. 15, 2008; appeal
terminated on death, June 29, 2010); Enver Hadžihasanović—3.5 years (Apr. 22, 2008); Dragoljub
Prcać—five years (Feb. 28, 2005); Veselin Šljivančanin—five years (Sept. 27, 2007); Milan
Gvero—five years (appeal terminated on death, March 7, 2013); Milojica Kos— six years (Feb.
28, 2005); Simo Zarić—six years (Nov. 28, 2006); and Lahim Brahimaj—six years (Apr. 3, 2008),
https://www.icty.org/en/cases.
For aggregated data on sentencing by crime category, hierarchy, and more, see Barbora Holá,
Alette Smeulers & Catrien Bijleveld, International Sentencing Facts and Figures: Sentencing Practice at
the ICTY and ICTR, 9 J. Int’l Crim, Just. 411 (2011).
For example, in 2007 Corporal Donald Payne was sentenced by a UK court to 12 months’ imprisonment for the offense of inhuman treatment of persons protected under the Geneva Conventions.
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international crimes might not always culminate in lengthy sentences,
as even in the IMT, there have been some relatively short sentences.74
The fact that ultimately the Convention does not distinguish between
acts that constitute international crimes by their gravity indicates that
the drafters attached categorical significance to such acts. In the same
vein, it could be argued that when considering the public’s interest in
knowing against the individual’s right to privacy, the classification of the
act as an international crime, while by itself not tipping the balance in
favor of freedom of expression and the right to know, should add weight
to that consideration, irrespective of the specific punishment that was
meted out to the individual.

D PUBLIC SAFETY
Public interest in a crime is greater, and justifies retention of information for longer, when there is a risk of the former offender repeating
the crime.75 When assessing the legitimacy of interfering in a person’s
privacy in order to avoid a speculative risk, the relevant factors include
not only the gravity of the act but also the given offender’s propensity
to repeat the transgression. This propensity depends on the traits of the
individual, as well as on their social circumstances.
There is reason to assume that perpetrators of international crimes
are not particularly prone to relapse into criminal conduct. International
crimes are, for the most part, committed in the context of communal strife
or conflict (though not necessarily armed conflict). Perpetrators of international crimes are not typically the victims of adverse circumstances or
bearers of any personal traits that are regarded as the “common” breeding
grounds of criminality. In fact, perpetrators of international crimes often
act not in a personal capacity but as organs (even if low-ranking ones)
of a public authority engaged in the conflict.76 Outside the context of
communal conflict, and stripped of their apparent authority, they might
well be ordinary, law-abiding individuals. This does not detract from their
responsibility for their past conduct, but there is no reason to assume that
74

75
76

For example, Josef Alstötter, Chief of the civil law and procedure division of the German Ministry
of Justice, was sentenced to five years; Curt Rothenberger, President of the Court of Appeals in
Hamburg and later State Secretary in the German Ministry of Justice, was sentenced to seven
years’ imprisonment.
Jones, supra note 15, at 141.
J.Y. Dautricourt, L’orientation moderne des notions d’auteur de l’infraction et de participation à
l’infraction en droit international pénal, 27 R evue Internationale de Droit P ublic 90, 106–7
(1957). The public authority may be self-styled rather than a recognized government.
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absent the enabling environment, they would be more prone to repeat
the act than anyone else would be. Thus public safety does not seem to
carry particular weight in terms of the online preservation of the personal
information of perpetrators of international crimes.

CONCLUSION
The removal and de-linking of personal information available online is
an imitation of human memory loss. These measures are grounded in
the view that the fading of memory can be a useful feature of the human
character.77 Yet, unlike natural memory loss, removal of information from
the visible public sphere requires active choices as to which information
should be removed and when. These decisions, regardless of the particular institutional form in which they take place, involve the balancing
of competing rights and interests. This chapter considers these rights
and interests as they pertain to information about individuals who have
been convicted and punished for committing international crimes. It concludes that no special rules need to be applied to international crimes.
However, international crimes do have certain characteristics that should
shift the balance away from the right to privacy and towards freedom of
expression. These are the importance of public access to information on
international crimes in the context of transitional justice processes, and
the gravity of the category of crimes to which these acts belong.

77

Liam J. Bannon, Forgetting as a Feature, Not a Bug: The Duality of Memory and Implications for
Ubiquitous Computing, 2(1) Int’l J. Co Creation Design & A rts 3–15 (2006).
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The Right Not to
Forget: Cloud-Based
Service Moratoriums
in War Zones and
Data Portability
Rights
Amir Cahane1

INTRODUCTION
Long gone are the days when individuals relied exclusively on tangible
media as memory extensions. Little black telephone books, daybooks,
photo albums, filing cabinets, and (actual) folders are mostly relics of the
past. Everyday to-do lists, addresses, personal documents, and photo
graphs are more likely to be preserved in digital forms. Increasingly, these
personal digital archives are stored online, in “the cloud.”2
1
2

Researcher, Israel Democracy Institute; Research Fellow, Federmann Cyber Security Research
Center in the Law Faculty of the Hebrew University.
See, for example, Cisco’s estimate (in 2016) that by 2020, the majority of residential internet users
would be using cloud storage. Thomas Barnett, Jr., Shruti Jain, Arielle Sumits, Usha Andra & Taru
Khurana, Cisco Global Cloud Index 2015–2020, Cisco P ublic 39 (2016), https://www.cisco.com/c/
dam/m/en_us/service-provider/ciscoknowledgenetwork/files/622_11_15-16-Cisco. A recent survey
by Statistics Finland indicates that 45 percent of respondents use personal online storage services.
However, within the 16-to-54 age group, personal online storage users form a majority. Share of
People Who Used the Internet for Personal Online Storage Services in Finland from 2018 to 2020, by Age
Group, Statista (2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/558062/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
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If a large-scale humanitarian disaster occurs, such as a massive
missile strike in the heart of a major metropolitan area, many individuals are likely to focus their efforts on survival. In the aftermath, those
dislocated individuals may find themselves without stable electricity and
communications infrastructure for weeks and months, and the financial
institutions they depend on may be paralyzed. Those individuals may be
more preoccupied with their basic physical needs than with their internet
access and even less so with their online cloud-based accounts. Will those
accounts survive this prolonged period of forced inactivity?
This chapter aims to introduce a new digital right—the right not
to forget. The right not to forget recognizes the value of one’s personal
data stored on the cloud and ensures its protection from arbitrary deletion or purging. Part I of this chapter addresses the growing reliance of
individuals on cloud-based storage services and social media and outlines three paradigms under which these personal storage spaces can
be conceptualized: as a proprietary personal document archive, as an
extension of the self, or as social data. Part II outlines the terms and
conditions pursuant to which cloud-based service providers may terminate, purge, or delete accounts and personal data on the cloud due to
prolonged inactivity periods or the user’s default on payments. Part III
focuses on the consequences of applying these terms and conditions
within the context of humanitarian disasters by noting the importance
of cloud-based personal data storage to survivors of such events. Part IV
outlines a proposed moratorium mechanism under which personal data
storage service providers shall retain all accounts related to a qualifying
humanitarian disaster. Part V explores possible legal venues to ground
this mechanism.

I

SOCIAL MEDIA AND CLOUD STORAGE
AS EXTENSION OF THE SELF
Cloud computing is an IT architecture that provides for on-demand network access to a shared array of configurable computer resources, such as
online processing or storage.3 Although the “cloud” metaphor for online
3

Peter Mell & Timothy Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, National Institute
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distributed computing services, including online data storage, was coined
in the late 1990s,4 it was only after the rise of Web 2.0 in the decade of
the 2000s and the emergence of smart mobile devices in the early 2010s
that personal cloud computing services became ubiquitous.5
A large share of personal cloud storage services, such as Google One,
Google Drive, Microsoft One Drive, and iCloud,6 are integrated by their
providers into other products and services. Dropbox, a personal storage
service that is not operated by such tech giants, offers a user interface
that emulates local on-device storage.
Some of these cloud storage services are mediated to their users via
different platforms—email services, messaging apps, smartphone cameras, social networking platforms, and other applications whose secondary function may be any of the above. Even before the smartphone era,
scholarly studies noted people’s dependence on their mobile devices.7
As mobile devices became a gateway to a myriad of cloud-based internet
services, users’ dependence on them has increased:8 smartphones have
become an extended memory artifact,9 which facilitates a variety of
short-term mnemonic techniques for personal memory10 and supports the
development of new objects of memories11 but also serves as an extended
long-term, autobiographical memory cache.
Delegating personal memory to the scaffolding of memory technologies, from books to Google searches, has been criticized as potentially
undermining both personal identity and collective cultural practices.12
of Standards and T echnology (2011), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/

4

5
6
7

8

9
10

11

12

SP800-145.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
The earliest reference to “data clouds” is attributed to Andy Hertzfeld. See Steven Levy, Bill and
Andy’s Excellent Adventure II, Wired (Sept. 4, 1994), https://www.wired.com/1994/04/general-
magic/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
See early predictions by Forrester Research, Personal Cloud Services Emerge to Orchestrate Our Mobile
Computing Lives (2012).
See Statista, Tech Giants in the U.S. 2019 Report 19 (2019).
See, e.g., James B. Rule, From Mass Society to Perpetual Contact: Models of Communication Technologies in Social Context, in Perpetual Contact: Mobile Communication, Private Talk, P ublic
Performance 242–54 (James E. K atz & M ark A. A akhus eds. 2004); Jon Agar, Constant
T ouch: T he Global History of the Mobile Phone (2003).
Astrid Carolus, Jens F. Binder, Ricardo Muench, Catharina Schmidt, Florian Schneider & Sarah L.
Buglass, Smartphones as Digital Companions: Characterizing the Relationship between Users and Their
Phones, 21 New M edia & S oc. 914–38 (2018).
Natalia Juchniewicz, Extended Memory: On Delegation of Memory to Smartphones, 25 T echné:
R esearch in Phil. & T ech. 308–31 (2021).
Arlene R. Lundquist, Emily J. Lefebvre & Sara J. Garramone, Smartphones: Fulfilling the Need for
Immediacy in Everyday Life, but at What Cost?, 4 Int’l. J. Humanities & S oc. S ci 80–89 (2014);
Amanda J. Barnier, Memories, Memory Studies and My iPhone: Editorial, 3 M emory Studies 293–97
(2010).
For example, the constant record-keeping of instant messaging conversations influences the
construction of memories. See Chris Drain & Charles Strong, Situated Mediation and Technological
Reflexivity: Smartphones, Extended Memory, and Limits of Cognitive Enhancement, in S ocial Epistemology and T echnology: T oward P ublic Self-Awareness R egarding T echnological
M ediation, 187–96, 190 (Frank S calambrino ed. 2016).
See, e.g., Nicholas C arr, T he Shallows: What the Internet Is D oing to Our Brains (2011);
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However, these arguments were mostly raised within the context of technologies by which individual knowledge of common facts is eroded by
delegation to computer systems, where one allegedly does not need to
memorize sections from the classics, as they are available from a simple
Google search. Heersmink argues that delegating one’s private, autobiographical memory to external storage technologies is widening the
constitutive base form of one’s identity rather than outsourcing it,13 while
Mayer-Schönberger expresses concerns that digital archives serve only
as a veneer of memory while decontextualizing it.14
Regardless of the theoretical debate over its potential risks or harms
to personal identity, reliance on cloud technologies for the backup of
personal, private, long-term autobiographical memories and documents
is prevalent. Cloud storage is used—via devices—for active self-documentation that later will be used for personal evocation of significant
biographical events.15
Alongside storing data that serves as an extension of the autobiographical memory of individuals, and thereby of their selves, cloud
services also function as a personal backup archive of miscellaneous
files,16 such as medical, financial, or identification documents. These two
aforementioned categories of memory—autobiographical and archival—
correspond with notions of narrative memory and database memory.
Within the context of personal data, autobiographical memory tends to
be retained within a personal narrative that charges it with emotive
power and serves as an extension of the self. Personal digital archives
are organized mostly as database memory, of decontextualized items
to be retrieved when needed, such as financial documents, academic or
professional certificates, and medical history. The database paradigm
alludes to a proprietary relation to one’s personal data and accordingly
may invoke property rights.
The effective management of personal digital archives is a complex
task.17 Indeed, many individual digital personal archives are amalgams

13

14
15
16

17

Nicholas Carr, Is Google Making Us Stupid? 302 Atlantic Monthly 56–62 (2008); Susan
Greenfield, M ind Change: How Digital T echnologies A re Leaving T heir M ark on Our
Brains (2015).
Richard Heersmink, Distributed Selves: Personal Identity and Extended Memory Systems, 194 Synthese
3135–51 (2017); Richard Heersmink & J. Adam Carter, The Philosophy of Memory Technologies:
Metaphysics, Knowledge, and Values 13 M emory Studies 416–33 (2017).
Viktor M ayar-S chönberger, Delete: T he Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age (2019).
Juchniewicz, supra note 9, at 318; Heersmink & Carter, supra note 13, at 419.
See, for example, the study by Finley, Nazz, and Goh, in which 35 percent of respondents declared
that they use cloud services for backup. Jason R. Finley, Farah Naaz & Francine W. G oh,
M emory and T echnology: How We Use Information in the Brain and the World 40 (2018).
See, e.g., Catherine C. Marshall, Rethinking Personal Digital Archiving, Part 1: Four Challenges from the
Field, 14 D-Lib M agazine (2008). For general criticism of the delegation of intimate activities,
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of data stored in various databases and online storage services offered
by a range of platforms and apps, in a manner that makes their retrieval
challenging.18 Nevertheless, even such mismanaged personal repositories,
rather than being carefully curated by their owners, are accumulating
personal data that is of immense value to their owners. This is unique
data, of a very personal nature, which may be very hard to retrieve or
recreate if lost.19 This indicates that, despite the theoretical differentiation
between database and narrative memories,20 in practice, personal data is
not stored in a manner that allows this distinction.
A third category of data preserved by cloud services should also be
mentioned: social data. A myriad of social contacts, social interactions, and
public or semi-public posts that individuals manage via social networking,
instant messaging, or email platforms is documented in the cloud. The
sum of these interactions becomes an individual digital persona.
The aforementioned categories of personal data stored on the cloud
may reflect Dror-Shpoliansky and Shany’s account of the three generations of digital rights.21 While first-generation digital property rights may
apply to personal digital archives22 functioning as databases, second-generation digital rights, such as the German notion of the right to informational self-determination,23 may serve to further protect personal data
stored in the cloud that functions as an extension of the self. The third
category of social data may call for further protection within third-generation digital rights for digital personae.24 However, there may be other
digital rights that apply to all categories, such as the second-generation
right to data portability.25

18

19

20
21
22
23
24
25

see Arlie Russell Hochschild, T he Outsourced Self: What H appens When We Pay O thers to
Live Our Lives (2013).
This is especially the case when an individual personal digital archive is a cumulative cache of
short-term memory artifacts, such as digital photos of identification documents a user may send
to herself via email or instant messaging apps before traveling abroad. These artifacts may be
useful for the long term yet difficult to retrieve in lieu of a personal management system.
For example, the possibility of losing one’s personal photos (which evokes the “saving the photo
albums from a burning house” trope) raises individual anxiety. Some have expressed “intense
fear of losing their digital images”: Emily Keightley & Michael Pickering, Technologies of Memory:
Practices of Remembering in Analogue and Digital Photography, 16 New M edia & S oc. 576–93,
582–83 (2014). In a market research survey cited by Lury, 39 percent of respondents claimed
their (tangible) family albums to be their “most treasured possession.” Celia Lury, Prosthetic
C ulture: Photography, M emory and Identity 82 (1998).
Lev M anovich, T he L anguage of New M edia 194–202 (2002).
Dafna Dror-Shpoliansky & Yuval Shany, It’s the End of the (Offline) World as We Know It: From Human
Rights to Digital Human Rights—A Proposed Typology, Eur. J. Int’l L. (forthcoming 2022).
See, e.g., Dixon v. R. [2015] NZSC 147, [2016] 1 NZLR 678, at 25.
65 BVerfGE, 1 (1983); D onald Kommers & Russell A. M iller, T he Constitutional Jurisprudence of the F ederal R epublic of Germany 408–11 (2009).
See, e.g., The Internet Rights & Principles Dynamic Coalition (IRPC) and the Internet Governance
Forum (IGF), The Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the Internet, Art. 8(d) (2014).
The most notable codifications of the right to data portability are in the European Union’s
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and in the Californian civil code (as part of the
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)). See Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament
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II

DEFAULTING ON YOUR MEMORIES
Retail cloud service providers often offer freemium services, where users
are first introduced to a rudimentary version of a product or a service and
encouraged by their provider to acquire a premium version with additional features or enhanced performance. Dropbox, for example, offers a
basic 2GB storage account for free, which may be upgraded to premium
subscription plans of up to 2TB for personal users.26 According to its 2020
annual SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) filing, Dropbox has
more than 700 million registered accounts, of which nearly 15.5 million
are paying users.27
Personal cloud-based storage services that operate under the freemium paradigm strive to strike a balance between the cost of resources
allocated to non-paying users and the revenue generated from premium
accounts. While some cost-reduction strategies may aim to optimize performance, other such strategies will seek to identify and purge inactive
non-paying accounts, thereby saving resources. Another strategy is to
recalibrate the balance between premium and free accounts by changing
the terms of use—narrowing the set of free features offered to non-
paying users, in the hope of incentivizing them to pay.
Under Dropbox’s terms of service, non-paying users who remain
inactive on the site for prolonged periods (i.e., exceeding 12 months) may
be subject to termination or suspension of their access to their accounts.28
Similarly, Google states in its Gmail program policies that it may take
action on accounts inactive for more than two years, including deleting email messages from the product.29 Similar provisions stating that
inactive accounts may result in the termination and deletion of data can
be found in the terms of service of Yahoo online email service,30 iCloud

26
27
28
29
30

and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and repealing Directive
95/46/EC, 2016 O.J.L 119/1, Art. 20 [GDPR]; C al. Civ. Code § 1798.100(d) [CCPA]. For an overview
of contemporary data portability legislation, see Peter Swire, The Portability and Other Required
Transfers Impact Assessment: Assessing Competition, Privacy, Cybersecurity, and Other Considerations,
G a . T ech. S cheller c. Of bus. R es. Paper series (Sept. 5, 2020), at 14–21, https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3689171.
Dropbox, Inc., A nnual R eport (Form 10-K) (Feb. 19, 2021).
Id.
Dropbox Terms of Service, Dropbox (July 6, 2021), https://www.dropbox.com/terms (last visited
Sept. 15, 2021).
Gmail Program Policies, G oogle, https://www.google.com/gmail/about/policy/ (last visited Sept.
15, 2021).
Yahoo Terms of Service, § 13, Yahoo, https://policies.yahoo.com/sg/en/yahoo/terms/utos/index.
htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
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by Apple,31 WhatsApp by Facebook,32 Microsoft OneDrive,33 and Amazon
Cloud services.34
These terms of service typically contain provisions that allow their
providers to change the terms and conditions applying for unpaid
accounts. Recently, Google revised its once-unlimited Google Photos
storage policy, declaring that as of June 1, 2021, any new photos backed
up on Google Photos will count towards the free 15 GB storage quota
generally allocated to the user’s Google account.35
Data of paying users that is stored in premium cloud accounts may
also be deleted when users exceed their allocated quota36 or when they
default on their payments. Under the iCloud terms of service, for example,
Apple may terminate its services upon a failure to pay, provided that it
has given the user a 30-day notice.37
While the above provisions allow providers of cloud-based services to
terminate users’ access to their personal data (which may be used under
the self-extension, personal archive, or social paradigms) or delete such
data, these actions are typically subject to prior notification or to a sufficiently long period of inactivity, thereby providing users with time to
back up their data, transfer it elsewhere, or cure any breach of contract.
Such backup mechanisms are usually made available by service providers pursuant to data portability rights, such as those under the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) or the California
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA).38 Data portability, as a legal term of art,
allows an individual to take his or her data from a service provider and
transfer—or “port”—it elsewhere.39 While the right to data portability
is considered a possible antitrust measure, which paves the way for the
interoperability of online platforms and services and increasing competition between them,40 it also allows users to control their own data. Users
31
32
33
34
35
36

37
38
39

40

Welcome to iCloud, A pple, https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/icloud/ (last visited
Sept. 15, 2021).
Terms of Service, Whats A pp (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.whatsapp.com/legal/updates/terms-ofservice/?lang=en (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
Microsoft Services Agreement, § 4.a.ii., M icrosoft (Jun. 15, 2021), https://www.microsoft.com/en/
servicesagreement/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
File Retention Policy, A mazon, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.
html?nodeId=202146630 (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
Updated Storage Policy for Google Photos, G oogle, https://support.google.com/photos/
answer/10100180?hl=en (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
See, e.g., How Your Google Storage Works, G oogle, https://support.google.com/googleone/
answer/9312312?hl=en (last visited Sept. 15, 2021); A mazon, supra note 34; M icrosoft, supra note
33, at § K.i.
A pple, supra note 31, § B(g).
See supra note 25.
Gennie Gebhart, Bennett Cyphers & Kurt Opsahl, What We Mean When We Say “Data Portability,”
Elec. Frontier Found. (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/09/what-we-meanwhen-we-say-data-portability (last visited Sept. 15, 2021). See also Swire, supra note 25, at 8.
See, e.g., Swire, supra note 25, at 12–13; Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunges, No Mistake About
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may autonomously exercise control41 over their data42 stored in online
platforms by porting between services, as well as by downloading it for
backup purposes. However, the temporal reach of the right to data portability appears to be, prima facie, limited to the right of the user to port
any applicable data stored at the moment of porting. This is supported
by the common understanding of data portability rights as facilitators of
competition in the market economy: the exercise of those rights should
allow users to switch, in real time, between service providers.

III

THE PRECARIOUSNESS OF THE
DISLOCATED AND THE SUPPORT OF
THE CLOUD
Barton’s two-dimensional typology of collective stress situations encompasses a wide range of disasters in which “many members of a social
system fail to receive expected conditions of life from the system.”43
Within Barton’s broad definition, disasters differ in their societal scope
and duration. Disasters of wide societal scope that are brief, such as largescale violent conflicts, massive natural disasters, or complex humanitarian emergencies in which violence exacerbates the latter,44 adversely
affect the livelihood of individuals and lead to their mass deprivation of
basic necessities and, at times, to mass displacement scenarios. Individuals seeking refuge from such calamitous events are likely to have lost
contact with family and friends, some of whom may have perished. These

41
42

43
44

It: The Important Role of Antitrust in the Era of Big Data, A ntitrust S ource, April 2015; Inge Graef,
Blurring Boundaries of Consumer Welfare: How to Create Synergies Between Competition, Consumer and
Data Protection Law in Digital Markets, in Personal Data in Competition, Consumer Protection
and Intellectual P roperty L aw: T owards a Holistic A pproach? 121–51 (Mor Bakhoum,
Beatriz Conde-G allego, M ark-Oliver M ackenrodt & Gintarė Surblytė-Namavičienė eds.
2018).
Helena U. Vrabec, Data Subject R ights under the GDPR 181–86 (2021).
As to the scope of users’ data under the right to data portability, see Paul De Hert, Vagelis
Papakonstantinou, Gianclaudio Malgieri, Laurent Beslay & Ignacio Sanchez, The Right to Data
Portability in the GDPR: Towards User-Centric Interoperability of Digital Services, 34 Comp. L. & Sec.
R ev. 193–203 (2018); Vrabec, supra note 41, at 167–68.
Allen H. Barton, Disaster and Collective Stress, in What is a Disaster? New A nswers to Old
Questions 125–52 (Ronald W. Perry & E.L. Quarantelli eds. 2005).
On the concept of complex humanitarian emergencies, see Sue Lautze & Angela Raven-Roberts,
Violence and Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Implications for Livelihoods Models, 30 Disasters
383–401 (2006); Richard J. Brennan & Robin Nandy, Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: A Major
Global Health Challenge, 13 E mergency M edicine 147–56 (2001).
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individuals may be out of money, displaced, and challenged by a variety
of health, psychological, and/or livelihood problems. Such individuals
may eventually be recognized as refugees or remain, albeit dislocated
from their homes, in their country.
During catastrophes, individuals often strive to hold on to personal
memory artifacts—personal documents and photographs.45 Such artifacts
may hold the only record of a loved one lost in the calamities.46 Personal
identities, in a post-traumatic context, may be reaffirmed through the
re-creation of personal memory. Such re-creation can be fragmented
and dependent on the availability of relevant documents in community
archives,47 or on individual ability to retain possession of tangible memory artifacts during a crisis. A richer path to fuller memory reconstruction
and the partial restoration of individual pre-catastrophe identity can be
found in their extended memories stored in the cloud.
If national archives are destroyed, academic registers, financial databases, and similar record-keeping institutions during conflicts, personal
documents that provide proof of birth, professional qualifications, academic degrees, medical history, or possession of assets cannot be replicated. At times, the only copy of such records is available in personal
digital archives. While functioning under the paradigm of personal digital archives, cloud-based storage services are invaluable to survivors of
humanitarian catastrophes. The aforementioned documents may, in time,
prove crucial to the process of rehabilitating displaced individuals trying to
re-establish themselves in a new country, or of redeeming lost property.
Furthermore, proper documentation is an important factor in the
status determination of individuals seeking international protection.48
In many cases, individuals applying for refugee status have few if any
documents to support their statement, and their status determination
depends on an assessment of applicants’ credibility.49 On the other hand,
decision-makers who assess applicants’ credibility tend to have unreasonable expectations of human memory, whose accuracy can be limited
45
46
47
48
49

Hariz Halilovich, Re-Imaging and Re-Imagining the Past after “Memoricide”: Intimate Archives as
Inscribed Memories of the Missing, 16 A rchival S ci. 77–92, 89 (2016).
Hariz Halilovich, Reclaiming Erased Lives: Archives, Records and Memories in Post-War Bosnia and the
Bosnian Diaspora, 14 A rchival S ci. 231–47, 234 (2014).
Halilovich, supra note 46, at 85.
See, e.g., Council Directive 2011/95/EU, Art. 4, 2011 O.J. (L 337/9) 9, 14.
Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in Refugee Status
Determination, 17 Geo. I mmigr. L.J. 367 (2002–2003); Cécile Rousseau, François Crépeau, Patricia
Foxen & France Houle, The Complexity of Determining Refugeehood: A Multidisciplinary Analysis of the
Decision-Making Process of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, 15 J. R efugee Stud. 43–70
(2002); Bruno Magalhães, The Politics of Credibility: Assembling Decisions on Asylum Applications in
Brazil, 10 Int’l Pol. S ociology, 133–49 (2016); John R. Campbell, Examining Procedural Unfairness
and Credibility Findings in the UK Asylum System, 39 R efugee Surv. Q. 56–75 (2020).
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for certain categories of information.50 The availability of personal documents retrieved from cloud-based storage services may tip the balance
in favor of applicants, who may be able to provide objective evidence
supporting their request.
Social data may also be of immense importance to survivors of
humanitarian disasters.51 Survivors may use their pre-catastrophe online
contacts to locate missing persons and reunite with relatives and loved
ones—a process much more targeted and potentially fast-paced than the
search bureaus established following World War II that relied on mass
media broadcasts to assist survivors in reuniting with their families.52
Furthermore, subject to the availability of internet access within the
disaster zone, social data can be of use to individuals in areas undergoing
crisis to request assistance from contacts abroad, as well as to provide
real-time eyewitness reports. Another benefit of stored social data is as
a basis to create online communities of survivors—providing a collective
space for individuals to process the trauma,53 preserve their collective
identity and heritage,54 and establish local refugee communities to assist
their members in the transition to a new host country. In these digital
communities, survivors can network and exchange practical information
that allows for a smoother relocation and socialization abroad.
Viewed either as extended memory, as a personal digital archive, or as
social data, the information retained in personal accounts of cloud-based
platforms and services can vastly improve the living conditions and personal well-being of survivors of humanitarian disasters. However, during
such disasters, personal resources are likely to be diverted into long-term
real-life self-preservation efforts in an unstable, hostile environment.
Individual online self-preservation activities, such as the maintenance of
personal online accounts and presence, are most likely to be deprioritized
and at times—in cases of the collapse of internet and electricity infrastructure—untenable. While fleeing, refugees may lack devices that allow
50
51
52
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Hilary Evans Cameron, Refugee Status Determinations and the Limits of Memory, 22 Int’l. J. R efugee
L. 469–511 (2010).
See also Linda Leung, C ath Finney L amb & Liz E mrys, T echnology’s R efuge: T he use of
technology by asylum seekers and refugees 8–12 (2009).
Compare with the relatively successful efforts of the Jewish Agency’s Search Bureau for Missing
Relatives, which achieved a success rate of 30 percent within less than a decade of operations.
Tehila Darmon Malka, Missing Persons and World War II: Between Personal and National Loss, War
in History (forthcoming 2022); Search Bureau for Missing Relatives, Central Zionist A rchives,
http://www.zionistarchives.org.il/en/AttheCZA/AdditionalArticles/Pages/ChipushKrovim.aspx
(last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
See, e.g., Victoria Bernal, Nationalist Networks: The Eritrean Diaspora Online, in T he New M edia Age:
Identity, Politics, and Community 122–35 (A ndoni A lonso & Pedro J. Oiarzabal eds. 2010).
Xabier Cid & Iolanda Ogando, Migrate Like a Galician: The Graphic Identity of the Galician Diaspora
on the Internet, in T he New M edia Age: Identity, Politics, and Community 317–36 (A ndoni
A lonso & Pedro J. Oiarzabal eds. 2010).
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internet access and may go for long periods of rarely using the internet;
moreover, such usage may be limited to information-gathering efforts
regarding their destination or planning their escape.55
This also applies to the preservation of cloud-based premium
accounts, which, as outlined in Part II above, may be terminated or deleted
by service providers pursuant to users’ default on their payments—either
due to the collapse of national financial institutions or the allocation of
personal resources for stressing and immediate survival needs.
As not only survivors of humanitarian disasters may default on their
payment in installments for premium cloud services, or undergo prolonged online inactivity, it may be argued that the termination policies
outlined in Part II above are reasonable when applied to ordinary users.
Under the various terms of service and policies, ordinary users, those who
are not suffering the consequences of humanitarian events, are typically
given sufficient time to either exercise their data portability rights and
backup their data locally or transfer their cloud data elsewhere. It may be
prudent to consider a solution for individuals undergoing personal crises
such as imprisonment or long periods of hospitalization that prevent
them from accessing their accounts. However, survivors of collective
stress situations are situated in a more precarious situation than those
unfortunate individuals, and their personal data stored in cloud-based
services—possibly a key factor in their rehabilitation—may be the only
surviving copy of documents and photographs that cannot be replicated
or recreated elsewhere.

IV

LONG-TERM RETENTION OF
CLOUD-BASED ACCOUNTS
IN HUMANITARIAN DISASTERS
Given the importance of personal digital storage to its owners—as an
extension of the self, a proprietary record-keeping mechanism, or an
55

See Martin Emmer, Marlene Kunst & Carola Richter, Information Seeking and Communication during
Forced Migration: An Empirical Analysis of Refugees’ Digital Media Use and Its Effects on Their Perceptions
of Germany as Their Target Country, 16 Global M edia and Communication 167–86 (2020). Note
that this study is limited to the internet access and usage habits of refugees who managed to
reach Germany.
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amalgam of social contacts—its preservation in times of crisis is imperative. Commercial practices of purging personal data upon the termination of payment or after a predefined period of inactivity should not be
curtailed when users are unable to sustain their online activity due to a
large-scale collective stress situation. This part will outline principles
for a proposed moratorium mechanism under which, in areas of humanitarian disaster, personal accounts of online services and their respected
data will be retained for future use.
Under the proposed moratorium mechanism, once a qualifying
humanitarian disaster is identified, cloud-based service providers will
refrain from any deletion of data or purging of personal accounts or
users that may be affected by the event. Their data will be retained for
enough time to allow survivors access to their personal accounts and
data. Accordingly, defining the geographical domain of the moratorium
could evolve as the event progresses.
A qualifying humanitarian disaster should be defined as any largescale conflict or natural or manmade disaster that is likely to subject a
substantial number of individuals to prolonged periods without online
access or, due to the collapse of national infrastructures, to render those
individuals unable to keep up payments on their premium accounts.
There is room to consider in further detail which events will constitute
qualifying humanitarian disasters; however, the definition should capture
circumstances in which many individuals are likely to lose access to their
cloud-based accounts. It may also be advisable to consider a declaration
mechanism by an independent international body. Such a body could
be under the auspices of the UN or the World Trade Organization or be
entirely independent thereof (such as an association of leading cloud
services providers). It is likely that the identity of such a body would be
determined by the obligatory force of the moratorium mechanism.
Given that most online service providers allow minimal inactivity
periods of a year before taking any action on non-paying users, a declaration of a crisis as a qualifying humanitarian disaster may be made within
a reasonable period from the start of the events, when its magnitude can
be thoroughly evaluated.
However, during conflicts, accounts of cloud-based services can be
weaponized for odious purposes, such as the coordinated online campaign against the Rohingya ethnic group of Myanmar.56 Implementing

56

See in re: Application Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 of Republic of the Gambia v. Facebook, Inc.
Case 1:20-mc-00036-JEB-ZMF, ¶ 12 (Sept. 11, 2021).
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the moratorium mechanism should not preclude the application of content moderation policies—either for hate speech or for illegal content—
by cloud-based service providers. Nevertheless, as such accounts may
contain evidence to be used later in international criminal proceedings,
cloud-based service providers should block access to such accounts while
retaining the data for potential evidentiary purposes.
There could be, however, instances in which accounts need to be
deleted or blocked in order to protect their users. Databases containing
personal data can expose the political affiliation of their data subjects
and thereby be weaponized to persecute individuals.57 Safeguards should
be put in place so that data preserved under the proposed moratorium
mechanism cannot be accessed for nefarious purposes. First, the purpose
of the moratorium is to prevent any arbitrary account deletion or blocking
by service providers. Accordingly, it does not preclude users from deleting their accounts or limiting public access to their data if they wish to
do so. If these users cannot do so (as their ability to access and control
their accounts is assumed to be limited), it may be advisable to lay out
procedures for surgically limiting public access to specific jeopardized
accounts (and in extreme cases, even temporally limiting private access
to these accounts) subject to a request by a trusted flagger.58
It should be noted, prior to defining in further detail the various
components of the moratorium mechanism proposed above, that these
elements should be rigidly designed, rather than leaving their calibration
to the discretion of service providers. It may be tempting to allow service
providers to use machine learning techniques to determine, for example,
how long it took, following a prolonged inactivity period subsequent
to a humanitarian disaster, before users regained control and access to
their accounts. However, given the diverse online behavior patterns of
users with varying cultural backgrounds and different crisis scenarios,
the ability to infer from past localized events is questionable. In normal
times, the balance between users and service providers may place some
burden on users to access their accounts or ensure that regular payments
are made. However, in the context of humanitarian disasters, that balance should be revisited in a manner that takes all the burden off the
now-displaced users.
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See, e.g., Frank Bajak, US-Built Databases a Potential Tool of Taliban Repression, AP (Associated
Press), Sept. 7, 2021.
On trusted flaggers, see European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on a Single Market For
Digital Services (Digital Services Act), Art. 19 COM (December 15, 2020), 825 final.
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Accordingly, the protected users should be broadly defined—both by
actual evidence of their proximity to the disaster event, such as IP (Internet Protocol) addresses, and by presumption of proximity when their
accounts are registered in the country in which the qualifying humanitarian disaster took place. Other indicators, such as the use of a unique
regional language, may help identify protected users. The retention period
should be uniform for all such users, with rigid temporal boundaries of
several years.
Generally, the rationale underlying the moratorium mechanism does
not preclude the possibility that users may waive their right not to forget,
as an exercise of their personal autonomy. However, there may be other
considerations that may provide support against allowing individuals to
waive this right, or at least to restrict it to an ex-ante waiver only, as
the retained data may be used for international criminal investigations
or even as a digital time capsule for future historians. Nevertheless, any
such waiver should be on an opt-out basis and designed in a neutral
manner, avoiding “dark patterns” designed to encourage users to opt out.
While the range of applicable online services may be wide, ranging
from emails and virtual storage services to social media and messaging
platforms, which cloud-based service providers will fall within the scope
of the proposed moratorium mechanism should be considered carefully.
By definition, these service providers are likely to be operating outside
of the disaster zone and therefore almost certain to be international
businesses. Any applicable platform operated by a leading multinational
provider (which can be defined by revenue, net worth, or global number
of users) should be within the scope of the moratorium mechanism.
Supplementary criteria should be in place to identify online services that
are in common use in the disaster region, which might be operated by
either local or international providers.59
Although the costs of retail data storage continue to decrease,60 and
cloud-based services rely on the freemium model, under which a small
fraction of their users pay for additional premium services,61 declaring
59
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The now-defunct Orkut SNS is an example of a social media cloud-based service that gained
local popularity exceeding that of leading international platforms (with high penetration rates in
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the Japanese GREE, the South Korean KakaoTalk, and the Russian Odnoklassniki and VKontakte.
Petros Iosifidis & M ark Wheeler, P ublic Spheres and M ediated S ocial Networks in the
Western Context and Beyond 180, 182, 236–38, 243–44, 248–49 (2016); Javier Bustamante,
Tidelike Diasporas in Brazil: From Slavery to Orkut, in Diasporas in the New M edia Age: Identity,
Politics, and Community 170–89, 175–79 (A ndoni A lonso & Pedro J. Oiarzabal eds. 2010).
See, for example, the historical hard drive prices presented by John C. McCallum, Price-Performance of Computer Technology, in T he Computer Engineering H andbook: Digital Design and
Fabrication 4-12-4-13 (Vojin G. Oklobdzija ed., 2nd ed. 2008).
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long-term data retention applicable for millions of accounts of potential
displaced users may prove costly for service providers. When a moratorium mechanism is designed in detail, it should include measures to prevent abuse by qualifying users who are not facing actual harm. However,
any limitation on users’ access to their online accounts should ensure
that they retain complete access to their data, as well as the ability to
communicate within the platform with other accounts. Furthermore, the
financial loss incurred by the moratorium will likely be mitigated by the
lower penetration rates of internet usage and social media in developing
countries.62
The general framework proposed above for a cloud-services moratorium in disaster events suggests stretching the concept of data portability
rights beyond its current temporal boundaries. Over time, users should be
given greater autonomy to decide where their personal data is stored. As
technology makes it possible to retrieve data, memories, and social contacts that are irreplaceable to dislocated persons, data portability options
should include not only transferring the data in its present form from
one service provider to the other but also porting it to a better future.

V

LEGAL BASIS OF THE RIGHT
NOT TO FORGET?
This section aims to explore the legal basis of the right not to forget and
whether the moratorium mechanism similar to the one generally outlined
in Part IV can be established thereunder.
It may be tempting to consider shoehorning the right not to forget
into existing international human rights frameworks. For example, under
the personal digital archive paradigm that conceptualizes personal data
stored in the cloud as digital property, the right not to forget can be
protected as a first-generation digital right whose offline equivalent is
well established as a human right in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,63 as well as in various regional legal instruments.64 When framed
62
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Digital 2021 Global Overview Report, We A re S ocial, https://wearesocial.com/digital-2021 (last
visited Sept. 15, 2021).
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 17 (Dec. 10, 1948).
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Art.
1, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, E.T.S. No. 009; American Convention on Human Rights,
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under the paradigm of self-extension as a second-generation digital
right, akin to the right to be forgotten or the right to informational
self-determination,65 the right not to forget can be either outlined as
a reconfiguration of the latter or independently restated in future legal
instruments. It might even be worthwhile to define this new digital right
by framing personal digital archives as the extension of the self, thereby
giving primacy to core values and fundamental rights of autonomy and
self-determination.
Conceptualization of data as private property66 is required to invoke
potential international law protections but is not sufficient. For example,
under Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, private property “must be
respected [and] cannot be confiscated.”67 However, Article 46 has been
applied to acts such as pillage or the manufacturing of weapons that
caused substantial collateral damage to private property.68 The deletion
of data in the normal course of business is hardly in the same category.
An effective moratorium mechanism is unlikely to be enforceable
under either international humanitarian law (IHL) and international
human rights law (IHRL). While IHL lays out the responsibilities of parties
to an armed conflict69 and IHRL generally lays out State obligations,70 the
duty-holding parties under the proposed moratorium are private business
entities, which are not expected to be engaging directly in a conflict and
whose behavior is barely regulated under these two frameworks. Accordingly, at present such a moratorium mechanism can be firmly established
only within a voluntary legal framework.
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPBHR) calls for private business entities to “address adverse human rights
impacts with which they are involved”71 and, in particular, to “avoid
causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their

65
66
67
68

69
70
71

Art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter) Art. 14, June 27, 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M.
58 (1982).
See, e.g., Dror-Shpoliansky & Shany, supra note 21, at 33–34.
On data as property see Blank & Jensen (ch. 3 of this collection).
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex: Regulations
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land Art. 46, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277.
Jonathan Kolieb, Don’t Forget the Geneva Conventions: Achieving Responsible Business Conduct in
Conflict-Affected Areas through Adherence to International Humanitarian Law, 26 Australian J. Hum.
Rts. 142–64 (2020).
See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, Art. 49.
See, e.g., R ené Provost, International Human R ights and Humanitarian L aw 57–75 (2004).
UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 26.8.2003) and the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John
Ruggie) [hereinafter UNGPBHR].
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own activities, and address such impacts when they occur.”72 The adverse
impact on human rights caused by the de-platforming, deletion, or suspension of cloud-based accounts can be mitigated or avoided by the moratorium mechanism outlined in Part IV above, thereby complying with the
UNGPBHR principle requiring business entities to have in place policies
and processes to meet their responsibility to respect human rights.73 The
UNGPBHR were presented as social norms that extended beyond black
letter law,74 as responsibilities rather than obligations. Accordingly, their
normative force may be a step away from soft-law voluntarism, but it
remains lacking and tilted toward the voluntary.75
In lieu of positive international law under which a mandatory moratorium mechanism could be established, as the human rights obligations
of private corporate entities are mostly voluntary, another possible venue
is regional or national legislation.76
Some regional or national data protection laws have extraterritorial
reach.77 However, their protection is typically limited by the nationality
of the data subjects, rendering the overall extraterritorial blanket of data
protection laws incomplete and leaving unprotected those regions and
individuals that are more disaster-prone. Furthermore, mapping the
right not to forget in existing second-generation digital rights yields
incomplete results. First, contemporary data portability provisions, such
as those in the GDPR, do not have a global reach. Secondly, they include
certain limitations precluding them from providing a solid legal basis
to the exercise of a right not to forget within the proposed moratorium.
For example, data portability rights under both the GDPR and the CCPA
are subject to the technical feasibility of their exercise.78 The GDPR data
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portability right is limited to data provided by the data subject under contract or consent (rather than unqualified data and secondary data relating
to the data subject),79 and the CCPA data portability right applies to the
12-month period preceding the porting request (thereby not necessarily
applying to older data stored in the cloud).80
However, the lack of positive international law obligating private
international business entities to comply, and the insufficiency of regional
or national legal instruments, does not preclude the proposed moratorium
from being developed as a voluntary framework by all stakeholders.
The increasing attention to corporate performance in environmental,
social, and governance (ESG) issues,81 and the recent adoption of corporate social responsibility rhetoric by leading global business entities,82
may facilitate the voluntary establishment of the proposed moratorium
mechanism. In an era when social media platforms exacerbate genocidal
incitement83 and cloud storage providers contemplate the deployment of
controversial surveillance techniques,84 a voluntary mechanism established by cloud-based service providers may be incentivized by potential
reputational gains.

CONCLUSION
This chapter has offered an account of an overlooked digital right—a right
not to forget—and proposed an initial outline of a mechanism supporting
it in humanitarian contexts. Questions regarding the technical nature of
the optimal data governance system for service providers’ compliance
with the moratorium in the context of the physical survival of data in
the cloud, or whether similar mechanisms should be applied in other
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scenarios of prolonged user inactivity, can and should be addressed by
policy-makers and technical experts. Since it appears that such a proposed moratorium is likely to be based on service providers’ goodwill,
it is imperative to further design an optimal framework to be compared
with its eventual voluntary application on the ground.
The right not to forget may be proven to offer additional benefits apart from securing the digital self in a manner contributing to its
owner’s struggle to survive calamity. Mass retention of personal data
archives during a humanitarian crisis may allow the preservation of historical records85 or of evidence to be used later in international criminal
proceedings once the violence has ended.86 In extreme cases of mass
atrocities and genocide, the right not to forget may transform into the
right not to be forgotten, resulting in a digital monument for cultures
and lives destroyed in the conflict—a database from which academics
and researchers could resurrect the memory of the dead.87
The reliance on external technologies to supplement and replace
human memory calls for further protection of users’ data from one-sided
deletion or purging by service providers, especially when users are unable
to respond in a timely fashion to providers’ warnings. Another potential
venue for the right not to forget is its application outside the humanitarian
context—in situations in which users are unable to access internet services
for an extended period, such as during incarceration or hospitalization.
However, the precariousness of refugees, internally displaced persons,
and survivors of humanitarian disasters emphasizes the importance of
the right not to forget. While cloud storage renders obsolete the trope of
rescuing the family photo album from a burning house, without a mechanism ensuring that its digital successor remains stored in the cloud, our
memory—and a part of ourselves—will fade away.
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See, for example, the comments to rule 142 (Respect for and protection of cultural property) in
Tallinn M anual 2.0 on the International L aw A pplicable to C yber Operations, cmt.
to rule 142, ¶ 6, at 535 (M ichael N. S chmitt ed. 2017). It may be that the sum of all online
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Recent armed conflicts in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Palestine, and Ukraine
have demonstrated the profound
risks posed to the rights to privacy
and data protection in contemporary
warfare. Technological advances in
the fields of electronic surveillance,
predictive algorithms, big data
analytics, user-generated evidence,
artificial intelligence, cloud storage,
facial recognition, and cryptography
are redefining the scope, nature,
and contours of military operations.
Against this backdrop, international
humanitarian law offers very few,
if any, lex specialis rules for the lawful
processing, analysis, dissemination,
and retention of personal information.
This book offers a first-of-its-kind
account of the current and potential
future application of digital rights in
armed conflict situations and serves
as a valuable reference piece for
practitioners and scholars alike.
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